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We investigated the possible causes of perceptual switching in ambiguous figures. Ambiguous figures are a special class of visual stimuli that can give rise to at least two alternative interpretations. Because the figures themselves stay the same, these stimuli are particularly suitable to study the dynamic changes in our visual apparatus that enable us to see the world in different ways. Recent studies stress the importance of both low-level (sensory) and high-level (cognitive) processes in switching. We show that these processes lead to switching independently, and that, when they co-occur, they do not occur at exactly the same time. We take these results to indicate that perceptual switching is a radically multiply realizable process, in that various neurological states can instantiate it in a single individual from time to time. We reflect on the consequences of this conclusion for experiential realism, in particular the notion that embodiment misleads us in identifying psychological types. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers of perception widely agree that sensory properties, like color, are represented in perceptual experience. Arguments are usually needed to establish that something other than sensory properties, for example three-dimensional objects or kind properties, are part of perceptual content. Call the idea that sensory properties are represented in perceptual experience the Sensation View (SV). Given its widespread acceptance, we may expect to find strong reasons for holding SV. In this paper, I argue that we lack such reasons: SV is largely unjustified. We have surprisingly poor justification for thinking that sensory properties are represented in perception. By focusing on the case of vision, I show that an embedded understanding of visual perception, and empirical evidence in cognitive psychology, indicate that SV is far from warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]