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The computational theory of cognition, or computationalism, holds that cognition is a form of computation. Two issues related to this view are comprised by the goal of this paper: A) Computing systems are traditionally seen as representational systems, but functional and enactive approaches support non-representational theories; B) Recently, a sociocultural theory against computationalism was proposed with the aim of ontologically reducing computing to cognition. We defend, however, that cognition and computation are in action, thus cognition is just a form of computing and that cognition is the explanatory basis for computation. We state that: 1. Representational theories of computing recurring to intentional content run into metaphysical problems. 2. Functional non-representational theories do not incur this metaphysical problem when describing computing in terms of the abstract machine. 3. Functional theories are consistent with enactive in describing computing machines not in a strictly functional way, but especially in terms of their organization. 4. Enactive cognition is consistent with the computationalism in describing Turing machines as functionally and organizationally closed systems. 5. The cognitive explanatory basis for computing improves the computational theory of cognition. When developed in the human linguistic domain, computer science is seen as a product of human socionatural normative practices, however, cognition is just an explanatory, not ontological, basis for computing. The paper concludes by supporting that computation is in action, that cognition is just one form of computing in the world and the explanatory basis for computation.

Relational reasoning, or the ability to identify meaningful patterns within streams of information, has emerged as an important factor in a variety of complex tasks. One factor that has received relatively little research attention, however, is how relational reasoning may be influenced by the representational systems (i.e., verbal or nonverbal) that hold the information about which one is reasoning. Most studies have also focused only on analogical reasoning at the expense of anomaly, antinomy, antithesis, 3 additional forms of relational reasoning. All participants in the current study, 762 undergraduate students, completed shortened versions of the Test of Relational Reasoning (TORR; Alexander, 2012) and verbal Test of Relational Reasoning (vTORR; Alexander, 2015). These 2 tests both measure each of the 4 forms of relational reasoning, but the TORR uses a nonverbal representation system and the vTORR uses a verbal system. Patterns of performance within and between these relational reasoning tests, as well as measures of linguistic and spatial ability, test the hypothesis that representational system adds explanatory value for understanding relational reasoning. Results show that the 4 form framework of relational reasoning is present in the 2 measures, both separately and combined, but representational system exerts a more powerful effect than expected. Use of the shortened measures is also supported through evidence of score reliability and validity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)

We revived Jung’s Archetypes to characterize what we see as an emerging confluence of evolutionary, embodied, and ecological responses to traditional cognitive models of mental representation. We p...

Working memory capacity and executive functions play important roles in the early development of drawing and language, but we lack models that specify the relationships among these representational systems and cognitive functions in toddlers. To respond to this need, the present study investigated the relations between drawing and language in very young children, and the role of working memory capacity, inhibition, and shifting in the association between these two representational systems. The participants were 80 children, 25–37 months old. The results revealed that in toddlers (a) all the measures of working memory, inhibition, and shifting loaded on a single factor of general executive functioning; (b) language and drawing are two distinct, but substantially correlated, representational systems; and (c) the development of executive function has a strong impact on language development, which in turn influences the development of drawing.

We present a framework for assessing the relative cognitive cost of different representational systems for problem solving. The framework consists of 13 cognitive properties. These properties are mapped according to two dimensions: (1) the time scale of the cognitive process, and (2) the granularity of the representational system. The work includes analyses of those processes that are relevant to the internal mental world, and those that are relevant to the external physical display too. The motivation for the construction of this framework is to support the engineering of an automated system that (a) selects representations, (b) that are suited for individual users, (c) and works on specific classes of problems. We present a prototype implementation of such an automated representation selection system, along with an evaluation.

Choosing how to represent knowledge effectively is a long-standing open problem. Cognitive science has shed light on the taxonomisation of representational systems from the perspective of cognitive processes, but a similar analysis is absent from the perspective of problem solving, where the representations are employed. In this paper we review how representation choices are made for solving problems in the context of theorem proving from three perspectives: cognition, heterogeneity, and computational demands. We contrast the different factors that are most important for each perspective in the context of problem solving to produce a list of considerations for developers of problem solving tools regarding representations that are appropriate for particular users and effective for specific problem domains.

According to the grounded perspective, cognition emerges from the interaction of classic cognitive processes with the modalities, the body, and the environment. Rather than being an autonomous impenetrable module, cognition incorporates these other domains intrinsically into its operation. The Situated Action Cycle offers one way of understanding how the modalities, the body, and the environment become integrated to ground cognition. Seven challenges and opportunities are raised for this perspective: (1) How does cognition emerge from the Situated Action Cycle and in turn support it? (2) How can we move beyond simply equating embodiment with action, additionally establishing how embodiment arises in the autonomic, neuroendocrine, immune, cardiovascular, respiratory, digestive, and integumentary systems? (3) How can we better understand the mechanisms underlying multimodal simulation, its functions across the Situated Action Cycle, and its integration with other representational systems? (4) How can we develop and assess theoretical accounts of symbolic processing from the grounded perspective (perhaps using the construct of simulators)? (5) How can we move beyond the simplistic distinction between concrete and abstract concepts, instead addressing how concepts about the external and internal worlds pattern to support the Situated Action Cycle? (6) How do individual differences emerge from different populations of situational memories as the Situated Action Cycle manifests itself differently across individuals? (7) How can constructs from grounded cognition provide insight into the replication and generalization crises, perhaps from a quantum perspective on mechanisms (as exemplified by simulators).

Studies conducted over the past 40 years on emergent literacy have shown that children well before starting formal instruction develop ideas, beliefs and conceptualizations that direct the functioning of writing and other systems of graphic representations like drawings. Researchers have argued that early distinction among representational systems are based on domain specific constraints operating within every knowledge domain. According to this precocious distinction between different notational systems, children perform different actions in case they are asked to write or draw. However, drawing and writing are closely developmentally intertwined, as both perform communicative functions, require cognitive and psychomotor skills and the use of graphic implements. In this sense, overcoming a perspective, even a pedagogical one, that favors writing rather than drawing in the first years of schooling allows to expand the notion of literacy, to remind the importance of building new knowledges (conventionalities in print) starting from the known (mastery of graphical units), and finally to widen text construction combining visual and linguistic literacy.

People can identify the number of objects in sets of four or fewer items with near-perfect accuracy but exhibit linearly increasing error for larger sets. Some researchers have taken this discontinuity as evidence of two distinct representational systems. Here, we present a mathematical derivation showing that this behaviour is an optimal representation of cardinalities under a limited informational capacity, indicating that this behaviour can emerge from a single system. Our derivation predicts how the amount of information accessible to viewers should influence the perception of quantity for both large and small sets. In a series of four preregistered experiments (N = 100 each), we varied the amount of information accessible to participants in number estimation. We find tight alignment between the model and human performance for both small and large quantities, implicating efficient representation as the common origin behind key phenomena of human and animal numerical cognition. Cheyette and Piantadosi present a model of numerosity perception and find that core properties of number processing can be derived as optimal information processing with memory limits.

A variety of practices and specialised representational systems are required to understand, communicate and construct molecular genetics knowledge. This study describes teachers’ use of multimodal representations of molecular genetics concepts and how their strategies and choice of resources were interpreted, understood and used by students to demonstrate their conceptual understanding. Recordings of teachers’ and students’ discourse around representations, teacher interviews and student pre- and post-tests were used as data sources. Vignettes of students’ dialogue with teachers around the form and function of representations and teacher interview responses highlight higher order conceptual understanding. Coding for cognitive domains within lesson phases where different modes of representation were utilised showed classrooms operated at higher domains compared to lessons where modalities were absent. This study shows how pedagogy that focuses on representational form and function as well as students’ engagement in critical discussion around affordances and constraints of representations results in a higher cognitive engagement with molecular genetics knowledge.

Item does not contain fulltext The notion that processing spoken (object) words involves activation of category-specific representations in visual cortex is a key prediction of modality-specific theories of representation that contrasts with theories assuming dedicated conceptual representational systems abstracted away from sensorimotor systems. In the present study, we investigated whether participants can detect otherwise invisible pictures of objects when they are presented with the corresponding spoken word shortly before the picture appears. Our results showed facilitated detection for congruent ("bottle" → picture of a bottle) versus incongruent ("bottle" → picture of a banana) trials. A second experiment investigated the time-course of the effect by manipulating the timing of picture presentation relative to word onset and revealed that it arises as soon as 200–400 ms after word onset and decays at 600 ms after word onset. Together, these data strongly suggest that spoken words can rapidly activate low-level category-specific visual representations that affect the mere detection of a stimulus, that is, what we see. More generally, our findings fit best with the notion that spoken words activate modality-specific visual representations that are low level enough to provide information related to a given token and at the same time abstract enough to be relevant not only for previously seen tokens but also for generalizing to novel exemplars one has never seen before 10 p.

In this brief review, we argue that attention operates along a hierarchy from peripheral through central mechanisms. We further argue that these mechanisms are distinguished not just by their functional roles in cognition, but also by a distinction between serial mechanisms (associated with central attention) and parallel mechanisms (associated with midlevel and peripheral attention). In particular, we suggest that peripheral attentional deployments in distinct representational systems may be maintained simultaneously with little or no interference, but that the serial nature of central attention means that even tasks that largely rely on distinct representational systems will come into conflict when central attention is demanded. We go on to review both the behavioral and neural evidence for this prediction. We conclude that even though the existing evidence mostly favors our account of serial central and parallel noncentral attention, we know of no experiment that has conclusively borne out these claims. As such, this article offers a framework of attentional mechanisms that will aid in guiding future research on this topic.

En este estudio desarrollamos un cuestionario sobre el saber del profesor de primaria en su conocimiento disciplinario de estadística y en su conocimiento para llevar a cabo la enseñanza de la estadística, centrado en el conocimiento del profesor en relación al saber estadístico del alumno y la enseñanza del contenido estadístico. Se incluyeron tres elementos de la educación estadística: comprensión gráfica, diferenciación de niveles cognitivos y comprensión generada al cambiar de sistemas de representación. La construcción de los ítems del cuestionario integró dichos elementos con los conocimientos sobre los errores y dificultades comunes de los alumnos en el aprendizaje de la Estadística y de la Probabilidad. El cuestionario considera un total de catorce ítems y fue aplicado a 85 profesores de educación primaria y a sus respectivos alumnos (de grados 4 y 7), pertenecientes a escuelas chilenas. El cuestionario posee validez de contenido otorgada por ocho expertos. Se presenta el cuestionario completo, y a partir de dos ítems se muestran los resultados de los profesores y de sus alumnos. Se propone al formador de profesores promover actividades de generación de ítems, para que los futuros profesores reflexionen sobre la enseñanza del contenido estadístico y construyan un conocimiento respecto al saber estadístico del alumno. In this study, we developed a questionnaire on the knowledge of Statistics among primary school teachers and their knowledge of how to teach statistics. This questionnaire focused on teacher awareness of student statistical knowledge and the teaching of statistical content. Three items related to statistical education were included: graph comprehension, differentiation between cognitive levels, and the understanding that arises from changing representational systems. When constructing questionnaire items, these features were included along with information on typical mistakes and difficulties experienced by students learning statistics and probability. The questionnaire comprised a total of 14 items and was administered to 85 primary school teachers and their respective students (n = 994) in Chilean schools. The content validity of the questionnaire was confirmed by 8 experts. The entire questionnaire is not included, and teacher and student performance are given for 2 of its items. Teacher trainers are advised to promote item-generation activities for future teachers to reflect on the teaching of statistical content and to build their awareness of student statistical knowledge.

© 2014 Taylor & Francis. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms. —David Hume, A treatise of human nature, Book 1, section VII Map-like representations are frequently invoked as an alternative type of representational vehicle to a language of thought. This view presupposes that map-systems and languages form legitimate natural kinds of cognitive representational systems. I argue that they do not, because the collections of features that might be taken as characteristic of maps or languages do not themselves provide scientifically useful information above and beyond what the individual features provide. To bring this out, I sketch several allegedly distinctive features of maps, and show how they can easily be grafted onto a simple logical language, resulting in a hybrid “manguage.” The ease with which these linguistic and map-like properties can be integrated into a single representational system raises the question of what work broader categories like language and map are doing. I maintain that, as an empirical matter of fact, they serve no particular purpose in cognitive science, and thus do not characterize distinct kinds of cognitive architectures.

The relation between the approximate number system (ANS) and symbolic number processing skills remains unclear. Some theories assume that children acquire the numerical meaning of symbols by mapping them onto the preexisting ANS. Others suggest that in addition to the ANS, children also develop a separate, exact representational system for symbolic number processing. In the current study, we contribute to this debate by investigating whether the nonsymbolic number processing of kindergarteners is predictive for symbolic number processing. Results revealed no association between the accuracy of the kindergarteners on a nonsymbolic number comparison task and their performance on the symbolic comparison task six months later, suggesting that there are two distinct representational systems for the ANS and numerical symbols.

Embedded and embodied approaches to cognition urge that (1) complicated internal representations may be avoided by letting features of the environment drive behavior, and (2) environmental structures can play an enabling role in cognition, allowing prior cognitive processes to solve novel tasks. Such approaches are thus in a natural position to oppose the `thesis of linguistic structuring': The claim that the ability to use language results in a wholesale recapitulation of linguistic structure in onboard mental representation. Prominent examples of researchers adopting this critical stance include Andy Clark, Michael Wheeler, and Mark Rowlands. But is such opposition warranted? Since each of these authors advocate accounts of mental representation that are broadly connectionist, I survey research on formal language computation in artificial neural networks, and argue that results indicate a strong form of the linguistic structuring thesis is true: Internal representational systems recapitulate significant linguistic structure, even on a connectionist account of mental representation. I conclude by sketching how my conclusion can nonetheless be viewed as consistent with and complimentary to an embedded/embodied account of the role of linguistic structure in cognition.

Recent research exploring phenomena such as change blindness, inattentional blindness, attentional blink and repetition blindness has revealed a number of counterintuitive ways in which apparently salient visual stimuli often go unnoticed. In fact, large majorities of subjects sometimes predict that they would detect visual changes that actually are rarely noticed, suggesting that people have strong beliefs about visual experience that are demonstrably incorrect. However, for other kinds of visual metacognition, such as picture memory, people underpredict performance. This paper describes two experiments demonstrating that both these overpredictions of change detection, and underpredictions of visual memory can be linked with intuitions about the visual experience of different kinds of agents. Subjects predicted more visual change detection and poorer visual memory for mechanical representational systems (e.g. computer programs) when these were anthropomorphized using intentional terminology.

SUMMARY Although theories of mental simulations have used different formulations of the premises of ‘thought experiments’, they can be fitted under a minimalist hypothesis stating that mental simulations are run under situations of uncertainty to turn that uncertainty into approximate answers. Three basic assumptions of mental simulations were tested by using naturalistic data from engineering design. Results from the design protocols showed (1) initial representations in mental simulations was higher than base-rate uncertainty, (2) uncertainty in mental simulations were lowered after simulation runs, (3) resulting representations had more approximations than base-rate or initial representations. Further, the reference to external representational systems (sketches and prototypes) was examined. It was found that prototypes had fewer technical/functional simulations compared to sketches or unsupported cognition. Although prototypes were associated with more approximation than unsupported cognition, the different external representation categories did not differ in information uncertainty. The results support the minimalist hypothesis of mental simulations. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Human mathematical competence emerges from two representational systems. Competence in some domains of mathematics, such as calculus, relies on symbolic representations that are unique to humans who have undergone explicit teaching. More basic numerical intuitions are supported by an evolutionarily ancient approximate number system that is shared by adults, infants and non-human animals-these groups can all represent the approximate number of items in visual or auditory arrays without verbally counting, and use this capacity to guide everyday behaviour such as foraging. Despite the widespread nature of the approximate number system both across species and across development, it is not known whether some individuals have a more precise non-verbal 'number sense' than others. Furthermore, the extent to which this system interfaces with the formal, symbolic maths abilities that humans acquire by explicit instruction remains unknown. Here we show that there are large individual differences in the non-verbal approximation abilities of 14-year-old children, and that these individual differences in the present correlate with children's past scores on standardized maths achievement tests, extending all the way back to kindergarten. Moreover, this correlation remains significant when controlling for individual differences in other cognitive and performance factors. Our results show that individual differences in achievement in school mathematics are related to individual differences in the acuity of an evolutionarily ancient, unlearned approximate number sense. Further research will determine whether early differences in number sense acuity affect later maths learning, whether maths education enhances number sense acuity, and the extent to which tertiary factors can affect both.

The event specificity of autobiographical memories refers to the degree to which retold memories include specific details about a unique personal experience from a variety of representational systems supported by different brain areas. This article proposes 2 text measures as indicators of event specificity: (a) a measure of temporal sequence in narration (Labov & Waletzky, 1967; Nelson & Horowitz, 2001) and (b) referential activity (RA; Bucci, 1997). Temporal sequence in narration measures the degree to which a personal memory includes clauses spoken in the same order as the speaker's representation of events. RA is text vividness, or the extent to which words clearly refer to a speaker's detailed cognitive, sensory, and emotional experiences. This article hypothesizes that temporal sequences and RA are both signs of speaker activation of event-specific memories and should be positively correlated. Using 55 transcripts from high school students interviewed about their “most stressful time,” this article ...

This paper presents a taxonomy of 19 cognitive criteria for judging what constitutes effective representational systems, particularly for knowledge rich topics. Two classes of cognitive criteria are discussed. The first concerns access to concepts by reading and making inferences from external representations. The second class addresses the generation and manipulation of external representations to fulfill reasoning or problem solving goals. Suggestions for the use of the classification are made. Examples of conventional representations and Law Encoding Diagrams for the conceptual challenging topic of particle collisions are provided throughout.

Analogy was studied in real-world engineering design, using the in vivo method. Analogizing was found to occur frequently, entailing a roughly equal amount of within- and between-domain analogies. In partial support for theories of unconscious plagiarism (Brown & Murphy, 1989; Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996) and Ward’s (1994) path-of-least-resistance model, it was found that the reference to exemplars (in the form of prototypes) significantly reduced the number of between-domain analogies between source and target, as compared with using sketches or no external representational systems. Analogy served three functions in relation to novel design concepts: identifying problems, solving problems, and explaining concepts. Problem identifying analogies were mainly within domain, explanatory analogies were mainly between domain, and problem-solving analogies were a mixture of within- and between-domain analogies.

We discuss a research-based theoretical framework based on affect as an internal representational system. Key ideas include the concepts of meta-affect and affective structures, and the constructs of mathematical intimacy and mathematical integrity. We understand these as fundamental to powerful mathematical problem solving, and deserving of closer attention by educators. In a study of elementary school children we characterize some features of emotional states inferred from individual problem solving behavior, including interactions between affect and cognition. We describe our methodology, illustrating theoretical ideas with brief qualitative examples from a longitudinal series of task-based interviews.

Dyscalculia, although officially acknowledged, is more controversial than dyslexia. It is particularly problematic for mathematics educators, involving evidence from non-educational paradigms and raising issues about the nature of mathematics, learning and inclusion. Theories based on a number-processing brain area challenge socio-cultural views of mathematics learning and suggest that innate representational systems play a key role. However, a medical model of mathematical disability undervalues social factors of learning, suggesting a more complex model of mathematics difficulties is required. The issues raised suggest implications for mathematics teaching and research, including the need for compensatory strategies for some children with cognitive difficulties and the possible prevention of mathematics difficulties.

Does the acquisition of spatial language always reflect the characteristics of non-linguistic spatial representation? We explored this question by examining spatial representation and spatial language among children and adults with Williams syndrome, a rare genetic syndrome that gives rise to a pattern of severe spatial impairment together with preserved language. The results of three experiments showed striking evidence for the preservation of axial reference systems together with fragility in representing direction within axes, in both non-linguistic judgments of object location and naming of those locations. These basic properties of the spatial representational systems were observed among WS children and adults and normally developing children, although the WS individuals exhibited noisier performance in both domains. The results indicate that non-linguistic spatial representations and spatial language share structure, even in cases of severe spatial impairment.

Four experiments investigated whether 12-month-old infants use perceptual property information in a complex object individuation task, using the violation-of-expectancy looking time method (Xu, 2002; Xu & Carey, 1996). Infants were shown two objects with different properties emerge and return behind an occluder, one at a time. The occluder was then removed, revealing either two objects (expected outcome, if property differences support individuation) or one object (unexpected outcome). In Experiments 1-3, infants failed to use color, size, or a combination of color, size, and pattern differences to establish a representation of two distinct objects behind an occluder. In Experiment 4, infants succeeded in using cross-basic-level-kind shape differences to establish a representation of two objects but failed to do so using within-basic-level-kind shape differences. Control conditions found that the methods were sensitive. Infants succeeded when provided unambiguous spatiotemporal information for two objects, and they encoded the property differences during these experiments. These findings suggest that by 12 months, different properties play different roles in a complex object individuation task. Certain salient shape differences enter into the computation of numerical distinctness of objects before other property differences such as color or size. Since shape differences are often correlated with object kind differences, these results converge with others in the literature that suggest that by the end of the first year of life, infants' representational systems begin to distinguish kinds and properties.

Recent work on human attention and representational systems has benefited from a growing interplay between research on normal attention and neuropsychological disorders such as visual neglect. Research over the past 30 years has convincingly shown that, far from being a unitary condition, neglect is a protean disorder whose symptoms can selectively affect different sensory modalities, cognitive processes, spatial domains and coordinate systems. These clinical findings, together with those of functional neuroimaging, have increased knowledge about the anatomical and functional architecture of normal subsystems involved in spatial cognition. We provide a selective overview of how recent investigations of visual neglect are beginning to elucidate the underlying structure of spatial processes and mental representations.

Early theories of categorization assumed that either rules, or prototypes, or exemplars were exclusively used to mentally represent categories of objects. More recently, hybrid theories of categorization have been proposed that variously combine these different forms of category representation. Our research addressed the question of whether there are representational shifts during category learning. We report a series of experiments that tracked how individual subjects generalized their acquired category knowledge to classifying new critical transfer items as a function of learning. Individual differences were observed in the generalization patterns exhibited by subjects, and those generalizations changed systematically with experience. Early in learning, subjects generalized on the basis of single diagnostic dimensions, consistent with the use of simple categorization rules. Later in learning, subjects generalized in a manner consistent with the use of similarity-based exemplar retrieval, attending to multiple stimulus dimensions. Theoretical modeling was used to formally corroborate these empirical observations by comparing fits of rule, prototype, and exemplar models to the observed categorization data. Although we provide strong evidence for shifts in the kind of information used to classify objects as a function of categorization experience, interpreting these results in terms of shifts in representational systems underlying perceptual categorization is a far thornier issue. We provide a discussion of the challenges of making claims about category representation, making reference to a wide body of literature suggesting different kinds of representational systems in perceptual categorization and related domains of human cognition.

Randall C. O'Reilly is an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology and Institute of Cognitive Science at the University of Colorado at Boulder. In 1996, he received his Ph.D. in psychology from Carnegie Mellon University under the supervision of Professor James L. McClelland. From 1996 to 1997, Randall O'Reilly was awarded a McDonnell–Pew Cognitive Neuroscience Postdoctoral Fellowship to study at the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has served on several National Institutes of Health grant peer review panels and is currently an associate editor of the journal Cognitive Science . Professor O'Reilly's primary research interests are concerned with understanding the biological basis of cognitive processes through a variety of methodologies including computational and formal models of the biological bases of cognition. Yuko Munakata is an associate professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Denver. In 1996, she received her Ph.D. in psychology from Carnegie Mellon University under the supervision of Professor James L. McClelland. Professor Munakata is a panel member of the NIH Biobehavioral and Behavioral Processes Study Section, a recent recipient of the Boyd R. McCandless Young Scientist Award (American Psychological Association), and Co-Editor (with M. Johnson and R. O. Gilmore) of the book Brain Development and Cognition: A Reader (2nd ed.). From 1996 to 1997, Yuko Munakata was awarded a McDonnell–Pew Cognitive Neuroscience Postdoctoral Fellowship to study at the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Munakata's primary research interests are concerned with the development and evaluation of neural network models and other representational systems for the purposes of understanding human cognitive development. Richard M. Golden is associate professor of psychology, cognitive science, and electrical engineering at the University of Texas at Dallas. Professor Golden is currently a member of the editorial boards of the journals Neural Networks , Neural Processing Letters , and the Journal of Mathematical Psychology , which focus upon computational and mathematical analyses of neurally inspired mathematical models. He is also a member of the Governing Board of the Society for Text and Discourse and the author of the book Mathematical Methods for Neural Network Analysis and Design . Professor Golden's primary research interests are concerned with the development and evaluation of formal models of higher level cognitive processes through a variety of methodologies from fields such as dynamical systems theory, optimization theory, statistical pattern recognition, and computational cognitive neuroscience.

This study examined event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited in response to semantic processing of non-verbal stories. ERPs were recorded from 29 scalp electrodes on 16 participants while they viewed series of complex gray-scale pictures, each of which relayed a simple story. The final picture of each story was either congruous or incongruous with the preceding context. Participants made delayed meaningfulness judgments for each story. Averaged ERPs time-locked to the onset of the final picture were more negative for incongruous than congruous pictures. Two distinct components were sensitive to congruency. The first component peaked at approximately 325 ms (N300) and was distributed over central and frontal sites. The second component peaked at approximately 500 ms and also had a centro-frontal maximum but was more widespread than the earlier component (anterior N400). The distinct scalp topographies of these two negativities provide strong evidence that the N300 and N400 are separate and distinguishable components. Furthermore, the presence of the N300 in this exclusively pictorial task suggests that the N300 is specific to the semantic processing of non-verbal stimuli and is not due to linguistic mediation. This study also revealed that the N400 can be modulated by discourse-level coherence manipulations with pictures. Finally, the different patterns of ERP effects observed during the semantic processing of verbal and non-verbal information suggest that non-identical neuronal sources, and thus non-identical representational systems, are accessed by these different types of materials. These findings strongly support at least partial modularity of semantic representations and processing mechanisms in the human brain.

We propose a new approach to the neuroscience of consciousness, growing out of the 'enactive' viewpoint in cognitive science. This approach aims to map the neural substrates of consciousness at the level of large-scale, emergent and transient dynamical patterns of brain activity (rather than at the level of particular circuits or classes of neurons), and it suggests that the processes crucial for consciousness cut across the brain-body-world divisions, rather than being brain-bound neural events. Whereas standard approaches to the neural correlates of consciousness have assumed a one-way causal-explanatory relationship between internal neural representational systems and the contents of consciousness, our approach allows for theories and hypotheses about the two-way or reciprocal relationship between embodied conscious states and local neuronal activity.

In response to my paper on possible phylogenetic divergence in the case of theistic percepts, Gallup and Maser argue that an alternative — and more heuristic — approach to studying religious phenomena can be found in neuroanatomical mapping of cognitive functions that seem to play some role in this category of thought. On the one hand, the argument is sound and will probably come to be prescient; cognitive neuroscience should begin to emerge as an increasingly important player in the newly overlapping Ž elds of cognition and comparative religion. Indeed, initial strides have already been taken in just this area (Shaver & Rabin 1997). But on the other hand, it is somewhat misguided in that it implies that neurological methods are alternative rather than complementary ways to go about seriously studying the cognitive foundations of religion. The representational systems outlined in my article are inherently brain-based, and there is, as Gallup and Maser point out, reason to assume some degree of localization of the general aspects associated with them. Until comparative neuropsychologists are able to discern the seemingly subtle differences in the brains of humans and our closest living relatives, however, we can produce only admittedly speculative hunches as to the unique adaptive functioning of the neuroanatomical regions in question. However, it is worth pointing out that there are considerable morphological differences between humans and chimpanzees in precisely the area of the brain that is presumed responsible for allowing the attribution of mental states. The human prefrontal cortex has expanded substantially over the past 5-8 million years, is signiŽ cantly larger than homologous structures of the African great apes, and occupies more of the cerebral mantle (Povinelli

An affective system of representation is joined with several cognitive representational systems in endeavoring to construct a realistic model for problem-solving competence. The affective states described are not global attitudes or traits, but local changing states of feeling that the solver experiences and can utilize during problem solving-to store and provide useful information, facilitate monitoring, and evoke heuristic processes. Thus affect, like language, is seen as fundamentally representational as well as communicative. Two major affective pathways-one favorable and one unfavorable-are discussed, together with conjectured relationships between affective states and useful or counterproductive heuristic configurations. Implications of the model include local affective goals for mathematics teaching related to problem-solving heuristics.

Borrett, Kelly, and Kwan follow the lead of Merleau-Ponty and develop a theory of neural-network modeling that emerges out of what they find wrong with current approaches to thought and action. Specifically, they take issue with "cognitivism" and its tendency to model cognitive agents as controlling, representational systems. While attempting to make the point that pre-predicative experience/action/place (i.e. grasping) involves neither representation nor control, the authors imply that control-theoretic concepts and representationalism necessarily go hand-in-hand. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that this is not the case. Rather, it will be argued that such necessity is only assumed because the authors attempt to apply the control theory of servo-mechanisms to the behavior of organisms. By adopting this engineering control-theoretic perspective, the authors are led, as are most of the cognitivists with whom they disagree, to overlook critical aspects of how it is that biological system...

This paper describes a semantic approach to understanding the cognitive consequences for educational communication of assigning the same information to different modalities. The central idea is to base a theory of usability on semantic analysis of representational systems, and in particular the consequences of semantics for the computational complexity of reasoning. The paper reviews published work on evaluating interactive multi-media logic teaching as a test of the framework. One comparison is between sentential and graphical representations in teaching first-order logic ( Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 1995 ). This comparison reveals substantial aptitude×treatment interactions which hinge on the semantic issues predicted to be pivotal in determining usefulness. Another comparison is between alternative graphical methods of teaching ( Dobson, 1995 ). The example studies illustrate the benefits and problems in applying a semantic analysis to representations used in education.

Classical theories of cognitive processing have defended a propositional approach to mental information processing. Because not all cognitive processes offer the systematicity proper to these types of languages, other theories have proposed a more iconic or associative approach. These types of representational systems do not seem to possess such a systematic structure. But this is debatable. In a semiotic perspective, it can be shown that these systems can be modelled in a categorial approach and hence render more explicit their underlying systematicity. It then follows that a propositional language is not the only language that offers the systematicity required for coherent information processing.

The analysis of route directions provides a relevant context for the study of relationships between language and spatial cognition. This research examines the theoretical issue of the cooperation between differing cognitive representational systems possessing contrasting functional properties. In addition, this research domain offers a unique opportunity for psychology, linguistics, computer science, and human-machine communication to work together, thereby contributing to the understanding of cognitive processes and improving the design of navigational systems adjusted to the cognitive capacities of their users. This paper outlines the cognitive operations involved in producing route directions and identifies certain invariant features of route descriptions beyond the diversity of individual protocols. Data collected in natural environments were analyzed and used to construct “skeletal descriptions” that reflected the essentials needed for navigating along a route. The functional value of these descriptions was assessed by their ability to guide navigation in unfamiliar environments.

This paper suggests that from a cognitive-evolutionary perspective, computational media are qualitatively different from many of the technologies that have promised educational change in the past and failed to deliver. Recent theories of human cognitive evolution suggest that human cognition has evolved through four distinct stages: episodic, mimetic, mythic, and theoretical. This progression was driven by three cognitive advances: the ability to ‘represent’ events, the development of symbolic reference, and the creation of external symbolic representations. In this paper, we suggest that we are developing a new cognitive culture: a ‘virtual’ culture dependent on the externalization of symbolic processing. We suggest here that the ability to externalize the manipulation of formal systems changes the very nature of cognitive activity. These changes will have important consequences for mathematics education in coming decades. In particular, we argue that mathematics education in a virtual culture should strive to give students generative fluency to learn varieties of representational systems, provide opportunities to create and modify representational forms, develop skill in making and exploring virtual environments, and emphasize mathematics as a fundamental way of making sense of the world, reserving most exact computation and formal proof for those who will need those specialized skills.

The goal of this study was to analyze the early manifestations of gender identity. Authors speculate that 24-month-old children do not know their gender identity and sex roles. However, most of the time, the methods used are not really suited to the cognitive capacities of young children. Other studies have shown that, in fact, children at this age seem to adjust their behavior according to the gender characteristics of the situation and the sex of the partner. We therefore hypothesized that if children are able to exhibit such behaviors, then an internal gender system exists, even if at 24 months the cognitive capacities are not well established. In order to establish the existence of such a system at 24 months, we designed an experimental situation which did not involve complicated representational systems. Mixed-peer dyads and unmixed peer dyads (24 months old) were videotaped while playing in a room with gender-stereotyped toys. The children’s attitudes towards the objects and the partners were observed. The results indicate that gender directs children attitudes at 24 months.

Although the construct of regulation is usually applied to ongoing behavior, it also has implications for ongoing cognition and the development of cognitive representations. We propose that subcortical motivational systems influence cortical representations in two general ways. First, they regulate response processes, promoting a general selection of information to which the child is exposed. Second, motivational systems regulate attention, promoting a more selective stabilization of representations for motivationally relevant sources of information. Together with the environment, these regulatory processes shape the child's developing representations. Individual differences in these processes result in cortical representational systems that enhance the motivational systems* ability to detect relevant inputs and to guide behavior in light of them. Examples are provided that focus on fearful children, discussing how their self-representation may contribute to anxious psychopathology.

The ability to think about the future-prospection-is central to many aspects of human cognition and behavior, from planning and decision making, to self-control and the construction of a sense of identity. Yet, the exact nature of the representational systems underlying prospection is not fully understood. Recent findings point to the critical role of episodic memory in imagining specific future events, but it is unlikely that prospection depends solely on this system. Using an event-cueing paradigm in two studies, we here show that specific events that people imagine might happen in their personal future are commonly embedded in broader event sequences-termed event clusters-that link a set of envisioned events according to causal and thematic relations. These findings provide novel evidence that prospection relies on multiple representational systems, with general autobiographical knowledge structures providing a frame that organizes imagined events in overarching event sequences. The results further suggest that knowledge about personal goals plays an important role in structuring these event sequences, especially for the distant future.

A common subtask in spreadsheet calculation is the transformation of verbal task instructions into spreadsheet formulas. This task can be used to study the relation of imagery to thinking. Research using physics and mathematics problems has indicated that mental transformation from verbal to mathematical representations is not necessarily direct but is intermediated by imagery. Therefore, a human-computer interaction task such as spreadsheet calculation provides a good task environment for analysing mental imagery operations, the role of imagery operations, and the role of intermediate imagery in thinking tasks. Testing the use of imagery in spreadsheet calculations also improves our understanding of representational systems used in this specific task and in user interfaces in general.Four experiments provided different types of evidence for the intermediate imagery hypothesis, which means that subjects do not directly transform verbal instructions into spreadsheet formulas. They first try to code an overall image of the areas referred to by verbal instructions, segment it into suitable fields, and only thereafter do they write down the set of formulas which best extract the information demanded. Typically, the field borders, used in this segmentation are often imagined and are not presented at all in the original verbal task instructions.Intermediate imagery is a relevant notion in discussing the construction of user models because the most important current models, such as GOMS, assume only propositional representations. Also, the use of images should be taken into account in designing spreadsheet packages by providing features which aid analog information processing.

Studies like the one conducted by Domahs et al. (2010, in Cognition) corroborate that finger counting habits affect how numbers are processed, and legitimize the assumption that this effect is culturally modulated. The degree of cultural diversity in finger counting, however, has been grossly underestimated in the field at large, which, in turn, has restricted research questions and designs. In this paper, we demonstrate that fingers as a tool for counting are not only naturally available, but are also-and crucially so-culturally encoded. To substantiate this, we outline the variability in finger counting and illustrate each of its types with instances from the literature. We argue that the different types of finger counting all constitute distinct representational systems, and we use their properties-dimensionality, dimensional representation, base and sub-base values, extendibility and extent, sign count, and regularity-to devise a typology of such systems. This allows us to explore representational effects, that is, the cognitive implications these properties may have, for instance, for the efficiency of information encoding and representation, ease of learning and mastering the system, or memory retrieval and cognitive load. We then highlight the ambivalent consequences arising from structural inconsistencies between finger counting and other modes of number representation like verbal or notational systems, and we discuss how this informs questions on the evolution and development of counting systems. Based on these analyses, we suggest some directions for future research in the field of embodied cognition that would profit substantially from taking into account the cultural diversity in finger counting.

Developmental psychology, like anthropological psychology, has allowed us to see that others, including the young, must be described not merely as failed attempts to achieve modern adult norms but as peoples in their own right. Secondly, it has shown that the structures and processes needed for the explanation of adult minds, specifically symbolic representational systems, cannot be assumed to be present in children. In this paper I examine the notion of representation and its role in cognitive theory. The representational theory of mind simply takes for granted the existence of such representational states and processes as symbol use, belief, meaning and intention. The problem for developmental psychology is to explain the origin and development of such states. A sequence of developments is proposed which would have the effect of reworking the elementary sensorymotor schemata present at birth and which are causal in nature into the propositional representational states which develop in twoto four - year - olds and which operate on the basis of meaning, significance and intentionality. The theory is used to explain a series of intellectual achievements of young children.In her introduction to this symposium Callaghan (this issue) cited the contradictory claims of Wundt and Baldwin as to the relation between developmental theory and general psychological theory, Wundt claiming that development cannot be studied fruitfully without reference to adult norms and Baldwin that adult norms can be understood only in terms of their developmental history. In my view both are right. A theory of adult cognition is required if we are to understand developmental changes as solutions to problems which are more or less universal and which have been solved in particular ways by adults in that culture.Equally important, however, is the significance of developmental theory for theories of adult cognition. Baldwin's claim was that no process can be understood unless we understand how it came to be -- a view which would be hotly contested by structuralists who insist that we distinguish synchronic from diachronic descriptions. That, after all, was what made possible the development of modern semantic theory as opposed to the traditional etymological accounts of word and sentence meaning.Developmental studies make at least two other contributions to general psychology. First, they help free us from our adult ethnocentrism which sees all members of all cultures other than the currently dominant one as faltering steps toward or failed attempts at achieving modern adult norms by insisting that other cultural or age groups be understood on their own terms and in their own rights. That, after all, was the legacy of modern anthropology to cultural studies and it was the legacy of Piaget to developmental studies.But secondly, developmental studies may permit us to critically examine the underlying assumptions about mental functions and to either reject them as unwarranted or, in the best case, provide a basis for justifying them. This is the case for the topic I shall develop, namely, the assumption that the mind is a representational system, a system which operates on the basis of symbols and meanings rather than simply chemical and biological causes. The ProblemA central question in cognitive psychology is how the brain, which is a purely physical - biological causal system, can ever produce or come to be a mental system, one which operates on the basis of meanings, beliefs and intentions. It seems inescapable that we experience the actions of ourselves and others in terms of beliefs, desires and intentions -- mental states -- and yet as scientists we are committed to the view that the brain is a purely causal system. How are we to reconcile these seemingly incommensurable notions?We are all familiar with the traditional alternatives. Abolish the notion of mind as the behaviourists attempted to do and explain behaviour in terms of complex causal states which reflect accumulated patterns of experienced objects and events. …

In the pain-flexor reflex, arm extension is temporally coupled with the onset of the unconditioned aversive stimulus, whereas flexion is associated with its offset; when retrieving desirable stimuli, arm flexion is more closely coupled temporally to the acquisition or consumption of the desired stimuli than arm extension. It was posited that these contingencies foster an association between arm flexion, in contrast to extension, and approach motivational orientations. Six experiments were conducted to examine this hypothesis. Ideographs presented during arm flexion were subsequently ranked more positively than ideographs presented during arm extension, but only when the Ss' task was to evaluate the ideographs when they were presented initially. Arm flexion and extension were also each found to have discernible attitudinal effects. These results suggest a possible role for nondeclarative memory in attitude formation. In general, we should not be terribly surprised that it is so difficult to change attitudes and preferences by cognitive methods. These methods do not reach the motor system and other somatic representational systems of the organism. They only deal with one representational system—the one that exists in the form of associative structures, images, and other subjective states. Since attitudes contain such a substantial affective component, they are likely to have multiple representations—and somatic representations are probably among the more significant ones. (Zajonc & Markus, 1982, p. 130) The term attitude comes from the Latin words apto (aptitude or fitness) and acto (postures of the body), both of which have their origin in the Sanskrit root ag, meaning to do or to act (Bull, 1951). The connection between attitude and action carried into the 18th century, when attitude referred to a physi

The issue of mental representation of symbols has plagued cognitive science for decades and still doesn't have a resolution. The basic dispute is between the symbol system hypothesis of artificial intelligence, whose proponents include Newell and Simon [1], Newell [2], Smith [3], Fodor and Pylyshyn [4] and others, and Smolensky style connectionism [5] where a “high level” concept or symbol is represented by a number of subconcepts (subsymbols). Both sides claim their representational systems to be at the cognitive level, which means the elements used in their representational systems have meaning. In this paper, we take a closer look at Smolensky style connectionism and find it to be flawed in a number of ways. In particular, the cognitive level subconcepts (subsymbols with meaning) used by Smolensky are inconsistent with a number of principles of human learning. We argue that the subsymbolic distributed representation at the non-cognitive neural layer (McClelland and others [6], [7], [8]) is sufficient to represent a concept or symbol and that an additional layer of cognitive level subconcepts (Smolensky [5]) is redundant.

Although young infants have repeatedly demonstrated successful numerosity discrimination across large sets when the number of items in the sets changes twofold (E. M. Brannon, S. Abbott, & D. J. Lutz, 2004; J. N. Wood & E. S. Spelke, 2005; F. Xu & E. S. Spelke, 2000), they consistently fail to discriminate a twofold change in number when one set is large and the other is small (

Students taking a graduate‐level course in organic synthesis were individually interviewed and asked to ‘think aloud’ as they solved several problems from the domain of organic synthesis. Based on analyses of these data, along with two models of problem solving and a constructivist epistemological stance, a new model was constructed stressing both psychological and cultural influences on problem solving. The cultural portion of the model describes how the knowledge constructed by the problem solver is rooted in those symbols in representational systems that have been constructed by the culture in which the problem was formulated. The culture assists the individual by providing often‐used strategic decisions about which representational systems are useful, and what tactics are most appropriate. The psychological portion of the model focuses on the cognitive activities that the individual engages in whilst problem solving. These activities include preparation (construction of a representation of the problem...

This paper presents a cognitive analysis of subjective probability judgments and proposes that these are assessments of belief-processing activities. The analysis is motivated by an investigation of the concepts of belief, knowledge, and uncertainty. Judgment and reasoning are differentiated, Toulmin's (1958) theory of argument being used to explicate the latter. The paper discusses a belief-processing model in which reasoning is used to translate data into conclusions, while judgmental processes qualify those conclusions with degrees of belief. The model sheds light on traditional interpretations of probability and suggests that different characteristics of belief—likelihood and support—are addressed by different representational systems. In concluding, the paper identifies new lines of research implied by its analysis.

Associative agnosias are traditionally regarded as perceptual, and ideational apraxia as motor, deficits, but they can be understood as amnesias for generic knowledge, caused by bilateral or unilateral left-hemispheric cortical lesions. Current theories of hemispheric specialization explain these syndromes' mandatory link with left-hemispheric damage, and are validated by this link. This link reflects the multiple nature of generic, categorical representational systems, not all reducible to natural language, and the left hemisphere's principal role as their substrate, regardless of their dependence on language. The distinction between processing novel information, and processing based on well-established, routinized representations, captures a fundamental difference between the functions of the right and left hemispheres. The complementary link of apperceptive agnosias with right-and associative agnosias with left-hemisphere lesions is an expression of this general principle in the posterior cortex. Future studies of the neuroanatomy of agnosias in animals may offer insights into the evolutionary continuities of hemispheric specialization.