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A crucial point for urban design is the acknowledgement that urban material structures are not only constituting a set of cognitive-cultural affordances that shapes people's behavior and experiential world, but likewise that the design process itself is an expression of cultural conceptualizations possibly evoked by ongoing cultural practices and perceptions, thus forming a dynamic loop. In this paper, we outline a framework for the study of material, cultural and social mechanisms interacting with human cognition, behavior and emotions. We attempt a conceptual model that integrates dynamic interactions between cognitive-cultural affordances and our conceptualization of the environment and provides a few illustrative case examples. The model proposes a set of dynamic relations between cognitive and cultural processes at shorter time scales modifying conceptualizations and environmental affordances on longer timescales, while these - in turn - come to guide and constrain processes at the shorter timescales. The model has important implications for our understanding of the role of environmental design, especially urban design, as bridging between aspects of human situated experience, behavior, social and cultural norms and material culture., (© 2021. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.)

Study of the neural code for space in rodents has many insights to offer for how mammals, including humans, construct a mental representation of space. This code is centered on the hippocampal place cells, which are active in particular places in the environment. Place cells are informed by numerous other spatial cell types including grid cells, which provide a signal for distance and direction and are thought to help anchor the place cell signal. These neurons combine self-motion and environmental information to create and update their map-like representation. Study of their activity patterns in complex environments of varying structure has revealed that this "cognitive map" of space is not a fixed and rigid entity that permeates space, but rather is variably affected by the movement constraints of the environment. These findings are pointing toward a more flexible spatial code in which the map is adapted to the movement possibilities of the space. An as-yet-unanswered question is whether these different forms of representation have functional consequences, as suggested by an enactivist view of spatial cognition., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

Despite the intimacy between the situation and our agency, "situation" remains an ambiguous concept in theory. Even within the context of situated theories of cognition and agency that take the organism-environment system as central in their investigations, the notion of "situation" has been undertheorized. Yet, whether affordances are relevant depends on the situation. Therefore, Van Dijk and Rietveld argue that we must understand the practical situation in which behavior occurs in order to know how we respond to the affordances that the materials and other people offer. Taking John Dewey's notion of "situation" as the basis for investigation, I follow Shaun Gallagher's analysis of how we are not just part of a situation, but we understand what an action is only in relation to a situation. Situations act like large-scale affordances, but this does not mean that affordances are inviting or soliciting as such. Because of the situational transactions with the environment that an agent has, the environment pushes and pulls the agent from and toward certain actions. This means that environments have expressive qualitative features that are non-subjective emotional qualities and social gestalt. I propose four overlapping but distinct features or axes of analysis of situations that can be identified and analyzed in terms of how they shape our agency: complexity, determinedness, the establishment of expectations, and restrictiveness. Situations can be more or less complex in a spatial, temporal, or layered way. They can also be more or less determined, meaning that the agent's actions are more or less obvious. Third, they can be characterized as socially established, meaning that certain behavior is expected. Finally, situations are more or less restricted, denoting the number of activities available to an agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition. The concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science. Yet, contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy. Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a "package deal"—a principled and unified perspective on perception and action. Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways. Aiming to open the field to critical engagement and productive exchange, we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson's death: physical, biological, and social ecological psychology. Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, adopting different explanatory principles, and embodying different philosophical worldviews. Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology. Given the diversity of the strands, we extend this plea to within ecological psychology itself; the field is better off aiming for a productive pluralism in which the different strands are in dialogue with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text focuses on the nature of the relationship between Si Mohammed, a blacksmith in southern Morocco, and the diverse life-forms that inhabit the forge-in-activity during the making of a steel beater. The notion of milieu enables us to examine the co-construction of milieus and subjects, themselves considered fluid. Through a material and sensory-affective-motor approach to the reciprocal production of objects and subjects, coupled with the notion of affordance, we explore two dimension of the blacksmith’s skilled practice: temperance and the exercise of authority, but also mathematical and scientific knowledge.

The proposal of Cognition and the Built Environment (MØYSTAD, 2017) is that architecture is a basic mode of human cognition. The production as well as the use of our environment is a cognitive process in and of itself. Building human environment relates to and is informed by the prior built environment. One of Christopher Alexander’s observations (1987) was that “building cities” actually means changing cities. Project by project. This insight carries implications for how we understand architecture, for how we understand the human brain and for how they interact. This paper will outline (1) the interaction between some spatial and morphological properties of the built environment on one hand, and (2) some of the recently discovered properties of the brain on the other, which seem to mirror similar properties of the external environment. Based on these two sets of properties I will then (3) make a brief discussion of some theories that seem to suggest an outline, not complete but still useful, of the cognitive relationship between (1) and (2).

Self-adaptive behavior can be defined as the behavior that allows an agent to adapt to a context using her/his/its resources. The property of being 'self-adaptive' implies considering some preliminary sources or elicitors for such skill. In the case of machine learning, all the learning or self-adaptive behavior mechanisms are related to algorithmic models of mathematical nature, while in the case of humans more subtle neurochemical and symbolic processes (logical and linguistic) are present. The purpose of this paper is to offer a theoretical analysis of the basic mechanisms related to learning processes, always oriented towards the creation of artificial cognitive systems which can implement such bioinspired mechanisms. Parafunctionality is the key innovative concept we introduce for applying bioinspired cognition to machine learning exploring a real mechanism still unexplored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to much recent work in metaethics, we have a perceptual access to normative properties and relations. On a common approach, this access has a presentational character. Here, 'presentational' specifies a characteristic feature of the way aspects of the environment are apprehended in sensory experience. While many authors have argued that we enjoy presentations of value properties, thus far comparatively less effort has been invested into developing a presentational view of the apprehension of normative reasons. Since it appears that this view would offer much the same theoretical benefits as presentational views of the apprehension of value, it seems worthwhile redressing this imbalance. My paper aims at doing so, focusing on concern-dependent practical reasons. After clarifying the central commitment of this view, I assess a recent proposal by Dancy (Ethics 124(4):787-812, 2014) which provides a detailed characterization of the relevant type of cognition. I argue that Dancy ignores one of the central features of a presentational access to normative reasons and therefore misidentifies which actual psychological phenomena are apt to play this role. In this context, I also assess and reject further candidates that might seem fitting for this purpose. In the remainder of the paper, I then offer a more adequate account which specifies an actual form of presentational access to concern-dependent practical reasons and provide the contours of a more substantive account of its nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Smart touch-sensitive screens provide a wide range of possibilities. Compared with static icons, animated icons should be effective in terms of narrative function learning and visual pleasure to provide a good interactive experience. The purpose of this study was to explore the affordance of animated visual cues for the interface design of smart washing machines. A $2\times3$ mixed factorial design was planned to help explore whether different affordance states and operation modes may affect users’ task performance and subjective evaluation. Adopting the convenience sampling method, 24 participants were recruited to take part in the experiment. The experimental data were collected pertinent to task performance using the system usability scale (SUS) and a 7-point Likert scale of subjective evaluation, as well as semi-structured interviews. The generated results revealed that: (1) There was a significant difference in the affordance states. Animated icons significantly affect the heuristic processing of the smart washing machine interface, and enhance the usefulness of icons, which helps improve operational efficiency. (2) There were significant differences among different operation modes. The Square type interface combines the modern smart mode and traditional learning performance to help users improve task performance. (3) The overall analysis of task performance and satisfaction consistently showed that the Square type is better than the Circle and Mesh types in all aspects, and the animated affordance had the best task performance. (4) A smart user interface design should combine user experience and touch-sensitive screen product characteristics to help improve users’ affordance perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Mentalization concerns the human ability to understand the actions of others (and oneself) in terms of intentional mental states. Theoretically, the notion has been described via the poles of automatic, non-verbal implicit mentalization as opposed to conscious and verbal explicit mentalization. In this article, we challenge this standard distinction by examining examples from psychotherapy. We argue that explicit mentalization can also be carried out via embodied non-verbal actions. Method: Four cases of real-life interaction from psychotherapy sessions are analyzed from the qualitative perspective of embodied cognition and multimodal interaction analysis. The analyses are based on video data transformed into transcriptions and anonymized drawings from a larger cognitive ethnography study conducted at a psychiatric hospital in Denmark. Results: The analyses demonstrate the gradual development from predominantly implicit mentalizing to predominantly explicit mentalizing. In the latter part of the examples, the mentalizing activity is initiated by the therapist on an embodied level but in an enlarged and complex manner indicating a higher level of awareness, imagination, and reflection. Thus, the standard assumption of explicit mentalization as contingent on verbal language is challenged, since it is demonstrated how processes of explicit mentalization can take place on an embodied level without the use of words. Conclusion: Based on real-life data, the study demonstrates that online processes of implicit and explicit mentalization are gradual and interwoven with embodied dynamics in real-life interaction. Thus, the analyses establish a window into how mentalization is carried out by psychotherapists through interaction, which testifies to the importance of embodied non-verbal behavior in psychotherapy. Further, informed by the notion of affordance-space, the study points to alternative ways of conceptualizing the intertwined nature of bodies and environment in relation to conveying more complex understandings of other people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay introduces a special issue focused on 4E cognition (cognition as embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) in the Lower Palaeolithic. In it, we review the typological and representational cognitive approaches that have dominated the past 50 years of paleoanthropology. These have assumed that all representations and computations take place only inside the head, which implies that the archaeological record can only be an "external" product or the behavioral trace of "internal" representational and computational processes. In comparison, the 4E approach helps us to overcome this dualist representational logic, allowing us to engage directly with the archaeological record as an integral part of the thinking process, and thus ground a more parsimonious cognitive archaeology. It also treats stone tools, the primary vestiges of hominin thinking, as active participants in mental life. The 4E approach offers a better grounding for understanding hominin technical expertise, a crucially important component of hominin cognitive evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional typological, technical, and cognitive approaches to early stone tools have taken an implicit Cartesian stance concerning the nature of mind. In many cases, this has led to interpretations of early technology that overemphasize its human-like features. By eschewing an epistemic mediator, 4E approaches to cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) are in a better position to make appropriate evaluations of early hominin technical cognition that emphasize its continuity with non-human primates and ground a description of the evolution of hominin technology. This essay takes some initial steps in that direction by shifting focus away from tool types and knapping patterns toward a description based on ergonomics and Gibsonian affordances. The analysis points to the evolutionary importance of two hitherto underappreciated aspects of hominin technical systems—the emergence of ergonomic clusters instantiated in artifact form and the development of displaced affordances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Well-designed social media are supposed to improve user deliberation. Around the 2020 US presidential election, Twitter temporarily suspended the Retweet function and prompted users to use the Quote Tweet function. This study aims to use this natural experiment condition to examine whether this affordance change can increase users' deliberation levels by encouraging them to express themselves. From the expression effect perspective, this change might increase the cognitive costs of users' retweeting and commenting behaviors and thus lead to deliberativeness. Based on this natural experiment, the study found that at the population level, the suspension of the Retweet function made users spend more time before quoting. However, it did not encourage them to post quotation tweets of higher analytical and interactive quality or put more effort into writing longer comments and finding longer tweets to quote. These effects were moderated by users' retweeting habits, as the change increased deliberativeness for those who used the quotation function frequently before the suspension. [Display omitted] • The effect of affordance change on deliberation is limited and nuanced. • Except for the reception of diverse ideas, expression can also improve deliberation. • The analytical and interactive quality of tweets can reflect deliberation levels. • The effort put into composing tweets can reflect deliberation levels. • Usage habits moderate the effect of affordance change on deliberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to show the socio-cognitive engineering of the pickpocket craft from the point of view of cognitive ecology. Being a pickpocket has a wider, existential status; studying it goes beyond the field of cognitive sciences. My ambitions are more modest: I try to show that the question about what it is like to be someone like a pickpocket is also a question about the cognitive structure of his or her activity space. In this light, I analyze some aspects of the reality presented in the movie Pickpocket by Robert Bresson. From the ecological point of view, scenes from the old movie present pickpocketing techniques in the context of the opportunities and constraints of a given environment. I claim that studies like this require integrating certain conceptual tools, like distributed cognition approach, ecological psychology, and cognitive studies of design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Husserl's phenomenology, the intentional horizon is a general structure of experience. However, its characterisation beyond perceptual experience has not been explored yet. This paper aims, first, to fill this gap by arguing that there is a viable notion of cognitive horizon that presents features that are analogous to features of the perceptual horizon. Secondly, it proposes to characterise a specific structure of the cognitive horizon—that which presents possibilities for action—as a cognitive affordance. Cognitive affordances present cognitive elements as opportunities for mental action (i.e., a problem affording trying to solve it, a thought affording calculating, an idea affording reflection). Thirdly, it argues that postulating cognitive affordances helps to unfold a rational dimension of thinking by conceiving of them as motivating reasons for action, something that in turn provides an argument for the experienced character of cognitive affordances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this conceptual analysis contribution to the special issue on radical embodied cognition, we discuss how embodied cognition can exist with and without representations. We explore this concept through the lens of judgment and decision-making in sports (JDMS). Embodied cognition has featured in many investigations of human behavior, but no single approach has emerged. Indeed, the very definitions of the concepts "embodiment" and "cognition" lack consensus, and consequently the degree of "radicalism" is not universally defined, either. In this paper, we address JDMS not from a rigid theoretical perspective but from two embodied cognition approaches: one that assumes there is mediation between the athlete and the environment through mental representation, and another that assumes direct contact between the athlete and the environment and thus no need for mental representation. Importantly, our aim was not to arrive at a theoretical consensus or set up a competition between approaches but rather to provide a legitimate scientific discussion about how to explain empirical results in JDMS from contrasting perspectives within embodied cognition. For this, we first outline the definitions and constructs of embodied cognition in JDMS. Second, we detail the theory underlying the mental representation and direct contact approaches. Third, we comment on two published research papers on JDMS, one selected by each of us: (1) Correia et al. (2012) and (2) Pizzera (2012). Fourth, following the interpretation of the empirical findings of these papers, we present a discussion on the commonalities and divergences of these two perspectives and the consequences of using one or the other approach in the study of JDMS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High-level motor computations reflect abstract components far apart from the mere motor performance. Neural correlates of these computations have been explored both in nonhuman and human primates, supporting the idea that our brain recruits complex nodes for motor representations. Of note, these computations have exciting implications for social cognition, and they also entail important challenges in the context of autism. Here, we focus on these challenges benefiting from recent studies addressing motor interference, motor resonance, and high-level motor planning. In addition, we suggest new ideas about how one maps and shares the (motor) space with others. Taken together, these issues inspire intriguing and fascinating questions about the social tendency of our high-level motor computations, and this tendency may indicate that we are “motorically” wired to others. Thus, after furnishing preliminary insights on putative neural nodes involved in these computations, we focus on how the hypothesized social nature of high-level motor computations may be anomalous or limited in autism, and why this represents a critical challenge for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of affordance perception is one of the distinctive traits of human cognition; and its application to robots can dramatically improve the quality of human-robot interaction (HRI). In this paper we explore and discuss the idea of "emotional affordances" by proposing a viable model for implementation into HRI; which considers allocentric and multimodal perception. We consider "2-ways" affordances: perceived object triggering an emotion; and perceived human emotion expression triggering an action. In order to make the implementation generic; the proposed model includes a library that can be customised depending on the specific robot and application scenario. We present the AAA (Affordance-Appraisal-Arousal) model; which incorporates Plutchik's Wheel of Emotions; and we outline some numerical examples of how it can be used in different scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on identifying the technical and cognitive processes that imbue artefacts and practices with forms of efficacy central to the relations the Owa people have with surrounding invisible entities. In particular, it aims to describe the correspondences between the schemas at work, on the one hand, in material logics, by analysing the making of magical artefacts and, on the other hand, in ritual logics, through an analysis of the practices and representations involved in Owa rituals. These two domains – technical action and ritual action – are both locally understood as ways of acting on and in the world. This efficacy rests on the relationships established between vital processes and technical processes, or more precisely on the co‐construction, by specialized humans and by invisible entities, of artificial devices that reproduce visible phenomena considered by the Owa to be visible manifestations of powerful entities’ effective capacity to intervene (mana‐ity/mana‐ization) in the world. These include a broad category of phenomena that can be seen in the atmosphere and on the bodies of living organisms and which all display, in different ways, chromatic distortions that are mobilized and imitated by Owa carvers, who apply them to the surface of magical artefacts. By illustrating one of the ways in which Owa craftsmen imitate vital processes through artefacts, this article examines what this imitation indicates about how the Owa conceive the renewal of life and act upon life in an attempt to control it. The idea of ‘vital processes’ should be understood here in a broad sense to include all the processes that benefit life and result from non‐human action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the extent to which normativity is situated in human biological and cultural ecosystems, with an emphasis on the role of artefacts. The basic question addressed is whether affordances - however defined - may be normative. The text briefly introduces cognitive ecology and ecological psychology, and then moves on to consider and reject the possibility of applying classical affordance theory to normativity. Lastly, it attempts to modify this account by referring to social and cultural affordance. The review and its conclusions are complemented by an original proposal to advance research on the normativity of affordances through an analysis of their structures and by stressing the role of human-artefact interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interpersonal coordination is a key factor in team performance. In interactive team sports, the limited predictability of a constantly changing context makes coordination challenging. Approaches that highlight the support provided by environmental information and theories of shared mental models provide potential explanations of how interpersonal coordination can nonetheless be established. In this article, we first outline the main assumptions of these approaches and consider criticisms that have been raised with regard to each. The aim of this article is to define a theoretical perspective that integrates the coordination mechanisms of the two approaches. In doing so, we borrow from a theoretical outline of group action. According to this outline, group action based on a priori shared mental models is an example of how interpersonal coordination is established from the top down. Interpersonal coordination in reaction to the perception of affordances represents the bottom-up component of group action. Both components are inextricably involved in the coordination of interactive sports teams. We further elaborate on the theoretical outline to integrate a third, constructivist approach. Integrating this third approach helps to explain interpersonal coordination in game situations for which no shared mental models are established and game situations that remain ambiguous in terms of perceived affordances. The article describes how hierarchical, sequential, and complex dimensions of action organization are important aspects of this constructivist perspective and how mental models may be involved. A basketball example is used to illustrate how top-down, bottom-up and constructivist processes may be simultaneously involved in enabling interpersonal coordination. Finally, we present the implications for research and practice.

This research features the argument that the essence of translation is embodied simulation, which is powered by mirror neurons in the human brain. Through a renewed and detailed analysis of the two contrastive English translations of a well-known Chinese poem 天淨沙•秋思, it is argued that the embodied simulation principles can persuasively govern the mental operations in translation. On the one hand, a translator derives the mental simulation from the source language and culture, and such simulation is conditioned by numerous influencing factors, such as his linguistic competence in the source language and his overall knowledge of the source culture, both of which are individualized by one' s life experiences. On the other hand, the translator represents or restores the simulations he has constructed from the source language in the target language and culture. The representation process and the final products, in turn, are constrained by the translator's conditions. Since translators' background conditions differ, the simulation that each of them makes then varies accordingly, resulting in diverse renditions of the same source language text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Osiurak and Badets (2016) examined the validity of the manipulation-based versus the reasoning-based approaches to tool use in light of studies in experimental psychology and neuropsychology. They concluded that the reasoning-based approach seems to be more promising than the manipulation-based approach for understanding the current literature. Buxbaum (2017) questioned this conclusion and raised certain theoretical limitations with regard to the reasoning-based approach. She also suggested that this approach is not well-equipped to integrate the existing psychological and neuroanatomical data in the tool use domain. In this context, she presented a neurocognitive model--the "Two Action Systems Plus" (2AS + ) framework--deeply anchored in the embodied cognition approach. In this reply, we address the key points raised by Buxbaum, leading us to draw 2 new conclusions. The first is that the reasoning-based approach integrates the existing psychological and neuroanatomical data not only in the tool use domain, but also in the motor control domain. As a matter of fact, it is even better equipped than the 2AS+ to account for recent neuroscience data. The second is that the 2AS+ suffers from epistemological and theoretical limitations, generating confusion as to what manipulation knowledge-a core concept in this model-precisely is. To sum up, 2AS+ illustrates potential misuse of embodied cognition, viewing tool use mainly as a matter of manipulation and not of understanding mechanical actions between tools and objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Potential interactions between objects affect response selection in action-related object pairs. The present paper aimed to examine whether this effect is conditional on the knowledge about object functionality, or whether action-related structures such as handles are sufficient. This issue was investigated by utilizing a paradigm established previously. They presented imperative central targets which overlapped with task-irrelevant object pairs and required speeded left/right responses to the targets. With this paradigm, two stable effects of implied actions between objects on response selection have been identified: an inhibitory effect on responses aligned with the passive object (e.g., a bowl in a bowl–spoon pair) and an advantage associated with responses aligned with the active objects (e.g., a spoon). The present paper utilized these two effects as the indexes of response selection in paired-object scenarios, and found that active–passive object pairs without established functionality (e.g., a saw and a bowl, Experiment 1) generated the same effects, suggesting that response selection does not rely on functionality knowledge of given object pairs. Further, the two effects were also observed in passive–passive object pairs with handles (e.g., a cup–nail pair), but not in those without a handle (e.g., a bowl–nail pair, Experiment 2), and remained when the active objects were replaced by novel objects with handle but no known functionality (Experiment 3), suggesting that the action-related structures of objects are sufficient to affect response selection. The present study empirically illustrated the automaticity and directness of the extraction of potential interaction between objects, probably based on the relative location of action-related structure of objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]