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The article examines whether political control of the U.S. Supreme Court is possible and, if so, whether judicial independence is simply a myth. It attempts to provide evidence that both the president and U.S. Congress have the capacity to control or at least influence the court. It argues that with regard to both civil rights and specific economic legislation, Congress has the ability not only to constrain justices, but also to further promote judicial decisions that align with their policy preferences.

Does the hierarchical relationship between the district courts and the courts of appeals influence decision-making at the trial level? Stated another way, are district court judges constrained by the appeals courts, according to the tenets of principal agency theory? Do these judges anticipate responses by appellate panels and condition their decisions based on these expectations? Using an original dataset of foreign policy cases from 1946-2000 and incorporating a strategic choice statistical framework to analyze a formal model, I discover that the District Courts are not constrained by the anticipated responses of the Appeals Courts. Whether one examines District Courts in isolation from other tribunals or within a hierarchical structure, conclusions regarding ideological voting remain consistent: Democratic judges are more likely to rule in favor of civil liberties than their Republican colleagues. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary does not appear to be a significant constraint to the District Courts as it seemingly is for the Courts of Appeals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the literature on U.S. foreign policy and judicial decision making by focusing on the role of the federal appellate courts since World War II. Specifically, the paper addresses the question whether appeals court judges are defenders of civil liberties or champions of national security. Using an original dataset of 300 cases randomly selected from 1946-2000 in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, I test whether specific institutional characteristics, legal challenges or case issues significantly affect whether appellate judges rule in favor of federal government interests or civil liberties claims. The empirical results indicate that for a majority of cases appellate judges support the interests of the federal government to the detriment of civil liberties. However, certain institutional characteristics will induce the courts of appeals to curtail federal interests. If Democratic judges dominate an appellate panel or if the lower courts ruled in favor of civil liberties, then the appeals courts will render decisions against the interests of the federal government. However, if judges must resolve a threshold issue or contend with a national security defense then the ruling will most likely favor federal interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]