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In clinical diagnosis, both causal attribution and the interaction between different types of probability may take place. We deal with a hypothetical, but quite realistic, clinical case and go through various idealized ways in which the case can be framed. In the diverse scenarios linked to our proposed case, the possibility of causal attributions will be taken into account and each one of them will correspond to a distinct role of probabilistic evaluation. For some of these scenarios, it will be necessary to comply with certain requirements such as the construction of a specific partition that serves as a point of reference for the diagnostic analysis. The interaction between probabilities occuring within these scenarios will be critically investigated, as it may shed light on some causality claims in clinical diagnosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patients are interested in receiving accurate diagnostic and prognostic information. Models and reasoning about diagnoses have been extensively investigated from a foundational perspective; however, for all its importance, prognosis has yet to receive a comparable degree of philosophical and methodological attention, and this may be due to the difficulties inherent in accurate prognostics. In the light of these considerations, we discuss a considerable body of critical thinking on the topic of prognostication and its strict relations with diagnostic reasoning, pointing out the distinction between nosographic and pathophysiological types of diagnosis and prognosis, underlying the importance of the explication and explanation processes. We then distinguish between various forms of hypothetical reasoning applied to reach diagnostic and prognostic judgments, comparing them with specific forms of abductive reasoning. The main thesis is that creative abduction regarding clinical hypotheses in diagnostic process is very unlikely to occur, whereas this seems to be often the case for prognostic judgments. The reasons behind this distinction are due to the different types of uncertainty involved in diagnostic and prognostic judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The beliefs involved in the placebo effect are often assumed to be self-fulfilling, that is, the truth of these beliefs would merely require the patient to hold them. Such a view is commonly shared in epistemology. Many epistemologists focused, in fact, on the self-fulfilling nature of these beliefs, which have been investigated because they raise some important counterexamples to Nozick's "tracking theory of knowledge." We challenge the self-fulfilling nature of placebo-based beliefs in multi-agent contexts, analyzing their deep epistemological nature and the role of higher-order beliefs involved in the placebo effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Possibility is one of the most common modalities in reasoning and argumentation. Various kinds of modal concepts have been identified in philosophical and logical discussion of the metaphysics of modality. We focus here on the concept of clinical possibility. A critical analysis of what is intended as clinical possibility has not yet received sufficient examination, although the concept is extensively used in clinical reasoning. We present arguments to emphasize some desirable features associated with the concept of clinical possibility. We argue that almost all clinical possibilities are potentialities, that is, possibilities that may be actualized by effective, appropriate and feasible interventions. However, in some limited cases, even mere possibilities - which may or may not be actualized, since we do not have the required knowledge - may be involved in clinical reasoning, and we present some examples in this paper. We then introduce some basic views on the nature of possibility showing their validity and limitations when applied to the concept of clinical possibility. Lastly, we conjecture that clinical possibility is a normative modality that can be formalized in a multimodal system with epistemic and deontic logical operators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]