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Causal illusion has been proposed as a cognitive mediator of pseudoscientific beliefs. However, previous studies have only tested the association between this cognitive bias and a closely related but different type of unwarranted beliefs, those related to superstition and paranormal phenomena. Participants (n = 225) responded to a novel questionnaire of pseudoscientific beliefs designed for this study. They also completed a contingency learning task in which a possible cause, infusion intake, and a desired effect, headache remission, were actually non-contingent. Volunteers with higher scores on the questionnaire also presented stronger causal illusion effects. These results support the hypothesis that causal illusions might play a fundamental role in the endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs., (© 2020 The British Psychological Society.)

Many theories of causal learning and causal induction differ in their assumptions about how people combine the causal impact of several causes presented in compound. Some theories propose that when several causes are present, their joint causal impact is equal to the linear sum of the individual impact of each cause. However, some recent theories propose that the causal impact of several causes needs to be combined by means of a noisy-OR integration rule. In other words, the probability of the effect given several causes would be equal to the sum of the probability of the effect given each cause in isolation minus the overlap between those probabilities. In the present series of experiments, participants were given information about the causal impact of several causes and then they were asked what compounds of those causes they would prefer to use if they wanted to produce the effect. The results of these experiments suggest that participants actually use a variety of strategies, including not only the linear and the noisy-OR integration rules, but also averaging the impact of several causes.

The propositional or rationalist Bayesian approach to learning is contrasted with an interpretation of causal learning in associative terms. A review of the development of the use of rational causal models in the psychology of learning is discussed concluding with the presentation of three areas of research related to cause-effect learning. We explain how rational context choices, a selective association effect (i.e., blocking of inhibition) as well as causal structure can all emerge from processes that can be modeled using elements of standard associative theory. We present the auto-associator (e.g., Baetu & Baker, 2009) as one such simple account of causal structure.

Pseudoscientific beliefs are widespread and have potentially harmful consequences. Being able to identify their presence and recognize the factors characterizing their endorsement is crucial to understanding their prevalence. In this preregistered study, we validated the English version of the Pseudoscience Endorsement Scale and investigated its correlates. A group of volunteers (n = 510), representative of the U.S. population, responded to this scale and to questionnaires measuring the presence of paranormal, denialist, and conspiracist beliefs. The validation resulted in a shorter version of the scale, the sPES. Participants also completed a scientific literacy questionnaire as well as bullshit detection and cognitive reflection tests. Scores obtained on the questionnaires corresponding to different unwarranted beliefs correlated with each other, suggesting a possible common basis. Scientific knowledge, cognitive reflection scores, and bullshit sensitivity were negatively associated with scores on the pseudoscience scale. Of note, bullshit receptivity was the main contributor in a model predicting pseudoscience endorsement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive biases such as causal illusions have been related to paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs and, thus, pose a real threat to the development of adequate critical thinking abilities. We aimed to reduce causal illusions in undergraduates by means of an educational intervention combining training-in-bias and training-in-rules techniques. First, participants directly experienced situations that tend to induce the Barnum effect and the confirmation bias. Thereafter, these effects were explained and examples of their influence over everyday life were provided. Compared to a control group, participants who received the intervention showed diminished causal illusions in a contingency learning task and a decrease in the precognition dimension of a paranormal belief scale. Overall, results suggest that evidence-based educational interventions like the one presented here could be used to significantly improve critical thinking skills in our students. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We agree with Jones & Love (J&L) that much of Bayesian modeling has taken a fundamentalist approach to cognition; but we do not believe in the potential of Bayesianism to provide insights into psychological processes. We discuss the advantages of associative explanations over Bayesian approaches to causal induction, and argue that Bayesian models have added little to our understanding of human causal reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]