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Despite experience‐based expertise being increasingly common in health care, what experiential knowledge consists of remains a topic for debate. Here I propose a philosophical approach to clarify experiential knowledge, drawing on an analogous debate in philosophy of mind, which similarly targets the intuition that experience may generate unique knowledge. I outline the philosophical debate and explicate some relevant ideas for health care, so as to (a) evaluate whether and to what extent this analogous debate is helpful, and (b) supplement existing ideas on experiential knowledge with a philosophical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a critique of Paulo Freire's philosophical perspective on human nature in the context of a doctoral research study to explore "muchness" or nurses' subjective experience of well‐being; and demonstrates how this critique has informed the refinement of the theoretical principles used to inform research methodology and methods. Engaging in philosophical groundwork is essential for research coherence and integrity. Through this groundwork, largely informed by Freire's critical pedagogy and his ideas on humanization, I recognized the need to clarify my understanding of the concepts of persons and personhood and how this related to Freire's use of the term human beings. This clarification process is essential to ensure congruence between the theoretical principles that I draw from his work and my beliefs about persons, personhood and person‐centredness. The article begins with a brief introduction to the research, followed by an overview of Freire's philosophical perspectives, and subsequently, the critique process is presented and discussed. This process involved engaging with the vast literature and debates about what it means to be a person, to make sense of the often complex and contradictory arguments. Eventually, three headings emerged that helped me to frame my evolving understanding: Our species: human beings; The kind that we are: human nature; and This person that I am: personhood. Through this process of exploration, I recognized that Freire's perspective on human nature (a) foregrounded cognitive rationality, which presented itself as a limitation when considering my ontological beliefs and the focus of my research, leading me to draw on the work of Mark Johnson and his ideas about embodiment to help me to further develop my theoretical principles; (b) focused on the "collective" rather than individuals, which is a shortcoming in relation to person‐centred research that acknowledges the uniqueness of participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paul (2018a, 2018b) discussed the concept of critical thinking in a series of American Annals of the Deaf editorials examining how critical thinking might serve as a "springboard" to deep knowledge or wisdom and wondering if critical thinking should be viewed as a noble endeavor or hopeless cause. Paul explored three questions in which he considered (a) types of critical thinkers, (b) teaching and evaluating critical thinking, and (c) empathy's role in critical thinking. Responding to Paul, the author focuses on the same questions by summarizing Paul's view, then following with his own. He also explores the question What is critical thinking? Mostly, the author's views resemble Paul's, but he elaborates on places where he thinks gaps or possible misunderstandings exist. The author concludes that critical thinking is indeed a noble endeavor because it is not just what you think that matters, but how you think. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information about what accounts for the perspectival character of perception. It offers details about the types of phenomena exemplifying the perspectival character of perception and the phenomenon called perspectival variance and perspectival similarity as well as other topics on the concept of a pluralist approach.

Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge's argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay seeks to situate a nai¨ve realist account of visual experience within the framework of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Topics covered include the argument that this view is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects, and the conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant.

Interdisciplinary research assumes that teams of highly specialized scientists develop new knowledge by bridging their respective horizons. Nurse educators preparing nursing doctoral students to conduct interdisciplinary research need insight into how members of interdisciplinary research teams experience knowledge horizons in these complex contexts. Based on the work of the philosopher Bernard Lonergan, this pilot study uses Transcendental Method for Research with Human Subjects to explore interdisciplinary researchers' experiences with and attitudes toward interdisciplinary research. Results reveal the overarching conceptual category of “engaged interdisciplinary inquiry” which includes six themes: (i) valuing interdisciplinary engagement; (ii) direct engagement; (iii) interior engagement; (iv) disengagement; (v) facilitated engagement and (vi) engaged researcher development. Results also suggest engagement depends on vigorous “back and forth”, or dialogue, with self and others, and demonstrate the study method is fruitful for cognitive inquiry. This pilot supports expanded study to inform preparation for and conduct of interdisciplinary research involving nurses and raises important questions about how the trend toward interdisciplinary research affects nursing science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience-the singular content view-the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object(s) a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well-known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are unique to perception in that strategies that have been developed to respond to Frege's puzzle in the case of belief cannot be employed successfully in the case of perception. Ultimately, I maintain that this perceptual analogue of Frege's puzzle provides a compelling reason to reject the singular content view of perceptual experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two studies provide evidence for distinguishing intellectual humility (IH) from general humility (GH). Humility involves (a) an Accurate View of Self and (b) the ability to regulate egotism and cultivate an other-oriented stance; IH is a subdomain of humility that involves (a) having an accurate view of one’s intellectual strengths and limitations and (b) the ability to negotiate ideas in a fair and inoffensive manner. First, we present a theoretical framework for distinguishing these constructs. In Study 1, with a sample of undergraduate students (N = 1097), we used confirmatory factor analysis to provide empirical evidence for this distinction. We also found that IH predicted unique variance in openness to experience relative to GH. In Study 2, we examined additional evidence of discriminant validity with another sample of college students (N = 355). IH also predicted unique variance in need for cognition, objectivism, and religious ethnocentrism relative to GH. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The metaparadigm concept of person as a core emphasis for nursing theorizing has attracted considerable attention in western literature, but has received less attention in the context of eastern philosophical contexts. In this philosophical inquiry, we sought to clarify the concept of what it is to be a human being according to ideas deriving from Islamic tradition, drawing on concept analysis as general approach to advance an understanding of how nursing within an Islamic context might operationalize metaparadigm conceptualization. Specifically, we considered person as human being on the basis of its definition, attributes/characteristics and boundaries to explore the anatomy of the concept in this context. Our analysis revealed that Islamic thought is relevant to two distinct understandings of the holistic concept of human being. Reciprocal interaction worldview organizes the dimensions of being human (cognitive, emotion, social and spiritual) into a whole. Simultaneous action worldview emphasizes that the human is a coherent and unified creature in harmony with the universe. In Islamic thought, these two worldviews are integrated and operate concurrently. Nurse-patient interactions arising from an integrated perspective that aligns both of these worldviews will allow for informed applications of knowledge to practice and enhanced patient care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The advent of the Web is one of the defining technological events of the twentieth century, yet its impact on the fundamental questions of philosophy has not yet been explored, much less systematized. The Web, as today implemented on the foundations of the Internet, is broadly construed as the space of all items of interest identified by URIs. Originally a space of linked hypertext documents, today the Web is rapidly evolving as a universal platform for data and computation. Even swifter is the Web-driven transformation of many previously unquestioned philosophical concepts of privacy, belief, intelligence, cognition, and even embodiment in surprising ways. The ensuing essays in this collection hope to explore the philosophical foundation of the World Wide Web and open the debate on whether or not the changes caused by the Web to technology and society warrant the creation of a philosophy of the Web. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an achievement, and so Pritchard's explanation of understanding's value fails. Next, I point out that Pritchard's is just one of many attempts to account for the value of an epistemic state - whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever - by appeal to the notion of achievement or, more generally, the notion of success because of ability. Tentatively, I offer reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of any such account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers of perception widely agree that sensory properties, like color, are represented in perceptual experience. Arguments are usually needed to establish that something other than sensory properties, for example three-dimensional objects or kind properties, are part of perceptual content. Call the idea that sensory properties are represented in perceptual experience the Sensation View (SV). Given its widespread acceptance, we may expect to find strong reasons for holding SV. In this paper, I argue that we lack such reasons: SV is largely unjustified. We have surprisingly poor justification for thinking that sensory properties are represented in perception. By focusing on the case of vision, I show that an embedded understanding of visual perception, and empirical evidence in cognitive psychology, indicate that SV is far from warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper Weinberg (2007) claims that there is an essential mark of trustworthiness which typical sources of evidence as perception or memory have, but philosophical intuitions lack, namely that we are able to detect and correct errors produced by these “hopeful” sources. In my paper I will argue that being a hopeful source isn't necessary for providing us with evidence. I then will show that, given some plausible background assumptions, intuitions at least come close to being hopeful, if they are reliable. If this is true, Weinberg's new challenge comes down to the claim that philosophical intuitions are not reliable since they are significantly unstable. In the second part of my paper I will argue that and why the experimentally established instability of folk intuitions about philosophical cases does not show that philosopher's expert intuitions about these cases are instable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we approach the idea that, the ease or fluency of information processing being subjectively experienced as feeling of familiarity with a positive affective tone, interfere with evaluative processing. The close association of familiarity and positive affect is here addressed within a affective priming paradigm. Participants were asked to evaluate a set of target stimuli previously tested for their valence. These targets were immediately preceded either by a familiar or a unfamiliar stimuli. Congruently with the familiarity-positive affect association, familiar stimuli facilitated evaluations (generate faster responses) of affective consistent targets (positive targets). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To examine the effectiveness of various affect regulation strategies and categories of affect regulation strategies, a meta-analysis was conducted. Results generally indicate that reappraisal (d=0.65) and distraction (d=0.46 for all studies; d=0.95 for studies with a negative or no affect induction) are the most effective regulation/repair strategies, producing the largest hedonic shift in affect. The effectiveness of different categories of regulation/repair strategies depended on the valence of the preceding affect induction. Results also indicate that stronger affect inductions and the use of bivariate affect measures will provide a richer understanding of affect regulation. Additionally, not all specific strategies or categories of strategies have been researched and the impact of individual differences on affect regulation has received relatively little attention. Finally, results indicate that control conditions in affect regulation research may not provide a valid point for comparison, as they facilitate effective affect repair. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research has shown that increasing the number of turns that a route takes through the environment increases estimates of distance-the route angularity effect. This study tested implications of different memory-based explanations of the route angularity effect within a virtual setting. Participants maneuvered through virtual pathways of varying length that included zero, two, or seven turns. After each set of three paths, they estimated relative path lengths on an analog scale. Results demonstrated that both increasing memory load during navigation and making retrieval more difficult by interpolating another spatial task prior to estimation significantly increased the magnitude of route angularity effects. These results are consistent with the idea that the number of turns is categorically encoded and used as a memory heuristic when fine-grained memory for the route distance is degraded either at encoding or prior to retrieval. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume attempts to explain all human cognition in terms of impressions, ideas, and their qualities, behaviors, and relations. This explanation includes a complicated attempted reduction of beliefs, or judgments, to single ideas. This paper attempts to demonstrate one of the inadequacies of this approach, and any of its kind (any attempted reduction of judgments to their constituent parts, single or multiple) via an argument concerning the logical forms of judgment found implicitly in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and more explicitly in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

History of mathematics occupies itself describing processes of growth and development, whereas philosophy of mathematics is concerned with questions of justification. Both play an essential role within the educational context. But there is a problem because genuine historical studies necessitate ever greater particularity whereas mathematics and philosophy require generality and abstraction. The paper offers some methodological reflections about these matters together with two case studies from nineteenth century history of arithmetic and integration theory, respectively, which try to strike a balance between the directly opposed requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Magnetoencephalography (MEG) was recorded to detect the 40 Hz component in auditory steady-state responses (ASSRs) to Dau''s chirp sound regularly repeated 40 times/s. The phase coherence of the 40 Hz component increased with the chirp intensity until the latter reached about 30 dB above its absolute hearing threshold and then saturated. We constructed a differential-equation model for the phase dynamics which showed similar behavior to the experimental result in terms of the phase coherence. One of the two parameters in the model was seen to be influenced by the stimulus intensity while the other seemed unaffected. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

James Conroy's Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Imagination, Education and Democracy implies three main aims: first, to celebrate aspects of imagination in education and politics; second, to challenge defensive closure in varieties of discourse, especially in the language of economic and monetary management in education and politics; and third, to open up, for reciprocal enrichment, situations and discourses pertaining to consideration of state funding for religiously affiliated schools. Liminality, characteristic of thresholds and borders, calls for interpretation and mediation, as well as appreciation of uncertainties. Liminality of imagination is explored in contexts associated with this third aim, but also in other kinds of context associated with the first two aims. As well as offering critical assessment of the book, this review article indicates some scope for interpretation and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not all empirical work in the psychology of perception has operated explicitly within a theoretical framework. But when it has, that framework has usually been provided by the inferential theory of perception. I argue that in spite of its explanatory strengths, the inferential theory of perception conceals a well-established empirical phenomenon. That phenomenon is known in ordinary parlance as 'familiarity'. I discuss why the inferential theory of perception cannot deal with familiarity and what it reveals about the limits of the inferential theory of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction presents an overview of the articles in this special issue, within the framework of an argument for the conclusion that there are various roads leading from imagination to knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: With respect to the specificity and structure of epistemological beliefs, we contend that beliefs about knowledge are reflective of the multidimensional, multilayered, and interactive nature of knowledge. Here we present a model of the nested and reciprocal relations between domain-general and domain-specific epistemological beliefs. Additionally, we present evidence in support of three claims related to that model. Those claims are that domain-specific beliefs: (a) emerge when beliefs are assessed at a more precise level; (b) are differentially related to motivation; and (c) develop from more general beliefs. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Research on epistemological beliefs has clearly increased in the last decade. Even though the construct is clearer and relevant data are being collected, there are important theoretical and methodological issues that need further clarification. One of them is the debate about the domain generality–specificity of epistemological beliefs. I argue that there are both theoretical and methodological difficulties that hinder a more fruitful approach of the domain generality–specificity debate. Differences in goals and scope of the diverse conceptualizations about epistemological beliefs and how they devise the role of content-domain and context are a major source of difficulties. Methodological problems such as whether such epistemological beliefs can be measured “in isolation”—free of content and context influence—or the impossibility of collecting direct measures of epistemological beliefs may influence how the domain generality–specificity question is approached. Some suggestions about how these difficulties may be overcome are developed. The relevance of exploring epistemological beliefs across domains and across contexts is emphasized. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article challenges the neo-Darwinist physicalist position assumed by currently prevalent naturalizing accounts of consciousness. It suggests instead an evolutionary (Deweyan) understanding of cognitive emergence and an acceptance of mental capacity as a phenomenon in its own right, differing qualitatively from, although not independent of, the physical and material world. I argue that if we accept that consciousness is an adaptation enabling survival through immediate individual intuition of the world, we may accept this metaphysics as a given. Methodological focus can then shift to investigating the, as yet untheorized, nature of consciousness itself as capacity/interconnectivity/potential. The article accepts Joseph Margolis's recent advocacy of a pragmatist approach that is “natural but not naturalizable” ( Margolis 2002 , 7), that is, an anti-reductionist as opposed to an eliminativist position, but it seeks to develop this position further and to give it new direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Gibson's concept of perceptual system and Reed's concept of action system. After discussing several assumptions underlying these concepts, the ontological status of these systems is considered. It is argued that perceptual systems and action systems should be conceptualized neither as parts of an animal's body nor as softly (temporarily) assembled devices; rather, they are best understood as animals' abilities to achieve functional relationships, that is, as dispositional properties. This conceptualization entails that these systems are relatively permanent properties of the animal that are causally supported by, though not identical to, anatomical substrates. Further, it entails that it is the animal that perceives and acts, not its perceptual and action systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common to assume that if Locke is to be regarded as a consistant epistemologist he must be read as holding that either ideas are the objects of perception or that [physical] objects are. He must either be a direct realist or a representationalist. But perhaps, paradoxical as it at first sounds, there is no reason to suppose that he could not hold both to be true. We see physical objects and when we do so we have ideas. We see or hear birds and bells but we also have visual and auditory ideas of birds and bells. This suggestion is explored through examination of what Locke says about perception in his Elements of Natural Philosophy and the accounts offered both by Locke in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and by some of Locke's successors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interpreters of Locke's Essay are divided over whether to attribute to him a Representational Theory of Perception (RTP). Those who object to an RTP interpretation cite (among other things) Locke's Book IV account of sensitive knowledge, contending that the account is incompatible with RTP. The aim of this paper is to rebut this kind of objection – to defend an RTP reading of the relevant Book IV passages. Specifically, I address four influential assumptions (about sensitive knowledge) cited by opponents of an RTP interpretation and argue that in each case the assumption is false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Yolton has argued that Locke held a direct realist position according to which sensory ideas are not perceived intermediaries, as on the representational realist position, but acts that take material substances as objects. This paper argues that were Locke to accept the position Yolton attributes to him he could not at once account for appearance-reality discrepancies and maintain one of his most important anti-nativist arguments. The paper goes on to offer an interpretation of Locke's distinction between ideas of substances and modes, a distinction that helps Locke to explain appearance-reality discrepancies, although not in a large enough range of cases to strengthen Yolton's interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An attempt at defending a version of John Yolton's non-representationalist reading of Locke's account of perception against Vere Chappell's very threatening criticisms. Concerning this version, which takes ideas to be appearances, Chappell questioned their identity criteria, their relation to what they are appearances of, and their nature in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explored Kocsis and Heller's findings concerning the relationship between one's belief and the perceived accuracy of a profile. The influence of types of information was also considered. A sample of 353 participants was used in the present experiment that gauged the perception of information contained in a profile. The results supported Kocsis and Heller's earlier findings with a positive relationship found between belief and perceived accuracy. The more an individual believes in profiling, the more likely he or she is to perceive a profile to be accurate. This relationship was most pronounced in participants' perceptions of information contained in a profile concerning an unknown offender's crime behavior and past history. The more an individual believes in profiling, the more information relating to these two factors is likely to be perceived. This relationship was not observed where information in the same profile involved physical features O f the offender [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines Tagalog expressions pertaining to cognition. It focuses on (1) the location of thinking terms within the categorization of experience and (2) the grammar of thinking. Also discussed are Tagalog philosophy of thought, metaphors of thinking, and sequential cognitive metamodels. The taxonomy of experiential terms has three main categories: (a) thought, (b) transient feelings caused by external events, and (c) ways of doing things (thought processes). In the grammar of thinking each term has its own set of rules and contexts, but in general, as in English, thinking in Tagalog is prototypically something you do, while feelings are something you experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduces articles in published in the first 2001 issue of the periodical "Studies in Philosophy and Education,". Exploration of the theme of transforming and redescribing critical thinking; Questions raised about the critical thinker's effort to become objective and neutral at the expense of their emotions, imagination and intuition.

Argues that although distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. Key issues of interest; Analysis of pertinent topics and relevant issues; Implications on philosophical studies.

Discusses the concept of intellectual cognition of material singulars according to French Franciscan theologian Peter Auriol. Question on the acquaintance between the immaterial intellect and material singulars; Origins of the problem of Auriol's thought; Recognition of material singulars by the intellect and imagination.

Two experiments investigated equivalence relations among auditory, visual, and tactile stimuli. In Experiment 1, three 6- and 7-year-old children learned conditional discriminations with auditory samples and tactile comparisons. In subsequent tests, they demonstrated that the conditional relations of the auditory and tactile stimuli were equivalence relations. Through cross-modal transfer, the classes also had extended to include novel visual stimuli that resembled the tactile stimuli in form and size. Experiment 2 reversed the role of the tactile and visual stimuli. After learning conditional discriminations with auditory samples and visual comparisons, the children demonstrated equivalence classes that included the training stimuli plus novel tactile stimuli that resembled the visual stimuli. One child in this experiment needed cross-modal training before the classes appeared. The experiments illustrate one way in which stimulus equivalence classes are extended and relate the paradigm of stimulus equivalence to studying perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A matching-to-sample procedure that engenders observation of two elements of a complex sample stimulus may establish equivalence relations among those elements. Studies that focus on complex stimulus control will help determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for equivalence class formation. Further studies in this area will benefit by blending the methods and concepts of stimulus equivalence research with those used in studies of conceptually related learning processes. The enterprise may also profit by reconsidering the role of compound stimulus control in the formation of equivalence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on imagination. Philosophy could not avoid, however, an encounter with the other dimension of the radical imaginary, its psychical dimension, the radical imagination of the subject. Here, the occultation cannot be radical. It has been the occultation of the radical character of the imagination, the reduction of the latter to a secondary role, sometimes a perturbing and negative one, sometimes auxiliary and instrumental: the question has always been posed in terms of the role the imagination plays in the relation to a True/False, Beauty/Ugliness, Good/Bad posited as already given and determined elsewhere. What mattered, indeed, was to assure the theory - the view, or the constitution - of what is, of what must be done, of what is valid, in its necessity, in its very determinacy. The imagination is, however, in its essence rebellious against determinacy. To this extent, it most of the time will be simply scotomized, or relegated to "psychology," or "interpreted" and "explained" in terms of its products, using flagrantly superficial ideas such as "compensation" for some unsatisfied need or desire.

A brinkmanship crisis with two-sided incomplete in formation is modeled as a game of sequential bargaining in which each state is uncertain of its adversary's resolve. The sequential crisis equilibria are characterized explicitly and used to analyze the influences of resolve, misperception, and the status quo on escalation and crisis stability. The description of brinkmanship as a contest of resolve is found to be misleading: the state with the greatest resolve may not prevail in the crisis; a state may be less, not more, likely to prevail the greater its resolve; and a states' expected payoff may be less, not more, the greater its resolve. Moreover, reducing misperception may destabilize a crisis. Surprisingly, increasing the stake a potential challenger has in the status quo may not make a challenge less likely. Finally, crises involving severe conflicts of interest are shown to be less likely than crises not entailing a severe conflict of interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article present review of some of the major publications related to the nursing practice. Topics discussed include definitions and relationships within science, speculative, productive and practical; nursing theory that transforms the knowing, making and doing into nursing; and the nature of knowledge in the discipline of nursing and human nature as the source of principles of nursing practice.

Discusses issues concerning perceptual content. Possibilities of what a person can actually see when looking at a particular thing; Requirement of the myth of immaculate perception; Premise of seeing a particular thing as a unique uncategorizable something; Controversy between Monima Chadha and Mark Siderits on the issue of whether a realist needs perception of particulars without deployment of concepts.

The article mentions French sociologist Bruno Latour's anthology "The Lure of Whitehead" on the speculative philosophy of English philosopher Alfred North Whitehead wherein Latour also uses Whitehead's objection to the bifurcation of nature. Latour and Whitehead argue that human cognition is a consequence of socialized intelligence brought about by the network of cognitive determinants distributed between matter and perception. The article also highlights cognitive innovation as a collaborative project in the sciences, arts, and humanities wherein creativity is considered a bootstrapping cognitive process.

This Symposium comprises five papers on Locke's theory of sense perception. The authors are John Rogers, Gideon Yaffe, Lex Newman, Tom Lennon, and Martha Bolton. There are also comments on the papers, both individually and as a group, by Vere Chappell. In addition to Locke's view of perception, the papers deal with the nature of Lockean ideas and with the question whether Locke is committed to skepticism regarding the external world. The authors (and the commentator) disagree in their readings of Locke on these issues, but most maintain – and some argue – that he holds a representative theory of perception, and that he is not an external-world skeptic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]