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In three task-switching experiments, we investigated the relationship of n-1 switch cost and n-2 repetition cost. N-1 switch cost is observed when participants are asked to switch from one classification task to another, e.g., from judging a digit as odd or even to judging a digit as smaller or larger than five. N-2 repetition cost is observed when participants are asked to switch among three tasks (thereafter called A, B, and C). This cost is observed when the task on trial n-2 is repeated in trial n (i.e., in task sequences like ABA) compared to when it is switched (i.e., in task sequences like CBA). So far, the n-1 switch cost is assumed to be caused either by reconfiguration processes or by episodic-memory inertia from the previously activated task-set. N-2 repetition cost is thought to reflect lingering inhibitory processes for resolving conflict among tasks. Whereas both views are integrated in some models, it is up to date unclear whether n-2 repetition cost is related to n-1 switch cost. To examine this relationship, we decomposed the processes underlying n-1 switch cost and n-2 repetition cost using a diffusion model analysis as well as a linear ballistic accumulator model. The results showed that n-1 switch cost reflects interference caused by the residual activation of the previous task set as indicated by slower evidence accumulation processes. In contrast, there were no consistent parameter modulations underlying n-2 repetition cost. These findings emphasize that different cognitive processes are involved in n-1 switch cost and n-2 repetition cost., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Aging has been assumed to go along with deficient inhibitory processes in cognitive performance. According to this inhibition deficit hypothesis, older adults are less able to suppress or ignore irrelevant thoughts and actions than young adults are. This hypothesis has been investigated in a large number of studies. We conducted a meta-analysis to determine whether there is an inhibition deficit in older age and whether this deficit is general or task-specific. We selected 176 studies in which young and older adults were tested on tasks commonly assumed to measure inhibition (i.e., the color Stroop, flanker, Simon, stop-signal, go/no-go, global-local, positive and negative compatibility tasks, as well as the paradigm assessing n-2 repetition costs in task switching). For most tasks (i.e., the color Stroop, flanker, and local tasks, as well as the n-2 repetition costs), the results speak against an inhibition deficit in older age. Only in a few tasks (i.e., the go/no-go and stop-signal tasks), older adults showed impaired inhibition. Moreover, for four tasks (i.e., the Simon, global, positive and negative compatibility tasks), the results suggest that more studies are necessary to draw a firm conclusion. Together, the present findings call into question the hypothesis of a general inhibition deficit in older age.

The question whether being bilingual yields cognitive benefits is highly controversial with prior studies providing inconsistent results. Failures to replicate the bilingual advantage have been attributed to methodological factors such as comparing dichotomous groups and measuring cognitive abilities separately with single tasks. Therefore, the authors evaluated the 4 most prominent hypotheses of bilingual advantages for inhibitory control, conflict monitoring, shifting, and general cognitive performance by assessing bilingualism on 3 continuous dimensions (age of acquisition, proficiency, and usage) in a sample of 118 young adults and relating it to 9 cognitive abilities each measured by multiple tasks. Linear mixed-effects models accounting for multiple sources of variance simultaneously and controlling for parents' education as an index of socioeconomic status revealed no evidence for any of the 4 hypotheses. Hence, the authors' results suggest that bilingual benefits are not as broad and as robust as has been previously claimed. Instead, earlier effects were possibly due to task-specific effects in selective and often small samples., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved.)

Task inhibition was explored in two experiments that employed a paradigm in which participants switched among three tasks. Two tasks required manual choice responses based on numerical judgment (parity or magnitude), whereas a third task required an unconditional double-press of both response keys. Both experiments showed that switching to a just-abandoned task (n-2 task repetition) generally leads to a performance cost relative to switching to another task. Specifically, this task inhibition effect also occurred for the double-press task, suggesting inhibition of response mode. Prolonging the task-cuing interval showed that advance task preparation reduced only inhibition of the double-press task but not of the choice tasks (Experiment 1). Prolonging the response-cue interval led to a decrease of the inhibition effect in all tasks (Experiment 2), suggesting a time-based release of task inhibition. Together, the experiments support the notion of a response-related component of task inhibition.

Conflicts in working memory (WM) can occur when retrieval cues activate competing items, which impairs the efficiency of retrieval. It has recently been shown that WM retrieval adapts similarly to these conflicts as predicted by conflict monitoring theory for selective attention tasks. Here, we utilized event‐related potentials (ERPs) to investigate whether conflict and adaptive control in WM are reflected by the same neural markers that have previously been described for selective attention tasks. In our task, participants encoded two differently colored memory lists that contained four digits each (i.e., 2 5 7 1 and 4 5 9 1), and had to recognize whether a probe item from a specific list and position was correct or incorrect. Conflict during retrieval emerged when digits at corresponding positions (e.g., 2 and 5 at the first position) were different (incongruent), but not when these digits were the same (congruent). In behavioral data, we found a congruency sequence effect, that is, responses to incongruent probe items were slower, and this effect was reduced following trials with incongruent probe items. In ERPs, this behavioral marker of adaptive control was accompanied by two effects. First, congruency affected the amplitude of an N450, and this conflict effect was reduced after incongruent trials. Second, the posterior P3 amplitude varied with the congruency of the current and the previous trial. Both results resemble those found for the Stroop task and thus highlight the similarity between conflict and adaptive control in WM and selective attention tasks. Our study links theoretical ideas from two research fields—working memory (WM) and adaptive cognitive control. Utilizing event‐related potentials, our findings show that adaptive cognitive control in WM is reflected by the same neural markers as adaptive cognitive control of selective attention. Furthermore, our results suggest that adaptive cognitive control plays a critical role in optimizing the use of limited WM storage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many researchers have employed secondary tasks, which have to be performed in parallel with a primary task requirement, to examine how successful task selection is accomplished in the context of task switching. The influence of such a secondary task on the observed switch cost (i.e., the cost arising when the currently relevant task differs from the task performed most recently) is seen as indicative that cognitive processes such as self-instruction are involved. Most secondary tasks chosen so far have required the repeated utterance of a word or syllable or a rhythmic movement of the foot. In the present study, we manipulated the dynamics of the to-be-performed secondary task (i.e., a repeated utterance or movement, or a static task that involved similar muscles—holding a spattle in the mouth or pressing keys). Additionally, we tested for modality-specific influences by asking participants to perform a dynamic or nondynamic (i.e., static) secondary task with two effector systems, namely oral and manual. Overall, our secondary tasks led to a reduced (rather than an increased) switch cost, as compared to a control condition without any secondary task. This reduction in switch cost was dependent on the secondary-task dynamics but independent of the effectors involved, showing larger switch-cost reductions for dynamic secondary tasks. To explain this finding, we suggest that performing secondary tasks interferes with the formation of episodic-memory traces that would lead to retrieval benefits in the case of a task repetition, so that our reduced task-switch costs actually represent reduced repetition benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working memory (WM) holds and manipulates representations for ongoing cognition. Oberauer ( Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 51, 45-100, 2009) distinguishes between two analogous WM sub-systems: a declarative WM which handles the objects of thought, and a procedural WM which handles the representations of (cognitive) actions. Here, we assessed whether analogous effects are observed when participants switch between memory sets (declarative representations) and when they switch between task sets (procedural representations). One mechanism assumed to facilitate switching in procedural WM is the inhibition of previously used, but currently irrelevant task sets, as indexed by n-2 task-repetition costs (Mayr & Keele, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(1), 4-26, 2000). In this study we tested for an analogous effect in declarative WM. We assessed the evidence for n-2 list-repetition costs across eight experiments in which participants switched between memory lists to perform speeded classifications, mental arithmetic, or a local recognition test. N-2 list-repetition costs were obtained consistently in conditions assumed to increase interference between memory lists, and when lists formed chunks in long-term memory. Further analyses across experiments revealed a substantial contribution of episodic memory to n-2 list-repetition costs, thereby questioning the interpretation of n-2 repetition costs as reflecting inhibition. We reanalyzed the data of eight task-switching experiments, and observed that episodic memory also contributes to n-2 task-repetition costs. Taken together, these results show analogous processing principles in declarative and procedural WM, and question the relevance of inhibitory processes for efficient switching between mental sets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When participants rapidly switch between tasks that share the same stimuli and responses, task confusions (i.e., the accidental application of the wrong task) can occur. The present study investigated whether these task confusions result from failures of endogenous control (i.e., from ineffective task preparation) or from failures of exogenous control (i.e., from stimulus-induced task conflicts). The frequency of task confusions was estimated by considering the relative proportion of distractor errors, that is, errors that result when participants erroneously respond to the distractor associated with the alternative task. In Experiment 1, the efficiency of exogenous control was manipulated by varying the temporal order of target and distractor presentation. In Experiment 2, the efficiency of endogenous control was manipulated by varying the time available for preparing the task in advance. It turned out that only the efficiency of exogenous control but not the efficiency of endogenous control influenced the proportion of distractor errors. Accordingly, task confusions are more related to failures in exogenous control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate interference between declarative and procedural representations in working memory (WM). Declarative representations are objects of thought, whereas procedural representations provide the (cognitive) actions to work upon these objects. In eight dual-task experiments we varied the number of representations to be maintained in WM (memory load). In Experiments 1–4, we varied declarative and procedural load separately in the two tasks used. In Experiments 5–8, only declarative or procedural load was manipulated in both tasks employed. We measured how much performance in the currently relevant task was impaired by increasing the load in the currently irrelevant task. These cross-task load effects were larger for Experiment 5–8 compared to Experiment 1–4. Yet, in task-switch trials we also obtained cross-task load effects in Experiment 1–4. Our findings support the distinction of declarative and procedural WM as largely independent sub-systems or distinct representational spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key feature of the human cognitive system is its ability to deal with an ever-changing environment. One prototypical example is the observation that we adjust our information processing depending on the conflict-likelihood of a context (context-specific proportion congruency effect, CSPC, Crump et al., 2006). Recently, empirical studies started to question the role of consciousness in these strategic adaptation processes (for reviews, see Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012; Kunde et al., 2012). However, these studies have not yielded unequivocal results (e.g., Kunde, 2003; Heinemann et al., 2009; Van Gaal et al., 2010a; Desender et al., 2013; Reuss et al., 2014). In the present study, we aim at replicating the experiment of Heinemann et al. (2009) in which the proportion of congruent and incongruenttrials between different contexts was varied in a masked priming task. Their results showed a reduction of the congruency effect for the context with more incongruent trials. However, this CSPC effect was only observed when the prime-target conflict was conscious, rather than unconscious, suggesting that context-specific control operates within the boundaries of awareness. Our replication attempt however contrasts these findings. In the first experiment we found no evidence for a CSPC effect in reaction times (RTs), neither in the conscious nor in the unconscious condition. The error rate analysis did show a CSPC effect, albeit not one modulated by consciousness. In the second experiment we found an overall CSPC effect in RTs, independent of consciousness. The error rates did not display a CSPC pattern. These mixed results seem to nuance the findings of Heinemann etal. (2009) and highlight the need for replication studies in psychology research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human cognitive system is equipped with various processes for dealing with everyday challenges. One of such processes is the inhibition of currently irrelevant goals or mental task-sets, which can be seen as a response to the critical event of information overflow in the cognitive system and challenging the cognitive system's ability to keep track of ongoing demands. In two experiments, we investigate the flexibility of the inhibitory process by inserting rare non-critical events (25% of all trials), operationalized as univalent stimuli (i.e., unambiguous stimuli that call for only one specific task in a multitasking context), and by introducing the possibility to prepare for an upcoming task (Experiment 2). We found that the inhibitory process is not influenced by a cue informing subjects about the upcoming occurrence of a univalent stimulus. However, the introduction of univalent stimuli allowed preparatory processes to modify the impact of the inhibitory process. Therefore, our results suggest that inhibitory processes are engaged in a rather global manner, not taking into account variations in stimulus valence, which we took as operationalization of critical, conflict-inducing events in the ongoing stream of information processing. However, rare uncritical events, such as univalent stimuli that do not cause conflict and interference in the processing stream, appear to alter the way the cognitive system can take advantage of preparatory processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]