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Objectives The role of self in veridical memory has been extensively studied, but what is the role of self in false memory development across the life span? The current study examined the impact of self-reference on associative false memory in children, younger adults, and older adults, and further investigated possible mechanisms concerning how self-reference might affect false memory in different age groups. Methods Combining a self-reference manipulation with the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm, children, younger adults, and older adults encoded DRM word lists as paired with their own name, another person’s name, or a red square. Later their true and false recognition memory as well as recollection and familiarity were measured. Results A self-enhanced false memory effect was found in all age groups. That is, participants generated more false memories in the self-reference condition relative to the other-reference and neutral conditions. Furthermore, when examining its underlying memory mechanisms, we found that self-reference mainly increased false recollection in younger adults but facilitated familiarity of critical lures in older adults. Discussion Although self-reference increases false memory in both younger and older adults, the underlying mechanisms are different in that older adults have more self-relevant false familiarity while younger adults generate more self-relevant phantom recollection. The current study also has implications for eyewitness reports, suggesting that the self-relevance of memory may be one relevant factor to consider when evaluating potential risk factors of false memory.

False memories can result in severe legal consequences including the imprisonment of innocent people. False memory in eyewitnesses is the largest factor contributing to miscarriages of justice in the United States. To date, no study has focused on how false memories might play a role in the Chinese legal system. The purpose of this review is to summarize the latest findings on false memory and eyewitness testimony in the literature, and to shed some light on how the Chinese legal system may incorporate these experiences into practice. Overall, false memories of eyewitnesses are generated either by external misleading information or by internal cognitive processes; false memories may guide police investigations in the wrong direction or cause eyewitnesses to misidentify an innocent person as the perpetrator. We conclude that specially designed interview protocols such as the Cognitive Interview, warnings given to eyewitnesses, and blind lineup administration may prevent or lower the risk of false memory occurrence.

OBJECTIVES\ud Recent research has shown that false memories can have a positive consequence on human cognition in both children and young adults. The present experiment investigated whether false memories could have similar positive effects by priming solutions to insight-based problems in healthy older adults and people with Alzheimer’s disease.\ud \ud METHODS\ud Participants were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been preceded by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lures were also the solutions to those problems.\ud \ud RESULTS\ud The results showed that regardless of cognitive ability, when the critical lure was falsely recognized, CRAT problems were solved more often and reliably faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list. When the critical lure was not falsely recognized, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different from when there was no DRM priming.\ud \ud DISCUSSION\ud These findings are consistent with predictions from theories of associative activation and demonstrate the importance of automatic spreading activation processes in memory across the lifespan.

Events consist of diverse elements, each processed in specialized neocortical networks, with temporal lobe memory systems binding these elements to form coherent event memories. We provide a novel theoretical analysis of an unexplored consequence of the independence of memory systems for elements and their bindings, 1 that raises the paradoxical prediction that schema-driven false memories can act solely on the binding of event elements despite the superior retrieval of individual elements. This is because if 2, or more, schema-relevant elements are bound together in unexpected conjunctions, the unexpected conjunction will increase attention during encoding to both the elements and their bindings, but only the bindings will receive competition with evoked schema-expected bindings. We test our model by examining memory for object-location bindings in recognition (Study 1) and recall (Studies 2 and 3) tasks. After studying schema-relevant objects in unexpected locations (e.g., pan on a stool in a kitchen scene), participants who then viewed these objects in expected locations (e.g., pan on stove) at test were more likely to falsely remember this object-location pairing as correct, compared with participants that viewed a different unexpected object-location pairing (e.g., pan on floor). In recall, participants were more likely to correctly remember individual schema-relevant objects originally viewed in unexpected, as opposed to expected locations, but were then more likely to misplace these items in the original room scene to expected places, relative to control schema-irrelevant objects. Our theoretical analysis and novel paradigm provide a tool for investigating memory distortions acting on binding processes. (PsycINFO Database Record

In three experiments we investigated the role of automatic and controlled inhibitory retrieval processes in true and false memory development in children and adults. Experiment 1 incorporated a directed forgetting task to examine controlled retrieval inhibition. Experiments 2 and 3 utilized a part-set cue and retrieval practice task to examine automatic retrieval inhibition. In the first experiment, the forget cue had no effect on false recall for adults but reduced false recall for children. In Experiments 2 and 3, both tasks caused retrieval impairments for true and false recall, and this occurred for all age groups. Implicit inhibition, which occurs outside of our conscious control, appears early in childhood. However, because young children do not process false memories as automatically as adults, explicit inhibition can reduce false memory output.

Can false memories have a positive consequence on human cognition? In two experiments, we investigated whether false memories could prime insight problem-solving tasks. Children and adults were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lures were also the solutions to the problems. In Experiment 1, the results showed that regardless of age, when the critical lure was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list. When the critical lure was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different from when there was no DRM priming. In Experiment 2, without an intervening recall test, children and adults still exhibited higher solution rates and faster solution times to CRAT problems that were primed than to those that were not primed. This latter result shows that priming occurred as a result of false memory generation at encoding and not at retrieval during the recall test. Together, these findings demonstrate that when false memories are generated at encoding, they can prime solutions to insight-based problems in both children and adults.

For some time now, questions have been asked about the impact of television and video materials on the cognitive and social development of preschoolers and older children. More recently, these same questions have been asked in relation to the extensive exposure to these media that infants and toddlers are currently experiencing. To answer these questions, we review current research that explicitly targets these concerns and provide new insights into the role these media play in early development.

Across five experiments we examined the role of valence in children's and adults' true and false memories. Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm and either neutral or negative-emotional lists, both adults' (Experiment 1) and children's (Experiment 2) true recall and recognition was better for neutral than negative items, and although false recall was also higher for neutral items, false recognition was higher for negative items. The last three experiments examined adults' (Experiment 3) and children's (Experiments 4 and 5) 1-week long-term recognition of neutral and negative-emotional information. The results replicated the immediate recall and recognition findings from the first two experiments. More important, these experiments showed that although true recognition decreased over the 1-week interval, false recognition of neutral items remained unchanged whereas false recognition of negative-emotional items increased. These findings are discussed in terms of theories of emotion and memory as well as their forensic implications.

One of the most extensively investigated topics in the adult memory literature, dual memory processes, has had virtually no impact on the study of early memory development. The authors remove the key obstacles to such research by formulating a trichotomous theory of recall that combines the traditional dual processes of recollection and familiarity with a reconstruction process. The theory is then embedded in a hidden Markov model that measures all 3 processes with low-burden tasks that are appropriate for even young children. These techniques are applied to a large corpus of developmental studies of recall, yielding stable findings about the emergence of dual memory processes between childhood and young adulthood and generating tests of many theoretical predictions. The techniques are extended to the study of healthy aging and to the memory sequelae of common forms of neurocognitive impairment, resulting in a theoretical framework that is unified over 4 major domains of memory research: early development, mainstream adult research, aging, and neurocognitive impairment. The techniques are also extended to recognition, creating a unified dual process framework for recall and recognition.

In this commentary, assumptions about the nature and development of children's false memories as described in a recent article by C. J. Brainerd, V. F. Reyna, and S. J. Ceci (2008; see record 2008-04614-001) are reviewed. Specifically, questions are raised about what drives the development of false memories in fuzzy-trace theory (FTT). Recent studies that challenge a core assumption of FTT, that false memory illusions increase across development as children learn to establish meaningful connections across items (i.e., establish gist), are discussed. An alternative conceptualization of the development of false memory illusions, associative-activation theory (AAT), is presented. AAT provides as viable an account of the development of false memory illusions as does FTT and anticipates a unique set of outcomes that have recently appeared in the developmental literature on false memory illusions.

A study was conducted to evaluate the (1) developmental course and (2) the temporal sequencing of visual (mirror, photo) and verbal (personal pronoun use) measures of self-recognition as well as the ability to locate a toy from its mirror image in relation to the child's own mirror image. A microgenetic approach was adopted to assess 10 toddlers biweekly between 15 and 23 months of age and for comparison, a cross-section of children tested once across the same age range. Longitudinal data indicated that visual self-recognition emerged gradually and showed wide variability in expression prior to becoming stable, a finding masked in the cross-sectional data where performance appeared to improve abruptly. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal data confirmed that mirror self-recognition was the earliest precursor of the indices of self-recognition to emerge followed by the use of personal pronouns and photo identification. Implications for the emergence and integration of the self are discussed.

Reductions in children's retroactive interference were examined with conceptual recoding. Children learned two 10-item lists of toys; items on the 2nd list could also be classified as vehicles. Some children were not told about this 2nd category, whereas others were told either at the end of acquisition or just prior to the retention test 24 hr later. The results showed that (a) children benefited from the recoding instruction, (b) younger but not older children failed to benefit from the recoding manipulation when it occurred just prior to the retention test, and (c) recoding reduced retroactive interference primarily through affecting storage processes. These results provide new evidence concerning the importance of making information distinctive in storage in children's retention.

The authors review competing theories concerning the emergence and early development of autobiographical memory. It is argued that the differences between these accounts, although important, may be more apparent than real. The crux of these disagreements lies not in what processes are important, but rather, the role these different processes play in the emergence of autobiographical memory and the temporal primacy of these controlling variables. These differences are explored theoretically and then extant as well as new data are brought to bear on these issues. What emerges is a new, more inclusive, multifactorial framework that integrates the controlling variables from diverse perspectives providing a more complete account of the beginnings of autobiographical memory.

Preschool and kindergarten children's retention of stories was examined in the presence of interfering information and instructions to forget. Children learned 2 stories and, 24 hr later, were asked to recall the 1st or 2nd story learned. Some of the children were instructed, either following acquisition or just prior to the retention test, to forget the 2nd, or interfering, story. A model was used to isolate storage and retrieval effects, and the results showed that (a) retroactive interference affected both storage- and retrieval-based forgetting rates for the younger children but only storage-based forgetting rates for the older children, (b) intentional forgetting reduced retroactive interference primarily by attenuating storage-based forgetting regardless of age, (c) intentional forgetting instructions were effective only at acquisition for preschoolers but at both acquisition and retention for kindergarteners, and (d) all children recalled the to-be-forgotten story as well as they recalled the to-be-remembered story. These results are interpreted in terms of reorganization and distinctiveness effects in storage.

In this commentary I discuss the work by Fivush and Schwarzmueller (1998) including some methodological limitations to their study. It is perhaps because of these limitations that the data do not provide support for their linguistic hypothesis concerning the onset of autobiographical memory. The data do, however, address important issues in the study of autobiographical memory, particularly in terms of very long-term retention and reconstruction of unique (and perhaps distinctive) events that are pleasant. This is a welcome change from the typical studies of recall of distinctive life events in which the target event is one that revolves around unpleasant medical procedures. Future research efforts should continue along these lines, although alternative suggestions are made for which theoretical issues need to be addressed and new measures developed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Language: en

In the present experiment, we evaluated the effects of individual differences in reading span and variation in memory demands on class-inclusion performance. One hundred twenty college students whose reading spans ranged from low to medium to high (as indexed by a computerized version of the Daneman and Carpenter [1980] reading-span task) solved 48 class-inclusion problems. Half of the subjects had the solution information available when the problems were presented; the other half performed a detection task between solution information and problem presentation. The results from both standard statistical analyses and from a mathematical model indicated that differences in reading span and memory load had predictable, similar effects. Specifically, the sophistication of reasoning strategies declined when memory demands increased or when reading spans decreased. Surprisingly, these effects were primarily additive. The results were interpreted in terms of global resource models and findings from the developmental literature.

The trace integrity framework, including the associated mathematical model, is used to summarize a corpus of data on the development of children's and adults' long-term retention. The purpose of this review is to get some leverage on what role storage and retrieval processes play in the forgetting and subsequent recovery of memory traces. What this review shows is that (1) forgetting is dominated by storage, not retrieval, failures; (2) trace recovery is dominated by retrieval, not storage, operations; and (3) storage failure rates decline with age in childhood, whereas only modest developments occur in retrieval recovery operations. These findings are then applied to current issues concerning adult recall of childhood memories.

The authors provide a new framework that integrates autobiographical memory with other early achievements (e.g., gesturing, language, concept formation). In this theory, the emergence and early development of autobiographical memory does not require the invocation of specialized neurological or multiple memory mechanisms but rather arises as a natural consequence of developments in related domains including in the "software" that drives general memory functioning. In particular, autobiographical memory emerges contemporaneously with the cognitive self, a knowledge structure whose features serve to organize memories of experiences that happened to "me." Because this cognitive self emerges in the 2nd year of life, the lower limit for early autobiographical memories is set at about 2 years, with subsequent accumulation of memories linked to improvements in children's ability to maintain information in storage.

1. Otgaar, Howe, Schwartz, & Toglia: What is Adaptive Memory? Section 1: Adaptive memory: What are the factors that drove the natural selection of memory? 2. Stanley B. Klein: Evolution, Memory, and the Role of Self-Referent Recall in Planning for the Future 3. Raoul Bell and Axel Buchner: Remembering cheaters 4. Daniel J. Burns and Joshua Hart: Living, Dying and Remembering: The Encoding Processes Involved in Survival Processing Section 2: Adaptive Memory: A Special Case for Survival Information and Processing? 5. Mark L. Howe and Mary H. Derbish: Adaptive memory: Survival processing, ancestral relevance, and the role of elaboration 6. Nicholas C. Soderstrom & Anne M. Cleary: On the Domain-Generality of Survival Processing Advantages in Memory 7. Jeanette Altarriba and Stephanie Kazanas: Survival Processing, Attention, and Interference 8. Toglia, M. P,, Leedy, A. D., Wilde, A. M., Baker, C. M. & & Dacey, E. M. Cognitive and social factors in the study of survival memory 9. Bennett L. Schwartz & Brock R. Brothers: Survival processing does not improve paired-associate learning 10. Edgar Erdfelder & Meike Kroneisen: Proximate cognitive mechanisms underlying the survival processing effect Section 3: Adaptive Memory in Distinctive populations 11. Memory Errors in Adaptive Recollections Henry Otgaar, Mark L. Howe, Tom Smeets, Linsey Raymaekers, & Johan van Beers 12. Linsey Raymaekers, Tom Smeets, Henry Otgaar, Maarten J.V. Peters & Harald Merckelbach: The Adaptive Value of Survival Processing in Childhood Trauma Victims 13. Corrina Maguinness and Fiona N. Newell: Recognising others: Adaptive changes to person recognition throughout the lifespan 14. Jennifer Vonk & Kelly W. Mosteller: Perceptual versus Conceptual Memory Processes in a Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) 15. Patrick Douglas Sellers II and David F. Bjorklund: The Development of Adaptive Memory 16. James S. Nairne. Adaptive Memory: Controversies and Future Directions

In 2 experiments, we examined pre-school, grade 1, and grade 3 children's metamemory about long-term retention. Specifically, we examined beliefs about the type of information most likely to be forgotten and beliefs about the impact of suggestions and retroactive interference on memory. Children made and explained paired-comparison judgments concerning the differential forgetting of peripheral versus central information, whether misinformation effects would arise from suggestions by others, and whether retroactive interference would arise from experiencing two similar events. The major findings were that (a) most children believed that events central to a story would be retained better than peripheral details; (b) in preschool and first grade, children believed that memory was invulnerable to suggestion (from a parent or a sibling), but in third grade, children believed suggestion could adversely affect memory; (c) most preschoolers believed that retroactive interference effects would not occur, whereas most first and third graders acknowledged that they would; (d) older children believed that both suggestibility and interference were less likely given a retention interval of several months compared to 1 day; and (e) in explaining their beliefs, children assigned sensory-behavioral factors a major causal role in determining what would be remembered over the long term. These results are discussed in terms of the development of beliefs about memory and the mind in general.

Classical interference effects were examined in preschool and kindergarten children's paired-associate recall (Experiment 1) and free recall (Experiment 2). Children in the control conditions learned a single picture list, whereas children in the experimental conditions learned 2 picture lists in succession. After 24 hr, children recalled items from the one list they had learned (control conditions), items from only List I (retroactive interference conditions), or items from both lists (modified free-recall conditions). Analyses based on the trace-integrity framework indicated that (a) children were susceptible to interference, (b) the locus of interference effects was at storage, (c) both younger (preschool) and older (kindergarten) children experienced similar amounts of interference, and (d) variations in trace strength generally did not modulate the magnitude of interference effects.

A model of long-term retention was used to eliminate problems in past studies regarding the effects postevent misinformation has on preschoolers' testimony and memory. Half of the 216 preschoolers received a single slide presentation and the remaining half received consecutive presentations until they learned the material to criterion. Children either did not receive postevent information or received either correct or misleading information, presented in narrative or questionnaire form, concerning event details 3 weeks after acquisition. Four weeks after acquisition, all of the children received 4 test trials without further study opportunity. When initial learning was controlled and appropriate measurement techniques were in place, exposure to misleading information encouraged preschoolers to report misinformation. However, the memory-impairing effects of misleading information on original memory were rare.

The present study examined the impact of divided attention on children's and adults' neutral and negative true and false memories in a standard Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm. Children (7- and 11-year-olds; n = 126) and adults (n = 52) received 5 neutral and 5 negative Deese/Roediger-McDermott word lists; half of each group also received a divided attention task. The results showed that divided attention affected children's and adults' false memory levels differently but did not alter true memory differently. Our results revealed a developmental shift in that divided attention lowered children's false memory rates but increased adults' false memory rates, regardless of the nature of the material (i.e., neutral or negative). Our study indicates that manipulations that target conscious processing (e.g., divided attention) result in marked qualitative and quantitative differences between children's and adults' false memories but not true memories.

We provide an introduction to the essential constructs involved in dynamic modeling. These constructs are then related to issues in psychological development. In particular, we discuss stages, states, sequences, and pure transition models as well as cross-sectional and longitudinal experimental designs. We conclude that transition is a key invariance in development and that single subject, longitudinal designs are essential in studying the dynamics of ontogeny.

An overview of the models and data relevant to children′s transitive reasoning is provided. We propose a new conceptual framework, one which is embedded in a dynamic model that accounts for children′s failures to reason transitively. It is assumed that rather than reasoning in a transitive manner, children often encode both relational and absolute stimulus information and use stimulus generalization as a transfer mechanism. The model is applied to new and extant data. The model provides an adequate and parsimonious account of children′s failures on these tasks. We conclude that progress in understanding children′s reasoning is dependent on operationalizing constructs in formal models so that assumptions can be evaluated and rejected.

In this article, we focus on two issues, namely, the nature and onset of very early personal memories, especially for traumatic events, and the role of stress in long-term retention. We begin by outlining a theory of early autobiographical memory, one whose unfolding is coincident with emergence of the cognitive self. It is argued that it is not until this self emerges that personal memories will remain viable over extended periods of time. We illustrate this with 25 cases of young children′s long-term retention of early traumatic events involving emergency room treatment. On the basis of both qualitative (case profiles) and quantitative (analysis of covariance) analyses, we conclude that (a) very young children (under the age of 2 years) retain limited memories for events which they commonly express behaviorally, (b) coherent autobiographical memories are not constructed until the child develops a cognitive sense of self (on average, at 24 months of age), (c) autobiographical memories for traumatic events are essentially no different from those for nontraumatic events, (d) stress is only related to long-term retention inasmuch as it is one variable that serves to make an event unique, and (e) like nontraumatic events, traumatic memories lose peripheral details during the retention interval and retain the central components of the event. These results are discussed both in terms of their implications for theories of early autobiographical memory as well as the ways in which we might differentiate implanted (or false) memories and authentic memories for traumatic events.

Three experiments investigated the effects of test-induced priming (TIP) on false recognition in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott procedure (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In Experiment 1, TIP significantly increased false recognition for participants who made old/new decisions at test but not for participants who made remember/know judgments or were given diagnostic information to help them avoid false recognition. In Experiment 2, a TIP effect was observed with old/new recognition but not when participants were required to remember whether study items were spoken by a male or a female speaker. In Experiment 3, false recognition increased when critical lures were preceded by 10 studied items but not when preceded by 5 studied and 5 unstudied items from the same list. These findings suggest that TIP increases false recognition by disrupting source monitoring processes.

Effects of reinstatement were examined in 2 1/2-year-olds' (Experiment 1) and 3 1/2-year-olds' (Experiments 2 and 3) long-term retention. Children learned object-location pairings and, 3 weeks later, were provided with postevent information consistent with the originally acquired pairings. One week later (4 weeks since acquisition), children were given 4 test trials. Analyses based on the trace-integrity framework indicated that, regardless of age, reinstatement (a) improved children's long-term retention, (b) affected both forgetting and reminiscence, and (c) affected both storage and retrieval processes, in particular, inoculating memories against storage-related forgetting processes

Most theories suppose that during unconstrained retrieval easy-to-retrieve items will be accessed before hard-to-retrieve items. Recent free-recall studies have supported a different access order, the cognitive triage pattern, in which hard-to-retrieve items are accessed first. The present experiments demonstrated that this pattern enhances total recall. In Experiments 1-3, clustering type measures of goodness of triage (grouping output according to items' levels of retrievability) predicted total recall in children and adults. In Experiments 4 and 5, goodness-of-triage measures predicted total recall when they were derived from on-line information about retrievability (error-success histories), but not when they were derived from normative information about retrievability (frequency and meaningfulness ratings)

The authors provide a critical evaluation of the use of stochastic independence in psychological research. Specifically, they consider problems of confirming the null hypothesis, power of the statistical test, Simpson's paradox, and between-subjects and within-subject correlations. These problems are discussed in the context of research on theories of memory and cognitive development and illustrated with data on reasoning-remembering relationships. The authors conclude that demonstrations of response independence do not, by themselves, provide sufficient grounds for deciding whether a single process or multiple processes are necessary to account for performance. Instead, they argue that formal models are necessary if findings of (in)dependence are to be interpreted meaningfully in terms of underlying theoretical processes.

Previous research has suggested that false memories can prime performance on related implicit and explicit memory tasks. The present research examined whether false memories can also be used to prime higher order cognitive processes, namely, insight-based problem solving. Participants were asked to solve a number of compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lure was also the solution to the problem. The results showed that when the critical lure: (a) was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list and (b) was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different than when there was no DRM priming. A second experiment demonstrated that these outcomes were not a simple artifact of the inclusion of a recall test prior to the problem solving task. The implications of these results are discussed with regard to the previous literature on priming and the adaptive function of false memories.

In two experiments, we investigated the robustness and automaticity of adults' and children's generation of false memories by using a levels-of-processing paradigm (Experiment 1) and a divided attention paradigm (Experiment 2). The first experiment revealed that when information was encoded at a shallow level, true recognition rates decreased for all ages. For false recognition, when information was encoded on a shallow level, we found a different pattern for young children compared with that for older children and adults. False recognition rates were related to the overall amount of correctly remembered information for 7-year-olds, whereas no such association was found for the other age groups. In the second experiment, divided attention decreased true recognition for all ages. In contrast, children's (7- and 11-year-olds) false recognition rates were again dependent on the overall amount of correctly remembered information, whereas adults' false recognition was left unaffected. Overall, children's false recognition rates changed when levels of processing or divided attention was manipulated in comparison with adults. Together, these results suggest that there may be both quantitative and qualitative changes in false memory rates with age.

Executive functions (EF) are those higher-level cognitive activities that include the monitoring and self-regulation of attention, thought, and action, and the ability to plan behavior and to inhibit inappropriate responses. These cognitive control processes are voluntary and effortful and have been described as providing a system for overriding routine or reflexive behavior in favor of more situationally appropriate and adaptive behavior (Shallice, 1988). As such, these processes are integrally tied to the functioning and development of working memory (WM) (see Cowan & Alloway, 2009). The significance of EF is evident in developmental conditions such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, autism, and fetal alcoholism spectrum disorder that are characterized by poor executive functioning across a variety of behavioral domains. Executive functioning activities are immature in infancy and toddlerhood but develop slowly over the preschool years and continue to be fine-tuned into adolescence. For example, research shows that 2-, 3-, and most 4-year-olds consistently perform poorly on a variety of tasks that require the ability to inhibit a prepotent but inappropriate response in a conflict task (e.g., dimensional switching), to demonstrate the theory of mind reasoning (e.g., false belief task), to mentally represent an object in two different ways simultaneously (e.g., the appearance-reality distinction task), or to execute a plan (e.g., motor sequencing tasks). In contrast, 5- and 6-year-olds succeed on these tasks, although some of the more sophisticated iterations of these will not be successfully performed until later childhood or adolescence (for a discussion see Goswami, 2007).

The fate of our earliest autobiographical memories has been a matter of intense speculation for over a century (e.g., Freud, 1905/1953; Henri & Henri, 1895). The enduring interest in this topic has become stronger over the past few decades as important mental health and forensic questions on the accuracy and durability of adults’ memories of childhood experiences have required answers. Coincident with (and partly as a consequence of) these questions, researchers have examined the fate of early memories in normally developing children and adults (for a review, see Howe, 2000). With this research direction, the emphasis shifted from the offset of infantile amnesia to its converse – the onset and development of autobiographical memory. We (e.g., Howe & Courage, 1993, 1997; Howe, Courage, & Edison, 2003; Howe, Courage, & Rooksby, 2009) have maintained that the necessary though not sufficient foundation for this achievement is the emergence of the cognitive self. The cognitive self refers to that objective aspect of the self that embodies the unique and recognizable features and characteristics that constitute one’s self concept, or “me.” This sense of the self contrasts with a different but related facet of the self that comprises the more subjective aspects of the self as a thinker, knower, and causal agent, or “I” (for a review see Courage & Howe, 2002). The cognitive self becomes stable at about 2 years of age and serves as a new organizer around which events can be encoded, stored, and retrieved as personal; that is, rather than being a memory for something that has happened, it is a memory of something that happened to “me.” Subsequent developments in basic memory processes (e.g., encoding, storage, and retrieval) as well as language and other aspects of social cognition serve to elaborate and refine characteristics of the self and help to shape the nature and durability of autobiographical recall.

The effects of embedding standard Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists into stories whose context biased interpretation either toward or away from the overall themes of the DRM lists on both true and false recognition were investigated with 7- and 11-year-olds. These biased story contexts were compared with the same children's susceptibility to false memory illusions using the standard DRM list presentation paradigm. The results showed the usual age effects for true and false memories in the standard DRM list paradigm, where 11-year-olds exhibited higher rates of both true and false recognition compared with the 7-year-olds. Importantly, when DRM lists were embedded in stories, these age effects disappeared for true recognition. For false recognition, although developmental differences were attenuated, older children were still more susceptible to false memory illusions than younger children. These findings are discussed in terms of current theories of children's false memories as well as the role of themes and elaboration in children's memory development.

We investigated children’s ability to generate associations and how automaticity of associative activation unfolds developmentally. Children generated associative responses using a single associate paradigm (Experiment 1) or a Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM)-like multiple associates paradigm (Experiment 2). The results indicated that children’s ability to generate meaningful word associates, and the automaticity with which they were generated, increased between 5, 7, and 11 years of age. These findings suggest that children’s domain-specific knowledge base and the associative connections among related concepts are present and continue to develop from a very early age. Moreover, there is an increase in how these concepts are automatically activated with age, something that results from domain-general developments in speed of processing. These changes are consistent with the neurodevelopmental literature and together may provide a more complete explanation of the development of memory illusions.

When children and adults retrieve words during unconstrained recall, it is commonly supposed that words will present themselves to consciousness in decreasing order of memory strength, which means that their order of readout should be stronger --~ weaker. In contrast, fuzzy-trace theory proposes a counterintuitive nonmonotonic relationship between order of readout and memory strength. This relationship, which we call cognitive triage, arises from the theory's interpretation of recall as a dynamic system in which the influences of three variables (memory strength, episodic activation, and output interference) must be balanced to maximize recall. Because fuzzy-trace theory anticipates ontogenetic variations in cognitive triage, we studied it developmentally. A series of nine experiments produced several findings that were consistent with the theory's assumptions: Children never recalled stronger words before weaker words, doing the reverse instead; the priority of weaker words over stronger words in output queues was observed in the earliest phases of learning in both younger and older children; as learning progressed and children secured more reliable information about the relative memory strengths of words, a weaker--~ stronger --~ weaker ordering emerged, and it emerged more rapidly in older children; at criterion, when all items were recallable, the weaker ~ stronger --~ weaker ordering was present at all age levels, although it was more pronounced in older children. We show how the theory's assumptions also explain some classic findings about the development of recall, especially subjective organization and serial-position effects.

When items are read out of storage during unconstrained recall, how should their memory strengths affect recall order? Commonsense argues that items will present themselves to consciousness in the order of their relative memory strength and that, hence, the read out sequence will be stronger to weaker. In experiments with 6- to 13-year-olds, however, this sequence was never obtained. Dichotomous measures of memory strength (strong vs. weak) showed that weak items were always recalled before strong items. Continuous measures of memory strength showed that the sequence was weaker to stronger to weaker. This pattern, which we term the cognitive triage effect, occurred at all age levels, for a variety of material, with different definitions of memory strength, and became more pronounced with age. Three results suggested that the pattern was not due to a deliberate strength-based ordering strategy: The pattern was observed in children as young as age 6; it was present at the earliest stages of recall; and adults (who also exhibited the pattern) were unaware of what they were doing.

Cognitive triage is a surprising nonmonotonic relationship that exists between the order in which children read words out of long-term memory and the memory strengths of those same words. Two forgetting experiments with 7- and 12-year-old children are reported in which fuzzy-trace theory's explanation of this effect was pitted against an effortful processing explanation. The two explanations make different predictions about the relative rates of forgetting for words that are recalled at the primacy and recency positions of output queues. The data consistently favored fuzzy-trace theory's predictions. We discuss the implications of our results for two assumptions that are commonly made in theories of memory development—namely, that recall accuracy is a monotonic-increasing function of memory strength and that recall order is a monotonic-decreasing function of memory strength.

A variety of resource and nonresource constructs relevant to cognitive development are described. An introduction to, and evaluation of, four resource-based neo-Piagetian models follows. Alternative models are then described. We conclude that the literature is rich in data and constructs, but that the link between them is frustratingly vague. Formal modeling, either computer- or mathematically based, seems to be the only way to establish this link.

Improvements in 5- and 7-year-olds' acquisition and retention of related concept pairings were examined when additional similarities and differences between pair members were provided. Using a standard paired-associate learning paradigm, children learned 18 related picture pairs; some of the children either were given or produced additional similarities or differences between pair members at the time of learning. Three weeks after learning was complete, children attempted to recall the pairs. Using a model to determine the storage and retrieval loci of these effects, the results showed that (a) all children benefited from self-generated elaborations, regardless of whether these were similarities or differences, and these benefits were storage related, and (b) difference elaborations improved children's retention regardless of whether they were self- or experimenter-generated, and these effects were primarily retrieval based. These results are consistent with theories that (a) view retrieval as the locus of distinctiveness effects and (b) view storage as the locus of self-generated memory improvements.

The role of categorical versus associative relations in 5-, 7-, and 11-year-old children's true and false memories was examined using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm and categorized lists of pictures or words with or without category labels as primes. For true items, recall increased with age and categorized lists were better recalled than DRM lists. For false items, recall increased with age except for picture lists, there were no differences between categorized and DRM lists and no effect of priming, and there were fewer false memories for pictures than words. Like adults, children's false memories are based on associative not thematic relations, whereas their veridical memories depend on both. This new, developmentally invariant dissociation is consistent with knowledge- and resource-based models of memory development.

Differences in basic memory processes between maltreated and nonmaltreated children were examined in an experiment in which middle-socioeconomic-status (SES; N = 60), low-SES maltreated (N = 48), and low-SES nonmaltreated (N =51) children (ages 5-7, 8-9, and 10-12 years) studied 12 Deese - Roediger - McDermott lists. Using recall and recognition measures, the results showed that both true and false memories increased with age and, contrary to some speculation, these trends did not differ as a function of maltreatment status. However, there were differences in overall memory performance as a function of SES. These results are discussed in the broader framework of children's memory development and the effects of the chronic stress associated with child maltreatment on basic memory processes. Historically, there has been considerable debate about whether emotional experiences cause memory to operate differently from what is considered normal (Howe, 2000; Toth & Cicchetti, 1998). In an attempt to resolve this debate, some researchers have focused on two affective dimensions: arousal and valence. Both dimensions are represented as continua with arousal ranging from calm to excitement and valence ranging from pleasant to unpleasant (e.g., Bradley & Lang, 1994). Using these definitions, cognitive neuroscientists have found that information from emotional events may enjoy privileged access to processing resources, resources that may lead to the creation of superior memories (e.g., Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002). Although such research is key to our understanding of the theoretical mechanisms underlying memory for emotional events, the extent of emotion studied in the laboratory is necessarily limited to a restricted range on both the arousal and valence continua. If our goal is to understand how emotions associated with everyday experiences affect memory in general as well as memory for the emotional experiences themselves, then more extreme ends of these continua need to be examined.

The authors review several key areas of early cognitive development in which an abrupt shift in ability at the end of the second year of life has been traditionally assumed. These areas include deferred imitation, self-recognition, language, and categorization. Contrary to much conventional theorizing, the evidence shows robust continuities in all domains of early cognitive development. Where there is evidence of a reorganization of behavior that makes a new level of performance possible, dynamic-systems analyses indicate that even these may be driven by underlying processes that are continuous. Although there remain significant definitional and methodological issues to be resolved, the outcome of this review augers well for newer models in which cognitive development is viewed as a continuous, dynamic process.

We studied the effects of individual differences in speak-span scores and variations in memory demands on the class-inclusion performance of 10-, 13-, and 15-year-old children. The speak-span task was an age-appropriate modification of Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) reading-span task and was considered to be a measure of global resources. The age variable was assumed to be a global index of skill development, and some of the specific skills hypothesized to be important in class-inclusion reasoning were estimated using a mathematical model. The results from both regression analyses and the mathematical model indicated that differences in age, speak span, and memory load all affected performance. Surprisingly, the effects of speak span and memory load were independent. However, the effects of each of these variables depended on the age level of the participants. Based on these findings, we argued that (a) resources vary continuously with age, (b) both skill level and global resources should be varied in developmental studies of problem solving, and (c) resource theories (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986) should be modified to account for developmental change.

Using a paired-comparison procedure, we examined the effect of familiarization variables on 3.5-month-old infants' (n = 120) retention of dynamic visual stimuli after 1-min, 1-day, and 1-month delays. The proportion of total looking time to the novel stimulus revealed novelty, null, and familiarity preferences after 1-min, 1-day, and 1-month delays, respectively, for infants who were permitted 30 s of familiarization time. Twenty seconds of familiarization time was insufficient to produce novelty preferences. These results support models of infant retention in which the direction of attentional preferences (novel, familiar, or null) depends on memory accessibility. To examine the impact of individual differences in familiarization or attentional style on memory, infants were identified as long or short lookers according to their peak-look duration on pretest and familiarization trial measures. Compared to long lookers, short lookers showed better retention over time indicating that much of the variability in the infant group data could be accounted for by these individual differences.

It is argued that memory for traumatic events is similar to that for other distinctive, personally significant events regardless of whether they are affectively positive or negative. Examined in this light, the focus now shifts to the role of individual differences in neurobiological, social, cognitive, and constitutional factors that conspire to determine long-term retention of significant autobiographical experiences. What is known about these factors in determining memorability is reviewed, issues of measurement inadequacies discussed, and recommendations for further research outlined.

Using paired-comparisons, 3-month-olds' ( n = 148) recognition of dynamic visual events was investigated after retention intervals of 1 minute, 1 day, and 1 and 3 months (Experiment 1) and 1 minute, 1 day, and 1 week (Experiment 2). Participants were either tested at each retention interval (Multiple Tests) or tested at one interval (Single Test). The proportion of total looking time to the novel event and the length of the longest look to novel and familiar events in the first 15 s of the retention test revealed significant novelty preferences at 1 minute and 1 day and a null preference at 1 week for Multiple- and Single-Test groups. At 1 month, Multiple- (Proportion of Total Looking Time and Longest Look) and Single-Test groups (Longest Look only) preferred the familiar event. The 3-month test revealed a familiarity preference (both measures) for Single- and a null preference for Multiple-Tests groups. This changing pattern of attentional preferences is consistent with models of infant recognition memory in which novelty, familiarity, and null preferences are considered conjointly and hypothesized to reflect the accessibility of novel and familiar event representations in memory.

We investigated the possibility that age differences in infants’ long-term retention are artifacts of correlated differences in learning rates or learning opportunities (overlearning). Using path analytic procedures, these possibilities were examined in two experiments in which 15- and 18-month-olds (Experiment 1) and 12- and 15-month-olds (Experiment 2) learned five novel activities to a strict acquisition criterion. Three months later, infants’ retention was tested using four test trials with no further study opportunities. Using a series of causal models to test the relationships between age, learning rate, learning opportunities, and forgetting rate, the results disconfirmed the artifact hypothesis. These analyses indicated that, at least for criterion-learning designs, developmental declines in forgetting rates between 12 and 18 months of age do exist independent of developmental differences in learning. Furthermore, age differences in forgetting rates are not confounded with age differences in “overlearning.” These findings are discussed in terms of the growing body of evidence that attests to the continuity of memory development across childhood.