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Developmental scientists have examined the independent effects of peer presence, social cues, and rewards on adolescent decision-making and cognitive control. Yet, these contextual factors often co-occur in real world social situations. The current study examined the combined effects of all three factors on cognitive control, and its underlying neural circuitry, using a task to better capture adolescents' real world social interactions. A sample of 176 participants ages 13-25, was scanned while performing an adapted go/no-go task alone or in the presence of a virtual peer. The task included brief positive social cues and sustained periods of positive arousal. Adolescents showed diminished cognitive control to positive social cues when anticipating a reward in the presence of peers relative to when alone, a pattern not observed in older participants. This behavioral pattern was paralleled by enhanced orbitofrontal activation. The results demonstrate the synergistic impact of social and reward influences on cognitive control in adolescents.

An individual is typically considered an adult at age 18, although the age of adulthood varies for different legal and social policies. A key question is how cognitive capacities relevant to these policies change with development. The current study used an emotional go/no-go paradigm and functional neuroimaging to assess cognitive control under sustained states of negative and positive arousal in a community sample of one hundred ten 13- to 25-year-olds from New York City and Los Angeles. The results showed diminished cognitive performance under brief and prolonged negative emotional arousal in 18- to 21-year-olds relative to adults over 21. This reduction in performance was paralleled by decreased activity in fronto-parietal circuitry, implicated in cognitive control, and increased sustained activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, involved in emotional processes. The findings suggest a developmental shift in cognitive capacity in emotional situations that coincides with dynamic changes in prefrontal circuitry. These findings may inform age-related social policies.

While much research on adolescent risk behaviour has focused on the development of prefrontal self-regulatory mechanisms, prior studies have elicited mixed evidence of a relationship between individual differences in the capacity for self-regulation and individual differences in risk taking. To explain these inconsistent findings, it has been suggested that the capacity for self-regulation may be, for most adolescents, adequately mature to produce adaptive behaviour in non-affective, “cold” circumstances, but that adolescents have a more difficult time exerting control in affective, “hot” contexts. To further explore this claim, the present study examined individual differences in self-control in the face of affective and non-affective response conflict, and examined whether differences in the functioning of cognitive control processes under these different conditions was related to risk taking. Participants completed a cognitive Stroop task, an emotional Stroop task, and a risky driving task known as the Stoplight game. Regression analyses showed that performance on the emotional Stroop task predicted laboratory risk-taking in the driving task, whereas performance on the cognitive Stroop task did not exhibit the same trend. This pattern of results is consistent with theories of adolescent risk-taking that emphasise the impacts of affective contextual influences on the ability to enact effective cognitive control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many brain-imaging studies are designed with the goal of isolating brain regions responsible for a specific mental function. The results, which reveal islands of activity scattered about the brain, can give the impression that the brain is just a disorganized collection of specialized processing centers. However, examination of how brain activity changes as a new skill is learned reveals a structured learning architecture composed of three hierarchically organized systems, each with a distinct role in learning and each characterized by a distinct pattern of learning-dependent plasticity. These systems are a representation system, which supports associative learning; a cognitive control network, which allocates attention during the execution of newly learned behaviors; and a metacognitive system, which guides the establishment of new behavioral routines, monitors the quality of ongoing behaviors, and oversees the transitions from one behavior to another. The combined involvement of these systems allows humans to learn rapidly and to flexibly transfer existing knowledge to novel contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: Functional magnetic resonance imaging and a meta-analysis of prior neuroimaging studies were used to characterize cortical changes resulting from extensive practice and to evaluate a dual-processing account of the neural mechanisms underlying human learning. Three core predictions of the dual processing theory are evaluated: 1) that practice elicits generalized reductions in regional activity by reducing the load on the cognitive control mechanisms that scaffold early learning; 2) that these control mechanisms are domain-general; and 3) that no separate processing pathway emerges as skill develops. To evaluate these predictions, a meta-analysis of prior neuroimaging studies and a within-subjects fMRI experiment contrasting unpracticed to practiced performance in a paired-associate task were conducted. The principal effect of practice was found to be a reduction in the extent and magnitude of activity in a cortical network spanning bilateral dorsal prefrontal, left ventral prefrontal, medial frontal (anterior cingulate), left insular, bilateral parietal, and occipito-temporal (fusiform) areas. These activity reductions are shown to occur in common regions across prior neuroimaging studies and for both verbal and nonverbal paired-associate learning in the present fMRI experiment. The implicated network of brain regions is interpreted as a domain-general system engaged specifically to support novice, but not practiced, performance. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper provides an overview of developments in a dual processing theory of automatic and controlled processing that began with the empirical and theoretical work described by Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) over a quarter century ago. A review of relevant empirical findings suggests that there is a set of core behavioral phenomena reflecting differences between controlled and automatic processing that must be addressed by a successful theory. These phenomena relate to: consistency in training, serial versus parallel processing, level of effort, robustness to stressors, degree of control, effects on long-term memory, and priority encoding. We detail a computational model of controlled processing, CAP2, that accounts for these phenomena as emergent properties of an underlying hybrid computational architecture. The model employs a large network of distributed data modules that can categorize, buffer, associate, and prioritize information. Each module is a connectionist network with input and output layers, and each module communicates with a central Control System by outputting priority and activity report signals, and by receiving control signals. The Control System is composed of five processors including a Goal Processor, an Attention Controller, an Activity Monitor, an Episodic Store, and a Gating & Report Relay. The transition from controlled to automatic processing occurs in this model as the data modules become capable of transmitting their output without mediation by the Control System. We describe recent progress in mapping the components of this model onto specific neuroanatomical substrates, briefly discuss the potential for applying functional neuroimaging techniques to test the model’s predictions, and its relation to other models. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]