Search

Resistance to clean energy policy in the United States stems partly from public hesitancy and skepticism toward anthropogenic climate change. This article examines self-declared climate change skeptics' views of clean energy policy along a continuum of skeptical thought, spanning from epistemic denial to attribution doubt. To perform this, we use data from an online survey administered in the US Pacific Northwest and a series of pilot interviews conducted with skeptics in the same region. Results reveal that skeptics' support for clean energy policy is consistently linked with their environmental concern across the skepticism continuum. Conspiracy ideation and distrust in science lead to a reduction in support. However, the positive effect of environmental concern trumps the effects of these beliefs. Important and hopeful implications of these findings for climate change communication and policy are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research has found that white people are more likely to be climate change skeptics. In much of this prior work, white identity is treated as a categorical label, limiting the theoretical and empirical understanding of this relationship. Drawing on survey data from a US national sample of 933 white young adults, we theorize that white identity is a developmental process where people explore the meanings of their racial identity and commit to a white identity marked by enhanced levels of social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation, two social-psychological constructs consistently associated with climate change skepticism. Using regression analyses, we tested a mediation model that a strong white identity would increase climate change skepticism by enhancing one's social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation. We found partial support for our model. While a strong white identity was positively associated with social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation, only social dominance orientation increased climate change skepticism. Conspiratorial ideation reduced climate change skepticism. We discuss the implications of our findings for the climate change literature as well as how our findings can inform policies that could reduce climate change skepticism among white people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses interview data with people who were once skeptical about climate change but have come to accept climate science to assess the factors that contribute to their shifts in perspectives. Our findings show two trajectories of change for skeptics, depending on the nature of their skepticism. For those who move from actively denying climate change, shifting beliefs about climate change occur via a profound need to reconcile what emerges as cognitive dissonance due to challenges to their religious identities. For skeptics who move from being unsure about climate change, moving to accept climate science happens through either encountering new information from a trusted source or personally observing the effects of climate change. This extends existing scholarship on the factors that contribute to changing minds on climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the existing scholarship on climate change uses religiosity to measure the effects of religion on climate skepticism and results in inconsistent findings. Drawing on insights from the study of religion and environmentalism more broadly, we suggest that scholars should seek a deeper understanding of religion's impacts by considering the influence of specific religious beliefs on perceptions of climate change. We further contend that researchers should consider how these factors shape attitudes within and between segments of the public who hold varying positions on climate change. We test these contentions using a novel sample of 1,000 self-declared "climate skeptics" in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. We find that, among skeptics, specific religious beliefs are more strongly associated with a range of selected climate/environmental attitudes (i.e., conspiracy ideation, trust in climate science, proenvironmentalism, emotions about climate change) than is religiosity. We discuss these findings and their implications for future scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing literature on perceptions of climate change skeptics does not include a direct examination of skeptics who are members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐day Saints (LDS), likely because they make up a small percentage of the U.S. population (1.6%). However, the LDS church is one of the fastest growing religious sects in the nation and world and is acquiring more political power, especially in the western United States. Our research note presents a preliminary look at Latter‐day Saint skeptics. We find evangelical and Latter‐day Saint skeptics align on measures of religious ideation and the belief that "humans are meant to rule over the rest of nature." Yet, on measures of environmental concerns and values, Latter‐day Saint skeptics appear to be somewhere between evangelical and mainline Christian skeptics. This pilot project provides a foundation for future work regarding LDS perceptions of climate change, environmental policy, and climate communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use data from 33 in‐depth interviews conducted with residents in the rural inland Northwestern state of Idaho who self‐identify as skeptical about anthropogenic climate change, to examine the nuance within the narratives that skeptics employ to voice their skepticism. Our findings show that the arguments employed by those who are skeptical of climate change do not constitute a clear typology of skepticism or "skeptics." Rather, individuals weave together unique stories—shaped by their social locations, personal experiences, and underlying ideological beliefs—and, through combining different argument threads, explain why they believe climate change is a fictitious problem. Our findings suggest that while some skeptics may lean on religion‐based or conspiracy‐based narratives to rationalize their skepticism, others may rely on science attitudes, personal experiences, or a range of additional reasons to be skeptical of climate change. In short, climate skepticism is not uniform nor accurately typologized, but a complex tapestry of socially shaped beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Munich Re (Munich, Germany: Munich Re, 2004), 76-83. 7 A. Engels, O. Hüther, M. Schäfer, and H. Held, "Public Climate-Change Skepticism, Energy Preferences, and Political Participation", I Global I Environmental i Change i 23 (2013): 1018-27; A. McCright and R. Dunlap, "Cool Dudes: The Denial of Climate Change Among Conservative White Males in the United States", I Global Environmental Change i 21 (2011): 1163-72. 8 K. PHOTO (COLOR) On March 6, 2012, future President Donald Trump tweeted: "The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive." Second, we present what we call a "conspiracy gap,"[10] in which skeptics who believe that climate change is a hoax hold significantly lower levels of environmental concern and policy support as compared to skeptics who do not. [Extracted from the article]

The article offers information on sources related to psychological understanding for climate change skepticism including article "Climate change skepticism and denial: an introduction"; the book "Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives"; and "Energy Research & Social Science".

• Demonstrates the importance of considering uncertainty about climate change. • Identify four points of skepticism across types and level of certainty. • Compare groups across predictors, demographic, and outcome variables. • Propose the use of skeptic as a term for people who do not accept climate science. In this paper we present an empirically driven language to discuss climate change skepticism. We conceptualize skeptic/skepticism as an umbrella term that includes those who actively reject climate science and those who are uncertain about climate change. We propose four categories for better empirical analysis of climate skepticism: epistemic deniers, epistemic doubters (borrowing from Capstick and Pidgeon 2014), attribution deniers, and attribution doubters (borrowing from Rahmstorf 2004). Using a unique dataset of surveys (n = 1000) and interviews (n = 33) with residents of the U.S. Pacific Northwest who are skeptical about climate change, we compare those four groups across several predictors and demographic variables (age, race, gender, political ideology, religiosity, income, education, and level of trust in science) and outcome variables (environmental concern, policy support, and conspiracy ideation (adherence to the belief that climate change is a "hoax"). We demonstrate the importance of considering attitudinal uncertainty in the analysis of climate skepticism by providing evidence for the presence of a continuum of thought wherein epistemic deniers and attribution doubters make up the two ends of a continuum with more complicated distinctions between epistemic doubters and attribution deniers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing survey instruments of trust in science and scientists that focus on the general public are potentially insufficient to assess climate skeptics' perspectives towards climate science. They may miss important aspects of climate science about which skeptics raise concerns, and may not accurately measure climate skeptics' distrust in climatology. We introduce a new survey instrument developed using data gathered from interviewing 33 self-identified climate change skeptics in Idaho. The survey items capture skeptics' beliefs regarding climate scientists' trustworthiness and credibility, their deference to scientific authority, and their perceptions of alienation from the climate science community. We validate our survey instrument using data from an online survey administered to 1000 residents in the U.S. Pacific Northwest who are skeptical of climate change. By employing standard survey design principles, we demonstrate how our new (dis)trust in climate science instrument performs in tandem with well-known predictors of science attitudes and pro-environmentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]