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This paper considers neural representation through the lens of active inference, a normative framework for understanding brain function. It delves into how living organisms employ generative models to minimize the discrepancy between predictions and observations (as scored with variational free energy). The ensuing analysis suggests that the brain learns generative models to navigate the world adaptively, not (or not solely) to understand it. Different living organisms may possess an array of generative models, spanning from those that support action-perception cycles to those that underwrite planning and imagination; namely, from explicit models that entail variables for predicting concurrent sensations, like objects, faces, or people-to action-oriented models that predict action outcomes. It then elucidates how generative models and belief dynamics might link to neural representation and the implications of different types of generative models for understanding an agent's cognitive capabilities in relation to its ecological niche. The paper concludes with open questions regarding the evolution of generative models and the development of advanced cognitive abilities-and the gradual transition from pragmatic to detached neural representations. The analysis on offer foregrounds the diverse roles that generative models play in cognitive processes and the evolution of neural representation., (© 2024 The New York Academy of Sciences.)

Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Predictive processing has become an influential framework in cognitive sciences. This framework turns the traditional view of perception upside down, claiming that the main flow of information processing is realized in a top-down, hierarchical manner. Furthermore, it aims at unifying perception, cognition, and action as a single inferential process. However, in the related literature, the predictive processing framework and its associated schemes, such as predictive coding, active inference, perceptual inference, and free-energy principle, tend to be used interchangeably. In the field of cognitive robotics, there is no clear-cut distinction on which schemes have been implemented and under which assumptions. In this letter, working definitions are set with the main aim of analyzing the state of the art in cognitive robotics research working under the predictive processing framework as well as some related nonrobotic models. The analysis suggests that, first, research in both cognitive robotics implementations and nonrobotic models needs to be extended to the study of how multiple exteroceptive modalities can be integrated into prediction error minimization schemes. Second, a relevant distinction found here is that cognitive robotics implementations tend to emphasize the learning of a generative model, while in nonrobotics models, it is almost absent. Third, despite the relevance for active inference, few cognitive robotics implementations examine the issues around control and whether it should result from the substitution of inverse models with proprioceptive predictions. Finally, limited attention has been placed on precision weighting and the tracking of prediction error dynamics. These mechanisms should help to explore more complex behaviors and tasks in cognitive robotics research under the predictive processing framework., (© 2021 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.)

Nervous systems' computational abilities are an evolutionary innovation, specializing and speed-optimizing ancient biophysical dynamics. Bioelectric signalling originated in cells' communication with the outside world and with each other, enabling cooperation towards adaptive construction and repair of multicellular bodies. Here, we review the emerging field of developmental bioelectricity, which links the field of basal cognition to state-of-the-art questions in regenerative medicine, synthetic bioengineering and even artificial intelligence. One of the predictions of this view is that regeneration and regulative development can restore correct large-scale anatomies from diverse starting states because, like the brain, they exploit bioelectric encoding of distributed goal states-in this case, pattern memories. We propose a new interpretation of recent stochastic regenerative phenotypes in planaria, by appealing to computational models of memory representation and processing in the brain. Moreover, we discuss novel findings showing that bioelectric changes induced in planaria can be stored in tissue for over a week, thus revealing that somatic bioelectric circuits in vivo can implement a long-term, re-writable memory medium. A consideration of the mechanisms, evolution and functionality of basal cognition makes novel predictions and provides an integrative perspective on the evolution, physiology and biomedicine of information processing in vivo . This article is part of the theme issue 'Basal cognition: multicellularity, neurons and the cognitive lens'.

We consider the ways humans engage in social epistemic actions, to guide each other's attention, prediction, and learning processes towards salient information, at the timescale of online social interaction and joint action. This parallels the active guidance of other's attention, prediction, and learning processes at the longer timescale of niche construction and cultural practices, as discussed in the target article.

In statistics and machine learning, model accuracy is traded off with complexity, which can be viewed as the amount of information extracted from the data. Here, we discuss how cognitive costs can be expressed in terms of similar information costs, i.e. as a function of the amount of information required to update a person's prior knowledge (or internal model) to effectively solve a task. We then examine the theoretical consequences that ensue from this assumption. This framework naturally explains why some tasks - for example, unfamiliar or dual tasks - are costly and permits to quantify these costs using information-theoretic measures. Finally, we discuss brain implementation of this principle and show that subjective cognitive costs can originate either from local or global capacity limitations on information processing or from increased rate of metabolic alterations. These views shed light on the potential adaptive value of cost-avoidance mechanisms., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

We discuss how cybernetic principles of feedback control, used to explain sensorimotor behavior, can be extended to provide a foundation for understanding cognition. In particular, we describe behavior as parallel processes of competition and selection among potential action opportunities ('affordances') expressed at multiple levels of abstraction. Adaptive selection among currently available affordances is biased not only by predictions of their immediate outcomes and payoffs but also by predictions of what new affordances they will make available. This allows animals to purposively create new affordances that they can later exploit to achieve high-level goals, resulting in intentional action that links across multiple levels of control. Finally, we discuss how such a 'hierarchical affordance competition' process can be mapped to brain structure., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

To be successful, the research agenda for a novel control view of cognition should foresee more detailed, computationally specified process models of cognitive operations including higher cognition. These models should cover all domains of cognition, including those cognitive abilities that can be characterized as online interactive loops and detached forms of cognition that depend on internally generated neuronal processing.

There is wide consensus that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is able to exert cognitive control on behavior by biasing processing toward task-relevant information and by modulating response selection. This idea is typically framed in terms of top-down influences within a cortical control hierarchy, where prefrontal-basal ganglia loops gate multiple input-output channels, which in turn can activate or sequence motor primitives expressed in (pre-)motor cortices. Here we advance a new hypothesis, based on the notion of programmability and an interpreter-programmer computational scheme, on how the PFC can flexibly bias the selection of sensorimotor patterns depending on internal goal and task contexts. In this approach, multiple elementary behaviors representing motor primitives are expressed by a single multi-purpose neural network, which is seen as a reusable area of "recycled" neurons (interpreter). The PFC thus acts as a "programmer" that, without modifying the network connectivity, feeds the interpreter networks with specific input parameters encoding the programs (corresponding to network structures) to be interpreted by the (pre-)motor areas. Our architecture is validated in a standard test for executive function: the 1-2-AX task. Our results show that this computational framework provides a robust, scalable and flexible scheme that can be iterated at different hierarchical layers, supporting the realization of multiple goals. We discuss the plausibility of the "programmer-interpreter" scheme to explain the functioning of prefrontal-(pre)motor cortical hierarchies.

The central problems that goal-directed animals must solve are: 'What do I need and Why, Where and When can this be obtained, and How do I get it?' or the H4W problem. Here, we elucidate the principles underlying the neuronal solutions to H4W using a combination of neurobiological and neurorobotic approaches. First, we analyse H4W from a system-level perspective by mapping its objectives onto the Distributed Adaptive Control embodied cognitive architecture which sees the generation of adaptive action in the real world as the primary task of the brain rather than optimally solving abstract problems. We next map this functional decomposition to the architecture of the rodent brain to test its consistency. Following this approach, we propose that the mammalian brain solves the H4W problem on the basis of multiple kinds of outcome predictions, integrating central representations of needs and drives (e.g. hypothalamus), valence (e.g. amygdala), world, self and task state spaces (e.g. neocortex, hippocampus and prefrontal cortex, respectively) combined with multi-modal selection (e.g. basal ganglia). In our analysis, goal-directed behaviour results from a well-structured architecture in which goals are bootstrapped on the basis of predefined needs, valence and multiple learning, memory and planning mechanisms rather than being generated by a singular computation.

While the cerebellum's role in motor function is well recognized, the nature of its concurrent role in cognitive function remains considerably less clear. The current consensus paper gathers diverse views on a variety of important roles played by the cerebellum across a range of cognitive and emotional functions. This paper considers the cerebellum in relation to neurocognitive development, language function, working memory, executive function, and the development of cerebellar internal control models and reflects upon some of the ways in which better understanding the cerebellum's status as a "supervised learning machine" can enrich our ability to understand human function and adaptation. As all contributors agree that the cerebellum plays a role in cognition, there is also an agreement that this conclusion remains highly inferential. Many conclusions about the role of the cerebellum in cognition originate from applying known information about cerebellar contributions to the coordination and quality of movement. These inferences are based on the uniformity of the cerebellum's compositional infrastructure and its apparent modular organization. There is considerable support for this view, based upon observations of patients with pathology within the cerebellum.

We show how simulated robots evolved for the ability to display a context-dependent periodic behavior can spontaneously develop an internal model and rely on it to fulfill their task when sensory stimulation is temporarily unavailable. The analysis of some of the best evolved agents indicates that their internal model operates by anticipating sensory stimuli. More precisely, it anticipates functional properties of the next sensory state rather than the exact state that sensors will assume. The characteristics of the states that are anticipated and of the sensorimotor rules that determine how the agents react to the experienced states, however, ensure that they produce very similar behaviour during normal and blind phases in which sensory stimulation is available or is self-generated by the agent, respectively. Agents' internal models also ensure an effective transition during the phases in which agents' internal dynamics is decoupled and re-coupled with the sensorimotor flow. Our results suggest that internal models might have arisen for behavioral reasons and successively exapted for other cognitive functions. Moreover, the obtained results suggest that self-generated internal states should not necessarily match in detail the corresponding sensory states and might rather encode more abstract and motor-oriented information.

Need states are internal states that arise from deprivation of crucial biological stimuli. They direct motivation, independently of external learning. Despite their separate origin, they interact with reward processing systems that respond to external stimuli. This article aims to illuminate the functioning of the needing system through the lens of active inference, a framework for understanding brain and cognition. We propose that need states exert a pervasive influence on the organism, which in active inference terms translates to a "pervasive surprise"—a measure of the distance from the organism's preferred state. Crucially, we define needing as an active inference process that seeks to reduce this pervasive surprise. Through a series of simulations, we demonstrate that our proposal successfully captures key aspects of the phenomenology and neurobiology of needing. We show that as need states increase, the tendency to occupy preferred states strengthens, independently of external reward prediction. Furthermore, need states increase the precision of states (stimuli and actions) leading to preferred states, suggesting their ability to amplify the value of reward cues and rewards themselves. Collectively, our model and simulations provide valuable insights into the directional and underlying influence of need states, revealing how this influence amplifies the wanting or liking associated with relevant stimuli. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brains at rest generate dynamical activity that is highly structured in space and time. We suggest that spontaneous activity, as in rest or dreaming, underlies top-down dynamics of generative models. During active tasks, generative models provide top-down predictive signals for perception, cognition, and action. When the brain is at rest and stimuli are weak or absent, top-down dynamics optimize the generative models for future interactions by maximizing the entropy of explanations and minimizing model complexity. Spontaneous fluctuations of correlated activity within and across brain regions may reflect transitions between 'generic priors' of the generative model: low dimensional latent variables and connectivity patterns of the most common perceptual, motor, cognitive, and interoceptive states. Even at rest, brains are proactive and predictive. Spontaneous brain dynamics are manifestations of top-down dynamics of generative models detached from action–perception cycles. Generative models constantly produce top-down dynamics, but we call them expectations and attention during task engagement and spontaneous activity at rest. Spontaneous brain dynamics during resting periods optimize generative models for future interactions by maximizing the entropy of explanations in the absence of specific data and reducing model complexity. Low-frequency brain fluctuations during spontaneous activity reflect transitions between generic priors consisting of low-dimensional representations and connectivity patterns of the most frequent behavioral states. High-frequency fluctuations during spontaneous activity in the hippocampus and other regions may support generative replay and model learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous studies indicate that lexical decision is a dynamic process in which various sources of information (e.g., orthographic, phonological, lexical) need to be integrated over time and that mismatches between these sources produce uncertainty during decision-making. However, the specific contribution of these different sources of information to the decision process, and the specific ways they interact over time, are still incompletely understood. Here we report two experiments conducted to investigate the role of a key characteristic of language - orthographic consistency - in modulating reading strategies in a lexical decision task. We aimed to test different theories of how exactly orthographic consistency influences decisions, and the ways lexical and sublexical representations are matched within it. For this, we exploited a key characteristic of the French language: the fact that retrieving spelling from phonology is hard, whereas the reverse is not the case (i.e., French is feedback-inconsistent but feedforward-consistent). Our results indicate a feedback inconsistency effect: uncertainty in our lexical decision task originates from the process of retrieving spelling from phonology, not when retrieving phonology from spelling. These results support the idea of a verification mechanism that compares orthographic sublexical information with lexical information during lexical decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present an information-theoretic method permitting one to find structure in a problem space (here, in a spatial navigation domain) and cluster it in ways that are convenient to solve different classes of control problems, which include planning a path to a goal from a known or an unknown location, achieving multiple goals and exploring a novel environment. Our generative nonparametric approach, called the generative embedded Chinese restaurant process (geCRP), extends the family of Chinese restaurant process (CRP) models by introducing a parameterizable notion of distance (or kernel) between the states to be clustered together. By using different kernels, such as the the conditional probability or joint probability of two states, the same geCRP method clusters the environment in ways that are more sensitive to different control-related information, such as goal, sub-goal and path information. We perform a series of simulations in three scenarios--an open space, a grid world with four rooms and a maze having the same structure as the Hanoi Tower--in order to illustrate the characteristics of the different clusters (obtained using different kernels) and their relative benefits for solving planning and control problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In keeping with the idea that observing objects activates possible motor responses, several experiments revealed compatibility effects between the hand postures used to report a choice and some characteristics of the stimuli. The real-time dynamics of such compatibility effects are currently unknown. We tracked the time course of a categorization experiment requiring subjects to categorize as natural or artifact figures of big and small objects. Participants reported their choice using either a big mouse (requiring a power grip: a hand posture compatible with the grasping of big objects) or a small mouse (requiring a precision grip: a hand posture compatible with the grasping of small objects). We found a compatibility effect between the grip required by the mouse and the grip elicited by objects, even if it was irrelevant to the task. In a following experiment with the same paradigm, lexical stimuli failed to reproduce the same effect. Nevertheless, a compatibility effect mediated by the target-word category (artificial vs. natural) was observed. We discuss the results in the context of affordance effects literature and grounded theories of cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Although the idea of action simulation is nowadays popular in cognitive science, neuroscience and robotics, many aspects of the simulative processes remain unclear from empirical, computational, and neural perspectives. In the first part of the article, we provide a critical review and assessment of action simulation theories advanced so far in the wider literature of embodied and motor cognition. We focus our analysis on twelve key questions, and discuss them in the context of human and (occasionally) primate studies. In the second part of the article, we describe an integrative neuro-computational account of action simulation, which links the neural substrate (as revealed in neuroimaging studies of action simulation) to the components of a computational architecture that includes internal modeling, action monitoring and inhibition mechanisms. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article explores the possibilities of formalizing and explaining the mechanisms that support spatial and social perspective alignment sustained over the duration of a social interaction. The basic proposed principle is that in social contexts the mechanisms for sensorimotor transformations and multisensory integration (learn to) incorporate information relative to the other actor(s), similar to the "re-calibration" of visual receptive fields in response to repeated tool use. This process aligns or merges the co-actors' spatial representations and creates a "Shared Action Space" (SAS) supporting key computations of social interactions and joint actions; for example, the remapping between the coordinate systems and frames of reference of the co-actors, including perspective taking, the sensorimotor transformations required for lifting jointly an object, and the predictions of the sensory effects of such joint action. The social re-calibration is proposed to be based on common basis function maps (BFMs) and could constitute an optimal solution to sensorimotor transformation and multisensory integration in joint action or more in general social interaction contexts. However, certain situations such as discrepant postural and viewpoint alignment and associated differences in perspectives between the co-actors could constrain the process quite differently. We discuss how alignment is achieved in the first place, and how it is maintained over time, providing a taxonomy of various forms and mechanisms of space alignment and overlap based, for instance, on automaticity vs. control of the transformations between the two agents. Finally, we discuss the link between low-level mechanisms for the sharing of space and high-level mechanisms for the sharing of cognitive representations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a methodological pathway from theories of situated, embodied cognition to simulations with an eye to empirical evidence, and suggest a possible cross-fertilization between cognitive robotics and psychology. Psychological theories, in particular those formulated at an abstract level, include models which are often severely underspecified at the level of mechanisms. This is true in the synchronic, constructive perspective (how can the effects observed in experiments be concretely generated by the model''s mechanisms?) and in the diachronic, developmental perspective (how can such mechanisms be learned and developed?). The synthetic method of artificial cognitive systems research, and in particular of cognitive robotics, can complement research in psychology (and neurosciences) by exploring the constructive and developmental aspects of theories. Our second aim is to provide an example of such a methodology by describing simulations aiming at developing a perceptual symbol system (PSS) (). We then describe the two main theoretical constructs of the PSS, perceptual symbols and simulators, illustrate their development in an artificial system, and test the system in prediction, categorization, and abstraction tasks. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Studies on how 'the social mind' works reveal that cognitive agents engaged in joint actions actively estimate and influence another's cognitive variables and form shared representations with them. (How) do shared representations enhance coordination? In this paper, we provide a probabilistic model of joint action that emphasizes how shared representations help solving interaction problems. We focus on two aspects of the model. First, we discuss how shared representations permit to coordinate at the level of cognitive variables (beliefs, intentions, and actions) and determine a coherent unfolding of action execution and predictive processes in the brains of two agents. Second, we discuss the importance of signaling actions as part of a strategy for sharing representations and the active guidance of another's actions toward the achievement of a joint goal. Furthermore, we present data from a human-computer experiment (the Tower Game) in which two agents (human and computer) have to build together a tower made of colored blocks, but only the human knows the constellation of the tower to be built (e.g., red-blue-red-blue- $$\ldots$$). We report evidence that humans use signaling strategies that take another's uncertainty into consideration, and that in turn our model is able to use humans' actions as cues to 'align' its representations and to select complementary actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a view of embodied representations that is alternative to both symbolic/linguistic approaches and purely sensorimotor views of cognition, and can account for procedural and declarative knowledge manipulation. In accordance with recent evidence in cognitive neuroscience and psychology, we argue that anticipatory and simulative mechanisms, which arose during evolution for action control and not for cognition, determined the first form of representational content and were exapted for increasingly sophisticated cognitive uses. In particular, procedural and declarative forms of knowledge can be explained, respectively, in terms of on-line sensorimotor anticipation and off-line simulations of potential actions, which can give access to tacit knowledge and make it explicit. That is, mechanisms that evolved for the on-line prediction of the consequences of one's own actions (i.e. forward models) determine a (procedural) form of representation, and became exapted for off-line use. They can therefore be used to produce (declarative) knowledge of the world, by running a simulation of the action that would produce the relevant information. We conclude by discussing how embodied representations afford a form of internal manipulation that can be described as internalized situated action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]