Search

This paper studies China's recent exchange rate policy for the renminbi (RMB). We demonstrate empirically that a two‐pillar policy is in place, aiming to balance exchange rate flexibility and RMB index stability via market and basket pillars. We further extend and validate the formulation that incorporates the so‐called countercyclical factor. Theoretically, we develop a flexible‐price monetary model for the RMB in which the two‐pillar policy arises endogenously as an optimal response of the government. We estimate the model by generalized method of moments and quantitatively assess various policy trade‐offs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses a structural VAR model to investigate the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in China over the period 1995Q1–2015Q4, taking into account five different types of macroeconomic shocks including technology, government spending, monetary policy, foreign demand, and risk premium shocks. These shocks are identified using sign restrictions derived from predictions of an open economy general equilibrium model calibrated to China’s economy. We find that foreign demand shocks are the most important driving force of China’s real exchange rate, which explains approximately 20% to 40% of the variance in 20 quarters. It is in line with the findings in the literature which show real demand shocks are the key contributor to fluctuations in the real exchange rate. Nominal shocks such as monetary policy shocks and risk premium shocks play relatively important roles at the short-term horizons, but their effects decay rapidly. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Movement of the renminbi (RMB) exchange rate is not only affected by economic factors, but also by political factors home and aboard. This paper analyzes the transmission mechanism of political cycles on the RMB exchange rate first, and then sets up a “political cycle spillover effect model” followed by an empirical analysis. We find that: (1) the US political cycle has a direct effect on the RMB exchange rate in the short run, which is mainly transmitted by capital flows and China’s exchange rate policy control; (2) the RMB exchange rate changes periodically in accordance with the US presidential election and midterm election cycle, with the appreciation ratio significantly lower in the first year of the election cycle, while significantly higher in the year after the midterm election; (3) The effect of the political cycle will not be affected by which party holds power, though it will be affected if the president and parliament are ruled by the same party. This paper not only extends the research of the influencing factors of the RMB exchange rate to the political field, but also sets up a use theoretical model to analyze the impact of political issues on the RMB exchange rate, providing a new perspective to fully understand the external environment of RMB exchange rate reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pegging the renminbi ( RMB) to the US dollar since 1994 has characterised China's exchange rate policy under a fixed peg or appreciating crawling peg. The current policy, announced in June 2010, of 'floating with reference to a basket' made the RMB 25 per cent stronger against a trade-weighted basket by early August 2015, while it was 10 per cent stronger against the US dollar. Thus, 14 percentage points arose from changes in the cross rates of the other currencies, notably from the fall of the euro since December 2014. Devaluation of the RMB by 3 per cent in August 2015 just covered the effective appreciation since December 2014. Effects of the cross rates of other currencies could be eliminated by managing the external value of the RMB with reference to a genuine trade-weighted basket. This could be a suitable intermediary exchange rate regime for China, as the risks associated with free floating are still great. Diversifying further the currency composition of the foreign exchange reserves and other foreign assets of the Chinese government, from US dollars towards euro and yen assets, would be a natural parallel shift. The euro- US dollar-yen exchange rates in late summer 2015 may offer a good opportunity to carry out this move. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the directional accuracy of Chinese renminbi exchange rate forecasts by professional forecasters. The forecast with a horizon of one year is useful, whereas the forecasts with forecast horizons of one and three months are not useful in predicting the direction of the exchange rate change. The results for the long-term forecasts suggest that forecasters believe that the government maintains its foreign exchange rate policy of renminbi appreciation. In contrast, short-term forecasts show consistent evidence of exchange rate unpredictability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike the depth of international political economy (IPE) research on finance and money in North America and Britain/Europe, or the amount of work that has been done inside China on the IPE of international trade, the IPE of global finance and money is still at a nascent stage inside China. The paper examines the evolution of Chinese IPE research on global finance and money and suggests that research in these issue areas appears to be reaching a turning point. The main empirical finding is that this shift in knowledge production has been induced principally by China's emergence as a financial force and the national developmental concerns this entails, as well as by the onset of the 2008–09 global financial crisis and the rise of the emerging economies’ grouping. The growing Chinese scholarship on the IPE of finance and money is adding analytical depth and broadening Chinese IPE, particularly on the impact of financial globalization on developing and emerging economies. While such research will likely contribute to Chinese policymaking in the future, the scholarly test for Chinese IPE is whether and how it will contribute to filling the global knowledge gaps on the determinants of financial and monetary policy, and whether it will give rise to new understandings on global finance and money, especially the causes of international financial crises. Heretofore, much of the literature has been heavily policy-oriented and normative. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China-bashing has become a popular US media and political sport. This is largely due to the US trade imbalance and the belief, by some, that China is responsible for it because it manipulates its currency to hold down the dollar prices of its goods, unfairly creating a trade advantage that has contributed to the loss of US businesses and jobs. This paper reviews the problem of the large trade imbalance that the United States has with China and its relationship to Chinese exchange rate policy. It examines the link between a Chinese renminbi appreciation and the trade balance and also whether a generalized dollar decline could solve the global or Chinese US trade imbalance. The consensus view explained here is that a renminbi appreciation is not likely to fix either the trade imbalance with China or overall. If these perceived benefits of a managed float are small or non-existent, then perhaps they should be pursued anyway because of small costs or even benefits for China. Section IV looks at the costs of a managed float in terms of the benefits of the earlier peg. Opponents of a fixed dollar/yuan exchange rate ignore the costs of a managed float for China, especially with limits on currency convertibility. These costs are outlined here in order to provide an economic basis for the earlier fixed rate and China's reluctance to appreciate. Finally it is suggested that the necessary convertibility on capital account, toward which China is moving, could easily result in yuan depreciation under a floating rate regime. This is hardly the end that China critics have in mind and it is not one that would improve US or other trade imbalances with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the actual exchange rate policy conducted by the Chinese government after the Chinese exchange rate system reform on 21 July 2005 is investigated. Also, the long-run effect is investigated, including the Balassa-Samuelson effect on the Chinese yuan. It was found that the Chinese government generated a statistically significant but small change in exchange rate policy during the sample period until 25 January 2006. It was not identified that the Chinese monetary authority is adopting the currency basket system because the change is too small in the economic sense. It is indicated that the Chinese government should take account of the productivity growth of countries composing the currency basket in order to operate a currency basket regime. (Edited by Xiaoming Feng) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2003 China has faced increasing pressure, especially from the US and Japan, to revalue the renminbi. In July 2005 China responded by announcing a small revaluation and a switch from a dollar peg to a tightly managed float against a currency basket. The mainstream economic debate, which we briefly review, has focused on whether, and to what extent, the renminbi is undervalued. From a political economy perspective, however, the more interesting question is why China has been so reluctant to significantly revalue the renminbi especially since it was keen to prove itself a ‘responsible member of the international community’ by not devaluing in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998. We argue that this can be explained by three factors. These are, firstly, the diminished ability of China's policy-makers to use the export tax rebate policy to mitigate the effects of a revaluation. Secondly, there are differences in the regional context between the two time periods. Thirdly, in the international game of ‘problem assignment’, China refuses to accept that the US trade deficit is its ‘problem’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]