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Working memory (WM) holds and manipulates representations for ongoing cognition. Oberauer (Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 51, 45–100, 2009) distinguishes between two analogous WM sub-systems: a declarative WM which handles the objects of thought, and a procedural WM which handles the representations of (cognitive) actions. Here, we assessed whether analogous effects are observed when participants switch between memory sets (declarative representations) and when they switch between task sets (procedural representations). One mechanism assumed to facilitate switching in procedural WM is the inhibition of previously used, but currently irrelevant task sets, as indexed by n-2 task-repetition costs (Mayr & Keele, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(1), 4–26, 2000). In this study we tested for an analogous effect in declarative WM. We assessed the evidence for n-2 list-repetition costs across eight experiments in which participants switched between memory lists to perform speeded classifications, mental arithmetic, or a local recognition test. N-2 list-repetition costs were obtained consistently in conditions assumed to increase interference between memory lists, and when lists formed chunks in long-term memory. Further analyses across experiments revealed a substantial contribution of episodic memory to n-2 list-repetition costs, thereby questioning the interpretation of n-2 repetition costs as reflecting inhibition. We reanalyzed the data of eight task-switching experiments, and observed that episodic memory also contributes to n-2 task-repetition costs. Taken together, these results show analogous processing principles in declarative and procedural WM, and question the relevance of inhibitory processes for efficient switching between mental sets.

Switching between mental sets has been extensively investigated in both experimental and individual differences research using a wide range of task-switch paradigms. However, it is yet unclear whether these different tasks measure a unitary shifting ability or reflect different facets thereof. In this study, 20 task pairs were administered to 119 young adults to assess 5 proposed components of mental set shifting: switching between judgments, stimulus dimensions, stimulus-response mappings, response sets, and stimulus sets. Modeling latent factors for each of the components revealed that a model with 5 separate yet mostly correlated factors fit the data best. In this model, the components most strongly related to the other latent factors were stimulus-response mapping shifting and, to a lesser degree, response set shifting. In addition, both factors were statistically indistinguishable from a second-order general shifting factor. In contrast, shifting between judgments as well as stimulus dimensions consistently required separate factors and could, hence, not fully be accounted for by the general shifting factor. Finally, shifting between stimulus sets was unrelated to any other shifting component but mapping shifting. We conclude that tasks assessing shifting between mappings are most adequate to assess general shifting ability. In contrast, shifting between stimulus sets (e.g., as in the Trail Making Test) probably reflects shifts in visual attention rather than executive shifting ability. (PsycINFO Database Record

The coding of stimuli and responses is crucial for human behaviour. Here, we focused primarily on the response codes (or response categories). As a method, we applied a combined dual-task and task-switch paradigm with a fixed task-to-hand mapping. Usually, negative effects (i.e., costs) are observed for response category repetitions under task switching. However, in several previous studies it has been proposed that such repetition effects do not occur, if the stimulus categories (e.g., “odd” if digits have to be classified according to their parity feature) are unequivocally mapped to specific responses. Our aim was to test this hypothesis. In the present experiments, we were able to distinguish between three different types of possible response codes. The results show that the participants generally code their responses according to abstract response features (left/right, or index/middle finger). Moreover, the spatial codes were preferred over the finger-type codes even if the instructions stressed the latter. This preference, though, seemed to result from a stimulus–response feature overlap, so that the spatial response categories were primed by the respective stimulus features. If there was no such overlap, the instructions determined which type of response code was involved in response selection and inhibition.

Under task switch conditions, response repetitions usually produce benefits if the task also repeats, but costs if the task switches. So far, it is largely undecided how to account for these effects. In the present study, we provide additional evidence in favor of the account that each response is inhibited in order to prevent its accidental re-execution. To test this hypothesis, the risk of an accidental re-execution of a given response was manipulated by modulating the activation of the response in the previous task. In Experiment 1, this was done by means of congruent and incongruent stimuli. As expected, on task switch trials, the repetition costs were larger if a congruent rather than an incongruent stimulus occurred in the previous task. In Experiment 2, the same effect occurred for stimulus-response compatible versus incompatible stimuli in the previous task. In Experiment 3, both manipulations were applied together, which produced almost additive effects. Altogether, the results support the inhibition account for the response repetition effects under task switch conditions.

Repetition effects are often helpful in revealing information about mental structures and processes. Usually, positive effects have been observed when the stimuli or responses are repeated. However, in task shift studies it has also been found that response repetitions can produce negative effects if the task shifts. Although several mechanisms have been proposed to account for this interaction between task shifting and response repetition, many details remain open. Therefore, a series of four experiments was conducted to answer two questions. First, are motor responses necessary to produce response-related repetition effects, or is response activation sufficient? Second, does the risk of an accidental re-execution of the last response affect the repetition costs? The results show that response activation alone can produce repetition effects. Furthermore, the risk of accidental response re-execution largely modulates these effects.

We investigate interference between declarative and procedural representations in working memory (WM). Declarative representations are objects of thought, whereas procedural representations provide the (cognitive) actions to work upon these objects. In eight dual-task experiments we varied the number of representations to be maintained in WM (memory load). In Experiments 1–4, we varied declarative and procedural load separately in the two tasks used. In Experiments 5–8, only declarative or procedural load was manipulated in both tasks employed. We measured how much performance in the currently relevant task was impaired by increasing the load in the currently irrelevant task. These cross-task load effects were larger for Experiment 5–8 compared to Experiment 1–4. Yet, in task-switch trials we also obtained cross-task load effects in Experiment 1–4. Our findings support the distinction of declarative and procedural WM as largely independent sub-systems or distinct representational spaces.

Repetition effects are often viewed as informative regarding the cognitive mechanisms of action control. One particular finding, namely costs for repeating the same response in subsequent trials, especially challenges theorizing. Costs for response repetitions have recently been reported in task-switch studies on task-switch trials (whereas benefits usually arise in task-repetition trials), but also in some choice-RT task studies. In three experiments, two of the most successful accounts for the response-repetition costs in choice-RT task studies and task switching were tested: an expectancy-based explanation, and an inhibition-based account. Using a choice-RT task introduced by Smith (1968) and manipulating the response-stimulus interval (RSI) and the categorizability of the stimuli, some specific predictions of the two accounts were tested. The results clearly revealed that expectancy-based explanations fail to account for the observed patterns of effects, whereas they are well in line with the predictions from the inhibition-based account. Finally, the results are further discussed with respect to alternative accounts from the field of task switching.

Interestingness is said to be the power of attracting or holding one's attention (because something is unusual or exciting, etc.). We, as humans, have the great capacity to direct our visual attention and judge the interestingness of a scene. Consider for example the image sequence in the figure on the right. The spider in front of the camera or the snow on the lens are examples of events that deviate from the context since they violate the expectations, and therefore are considered interesting. On the other hand, weather changes or a camera shift, do not raise human attention considerably, even though large regions of the image are influenced. In this work we firstly investigate what humans consider as "interesting" in image sequences. Secondly we propose a computer vision algorithm to automatically spot these interesting events. To this end, we integrate multiple cues inspired by cognitive concepts and discuss why and to what extent the automatic discovery of visual interestingness is possible.

When rapidly switching between two tasks, bivalent stimuli can accidentally trigger the previously executed and therefore still activated response. Recently, it has been suggested that behavioral response-repetition effects reflect response inhibition that reduces the risk of such erroneous response repetitions. The present study investigated neural correlates of this inhibition process using lateralized readiness potentials (LRP). In three experiments, we demonstrate a response-switch bias emerging during the preparatory interval which is independent of task sequence (Experiment 1), which is linked to task preparation (Experiment 2), and which is present only under task-switching conditions (Experiment 3). These results suggest that the bias reflects a control process that adaptively regulates response preparedness.

Several task-switch studies show that response category repetition is favorable on task repetition trials, but disadvantageous on task switch trials. In the present study we investigated how this interaction depends on the type and number of involved response categories. In a dual-task number-categorization experiment, subjects had to respond to tasks T(1) and T(2) with one of the two fingers of their left and right hand, respectively. For one group of participants, the use of spatial response categories, and for another group the use of finger-type categories was induced. It turned out that the interaction between task switching and response category repetition was clearly related to the induced response categories, but at the same time, the spatial categories nevertheless also affected response selection in the finger-type group. However, these two effects were additive. This shows that multiple response codes can simultaneously be involved in response selection, but that they affect performance differentially.

One of the proposed mechanisms for sequential control in task-shift conditions is backward inhibition (BI), which is usually measured in terms of lag-2 task repetition costs in A-B-A task sequences relative to C-B-A task sequences. By considering the so far existing experiments it seems that these lag-2 repetition costs occur only with temporally overlapping cues and targets. In the present study this issue was further examined in two experiments, in which temporal cue-target overlap was varied blockwise (Experiment 1) and from trial-to-trial (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 shows that lag-2 repetition effects can only be observed with temporally overlapping cues and targets, indicating that there was no BI with temporally separated cues and targets. However, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that both irrelevant task sets are inhibited in this case, and that with temporally overlapping cues and targets only the previously relevant task set is inhibited.