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This article provides an overview of Anja Jauernig's book on Kant's critical idealism, specifically focusing on his ontological doctrine of two layers of reality. Jauernig argues that Kant believes our mind cannot actively generate the data necessary for representing appearances and instead relies on receiving sensations from things in themselves. The author highlights that empirical objects depend on our cognitive abilities and possess genuine empirical reality. Jauernig proposes two conditions for the existence of empirical objects: they must adhere to Kant's formal conditions of objecthood and be grounded in things in themselves. The article also raises concerns about the accessibility of empirical reality, suggesting that Kant's perspective may lead to skepticism. The text delves into Jauernig's argument regarding the existence and persistence of empirical objects in relation to transcendental reality, discussing the epistemic and ontological gaps between transcendental regularities and phenomenal regularities, as well as the reliability of inferring the existence of external objects based on internal mental states. The author also questions the concept of a "properly direct" grounding relationship and proposes that the formal conditions of experience may be the sole determinant of genuine experience and empirical reality. Overall, the article explores the skeptical concerns and limitations of Jauernig's argument. [Extracted from the article]

The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his overview of recent work on intellectual humility, Nathan Ballantyne (2021) highlights some of the potential 'dark sides' of intellectual humility (IH) and calls for a critical study of the 'value-theory' of IH. In this article, we sketch out three ways that IH may threaten political conviction. We end our response by arguing that some forms of IH include different kinds of quietism about political convictions, which do not necessarily equate with a lack of conviction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Purpose: Clarification of interdisciplinary expertise as the ability to deal with the cognitive and epistemological challenges of multi- and interdisciplinary problem-solving—such as in developing and implementing medical technology for diagnoses and treatment of patients in collaborations between clinicians, technicians, and engineers—and of the higher-order cognitive skills needed as part of this expertise. Method: Clarify the epistemological difficulties of combining scientific knowledge, methodologies and technologies from different disciplines in problem-solving, by drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of science. Conclusion: We argue that interdisciplinary expertise involves the cognitive ability to connect, translate and establish links between disciplinary knowledge, as well as the metacognitive ability to understand and explain the role of the disciplinary perspective—consisting of, e.g. basic concepts, theories, models, methodologies, technologies, and specific ways of measuring, reasoning and modeling in a discipline—in how knowledge is used and produced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Islamic psychology (IP) community in Europe has recently witnessed a heated debate about the credentials required to participate in the theoretical substantiation of IP and Islamically integrated psychotherapy and counseling. This debate has provided convenient circumstances for Muslim psychologists and Islamic scholars alike to rethink their roles within the flourishing movement. Specifically, the discussions hint toward the importance of adopting a collaborative research methodology for IP, in particular for basic research. The methodology of choice will need to define the necessary qualifications and responsibilities of scholars and psychologists in a collaborative research process (personal collaboration) and evince its capability to appropriately marry knowledge and data, diverging research methods, and perspectives, concepts, and theories from Islamic studies and contemporary psychology (content‐related collaboration). Here, we devise and offer a case illustration of an Islamic Psychology Basic Research Framework (coined the SALAAM Framework). This framework uses the Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies (IIS) Model of Interdisciplinary Research, developed by the IIS at the University of Amsterdam. Our first aim is to appropriate the IIS model for the IP literature by applying the model's research process phases and technique for the integration of disparate bodies of knowledge—that is, the identification of common ground—to methodological approaches in the contemporary IP literature. Our second aim is to exemplify the devised SALAAM Framework using the relatively unexplored area of Islamic cognitive theories (ICTs), which remain underdeveloped in contemporary psychological literature, primarily because of a lack of commensurability with the nomenclature of contemporary psychology. We thus provide a primer on the potential scope of ICTs. Toward the end of this article, we discuss the potential of the project of interdisciplinary construction of Islamic psychological theory, and the ability of the SALAAM Framework to establish a research program in IP that centers on cognition. We finally offer our reflections on the distinctiveness of Islamic psychologies in comparison to mainstream and Christian psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that one of the purposes of education is to teach the student to think. Factors that influence and determine thinking include mental habits with which people have grown up. Culture, language and individual histories also shape thought. An educated mind should seek improvement in both knowledge and methods. It will conserve what is proved good and discard or correct the old. The application of logic to the process of discovery, evaluation and interpretation of empirical fact can be taught. A well-educated student should emerge from school with the habit and attitude of critical search for knowledge.

On a traditional view of perceptual justification, perceptual experiences always provide prima facie justification for beliefs based on them. Against this view, Matthew McGrath and Susanna Siegel argue that if an experience is formed in an epistemically pernicious way then it is epistemically downgraded. They argue that "wishful seeing"—when a subject sees something because he wants to see it—is psychologically and normatively analogous to wishful thinking. They conclude that perception can lose its traditional justificatory power, and that our epistemic norms should govern how experiences are formed. To make this case, the downgrader must first isolate a feature of wishful thinking that makes it epistemically defective, then show that this feature is present in wishful seeing. I present a dilemma for the downgrader. There are two features of wishful thinking that could plausibly explain why it is irrational: the fact that a desire causes you to form a belief not supported by adequate evidence, or the mere influence that desire holds over belief formation. Each option presents formidable difficulties. Although the first “bad evidence” explanation, which McGrath employs, explains the irrationality of wishful thinking, it does not transfer to wishful seeing, since experiences are not formed in response to evidence. The second “influence of desire” explanation, which Siegel employs, fails to isolate an epistemically defective feature of wishful thinking, and also does not transfer to wishful seeing. I conclude that the downgrader’s argument from wishful seeing fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent and emerging viewpoints in embodiment and knowledge necessitate a reexamination of epistemology within and beyond the brain. Taking a sociocultural approach, this article covers two main types of epistemology beyond the brain, namely, embodied epistemology and nonindividualist epistemology. Using citizen science and music to illustrate related concepts of intuition, experience, and embodiment, this article describes intuition as a cultural system, beyond a purely individual possession. We describe how—in cultural practices such as music—intuition acts as mediator between knowledge and embodiment, and intuition is built and modified by experience over time. Building on Dick's ( ) notion of “holistic perspectivism,” we pose a holistic epistemology approach that embraces knowledge that extends well beyond the purely cognitive, in both embodied situations and systemic manifestations. As information research becomes increasingly interested in the role of the body and its relationship to information, knowledge, intuition, and memory, we argue that such an approach will uncover further dimensions of nonindividualist, systemic, and embodied knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge can be a curse: Once we have acquired a particular item of knowledge it tends to bias, or contaminate, our ability to reason about a less informed perspective (referred to as the 'curse of knowledge' or 'hindsight bias'). The mechanisms underlying the curse of knowledge bias are a matter of great import and debate. We highlight two mechanisms that have been proposed to underlie this bias-inhibition and fluency misattribution. Explanations that involve inhibition argue that people have difficulty fully inhibiting or suppressing the content of their knowledge when trying to reason about a less informed perspective. Explanations that involve fluency misattribution focus on the feelings of fluency with which the information comes to mind and the tendency to misattribute the subjective feelings of fluency associated with familiar items to the objective ease or foreseeability of that information. Three experiments with a total of 359 undergraduate students provide the first evidence that fluency misattribution processes are sufficient to induce the curse of knowledge bias. These results add to the literature on the many manifestations of the curse of knowledge bias and the many types of source misattributions, by revealing their role in people's judgements of how common, or widespread, one's knowledge is. The implications of these results for cognitive science and social cognition are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We employed Cognitive Capitalism approach to shed light on the knowledge in the circuit shortage, on the fact that the subsumption of society by market logic exceeds the objective and subjective development of a knowledge-based economy. The concept of multitude indicates a socialization of the productive forces and potentially subversive, revolutionary and communist community at a global level. The aim of this article is to denounce this position from the practice of multitudinous intellectual in struggle for the common. We adopt the hypothesis that Luciano Gallino expressed in terms of cognitive capture, properly referring to the lack of opposition to the attacks of the class enemy and substantial acceptance of its theoretical paradigms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' understanding of general knowledge (e.g., knowing that clocks tell time) by investigating whether (1) they recognize that their own general knowledge has changed over time (i.e., they knew less as babies than they know now), and (2) such intraindividual knowledge differences are easier/harder to understand than interindividual differences (i.e., Do preschoolers understand that a baby knows less than they do?). Forty‐eight 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds answered questions about their current general knowledge (‘self‐now’), the general knowledge of a 6‐month‐old (‘baby‐now’), and their own general knowledge at 6 months (‘self‐past’). All age groups were significantly above chance on the self‐now questions, but only 5‐year‐olds were significantly above chance on the self‐past and baby‐now questions. Moreover, children's performance on the baby‐now and self‐past questions did not differ. Our findings suggest that younger preschoolers do not fully appreciate that their past knowledge differs from their current knowledge, and that others may have less knowledge than they do. We situate these findings within the research on knowledge understanding, more specifically, and cognitive development, more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suppose you are presented with 2 informants who have provided answers to the same question. One provides a precise and confident answer, and the other says that they do not know. If you were asked which of these 2 informants was more of an expert, intuitively you would select the informant who provided the certain answer over the ignorant informant. However, for cases in which precise information is practically or actually unknowable (e.g., the number of leaves on all the trees in the world), certainty and confidence indicate a lack of competence, while expressions of ignorance may indicate greater expertise. In 3 experiments, we investigated whether children and adults are able to use this "virtuous ignorance" as a cue to expertise. Experiment 1 found that adults and children older than 9 years selected confident informants for knowable information and ignorant informants for unknowable information. However, 5-6-year-olds overwhelmingly favored the confident informant, even when such certainty was completely implausible. In Experiment 2 we replicated the results of Experiment 1 with a new set of items focused on predictions about the future, rather than numerical information. In Experiment 3, we demonstrated that 5-8-year-olds and adults are both able to distinguish between knowable and unknowable items when asked how difficult the information would be to acquire, but those same children failed to reject the precise and confident informant for unknowable items. We suggest that children have difficulty integrating information about the knowability of particular facts into their evaluations of expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The metaparadigm concept of person as a core emphasis for nursing theorizing has attracted considerable attention in western literature, but has received less attention in the context of eastern philosophical contexts. In this philosophical inquiry, we sought to clarify the concept of what it is to be a human being according to ideas deriving from Islamic tradition, drawing on concept analysis as general approach to advance an understanding of how nursing within an Islamic context might operationalize metaparadigm conceptualization. Specifically, we considered person as human being on the basis of its definition, attributes/characteristics and boundaries to explore the anatomy of the concept in this context. Our analysis revealed that Islamic thought is relevant to two distinct understandings of the holistic concept of human being. Reciprocal interaction worldview organizes the dimensions of being human (cognitive, emotion, social and spiritual) into a whole. Simultaneous action worldview emphasizes that the human is a coherent and unified creature in harmony with the universe. In Islamic thought, these two worldviews are integrated and operate concurrently. Nurse-patient interactions arising from an integrated perspective that aligns both of these worldviews will allow for informed applications of knowledge to practice and enhanced patient care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epistemic and ontological cognition (EOC) involve beliefs about knowledge and knowing. These include beliefs about the certainty and complexity of knowledge and the means of justifying knowledge, for example, through authority figures or personal experience. Research has shown that these beliefs can influence learning and achievement, and that they may be specific to a particular domain. The EOC that define a particular health profession and influence its production, acceptance, and use of knowledge have been termed practice epistemology. Despite the importance of its practice epistemology, little research has been done related to EOC in occupational therapy. This paper describes models of EOC as a basis for understanding their implications for occupational therapy epistemology, education, and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an achievement, and so Pritchard's explanation of understanding's value fails. Next, I point out that Pritchard's is just one of many attempts to account for the value of an epistemic state - whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever - by appeal to the notion of achievement or, more generally, the notion of success because of ability. Tentatively, I offer reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of any such account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the role of grammatical form in the construction of social action, focusing on turns that either assert or request information. It is argued that the epistemic status of a speaker consistently takes precedence over a turn's morphosyntactically displayed epistemic stance in the constitution of the action a turn is implementing. Insofar as asserting or requesting information is a fundamental underlying feature of many classes of social action, consideration of the (relative) epistemic statuses of the speaker and hearer are a fundamental and unavoidable element in the construction of social action. A range of examples illustrate patterns of convergence and divergence in the relation between epistemic status and epistemic stance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the book "Liber de Sapiente," or "The Book of the Wise," also known as "De Sapiente," by French philosopher Charles de Bovelles is presented. It focuses on his ideas of wisdom, or sapientia, and what the author refers to as "suprasensible knowledge." The author also explores Bovelles' thoughts concerning intellect, self-knowledge, intuition, contemplation, and cognition.

Research has shown that increasing the number of turns that a route takes through the environment increases estimates of distance-the route angularity effect. This study tested implications of different memory-based explanations of the route angularity effect within a virtual setting. Participants maneuvered through virtual pathways of varying length that included zero, two, or seven turns. After each set of three paths, they estimated relative path lengths on an analog scale. Results demonstrated that both increasing memory load during navigation and making retrieval more difficult by interpolating another spatial task prior to estimation significantly increased the magnitude of route angularity effects. These results are consistent with the idea that the number of turns is categorically encoded and used as a memory heuristic when fine-grained memory for the route distance is degraded either at encoding or prior to retrieval. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the tenets of holism is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Applying this theorem epistemologically, we could say that a holistic view is greater than the sum of the specialized views that contribute to it. Within the framework of three divergent worldviews (mechanistic, organismic and contextual) as originally proposed by Pepper (World hypotheses: A study in evidence, University of California Press, Los Angeles, ), holism as both a philosophical position and a practical approach to research is applied to the study of adult human development. Because spiritual development has received less scholarly attention than biological, cognitive, or emotional functioning, topics such as meditation research, non-religious spirituality, and the concept of soul are covered to promote a balanced developmental perspective. Historical and philosophical factors leading to holism are described, a sampling of interdisciplinary dialogue between psychology and theology is presented, and conclusions regarding the need for holistic thinking and the relationship between religion and spirituality are offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The triple Albertian imagination, hierarchically organized on multiple levels (vis imaginativa, aestimatio, phantasia), played an important part in the theology of the Albert the Great. The image is the substratum for a certain theological knowledge, namely the symbolic theology. The importance of the theology of imagination is supported by the fact that it is the place for the revelation of transcendence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I will defend a principle at work in Thomas Aquinas's argument that the human intellect must be immaterial in order to know material things in Summa Theologica, Ia, q.75, a.2. Thomas relies on the position that whatever knows certain things would be impeded in this knowledge if it contained in itself these same things. Thus, if humans can, in principle, know all material things, then the intellect cannot be material. The position that a material intellect would be limited in knowledge of material things is perhaps the most controversial part of the argument. I will articulate a version of this argument and argue that two objections to Thomas's argument, offered by Norman Kretzmann and Robert Pasnau, fail, due in large part to a misunderstanding of proper objects of cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary epistemology seems almost exclusively focused on questions concerning knowledge and justification. Such a focus has had two broad consequences. First, epistemologists have neglected other equally important concepts. Specifically, the concept of understanding is absent in most discussions. Secondly, discussions have avoided the role of the will in the agents to whom we attribute knowledge and justification. Surprisingly, virtue epistemology also suffers from this narrow view. Specifically, virtue epistemologists of all kinds have neglected these two important aspects of our epistemic lives. I examine the spectrum of virtue theories in epistemology, and locate a gap between the two sides--responsibilism and reliabilism. This gap, I suggest, might be bridged if we take seriously (i) the idea that there are other epistemic goals apart from knowledge and justification (e.g., understanding), and (ii) that cognition requires the whole person--intellect and will--and not simply the intellect in isolation from other faculties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

History of mathematics occupies itself describing processes of growth and development, whereas philosophy of mathematics is concerned with questions of justification. Both play an essential role within the educational context. But there is a problem because genuine historical studies necessitate ever greater particularity whereas mathematics and philosophy require generality and abstraction. The paper offers some methodological reflections about these matters together with two case studies from nineteenth century history of arithmetic and integration theory, respectively, which try to strike a balance between the directly opposed requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how an ideology of cultural authenticity emerges in the casual but playful conversations of a bilingual Mexican American friendship group. Authenticating discourse, as illustrated here, is part of an ongoing, ordinary interactional routine through which speakers take overt (authentication) stances, which I call authenticating moves, to display, impugn, vie for, and enact forms of ethnic identity. In the data, issues of authenticity in relation to Mexicanness emerge as a result of the interactional exploitation of three ideological constructs: purity of bloodline, purity of nationality, and Spanish linguistic fluency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I claim that research on cognitive architectures is an important path to the development of general intelligent systems. I contrast this paradigm with other approaches to constructing such systems, and I review the theoretical commitments associated with a cognitive architecture. I illustrate these ideas using a particular architecture-ICARUS-by examining its claims about memories, about the representation and organization of knowledge, and about the performance and learning mechanisms that affect memory structures, I also consider the high-level programming language that embodies these commitments, drawing examples from the domain of in-city driving. In closing, I consider ICARUS'S relation to other cognitive architectures and discuss some open issues that deserve increased attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that computation via quantum mechanical processes is irrelevant to explaining how brains produce thought, contrary to the ongoing speculations of many theorists. First, quantum effects do not have the temporal properties required for neural information processing. Second, there are substantial physical obstacles to any organic instantiation of quantum computation. Third, there is no psychological evidence that such mental phenomena as consciousness and mathematical thinking require explanation via quantum theory. We conclude that understanding brain function is unlikely to require quantum computation or similar mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction presents an overview of the articles in this special issue, within the framework of an argument for the conclusion that there are various roads leading from imagination to knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Over the years, research on students’ epistemological beliefs has resulted in a growing common understanding but there are still some major points of discussion. Especially, the lack of consensus on the context-general and/or context-specific nature of epistemological beliefs deserves our attention. We argue that research in the field today is mainly characterized by a top-down approach that investigates students’ domain-specific beliefs from a general epistemological perspective. Alternatively, we report on one of our studies as well as some other research that takes a bottom-up approach starting from students’ domain-specific belief systems and analyzing their epistemic dimensions. Results of these studies point to the highly domain-specific nature of students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Therefore, a conceptual distinction between students’ general epistemological beliefs and the epistemic dimensions of domain-related belief systems is recommended as a more appropriate way to address the context-general–context-specific discussion on epistemological beliefs. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: With respect to the specificity and structure of epistemological beliefs, we contend that beliefs about knowledge are reflective of the multidimensional, multilayered, and interactive nature of knowledge. Here we present a model of the nested and reciprocal relations between domain-general and domain-specific epistemological beliefs. Additionally, we present evidence in support of three claims related to that model. Those claims are that domain-specific beliefs: (a) emerge when beliefs are assessed at a more precise level; (b) are differentially related to motivation; and (c) develop from more general beliefs. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Research on epistemological beliefs has clearly increased in the last decade. Even though the construct is clearer and relevant data are being collected, there are important theoretical and methodological issues that need further clarification. One of them is the debate about the domain generality–specificity of epistemological beliefs. I argue that there are both theoretical and methodological difficulties that hinder a more fruitful approach of the domain generality–specificity debate. Differences in goals and scope of the diverse conceptualizations about epistemological beliefs and how they devise the role of content-domain and context are a major source of difficulties. Methodological problems such as whether such epistemological beliefs can be measured “in isolation”—free of content and context influence—or the impossibility of collecting direct measures of epistemological beliefs may influence how the domain generality–specificity question is approached. Some suggestions about how these difficulties may be overcome are developed. The relevance of exploring epistemological beliefs across domains and across contexts is emphasized. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This research examines how attention and accuracy motivation moderate stereotyping in person perception. Hypotheses were derived from the stereotype validity model, which proposes that perceivers are more likely to use a stereotype as the basis of their impressions when they believe that the generalized beliefs contained within it are valid for the particular target whom they are judging. Consistent with the model's predictions, high attention and high accuracy motivation produced stronger label effects when a target's individuating information matched a stereotype's content. Also consistent with the model's predictions, the opposite pattern was found when a target's individuating information did not match a stereotype's content. Under conditions of a poor match, high accuracy motivation produced weaker label effects. The authors discuss these findings with respect to accuracy and bias in the impression-formation process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Students enrolled in an undergraduate mass communication course were asked to estimate self and third-person effects on learning, attitudes, and behavior after reading a movie plot synopsis that contained 6 versions of a rating, ranging from PG-13 to R, with varying degrees of sexual content. This study introduces media content that is neither harmful nor persuasive, as is often the case in third-person effect research, and this study also incorporates an age-based media rating system into a third-person framework. Respondents in this study considered others to be more affected by media messages along cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions; however, contrary to other third-person studies, we found perceived social distance to outweigh perceived likelihood of exposure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Gibson's concept of perceptual system and Reed's concept of action system. After discussing several assumptions underlying these concepts, the ontological status of these systems is considered. It is argued that perceptual systems and action systems should be conceptualized neither as parts of an animal's body nor as softly (temporarily) assembled devices; rather, they are best understood as animals' abilities to achieve functional relationships, that is, as dispositional properties. This conceptualization entails that these systems are relatively permanent properties of the animal that are causally supported by, though not identical to, anatomical substrates. Further, it entails that it is the animal that perceives and acts, not its perceptual and action systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Visual culture can be considered from semiotic point of view as a system of visual codes. Several of them have natural routs. So the perceptual code is formed already on biological level mediating translation of sensory data into perceptual images of the spatial world. The means of natural perceptual code are transformed in culture, where they are involved in communication by depictions. The depiction on the flat performs the function of a "perceptogram", which, on one hand, is an external record of an internal perceptual image or an idea, and, on the other hand, serves as a program for a spectator's visual perception. The means of this "perceptography" form an artificial code, which is, on the contrary to the perceptual code, communicative, deliberately used and transformed in various ways at different periods of time in diverse kinds of practical and artistic activity. Not all perceptograms become pieces of art, but all history of pictorial arts can be considered as a process of development and mastering with the different versions of this perceptographic code. The changes of this code in visual culture are connected with the intrinsic development of "vision forms" as well with invention of external means of communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This response to the open peer commentary discusses what should be the appropriate explanatory scope of a rules versus similarity proposal and accordingly evaluates the Rules versus Similarity one. Additionally, coherence, goals, and commitment I are presented as inferential notions, fully consistent with the Rules I, versus Similarity distinction, that allow us to predict when Rules would be preferred to Similarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a formal theory of robot perception as a form of abduction. The theory pins down the process whereby low-level sensor data is transformed into a symbolic representation of the external world, drawing together aspects such as incompleteness, top-down information flow, active perception, attention, and sensor fusion in a unifying framework. In addition, a number of themes are identified that are common to both the engineer concerned with developing a rigorous theory of perception, such as the one on offer here, and the philosopher of mind who is exercised by questions relating to mental representation and intentionality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new commentaries raise important issues about the target article (Stoffregen & Bardy 2001). The commentaries also highlight some assumptions, often implicit, that underlie traditional interpretations of perception. We argue that evaluation of the global array and its implications for perception requires both analytical research on specification in the global array and new empirical research on the use of information in the global array for the control of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common to assume that if Locke is to be regarded as a consistant epistemologist he must be read as holding that either ideas are the objects of perception or that [physical] objects are. He must either be a direct realist or a representationalist. But perhaps, paradoxical as it at first sounds, there is no reason to suppose that he could not hold both to be true. We see physical objects and when we do so we have ideas. We see or hear birds and bells but we also have visual and auditory ideas of birds and bells. This suggestion is explored through examination of what Locke says about perception in his Elements of Natural Philosophy and the accounts offered both by Locke in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and by some of Locke's successors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paul B. Baltes and his colleagues, who are among the most prominent contemporary wisdom researchers, define wisdom as ‘expert knowledge in the domain fundamental pragmatics of life.’ By contrast, this article argues that the definition, operationalization, and measurement of wisdom should not be reduced to expertise and that the term wisdom should be reserved for wise persons rather than expert knowledge. In fact, evidence from their research confirms that Baltes et al. primarily assess expert or intellectual knowledge in the wisdom domain ‘fundamental pragmatics of life’ rather than how wise people are. As an alternative, a model of wisdom is presented that defines, operationalizes, and measures wisdom as an integration of cognitive, reflective, and affective personality characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I distil a concept of the imaginary with which to make good the claim that our mode of embodied subjectivity is an imaginary embodiment in an imaginary world. The concept of the imaginary employed is not one in which imaginary worlds are contrasted with the real, but one in which imagination is a condition of there being a real for us. The images and forms in terms of which our imagined bodies and worlds are constituted carry, in an interdependent way, cognition and affects. Imagined configurations have a resilience which makes their displacement more than a matter of appealing to considerations of truth or falsity. It involves encounters with alternative imagined configurations which can be recognized as making both cognitive and affective sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Descartes is often thought to bifurcate sensory experience into two distinct cognitive components: the sensing of secondary qualities and the more or less intellectual perceiving of primary qualities. A closer examination of his analysis of sensory perception in the Sixth Replies and his treatment of sensory processing in the Dioptrics and Treatise on Man tells a different story. I argue that Descartes offers a unified cognitive account of sensory experience according to which the senses and intellect operate together to produce a fundamentally imagistic representation of the world in both its primary and secondary quality aspects. At stake here is not only our understanding of the cognitive structure of sensory experience but the relation of sense and intellect more generally in the Cartesian mind. The deep bifurcation in the Cartesian mind is not between the sensory perception of primary and secondary qualifies but between sensory perception and purely intellectual perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated the effects of the Ponzo illusion on three tasks: manual estimation of target width and peak grip aperture during pantomimed and natural prehension. The targets were three discs of 25 mm height and 20, 40 and 60 mm diameter. Illusory effects on perception were larger and less variable than effects on peak grip aperture during pantomimed reaching, and also were larger and less variable for targets at least 40 mm in diameter. Although a large, statistically significant perceptual illusion in the expected direction was induced for the 60-mm-diameter target, peak grip apertures during reaches to acquire the targets did not significantly differ due to high intersubject variability. However, in two of the six reaching conditions (two reaching tasks × three target sizes), individual differences in illusory effects on perception (perceived width of target placed over converging vs diverging lines) were strongly negatively correlated with individual differences in illusory effects on peak grip aperture during prehension (i.e., if object was perceived to be larger, peak grip aperture during reach was smaller). This unexpected correlation indicates that individuals with larger illusions of increased target size reached with reduced grip apertures. The strong relationship between effects on perception and action in two conditions may indicate shared visual processing by the perceptual and motor systems, with background visual information having opposite effects on the two systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argues that although distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. Key issues of interest; Analysis of pertinent topics and relevant issues; Implications on philosophical studies.

The influence of self-perceived dieting ability on restrained eaters was tested in a study directly manipulating such sell-perceptions. The hypothesis that a dieter's perception of her own dieting ability would affect how she handled an acute challenge to her diet was tested by manipulating the restrained eater's view of themselves as good or bad dieters. Restrained and unrestrained subjects were given ad lib access to ice cream after either a high-calorie preload or no preload. As predicted, dieters induced to see themselves as "good" ate less after the preload than did dieters whose self-perception was not manipulated, but dieters who saw themselves as "bad" also reduced their intake. Over the next week, restrained subjects in general lost more weight, with those who had been led to focus on their dieting ability in the face of a challenge, being mainly responsible for this effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recently proposed cognitive resource theory of leadership effectiveness explicates the role of such cognitive variables as intellectual abilities, technical competence, and job-relevant knowledge (experience) in determining group performance. This paper reviews research showing that the leaders' intellectual abilities contribute to performance only when leaders are directive, do not experience stress, have supportive groups, and work on tasks which require intellectual effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of whether early word meaning is based on perceptual (Eve Clark) or functional (Katherine Nelson) features has not been satisfactorily resolved by previous research. The present experiments addressed this issue by presenting young children (2- and 3-year-olds) with novel objects in which perceptual and functional features varied independently. Given choices of how to sort novel artificial objects varying in both aspects, children in experiments 1 and 2 chose perceptual features with few exceptions. Experiments 3 and 4 presented the same objects to children in a concept-learning task, where nonsense labels were to be learned for perceptually or functionally based categories; the latter were much more difficult. Experiment 5 was an extension of the first 2 experiments, except that more familiar objects were employed; comparable results were found. All of the results support 1 conclusion: early conceptualizations and word meanings are perceptually based when perceptual and functional features are independently available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relation between type of label and perception of faces was assessed. 64 second- and sixth-grade Ss were randomly assigned to 4 experimental conditions in which various kinds of labeling training were associated with 4 purple and green smiling and frowning faces. All Ss then judged the similarity of pairs of the faces. Results revealed the predicted effects of labeling only for white children. Labels associated with color cues augmented the perception of color differences, whereas labels based on expression increased differentiation of expression variations, but not of color cues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]