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The study of navigation is informed by ethological data from many species, laboratory investigation at behavioural and neurobiological levels, and computational modelling. However, the data are often species-specific, making it challenging to develop general models of how biology supports behaviour. Wiener et al. outlined a framework for organizing the results across taxa, called the 'navigation toolbox' (Wiener et al. In Animal thinking: contemporary issues in comparative cognition (eds R Menzel, J Fischer), pp. 51–76). This framework proposes that spatial cognition is a hierarchical process in which sensory inputs at the lowest level are successively combined into ever-more complex representations, culminating in a metric or quasi-metric internal model of the world (cognitive map). Some animals, notably humans, also use symbolic representations to produce an external representation, such as a verbal description, signpost or map that allows communication of spatial information or instructions between individuals. Recently, new discoveries have extended our understanding of how spatial representations are constructed, highlighting that the hierarchical relationships are bidirectional, with higher levels feeding back to influence lower levels. In the light of these new developments, we revisit the navigation toolbox, elaborate it and incorporate new findings. The toolbox provides a common framework within which the results from different taxa can be described and compared, yielding a more detailed, mechanistic and generalized understanding of navigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As babies rapidly acquire motor skills that give them increasingly independent and wide-ranging access to the environment over the first two years of human life, they decrease their reliance on habit systems for spatial localization, switching to their emerging inertial navigation system and to allocentric frameworks. Initial place learning is evident towards the end of the period. From 3 to 10 years, children calibrate their ability to encode various sources of spatial information (inertial information, geometric cues, beacons, proximal landmarks and distal landmarks) and begin to combine cues, both within and across systems. Geometric cues are important, but do not constitute an innate and encapsulated module. In addition, from 3 to 10 years, children build the capacity to think about frames of reference different from their current one (i.e. to perform perspective taking). By around 12 years, we see adult-level performance and adult patterns of individual differences on cognitive mapping tasks requiring the integration of vista views of space into environmental space. These lines of development are continuous rather than stage-like. Spatial development builds on important beginnings in the neural systems of newborns, but changes in experience-expectant ways with motor development, action in the world and success-failure feedback. Human systems for integrating and manipulating spatial information also benefit from symbolic capacities and technological inventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposal that humans can develop cognitive maps of their environment has a long and controversial history. We suggest an individual-differences approach to this question instead of a normative one. Specifically, there is evidence that some people derive flexible maplike representations from information acquired during navigation, whereas others store much less accurate information. Our research uses a virtual-reality paradigm in which two routes are learned and must be related to each other. It defines three groups: integrators, nonintegrators, and imprecise navigators. These groups show distinctive patterns of spatial skills and working memory, as well as personality. We contrast our approach with research challenging the cognitive-map hypothesis and offer directions for rapprochement between the two views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the existence of cognitive maps and on the cognitive processes that support effective navigation has often focused on functioning across individuals. However, there are pronounced individual differences in navigation proficiency, which need to be explained and which can illuminate our understanding of cognitive maps and effective navigation. Using a virtual environment involving 2 routes (Virtual Silcton, a desktop virtual environment; Weisberg, Schinazi, Newcombe, Shipley, & Epstein, 2014), we divided people into 3 groups based on their within-route and between-route pointing accuracy: integrators, non-integrators, and imprecise navigators. In Study 1, we found that imprecise navigators have lower spatial and verbal working memory, which may limit their ability to build accurate within-route representations. We also found that integrators maintain excellent memories of buildings as categorized by route membership, possibly supporting the idea of hierarchical representations of the environment. In Study 2, we assessed preferences regarding place and route learning using a virtual version of the rodent T-maze (Marchette, Bakker, & Shelton, 2011). Integrators found more goals overall, and although they did not have an overall preference for a place-based strategy, integrators who did choose a place-based strategy found more goals. The opposite was true for imprecise navigators. In Study 3, we added a monetary incentive for accuracy to evaluate whether increased motivation leads to fewer participants classified as imprecise, but found no significant change in the distribution of performance. These data have theoretical implications for the cognitive map hypothesis, and practical implications for improving navigational functioning. A one-size-fits-all approach may fit none. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans and animals use mental representations of the spatial structure of the world to navigate. The classical view is that these representations take the form of Euclidean cognitive maps, but alternative theories suggest that they are cognitive graphs consisting of locations connected by paths. We review evidence suggesting that both map-like and graph-like representations exist in the mind/brain that rely on partially overlapping neural systems. Maps and graphs can operate simultaneously or separately, and they may be applied to both spatial and nonspatial knowledge. By providing structural frameworks for complex information, cognitive maps and cognitive graphs may provide fundamental organizing schemata that allow us to navigate in physical, social, and conceptual spaces. Spatial navigation has been suggested to rely either on Euclidean cognitive maps or on graph-like representations of routes between locations. Instead of being competing hypotheses, cognitive maps and cognitive graphs may coexist in the same individuals, with their availability and use depending on environmental characteristics and navigational demands. Cognitive maps and cognitive graphs are instantiated by partially distinct but partially overlapping neural systems in the hippocampal formation, frontal lobes, and scene-selective cortical regions. Both representational systems can likely support abstract thought; Euclidean maps are suited for representing content varying along continuous dimensions, whereas cognitive graphs are suited for representing state transitions and discrete associations between items. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Individual differences in navigation stabilize at around 12 years of age. • Within-route judgements of direction stabilize before between-route judgements. • Before age 12, within-route judgements predict change in between-route judgments. • Perspective-taking and mental rotation do not predict children's navigation overtime. • Parent's small-scale spatial skills are not associated with children's navigation. Cross-sectional studies have suggested that the ability to form cognitive maps increases throughout childhood and reaches adult levels during early adolescence. However, adults show large individual differences in their ability to relate local routes to form a global map. Children also vary, but when does variation stabilize? We asked participants from a previously published cross-sectional study [ Journal of Experimental Child Psychology (2018), Vol. 170, pp. 86–106] to return for a second session of testing 3 years later to examine whether longitudinal stability is more evident at older ages. The subsample of 50 of the original 105 participants available for retesting did not differ from the original sample on male–female ratio or Session 1 task performance. We reassessed performance on the Virtual Silcton navigation paradigm, the Spatial Orientation Test (SOT), and the Mental Rotation Test (MRT) and added parents' scores on the SOT and MRT at Timepoint 2. Our initial analyses of normative development aligned with prior cross-sectional findings; overall navigation performance reached adult levels of proficiency around 12 years of age. In addition, variation in route integration abilities, as measured by between-route pointing, stabilized around 12 years of age; that is, longitudinal stability was higher in the older cohort than in the younger cohort. The same pattern appeared for the MRT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are marked individual differences in the formation of cognitive maps both in the real world and in virtual environments (VE; e.g., Blajenkova, Motes, & Kozhevnikov, 2005; Chai & Jacobs, 2010; Ishikawa & Montello, 2006; Wen, Ishikawa, & Sato, 2011). These differences, however, are poorly understood and can be difficult to assess except by self-report methods. VEs offer an opportunity to collect objective data in environments that can be controlled and standardized. In this study, we designed a VE consisting of buildings arrayed along 2 separated routes, allowing for differentiation of between-route and within-route representation. Performance on a pointing task and a model-building task correlated with self-reported navigation ability. However, for participants with lower levels of between-route pointing, the Santa Barbara Sense of Direction scale (Hegarty, Richardson, Montello, Lovelace, & Subbiah, 2002) did not predict individual differences in accuracy when pointing to buildings within the same route. Thus, we confirm the existence of individual differences in the ability to construct a cognitive map of an environment, identify both the strengths and the potential weaknesses of self-report measures, and isolate a dimension that may help to characterize individual differences more completely. The VE designed for diis study provides an objective behavioral measure of navigation ability that can be widely used as a research tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spontaneous, volitional spatial exploration is crucial for building up a cognitive map of the environment. However, decades of research have primarily measured the fidelity of cognitive maps after discrete, controlled learning episodes. We know little about how cognitive maps are formed during naturalistic free exploration. Here, we investigated whether exploration trajectories predicted cognitive map accuracy, and how these patterns were shaped by environmental structure. In two experiments, participants freely explored a previously unfamiliar virtual environment. We related their exploration trajectories to a measure of how long they spent in areas with high global environmental connectivity (integration, as assessed by space syntax). In both experiments, we found that participants who spent more time on paths that offered opportunities for integration formed more accurate cognitive maps. Interestingly, we found no support for our pre-registered hypothesis that self-reported trait differences in navigation ability would mediate this relationship. Our findings suggest that exploration patterns predict cognitive map accuracy, even for people who self-report low ability, and highlight the importance of considering both environmental structure and individual variability in formal theory- and model-building. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]