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Objectives The present paper elucidates some cognitive mechanisms of expertise in sport that have emerged from recent studies of three topics in psychology: motor imagery; flow and “clutch” states; and the “quiet eye” phenomenon. Design A selective narrative review was conducted of research on the three preceding topics. Special consideration was given to recent studies by European researchers on these topics. Method Following a brief overview of theoretical approaches to sport expertise, the paper examines certain cognitive mechanisms of elite athletic performance that have emerged from recent studies of motor imagery; flow and “clutch” states; and the “quiet eye” phenomenon. In the final section, conclusions are drawn about theoretical progress in understanding the cognitive mechanisms of expertise in sport. Results The mechanisms underlying sport expertise reflect both task-specific and universal cognitive processes (e.g., mental representations). Conclusion Considerable progress has been made in identifying the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise in sport but additional research is required to address certain unresolved issues in this field.

Motor imagery (MI) involves consciously performing an action in our minds without engaging in overt physical movement. Although inhibition is crucial to MI, few studies have explored the nature of ...

The study of choreography in dance offers researchers an intriguing window on the relationship between expertise, imagination, and attention in the creative process of learning new movements. The present study investigated an unresolved issue in this field – namely, the effects of expertise on motor imagery (MI; or the mental rehearsal of actions without engaging in the actual movements involved) and attentional effort (as measured by pupil dilation) on dancers while they engaged in the processes of learning, performing, and imagining a dance movement. Participants were 18 female dancers (mean age = 23, SD = 5.85) comprising three experience levels (i.e., novice, intermediate and expert performers) in this field. Data comprised these participants’ MI scores as well as their pupil dilation while they learned, performed, and imagined a 15 s piece of choreography. In addition, the time taken both to perform and to imagine the choreography were recorded. Results showed no significant effect of dance expertise on MI but some differences between beginners and intermediate dancers in attentional effort (pupil dilation) at the start of the performance and the imagined movement conditions. Specifically, the beginners had the highest pupil dilation, with the experts having the second highest, while intermediates had the lowest dilation. Further analysis suggested that the novice dancers’ pupil dilation at the start of the performance may have been caused, in part, by the initial mental effort required to assess the cognitive demands of the dance task.

Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of research interest in motor imagery (MI; sometimes known as mental practice) or the mental simulation of actions without any concomitant bodily movement. While numerous experimental studies have demonstrated the efficacy of MI in improving skilled performance in fields such as music, sport and medical surgery, few to date have investigated the extent to which MI and motor execution share similar cognitive mechanisms. Therefore, to address this gap, the present studies explored the relationship between the executed and imagined movements of expert pianists. Study 1 explored the effects of movement complexity and force on the time required for nine pianists to actually perform and imagine performing a musical composition. Results revealed that although the durations of participants’ imagined performances were longer than those of executed ones, stage-duration variations during execution were mirrored in the stage-duration variations during MI. In Study 2, seven pianists’ pupil-size measurements (obtained using Tobii eye-tracking glasses) were used to explore changes in cognitive effort between executed and imagined piano performance. Results showed that pupil-size measurements during executed and imagined piano playing were similar. The significance of the findings is discussed and some potential new directions for research are identified.

Empirical evidence demonstrates that performing artists are confronted by a variety of ‘bodily crises’ (e.g., injury, attrition of habits induced by ageing) over the course of their careers (Wainwright, Williams, & Turner, 2005). Such crises may present a serious threat to the embodied subject. Unfortunately, many prominent theories of skill acquisition (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967) appear to evacuate the body from performance by suggesting that any form of conscious processing (i.e., paying conscious attention to one's action during motor skill execution) will disrupt habitual behaviour. As a result, few researchers have considered how performers might tackle bodily anomalies. In the current paper, we seek to address this issue by discussing a variety of the ‘crises’ that confront the performing body. We start by discussing a number of disciplinary practices that may contribute to these crises. Next, we argue that habitual movements must be open to ‘acts of creativity’ in order to maintain a productive relationship between the performing body and the environment. Then we consider what this ‘creative action’ might involve and discuss a number of approaches (e.g., mindfulness, somaesthetic awareness) that could maintain and improve one's movement proficiency. Here, our argument draws on Dewey's (1922) pragmatist philosophy and his belief that ‘intelligent habit’ was required to help people to improve their movement functioning. Finally, we consider the implications of our argument for current conceptualisations of ‘habitual’ movement and recommend that researchers explore the adaptive and flexible capacity of the performing body.

Objectives Motor imagery (MI) is a dynamic mental state during which the representation of a given motor movement is rehearsed in working memory without overt motor output. Mental practice (MP; also known as motor imagery practice) is the systematic application of MI for the cognitive rehearsal of a task in the absence of overt physical movements. Although MP is known to enhance skilled performance, debate still exists about the magnitude and moderators of these imagery effects. Against this background, and amid concerns about the “reproducibility crisis” in psychology, it seems timely to revisit, update and extend a key meta-analysis of MP effects published over two decades ago – namely, that of Driskell, Copper, and Moran (1994). To this end, the present paper reports a methodological replication of the Driskell et al’s (1994) meta-analysis of MP effects. Design & method Included are 37 studies on MP effects published between 1995 and 2018. Nine factors were selected to examine the extent to which they moderate the effectiveness of mental practice, providing a window into the conditions under which mental practice is most effectively implemented. Practice Type (Mental or Physical), Expertise, Duration of practice (both program and session), Task Type, and Control Type were retained as factors of interest from the original Driskell et al. (1994) meta-analysis. In order to further explore the nuance of mental practice implementation, we additionally examined the Imagery Type, the Performance Measure used, Activity Type (team versus individual activities) and the Setting of the intervention. Results Following publication bias analyses, our results confirm that overall, MP has a small but significant positive effect on performance (r = 0.131). Moderators of this beneficial effect were MP duration, type of task and type of imagery used. Conclusions We conclude that MP has an enduring positive influence on performance.

Motor imagery (MI; mental simulation of actions) shares certain mental representations and processes with executed movement (ME). This neurocognitive overlap between MI and ME may explain why the systematic use of MI improves skilled performance in numerous domains. Unfortunately, the attentional mechanisms underlying MI remain unresolved. Therefore, the present studies investigated the role of attentional effort (as measured by pupil dilation) in MI. We evaluated the effects of movement complexity and speed on expert pianists' pupil dilation as they physically executed and used MI to perform easy/complex and slow/fast music phrases. Results revealed that easy movements required similar levels of attentional effort during MI and ME. However, during complex movements performed at a fast speed, the correspondence between execution and imagery of movement was disrupted.

What exactly is “concentration”, and how is it related to the broader psychological construct of attention? what theories and metaphors best help us to understand attentional processes? why do skilled performers “lose” their concentration? what are the building blocks of effective concentration? how is attention related to situational awareness and visual-perceptual skills? The chapter presents answers for these questions using the principles and findings of cognitive psychology – a discipline that studies how the mind works in acquiring, storing and using knowledge. In psychology, the term “attention” refers to a cognitive system that facilitates the selection of some stimuli for further processing while inhibiting that of other stimuli. In sport and performance psychology, considerable research has been conducted on how experts and novices use their perceptual system to guide their attention. In psychology, “pupillometry” is the objective measurement of mental effort though task-evoked changes in the diameter of the pupil of the eye during cognitive processing.

We are constantly bombarded by information. Therefore, during every waking moment of our lives, we face decisions about which stimuli to prioritize and which ones to ignore. To complicate matters, the information that clamors for our attention includes not only events that occur in the world around us but also experiences that originate in the subjective domain of our own thoughts and feelings. The end result is that our minds can consciously attend to only a fraction of the rich kaleidoscope of information and experiences available to us from our senses, thoughts, memories, and imagination. Attentional processes such as “concentration,” or the ability to focus on the task at hand while ignoring distractions, are crucial for success in sport and other domains of skilled performance. To illustrate, Venus Williams, one of the greatest tennis players of all time, proclaimed that “for the players it is complete and pure focus. You don’t see anything or hear anything except the ball and what’s going on in your head.” For psychological scientists, concentration resembles a mental spotlight (like the head-mounted torch that miners and divers wear in dark environments) that illuminates targets located either in the external world around us or in the internal world of our subjective experiences. A major advantage of this spotlight metaphor is that it shows us that concentration is never “lost”—although it can be diverted to targets (whether in the external world or inside our heads) that are irrelevant to the task at hand. Research on attentional processes in sport and performance has been conducted in cognitive psychology (the study of how the mind works), cognitive sport psychology (the study of mental processes in athletes), and cognitive neuroscience (the study of how brain systems give rise to mental processes). From this research, advances have been made both in measuring attentional processes and in understanding their significance in sport and performance settings. For example, pupillometry, or the study of changes in pupil diameter as a function of cognitive processing, has been used as an objective index of attentional effort among skilled performers such as musicians and equestrian athletes. Next, research suggests that a heightened state of concentration (i.e., total absorption in the task at hand) is crucial to the genesis of “flow” states (i.e., rare and elusive moments when everything seems to come together for the performer) and optimal performance in athletes. More recently, studies have shown that brief mindfulness intervention programs, where people are trained to attend non-judgmentally to their own thoughts, feelings, and sensations, offer promise in the quest to enhance attentional skills in elite athletes. By contrast, anxiety has been shown to divert skilled performers’ attention to task-irrelevant information—sometimes triggering “choking” behavior or the sudden and significant deterioration of skilled performance. Finally, concentration strategies such as “trigger words” (i.e., the use of short, vivid, and positively phrased verbal reminders such as “this ball now”) are known to improve athletes’ ability to focus on a specific target or to execute skilled actions successfully.

A number of influential theories of skill acquisition posit that the performing body is an absent presence during “habitualized” action. The current article counters this claim by drawing on a wide range of empirical and phenomenological evidence to argue that the body is never forgotten during skilled movement. We draw on Colombetti’s (2011) taxonomy of the bodily self to show how skilled performers may experience either a reflective or prereflective mode of bodily awareness depending on the foci of attention adopted during online skill execution. We argue that it is the dynamic interplay of these latter forms of bodily awareness that facilitates optimal performance and allows skilled performers to confront the challenges (e.g., injury, performance slumps) that are a ubiquitous feature of competitive environments.

Classical theories of skill acquisition propose that automatization (i.e., performance requires progressively less attention as experience is acquired) is a defining characteristic of expertise in a variety of domains (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967 ). Automaticity is believed to enhance smooth and efficient skill execution by allowing performers to focus on strategic elements of performance rather than on the mechanical details that govern task implementation ( Williams & Ford, 2008 ). By contrast, conscious processing (i.e., paying conscious attention to one's action during motor execution) has been found to disrupt skilled movement and performance proficiency (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001 ). On the basis of this evidence, researchers have tended to extol the virtues of automaticity. However, few researchers have considered the wide range of empirical evidence which indicates that highly automated behaviors can, on occasion, lead to a series of errors that may prove deleterious to skilled performance. Therefore, the purpose of the current paper is to highlight the perils, rather than the virtues, of automaticity. We draw on Reason's (1990) classification scheme of everyday errors to show how an overreliance on automated procedures may lead to 3 specific performance errors (i.e., mistakes, slips, and lapses) in a variety of skill domains (e.g., sport, dance, music). We conclude by arguing that skilled performance requires the dynamic interplay of automatic processing and conscious processing in order to avoid performance errors and to meet the contextually contingent demands that characterize competitive environments in a range of skill domains.

Motor imagery has been central to adzvances in sport performance and rehabilitation. Neuroscience has provided techniques for measurement which have aided our understanding, conceptualization and theorizing. Challenges remain in the appropriate measurement of motor imagery. Motor imagery continues to provide an impetus for new findings relating to our emotional network, embodied cognition, inhibitory processes and action representation. New directions are proposed which include exploring the physical setting and conditions in which imagery occurs and investigating if short term impairments to the motor system detract from motor imagery ability and the potential application of motor imagery for recovery.

Objectives: There has been considerable inconsistency and confusion in the definition of elite/expert athletes in sport psychology research, which has implications for studies conducted in this area and for the field as a whole. This study aimed to: (i) critically evaluate the ways in which recent research in sport psychology has defined elite/expert athletes; (ii) explore the rationale for using such athletes; and (iii) evaluate the conclusions that research in this field draws about the nature of expertise. Design: Conventional systematic review principles were employed to conduct a rigorous search and synthesise findings. Methods: A comprehensive literature search of SPORTDiscus, PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES and Academic Search Complete was completed in September, 2013 which yielded 91 empirical studies published between 2010 and 2013. The primarily qualitative findings were analysed thematically. Results: Eight ways of defining elite/expert athletes were identified, ranging from Olympic champions to regional level competitors and those with as little as two years of experience in their sport. Three types of rationale were evident in these studies (i.e., 'necessity', 'exploratory' and 'superior'); while findings also indicated that some elite athletes are psychologically idiosyncratic and perhaps even dysfunctional in their behaviour. Finally, only 19 of the 91 included studies provided conclusions about the nature of expertise in sport. Conclusions: This study suggests that the definitions of elite athletes vary on a continuum of validity, and the findings are translated into a taxonomy for classifying expert samples in sport psychology research in future. Recommendations are provided for researchers in this area. Author has checked copyright

“Flow” is a highly coveted yet elusive state of mind that is characterized by complete absorption in the task at hand as well as by enhanced skilled performance. Unfortunately, because most measures of this construct have been developed in physical activity and sport settings, little is known about the applicability of flow scales to the experiences of performers in other domains such as music. To fill this gap in the research literature, the present study had two objectives. First, we investigated the psychometric adequacy of the Dispositional Flow Scale–2 (DFS-2) for a large sample ( n = 205) of musicians. In addition, we examined the experience of flow among amateur and elite music students. Results indicated that the DFS-2 is a generally reliable and factorially-sound measure of flow and that flow states are experienced quite frequently by music students. Nevertheless, the results also raise questions about the validity of certain subscales of this test (e.g., merging of action and awareness, loss of self-consciousness). The theoretical and practical significance of these findings is discussed and suggestions are provided for future research on flow.

One of the most remarkable capacities of the mind is its ability to simulate sensations, actions, and other types of experience. A mental simulation process that has attracted recent attention from cognitive neuroscientists and sport psychologists is motor imagery or the mental rehearsal of actions without engaging in the actual physical movements involved. Research on motor imagery is important in psychology because it provides an empirical window on consciousness and movement planning, rectifies a relative neglect of non-visual types of mental imagery, and has practical implications for skill learning and skilled performance in special populations (e.g., athletes, surgeons). Unfortunately, contemporary research on motor imagery is hampered by a variety of semantic, conceptual, and methodological issues that prevent cross-fertilization of ideas between cognitive neuroscience and sport psychology. In this paper, we review these issues, suggest how they can be resolved, and sketch some potentially fruitful new directions for inter-disciplinary research in motor imagery.

Researchers have suggested that skill performance deteriorates when people try to exert conscious control over automatic actions. Unfortunately, little is known about the effects of different types of conscious processing on skilled performance by expert athletes. We conducted two experiments to address this issue. Experiment 1 investigated the influence of a specific form of conscious control (making technical adjustments to a stroke) on the putting skills of expert golfers. The expert golfers maintained putting proficiency (i.e. number of putts holed) when making technical adjustments. However, this form of conscious processing altered the timing and consistency of golfers' putting strokes. Experiment 2 compared the influence of technical adjustments and conscious monitoring (paying attention to the execution of the stroke) on expert golfers' putting skills. Technical adjustments had no disruptive influence on expert golfers' putting proficiency but did reduce the consistency of their strokes. However, conscious monitoring was found to impair putting proficiency. The implications of the work for theory and future work are discussed.

Problem There has been a recent upsurge of research interest in cognitive sport psychology or the scientific study of mental processes (e.g., mental imagery) in athletes. Despite this interest, an important question has been neglected. Specifically, is research on cognitive processes in athletes influential outside sport psychology, in the “parent” field of cognitive psychology or in the newer discipline of cognitive neuroscience? Objectives The purpose of this paper is to explore the theoretical significance of research on expertise, attention and mental imagery in athletes from the perspective of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Method Following analysis of recent paradigm shifts in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, a narrative review is provided of key studies on expertise, attention and mental imagery in athletes. Results and conclusions This paper shows that cognitive sport psychology has contributed significantly to theoretical understanding of certain mental processes studied in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It also shows that neuroscientific research on motor imagery can benefit from increased collaboration with cognitive sport psychology. Overall, I conclude that the domain of sport offers cognitive researchers a rich and dynamic natural laboratory in which to study how the mind works.

A new perspective on mental control is proposed that conceptually links conscious and automatic processes through a complementary postconscious activity that is rooted in the cognitive mechanism of priming. It is argued that the alterable structure of underlying mental representations connects these processes to produce a level of intentional regulation that would normally prove beneficial but in a few rare cases could prove detrimental. This hypothetical process is reflected in our empirical knowledge of mental control and related phenomena such as prospective memory. The new perspective maintains the traditional models' structure of conscious and automatic processing but, in an effort to expand our knowledge in the field, it redefines the relationship between these two processes so that it fits into a more accountable theoretical framework.

Motor imagery, or the mental rehearsal of actions in the absence of physical movement, is an increasingly popular construct in fields such as neuroscience, cognitive psychology and sport psychology. Unfortunately, few models of motor imagery have been postulated to date. Nevertheless, based on the hypothesis of functional equivalence between imagery, perception and motor execution, Holmes and Collins in 2001 developed the PETTLEP model of motor imagery in an effort to provide evidence-based guidelines for imagery practice in sport psychology. Given recent advances in theoretical understanding of functional equivalence, however, it is important to provide a contemporary critical reflection on motor imagery research conducted using this model. The present article addresses this objective. We begin by explaining the background to the development of the PETTLEP model. Next, we evaluate key issues and findings in PETTLEP-inspired research. Finally, we offer suggestions for, and new directions in, research in this field. Author has checked copyright kpw13/5/13

This study investigated the relationship of controllability of mental imagery with canoe-slalom performance. Controllability of mental imagery was assessed by an objective test of mental rotation, the Mental Rotations Test. This test was administered to both elite ( n = 19) and intermediate ( n = 12) athletes. Predictive validity of the controllability test was supported by a significant correlation between test scores and race rank order for the elite canoeing group ( rs = 0.42, p29 = 0.98, p>.05). Researchers should attempt to evaluate vividness of imagery, controllability of imagery, and accuracy of reference to understand more fully the nature of athletes' imagery.

For over a century, psychologists have investigated the mental processes of expert performers - people who display exceptional knowledge and/or skills in specific fields of human achievement. Since the 1960s, expertise researchers have made considerable progress in understanding the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie such exceptional performance. Whereas the first modern studies of expertise were conducted in relatively formal knowledge domains such as chess, more recent investigations have explored elite performance in dynamic perceptual-motor activities such as sport. Unfortunately, although these studies have led to the identification of certain domain-free generalizations about expert-novice differences, they shed little light on an important issue: namely, experts’ metacognitive activities or their insights into, and regulation of, their own mental processes. In an effort to rectify this oversight, the present paper argues that metacognitive processes and inferences play an important if neglected role in expertise. In particular, we suggest that metacognition (including such processes as ‘meta-attention’, ‘meta-imagery’ and ‘meta-memory’, as well as social aspects of this construct) provides a window on the genesis of expert performance. Following a critique of the standard empirical approach to expertise, we explore some research on ‘metacognition’ and ‘metacognitive inference’ among experts in sport. After that, we provide a brief evaluation of the relationship between psychological skills training and metacognition and comment on the measurement of metacognitive processes. Finally, we summarize our conclusions and outline some potentially new directions for research on metacognition in action.

A key postulate of traditional theories of motor skill-learning (e.g., Fitts and Posner, 1967; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) is that expert performance is largely automatic in nature and tends to deteriorate when the performer 'reinvests' in, or attempts to exert conscious control over, proceduralized movements (Masters and Maxwell, 2008). This postulate is challenged, however, by recent empirical evidence (e.g., Nyberg, in press; Geeves et al., 2014) which shows that conscious cognitive activity plays a key role in facilitating further improvement amongst expert sports performers and musicians – people who have already achieved elite status (Toner and Moran, in press). This evidence suggests that expert performers in motor domains (e.g., sport, music) can strategically deploy conscious attention to alternate between different modes of bodily awareness (reflective and pre-reflective) during performance. Extrapolating from this phenomenon, the current paper considers how a novel theoretical approach (adapted from Sutton et al., 2011) could help researchers to elucidate some of the cognitive mechanisms mediating continuous improvement amongst expert performers. Author has checked copyright

Maps help people to navigate in new or unfamiliar environments. This is especially true of ‘You-Are-Here’ maps. However, not all maps are the same. For example, some maps represent environmental in...

In a recent paper ( Toner & Moran, 2015 ), we argued that continued improvement among elite athletes requires alternation between external and internal foci of attention. In her commentary on this paper, Wulf (2015) claims that we have misunderstood the ‘attentional focus’ effect. Our rejoinder has three objectives. Firstly , we critically evaluate Wulf's arguments and counter her false allegations and spurious reasoning. Secondly , we explain our concerns about certain aspects of attentional focusing research. Finally , we propose that in order to explore the dynamic nature of attentional focusing, we need to go beyond restrictive theoretical dichotomies (e.g., “internal” versus “external” processes) using new approaches.

Gaze patterns and verbal reports of golfers at three skill levels (professional, elite amateur and club) were recorded as they read the slope of a virtual golf green from six different positions. The results showed that the professional golfers used a more economical gaze pattern consisting of fewer fixations of longer duration than the amateur and club players. Gaze pattern was accompanied by verbal reports that were not significantly more accurate in terms of aiming accuracy, although the professionals were accurate on 76.5 % of putts compared to 57.1 % for the elite and club groups. Two read positions lead to more accurate predictions by the professional golfers only, suggesting distinctive periods of visual perceptual–cognitive attention may underly higher levels of putting skill. Theoretical implications of these results are discussed in relation to the application of visual attention theory to practise, as well as suggestions provided for further research. Author has checked copyright

peer-reviewed Mental imagery, or the ability to simulate in the mind information that is not currently perceived by the senses, has attracted considerable research interest in psychology since the early 1970's. Within the past two decades, research in this field-as in cognitive psychology more generally-has been dominated by neuroscientific methods that typically involve comparisons between imagery performance of participants from clinical populations with those who exhibit apparently normal cognitive functioning. Although this approach has been valuable in identifying key neural substrates of visual imagery, it has been less successful in understanding the possible mechanisms underlying another simulation process, namely, motor imagery or the mental rehearsal of actions without engaging in the actual movements involved. In order to address this oversight, a "strength-based" approach has been postulated which is concerned with understanding those on the high ability end of the imagery performance spectrum. Guided by the expert performance approach and principles of ecological validity, converging methods have the potential to enable imagery researchers to investigate the neural "signature" of elite performers, for example. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to explain the origin, nature, and implications of the strength-based approach to mental imagery. Following a brief explanation of the background to this latter approach, we highlight some important theoretical advances yielded by recent research on mental practice, mental travel, and meta-imagery processes in expert athletes and dancers. Next, we consider the methodological implications of using a strength-based approach to investigate imagery processes. The implications for the field of motor cognition are outlined and specific research questions, in dynamic imagery, imagery perspective, measurement, multi-sensory imagery, and metacognition that may benefit from this approach in the future are sketched briefly. Published peer-reviewed

Concentration is an attentional process that involves the ability to focus on the task at hand while ignoring distractions. Cognitive research shows that it is vital for success in any field of skilled performance. The chapter begins by identifying three different dimensions of attention—concentration (or effortful awareness), selective perception, and divided attention (or the ability to perform two or more concurrent skills equally well). In the next section, three influential metaphors of attention are reviewed—the filter approach, capacity (or resource) theory, and the spotlight metaphor. Next, the relationship between people's attentional focus (i.e., whether they “shine” their mental spotlight externally or internally) and skilled performance is investigated. Then, the issue of why skilled performers appear to “lose” their concentration so easily (because of external and internal distractions) is examined. The next section of the chapter explains five research-based building blocks of effective concentration. The sixth section explains five practical techniques that can help people to improve their concentration skills. The final section of the chapter outlines some potentially fruitful new directions for research on attentional processes in skilled performers.

Historically, cognitive researchers have largely ignored the domain of sport in their quest to understand how the mind works. This neglect is due, in part, to the limitations of the information processing paradigm that dominated cognitive psychology in its formative years. With the emergence of the embodiment approach to cognition, however, sport has become a dynamic natural laboratory in which to investigate the relationship between thinking and skilled action. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to explore some insights into the relationship between thinking and action that have emerged from recent research on exceptional performance states (e.g., ‘flow’ and ‘choking’) in athletes. The paper begins by explaining why cognitive psychologists’ traditional indifference to sport has been replaced by a more enthusiastic attitude in recent years. The next section provides some insights into the relationship between thinking and skilled action that have emerged from research on ‘flow’ (or peak performance) and ‘choking’ (or impaired performance) experiences in athletes. The third section of the paper explores some practical issues that arise when athletes seek to exert conscious control over their thoughts in competitive situations. The final part of the paper considers the implications of research on thinking in action in sport for practical attempts to improve thinking skills in domains such as business organizations and schools. Author has checked copyright AMS Only 1 keyword.

There is now compelling evidence that motor imagery (MI) and actual movement share common neural substrate. However, the question of how MI inhibits the transmission of motor commands into the efferent pathways in order to prevent any movement is largely unresolved. Similarly, little is known about the nature of the electromyographic activity that is apparent during MI. In addressing these gaps in the literature, the present paper argues that MI includes motor execution commands for muscle contractions which are blocked at some level of the motor system by inhibitory mechanisms. We first assemble data from neuroimaging studies that demonstrate that the neural networks mediating MI and motor performance are not totally overlapping, thereby highlighting potential differences between MI and actual motor execution. We then review MI data indicating the presence of subliminal muscular activity reflecting the intrinsic characteristics of the motor command as well as increased corticomotor excitability. The third section not only considers the inhibitory mechanisms involved during MI but also examines how the brain resolves the problem of issuing the motor command for action while supervising motor inhibition when people engage in voluntary movement during MI. The last part of the paper draws on imagery research in clinical contexts to suggest that some patients move while imagining an action, although they are not aware of such movements. In particular, experimental data from amputees as well as from patients with Parkinson’s disease are discussed. We also review recent studies based on comparing brain activity in tetraplegic patients with that from healthy matched controls that provide insights into inhibitory processes during MI. We conclude by arguing that based on available evidence, a multifactorial explanation of motor inhibition during MI is warranted. Author has checked copyright DG 18/10/2012

This review examines themeasurement of motor imagery (MI) processes. First, self-report measures of MI are evaluated. Next, mental chronometry measures areconsidered. Then, we explain how physiological indices of the autonomic nervous system can measure MI. Finally, we show how theseindices may be combined to produce a measure of MI quality called the Motor Imagery Index. Key Words: motor imagery, mentalimagery, psychometric measures, mental chronometry, autonomic nervous system, electrodermal and cardiac activities

People differ from each other in the manner in which they process information from the world. These individual differences are called learning styles’. The purpose of this paper is to explore how research in this field can benefit from certain findings in cognitive psychology. Following a review of some difficulties which afflict research on learning styles (e.g. inadequate construct validation of measures), attention is drawn to two relevant findings in cognitive research: the influence of prior knowledge on learning and the potential value to learners of ‘metacognitive’ awareness. Some implications of these findings for learning styles research are then discussed.

It has long been known that athletes use mental imagery extensively for a variety of different purposes. Although many of these purposes have been well documented, several gaps remain in our understanding of atheletes’ imagery experiences. First, the issue of negative or debilitative imagery among athletes has received little research attention in sports psychology. In addition, until recently, athletes’ meta-imagery processes (i.e., their beliefs about the nature and regulation of their own imagery skills) have been neglected. So, the purpose of the present study is to use qualitative methodology to explore meta-imagery processes and imagery direction (i.e., facilitative or debilitative) in elite sports performers. The sample comprised seven participants from motor-sport, rugby, fencing and golf (mean age = 24.43 years; SD = 1.99). Results showed that motivational aspects of imagery were not as relevant to our sample of elite performers as they appear to have been in previous studies using non-elite samples. In addition, the elite performers in our study showed evidence of sophisticated meta-imagery control skills – being able, for example, to restructure negative imagery so that it facilitates future performance. Finally, our elite sample’s experience of imagery direction seems to be more complex than had previously been believed. For example, some athletes reported deliberately imagining errors in order to prepare for “worstcase” scenarios in competition (hence using such imagery to facilitate their performance). Overall, we propose that existing imagery use taxonomies that need to be revised to take into account the flexibility with which elite athletes actually employ imagery.

Imagery research has accumulated in two main waves since it was first investigated over a century ago. Firstly, in a period roughly extending over a century from the 1890s to the 1990s, several hundred experiments focused on the efficacy of the “mental practice” effect. More recently, attempts to shed light on the precise tasks or functions for which athletes use visualization in actual sport situations have led to an upsurge in imagery research. Central to this second wave of research is the imagery use framework (Hall et al., 1998), which has led to over 20 studies. Unfortunately, despite making significant advances these studies have a number of limitations, including a failure to include elite participants and the fact that they have largely overlooked meta-imagery abilities of the athletes. To address these issues, semi-structured interviews were used to explore imagery experiences among elite athletes. Canoe-slalom, which had been subject to previous research on imagery (e.g., White & Hardy, 1998), was the chosen sport. Five female and seven male elite level competitors (age= 25 years; SD = 4.16) participated. Findings from the elite athlete sample were inconsistent with previous research with regard to the motivational function of images. Furthermore, the athletes demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of imagery processes including imagery of realistic behaviours rather than perfect performance. Interestingly, the frequency of debilitative imagery was surprising given previous findings but may have been a consequence of the qualitative methods employed. Finally, examination of the meta-imagery construct proved valuable and is worthy of further research.

The past decade has witnessed increased interest in the visual search behaviour of athletes. Little is known, however, about the relationship between anxiety and eye movements in sport performers or about the extent to which athletes' planned and actual visual search strategies correspond. To address these issues, we conducted two studies. In Study 1, eight expert female gymnasts were presented with three digital slides of a model performing a skill that is known to be anxiety-provoking in this sport--namely, the 'back flip' on the beam. By varying the height of the beam and the presence or absence of safety mats, the slides differed in the amount of anxiety that they elicited vicariously in the viewer. In the study, the gymnasts were asked to imagine themselves in the position of the depicted model and to describe the anxiety that they felt. As they viewed the slides, their eye movements were recorded. As predicted, anxiety was associated with an increase in the number of fixations to peripheral areas. In addition, the more 'threatening' slides elicited significantly more fixations than the less feared images. In Study 2, the plans of 15 equestrian performers (5 expert, 5 intermediate and 5 novice) were elicited as they engaged in a virtual 'walk' around a computerized show-jumping course. Contrary to expectations, the congruence between intended and actual search behaviour was not significantly greater for expert riders than for the less skilled groups. Also, the fact that the top riders allocated more fixations to slides than the less skilled performers challenged the prediction that expertise would be associated with economy of visual search. Finally, as expected, the expert riders were significantly less dependent on the overall 'course plan' than the intermediate and novice equestrian performers when inspecting the fences.

The present commentary addresses two issues arising from Memmert's (2010) paper. First, can the 'misdirection' and 'inattentional blindness' paradigms provide important insights into the relationship between 'overt' and 'covert' attentional processes? Second, what are the most fruitful directions for research that seeks to combine these attentional paradigms in ecologically valid settings? We argue that although Memmert's (2010) paper postulates several important differences between the misdirection and inattentional blindness paradigms, it may not emphasise sufficiently strongly the significant insights into attention that have been yielded by the former approach. To illustrate, we discuss the utility of the misdirection paradigm in providing an ecologically valid method to investigate the relationship between overt and covert attentional processes. Such naturalistic methods are required to ensure optimal integration of the misdirection and inattentional blindness paradigms within a general theory of attention.

This study tested the hypothesis that field independence was significantly correlated with proficiency in fault diagnosis for a national sample of Irish apprentice electricians. This hypothesis was corroborated (with r values ranging between 0.33 and 0.69). Results suggest that embedded figures and troubleshooting tasks share a common demand for cognitive restructuring.

The Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) is a ‘test of a person's capacity at the time of the test to apprehend meaningless figures presented for his observation, see the relations between them, conceive the nature of the figure completing each system of relations presented and, by so doing, develop a systematic method of reasoning’ (Raven et al., 1983, p. 2). It was developed in Britain in the mid-1930s (see Penrose and Raven, 1936) as a non-verbal measure of Spearman's ‘g’ factor, eduction of relations among abstract items.

The past three decades have witnessed a remarkable growth of research interest in the mind. This trend has been acclaimed as the ‘cognitive revolution’ in psychology. At the heart of this revolution lies the claim that the mind is a computational system. The purpose of this paper is both to elucidate this claim and to evaluate its implications for cognitive psychology. The nature and scope of cognitive psychology and cognitive science are outlined, the principal assumptions underlying the information processing approach to cognition are summarised and the nature of artificial intelligence and its relationship to cognitive science are explored. The ‘computational metaphor’ of mind is examined and both the theoretical and methodological issues which it raises for cognitive psychology are considered. Finally, the nature and significance of ‘connectionism’— the latest paradigm in cognitive science—are briefly reviewed. 17/12/2013. SB.