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While children with typical language development may capitalize on general language skills to grasp the content of others' minds, those with challenges in mind-reading could rather rely more specifically on complementation structures. However, most studies investigating mind-reading have focused on first-order false-belief reasoning, while much less is known about secondorder false-belief, particularly for children that may present language difficulties, such as children with hearing impairment. This study aims to explore the link between language development and second-order false-belief in hearingimpaired children compared to their hearing counterparts. It seeks to ascertain whether mastering second-order false-belief requires the comprehension of complements or other language skills in hearing-impaired children, and if a distinct pattern emerges in their hearing peers. Children with hearing-impairment (n = 22) and a chronological age-matched control group (n = 25), ages 8-12, were administered a second-order false-belief task (carefully avoiding use of complements and highly visual). Alongside this, they completed assessments of expressive vocabulary, receptive and expressive syntax, recalling sentences, and a recursive sentential complements task. Correlational analysis revealed that in the control group only productive syntax was related to performance on the second-order false-belief task, while in the hearing-impaired group, expressive vocabulary, recalling sentences and sentential complements were related to second-order false-belief performance. These results show that vocabulary, recursive complements and expressive syntax are particularly important aspects for second-order false-belief success in children with hearing-impairment as compared to their hearing peers. These results shed light on how language and second-order false-belief understanding are related in their development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Previous literature suggests that children with Down syndrome (DS) have difficulties in cognitive and affective components of Theory of Mind (ToM). However, the nature of the distinction between cognitive and affective ToM has not yet been addressed in depth in this population. Aims This work is aimed at studying the cognitive and affective ToM in children with DS. Methods and Procedures Cognitive ToM tasks (first-order false belief) and affective ToM tasks (Test of Emotion Comprehension) were administered to 30 children with DS (aged from 4 to 12 years) and to 60 typically developing (TD) children (aged from 2 to 12 years). TD children were divided into 2 groups: a Language control group and a Chronological age control group. Results Results suggest that children with DS have difficulty with both the cognitive and affective ToM components, even when compared to the language control group. In contrast to children with typical development, children with DS have a better performance in affective ToM. Conclusions We discuss our results in the light of prior studies describing the difficulties of children with DS in ToM tasks and the role of language in ToM development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present research focuses on the self-admission of being a bully in primary school children who bully, and studies it in relation to sex, educational stage and type of bullying behavior. Our objective was to understand better the relationship between aggressive behaviors and bullying self-admission. We hypothesized aggressive behaviors would be related to bullying self-admission. A total of 4646 primary school students aged from 7 to 12 years participated in this correlational study. The EBIPQ questionnaire was administered to evaluate children's aggressive behaviors, whereas bullying self-admission was evaluated through a direct question, brom the total of participants, 14.9 % were considered bullies, and 4.4 % frequent bullies, according to their responses to the EBIPQ. Among bullies, 21.4 % admitted having bullied others, and this percentage increased to 32 % for frequent bullies. Self-admission of being a bully was independent of sex and educational stage. On the other hand, some aggressive behaviors were more associated than others to self-admission of being a bully. Results suggest reluctance in children to consider themselves as bullies, especially in some types of aggressive behaviors. Finally, we discuss the need to study further the factors influencing the self-admission of being a bully. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies children's capacity to understand that the emotions displayed in pretend play contexts do not necessarily correspond to internal emotions, and that pretend emotions may create false beliefs in an observer. A new approach is taken by asking children about pretend emotions in terms of pretence-reality instead of appearance-reality. A total of 37 four-year-olds and 33 six-year-olds were asked to participate in tasks where they had to pretend an emotion or where they were told stories in which the protagonists pretended an emotion. In each task children were asked: a) if the pretend emotion was real or just pretended and b) if an observer would think that the emotional expression was real or just pretended. Results showed that four-year-olds are capable of understanding that pretend emotions are not necessarily real. Overall, six-year-olds performed better than younger children. Furthermore, both age groups showed difficulty in understanding that pretend emotions might unintentionally mislead an observer. Results are discussed in relation to previous research on children's ability to understand pretend play and the emotional appearance-reality distinction., Author(s): Francesc Sidera [sup.1] , Anna Amadó [sup.1] , Elisabet Serrat [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (Aff1) grid.5319.e, 0000000121797512, Department of Psychology, Facultat d'Educació i Psicologia, University of Girona, , Campus de [...]

This study aims to further understand children's capacity to identify and reason about pretend emotions by analyzing which sources of information they take into account when interpreting emotions simulated in pretend play contexts. A total of 79 children aged 3 to 8 participated in the final sample of the study. They were divided into the young group (ages 3 to 5) and the older group (6 to 8). The children were administered a facial emotion recognition task, a pretend emotions task, and a non-verbal cognitive ability test. In the pretend emotions task, the children were asked whether the protagonist of silent videos, who was displaying pretend emotions (pretend anger and pretend sadness), was displaying a real or a pretend emotion, and to justify their answer. The results show significant differences in the children's capacity to identify and justify pretend emotions according to age and type of emotion. The data suggest that young children recognize pretend sadness, but have more difficulty detecting pretend anger. In addition, children seem to find facial information more useful for the detection of pretend sadness than pretend anger, and they more often interpret the emotional expression of the characters in terms of pretend play. The present research presents new data about the recognition of negative emotional expressions of sadness and anger and the type of information children take into account to justify their interpretation of pretend emotions, which consists not only in emotional expression but also contextual information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Many studies show a link between social cognition, a set of cognitive and emotional abilities applied to social situations, and executive functions in typical developing children. Children with Down syndrome (DS) show deficits both in social cognition and in some subcomponents of executive functions. However this link has barely been studied in this population. The aim of this study is to investigate the links between social cognition and executive functions among children with DS. We administered a battery of social cognition and executive function tasks (six theory of mind tasks, a test of emotion comprehension, and three executive function tasks) to a group of 30 participants with DS between 4 and 12 years of age. The same tasks were administered to a chronological-age control group and to a control group with the same linguistic development level. Results showed that apart from deficits in social cognition and executive function abilities, children with DS displayed a slight improvement with increasing chronological age and language development in those abilities. Correlational analysis suggested that working memory was the only component that remained constant in the relation patterns of the three groups of participants, being the relation patterns similar among participants with DS and the language development control group. A multiple linear regression showed that working memory explained above 50% of the variability of social cognition in DS participants and in language development control group, whereas in the chronological-age control group this component only explained 31% of the variability. These findings, and specifically the link between working memory and social cognition, are discussed on the basis of their theoretical and practical implications for children with DS. We discuss the possibility to use a working memory training to improve social cognition in this population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research is aimed at comparing children's understanding of the distinction between external and internal emotion in deception and pretend play situations. A total of 337 children from 4 to 12 years of age participated in the study. Previous research suggests that in deception situations this understanding is very rudimentary at the age of 4 years, whereas 6-year-olds can articulate it in words. In the present work the children were asked to make this distinction in pretend play or deception tasks. The results show that in pretend play situations children start making this distinction at the age of 6 years, and their performance is better when the simulated emotion is negative rather than positive. These findings suggest that 4-year-olds are not aware that the emotions expressed in pretend play situations might be different from internal emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]