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A Tokyo-based economist and a noted western economic geographer, both specializing in the hydrocarbon resources of Russia, apply the framework of governance studies in an effort to gain a deeper understanding of the recent changes in the country's energy policy-making. The authors argue that, unlike the international relations paradigm prevailing in studies of Russia's energy policy, the country's multiple roles in the international energy arena (as producer, consumer, exporter, importer, and transit state) warrant a more nuanced approach, reflecting Russian energy policy's flexibility over time and diversity across space. This paper endeavors, therefore, to apply a political economy and governance perspective to an understanding of the significant changes in Russia's energy policy-making regarding its dynamic energy relations with the Northeast Asia (NEA; China, Japan, and South Korea). In exploring the complex interactions between Russia's internal energy policy-making and its emerging energy relations in NEA, the authors addresses three key questions, namely: (1) how Russia's Asian energy policy corresponds to its domestic needs, (2) how much coherence in energy governance and cooperation exists between Russia and the Northeast Asian states at the institutional and organizational levels, and (3) the extent to which Russia's expectations for increased energy cooperation with the Northeast Asian states are likely to materialize. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines U.S. engagement in Central Asia over the past two decades, with specific reference to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. While alarmist voices occasionally warn of the threat to American interests from China and Russia through the SCO, the organization's influence appears limited. Washington has engaged it only sporadically, preferring to conduct relations bilaterally with the Central Asian states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The steady intensification of Sino-Russian cooperation over the past few years has triggered a surge in scholarly interest. However, in light of the far-reaching geopolitical implications of the Sino-Russian rapprochement, most studies of Sino-Russian dynamics are not only conducted from the disciplinary perspective of International Relations (IR), but also continue to be embedded in realist assumptions and power-political perspectives. This special issue seeks to advance the scholarly knowledge on the Sino-Russian relationship by making the case for expanding the scope of analysis theoretically, disciplinarily and empirically. This introductory article first sets the context by providing a historical overview of key developments in Sino-Russian relations. Following an in-depth review of the IR-dominated literature, it then substantiates the claim that there is a need to broaden the scope of analysis in order to move beyond the IR realist perspective that predominates the literature on the Sino-Russian relationship. Together, the articles in the special issue add new insights to the literature by analyzing the depth of the relationship; scrutinizing Russian discourses on China, in both historical and contemporary contexts; exploring the limitations and dilemmas of the relationship; and paying specific attention to the agency of the countries "in-between", from Central Asia to Mongolia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current state of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China is described by many international relations experts as the best in history. After taking the president office by Donald Trump, the bilateral relations between America and abovementioned powers are cooling down. Current foreign policy of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation focuses on holding a common position in the international political arena, which is in fact an attempt to counter-weight political influence of the US administration and their allies. The dimension of the strategic partnership between China and Russia is also determining the mutual economic dependence, which is now crucial for both powers to build a strong position on the international forum. In addition, Russia is one of the crucial partners for the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – by many recognized as the Chinese attempt to break the American economic domination. The collisional course of the American foreign policy towards Russia and China forces the latter to look for Central and Eastern European allies as well as to gain influence in the region of Central Asia which is leading to a constant increase in tensions between China and Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The failure of post-Soviet Russia to integrate into the West became evident with the 2014 Ukraine crisis, leading Moscow to accelerate its declared "pivot to the East". However, the increased dependence on China carries its own risks, such as the danger of becoming Beijing's junior partner. For an erstwhile superpower that continues to declare and prize its autonomy in international affairs, this is a particularly unappealing prospect. Thus, it remains to be seen whether a genuinely balanced partnership can exist between both countries. This article uses insights from Adam Watson's pendulum theory to explore Russia's post-2014 Eurasian predicament. We argue that the rapid rightward swing of the pendulum in the Euro-Atlantic order following the end of the Cold War has proven indigestible for Moscow. The article then moves to discuss the Sino-Russian relationship in the context of the emerging Eurasian space. It concludes that the growing disillusionment of Russian leaders with the West since the 2000s, along with the normative convergence between Moscow and Beijing, has led to a closer partnership between the two. Yet the partnership is also riddled with a number of insecurities on Moscow's side that could undermine the long-term prospects for cooperation between Russia and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the planned US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 looming ever closer. and Central Asia's own future increasingly in doubt, major powers are all competing to enhance their influence in Central Asia. 2014 may mark a regional tipping point, but none can accurately predict how the regional balance might shift after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. During 2009-2010, the signs of growing Russian dependence on China in terms of economy and energy were palpable, as were the signs of China successfully subordinating Russia to its Central Asian economic agenda. In 2011-2012, it was difficult to see Russia simply acquiescing in its subordination to China without reacting to that situation negatively. Since 2011, to avoid this dependence on China, Russia has vigorously pushed for its regional integration schemes. 2011 marked the launch of the US "New Silk Road" initiative. Great power regional integration schemes, however, undermine both regional and national development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given China's rising power and its growing influence in post-Soviet Central Asia, Russia's active advertising of the merits of the China-inspired Shanghai Cooperation Organization looks surprising. However, when one explores the many geopolitical advantages that Moscow can extract from this young multilateral organization, its interest appears more than justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia claims to be a great Asian power, but its policies have failed to develop the Russian Far East or to use the energy lever at its disposal to develop the region or become a major, reliable energy provider. These failures owe much to the nature of the Russian political and economic system, and, as a result of Moscow's failure, Russia is running the risk of coming under China's political and economic influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]