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How can the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) be made more effective? This paper argues that in order to make the UNFCCC fit for purpose, there is a need to identify the specific institutional reforms that can create ripple effects to accelerate climate action across governance levels and relevant organisations. Longstanding calls to reform the UNFCCC have targeted inefficient procedures with the intent to promote effective outcomes and – after entry into force of the Paris Agreement – to transform the UNFCCC towards holding more implementation‐focused deliberations. Despite such calls, UNFCCC reform has been modest, at best. Central to the failure of reform proposals are vested interests with conflicts of interest that seek to obstruct climate action. Without addressing these elephants in the room, reform proposals will make modest contributions to overcoming key challenges. It is due time to start retargeting institutional reform from addressing procedural inefficiencies at the UNFCCC towards addressing vested interests. We propose a new research agenda to understand ways to undermine incumbent actors seeking to preserve business as usual and support new entrants that facilitate climate action through green spiralling. A reform process addressing vested interests could improve both procedural efficiency and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most mitigation scenarios compatible with a likely change of holding global warming well below 2 °C rely on negative emissions technologies (NETs). According to the integrated assessment models (IAMs) used to produce mitigation scenarios for the IPCC reports, the NET with the greatest potential to achieve negative emissions is bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). Crucial questions arise about where the enormous quantities of biomass needed according to the IAM scenarios could feasibly be produced in a sustainable manner. Africa is attractive in the context of BECCS because of large areas that could contribute biomass energy and indications of substantial underground CO2 storage capacities. However, estimates of large biomass availability in Africa are usually based on highly aggregated datasets, and only a few studies explore future challenges or barriers for BECCS in any detail. Based on previous research and literature, this paper analyses the pre-conditions for BECCS in Tanzania by studying what we argue are the applications of BECCS, or the components of the BECCS chain, that are most feasible in the country, namely (1) as applied to domestic sugarcane-based energy production (bioethanol), and (2) with Tanzania in a producer and re-growth role in an international BECCS chain, supplying biomass or biofuels for export to developed countries. The review reveals that a prerequisite for both options is either the existence of a functional market for emissions trading and selling, making negative emissions a viable commercial investment, or sustained investment through aid programmes. Also, historically, an important barrier to the development of production capacity of liquid biofuels for export purposes has been given by ethical dilemmas following in the wake of demand for land to facilitate production of biomass, such as sugarcane and jatropha. In these cases, conflicts over access to land and mismanagement have been more of a rule than an exception. Increased production volumes of solid biomass for export to operations that demand bioenergy, be it with or without a CCS component, is likely to give rise to similar conflicts. While BECCS may well play an important role in reducing emissions in countries with high capacity to act combined with existing large point sources of biogenic CO2 emissions, it seems prudent to proceed with utmost caution when implicating BECCS deployment in least developed countries, like Tanzania.The paper argues that negative BECCS-related emissions from Tanzania should not be assumed in global climate mitigation scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using policy cycle model as a heuristic, this article studies Indian, Brazilian, and South African engagement with Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) by (a) comparing NAMA policy process and (b) identifying factors driving or limiting the framework’s domestic application. India largely remained uninterested in NAMAs, Brazil aligned its domestic climate policy and NAMAs, while South Africa had a more nuanced engagement when formulating NAMAs. Four factors influenced these countries’ NAMA engagements: the level and necessity of international support, the availability of domestic policy provisions to tackle climate change, the domestic institutional capacity to coordinate interministerial functioning, and the role of individuals in the institutional apparatus. As an international climate policy framework, studying NAMA engagement provides learnings for nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement for designing the instrument, ensuring clarity on support provisions for ratcheting up ambitions, and enhancing institutional capacity, to expedite transition from policy formulation to implementation and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Finance is at the heart of UN climate diplomacy. Through the long-term finance pledge, developed countries have committed to mobilize USD 100 billion annually from 2020 onwards to support climate action in developing countries. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is also expected to become a key player in the climate finance landscape. This viewpoint presents the views of representatives of developed and developing countries’ governments on how the annual sum of USD 100 billion should be dispensed by the GCF, based on a survey conducted at the 2013 UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw. Respondents’ give their views on (1) the mitigation/adaptation ratio in GCF support and (2) the public/private ratio in financial sources. Respondents from developing countries would prefer to channel a substantially higher amount of the long-term finance pledge through the GCF. The extent to which the long-term finance pledge should be governed by the GCF is contentious, because governments pledge long-term finance without specifying the mitigation/adaptation ratio, whereas the GCF Board is tasked with balancing the allocation of its funds between adaptation and mitigation. This contention is fuelled by the fact that developing countries have a greater say in the allocation of funds from the GCF than from alternative sources of finance for the long-term finance pledge. We suggest that it is time to (1) reformulate the pledge to clarify its mitigation/adaptation ratio and (2) agree to definitions of key concepts such as “climate finance” and “private finance” to allow for more distinct negotiating positions on sources of finance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Biochar may contribute to both agricultural productivity and atmospheric carbon dioxide removal. However, despite the many potential upsides of adding biochar to amend carbon-depleted soils in sub-Saharan Africa, deployment is largely lacking. This paper explores the socio-economic factors that can explain tendencies to avoid action. Based on a survey of 172 farming households, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions in the Mbeya and Songwe regions of Tanzania, which were targeted for a biochar aid program in 2014, several socio-economic drivers behind the continued use of biochar deployment were identified in this follow-up study. A key deployment driver was the increased crop yields, perceived to be the result of adding biochar to soils, increasing yields from 1 metric ton per hectare to 3 metric tons per hectare. Food security and family income were cited as the main reasons to engage in biochar production and use. Climate change mitigation and increased resilience were other key reasons that motivated adoption. In terms of socio-economic factors, farmers with low education and income, the majority being males aged 40–60 years, contributed to low adoption rates in the study area. Respondents often cited the alternative usage of biochar feedstocks, lack of government involvement or extension services, traditions, and farming customs as the main constraints limiting biochar deployment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sweden and Finland have national goals to reach net negative greenhouse gas emissions before mid-century. Achieving these ambitious goals could employ negative emission technologies, such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, but it is unclear how this technology could be realized in an energy transition. Sweden and Finland stand out for having a large share of substantial point source emissions of biogenic carbon dioxide, in the production of pulp, heat and power. In the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, Sweden and Finland reported 64% and 51% biogenic emissions, respectively, in facilities emitting over 100 kt of carbon dioxide in 2017, while the corresponding collective figure for all European states in the database is 6%. This qualitative study highlights company actors' perspectives on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage within a Nordic regional context and explores their perspective on emerging tensions in the energy transition. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 of the 24 companies with the largest point sources of biogenic emissions. The results are framed around four emerging tensions regarding bioenergy with carbon capture and storage from companies' perspectives in this study: (1) absence of reliable long-term policies; (2) limits to companies' climate change responsibility; (3) technical trade-offs of carbon capture; and (4) lack of customer demands for negative emissions. According to most of the companies, it is technically feasible to capture carbon dioxide, but it could be a challenge to determine who is responsible to create a financially viable business case, to enact supporting policies, and to build transport and storage infrastructure. Company representatives argue that they already contribute to a sustainable society, therefore bioenergy with carbon capture and storage is not their priority without government collaboration. However, they are willing to contribute more and could have an increasing role towards an energy transition in an international context. • BECCS discussions are on the horizon, but few companies are first movers. • Large-scale deployment of BECCS would require political and financial support. • Swedish and Finnish companies lack customer demand for negative emissions. • There are trade-offs between energy efficiency and carbon capture. • Companies consider BECCS as one of many climate change mitigation measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]