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Moral systems universally prohibit harming others for personal gain. However, we know little about how such principles guide moral behavior. Using a task that assesses the financial cost participants ascribe to harming others versus themselves, we probed the relationship between moral behavior and neural representations of profit and pain. Most participants displayed moral preferences, placing a higher cost on harming others than themselves. Moral preferences correlated with neural responses to profit, where participants with stronger moral preferences had lower dorsal striatal responses to profit gained from harming others. Lateral prefrontal cortex encoded profit gained from harming others, but not self, and tracked the blameworthiness of harmful choices. Moral decisions also modulated functional connectivity between lateral prefrontal cortex and the profit-sensitive region of dorsal striatum. The findings suggest moral behavior in our task is linked to a neural devaluation of reward realized by a prefrontal modulation of striatal value representations.

When people anticipate uncertain future outcomes, they often prefer to know their fate in advance. Inspired by an idea in behavioral economics that the anticipation of rewards is itself attractive, we hypothesized that this preference of advance information arises because reward prediction errors carried by such information can boost the level of anticipation. We designed new empirical behavioral studies to test this proposal, and confirmed that subjects preferred advance reward information more strongly when they had to wait for rewards for a longer time. We formulated our proposal in a reinforcement-learning model, and we showed that our model could account for a wide range of existing neuronal and behavioral data, without appealing to ambiguous notions such as an explicit value for information. We suggest that such boosted anticipation significantly drives risk-seeking behaviors, most pertinently in gambling.

Learning induces plasticity in neuronal networks. As neuronal populations contribute to multiple representations, we reasoned plasticity in one representation might influence others. We used human fMRI repetition suppression to show that plasticity induced by learning another individual's values impacts upon a value representation for oneself in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), a plasticity also evident behaviorally in a preference shift. We show this plasticity is driven by a striatal "prediction error," signaling the discrepancy between the other's choice and a subject's own preferences. Thus, our data highlight that mPFC encodes agent-independent representations of subjective value, such that prediction errors simultaneously update multiple agents' value representations. As the resulting change in representational similarity predicts interindividual differences in the malleability of subjective preferences, our findings shed mechanistic light on complex human processes such as the powerful influence of social interaction on beliefs and preferences., (Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Concern for the suffering of others is central to moral decision making. How humans evaluate others' suffering, relative to their own suffering, is unknown. We investigated this question by inviting subjects to trade off profits for themselves against pain experienced either by themselves or an anonymous other person. Subjects made choices between different amounts of money and different numbers of painful electric shocks. We independently varied the recipient of the shocks (self vs. other) and whether the choice involved paying to decrease pain or profiting by increasing pain. We built computational models to quantify the relative values subjects ascribed to pain for themselves and others in this setting. In two studies we show that most people valued others' pain more than their own pain. This was evident in a willingness to pay more to reduce others' pain than their own and a requirement for more compensation to increase others' pain relative to their own. This "hyperaltruistic" valuation of others' pain was linked to slower responding when making decisions that affected others, consistent with an engagement of deliberative processes in moral decision making. Subclinical psychopathic traits correlated negatively with aversion to pain for both self and others, in line with reports of aversive processing deficits in psychopathy. Our results provide evidence for a circumstance in which people care more for others than themselves. Determining the precise boundaries of this surprisingly prosocial disposition has implications for understanding human moral decision making and its disturbance in antisocial behavior.

Actions can lead to an immediate reward or punishment and a complex set of delayed outcomes. Adaptive choice necessitates the brain track and integrate both of these potential consequences. Here, we designed a sequential task whereby the decision to exploit or forego an available offer was contingent on comparing immediate value and a state-dependent future cost of expending a limited resource. Crucially, the dynamics of the task demanded frequent switches in policy based on an online computation of changing delayed consequences. We found that human subjects choose on the basis of a near-optimal integration of immediate reward and delayed consequences, with the latter computed in a prefrontal network. Within this network, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was dynamically coupled to ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) when adaptive switches in choice were required. Our results suggest a choice architecture whereby interactions between ACC and vmPFC underpin an integration of immediate and delayed components of value to support flexible policy switching that accommodates the potential delayed consequences of an action.

Rationale: Intertemporal choice has provided important insights into understanding addiction, predicted drug-dependence status, and outcomes of treatment interventions. However, such analyses have largely been based on the choice of a single commodity available either immediately or later (e.g., money now vs. money later). In real life, important choices for those with addiction depend on making decisions across commodities, such as between drug and non-drug reinforcers. To date, no published study has systematically evaluated intertemporal choice using all combinations of a drug and a non-drug commodity., Objectives: In this study, we examine the interaction between intertemporal choice and commodity type in the decision-making process of cocaine-dependent individuals., Methods: This study of 47 treatment-seeking cocaine addicts analyzes intertemporal choices of two commodities (equated amounts of cocaine and money), specifically between cocaine now vs. cocaine later (C-C), money now vs. money later (M-M), cocaine now vs. money later (C-M), and money now vs. cocaine later (M-C)., Results: Cocaine addicts discounted significantly more in the C-C condition than in M-M (P = 0.032), consistent with previous reports. Importantly, the two cross-commodity discounting conditions produced different results. Discounting in C-M was intermediate to the C-C and M-M rates, while the greatest degree of discounting occurred in M-C., Conclusions: These data indicate that the menu of commodities offered alter discounting rates in intertemporal choice and that the greatest rate is obtained when the drug is the later available commodity. Implications for understanding intertemporal choices and addiction are addressed.