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We respond to Lynn et al.'s (2014) comments on our review (Dalenberg et al., 2012) demonstrating the superiority of the trauma model (TM) over the fantasy model (FM) in explaining the trauma-dissociation relationship. Lynn et al. conceded that our meta-analytic results support the TM hypothesis that trauma exposure is a causal risk factor for the development of dissociation. Although Lynn et al. suggested that our meta-analyses were selective, we respond that each omitted study failed to meet inclusion criteria; our meta-analyses thus reflect a balanced view of the predominant trauma-dissociation findings. In contrast, Lynn et al. were hypercritical of studies that supported the TM while ignoring methodological problems in studies presented as supportive of the FM. We clarify Lynn et al.'s misunderstandings of the TM and demonstrate consistent superiority in prediction of time course of dissociative symptoms, response to psychotherapy of dissociative patients, and pattern of relationships of trauma to dissociation. We defend our decision not to include studies using the Dissociative Experiences Scale-Comparison, a rarely used revision of the Dissociative Experiences Scale that shares less than 10% of the variance with the original scale. We highlight several areas of agreement: (a) Trauma plays a complex role in dissociation, involving indirect and direct paths; (b) dissociation-suggestibility relationships are small; and (c) controls and measurement issues should be addressed in future suggestibility and dissociation research. Considering the lack of evidence that dissociative individuals simply fantasize trauma, future researchers should examine more complex models of trauma and valid measures of dissociation.

The relationship between a reported history of trauma and dissociative symptoms has been explained in 2 conflicting ways. Pathological dissociation has been conceptualized as a response to antecedent traumatic stress and/or severe psychological adversity. Others have proposed that dissociation makes individuals prone to fantasy, thereby engendering confabulated memories of trauma. We examine data related to a series of 8 contrasting predictions based on the trauma model and the fantasy model of dissociation. In keeping with the trauma model, the relationship between trauma and dissociation was consistent and moderate in strength, and remained significant when objective measures of trauma were used. Dissociation was temporally related to trauma and trauma treatment, and was predictive of trauma history when fantasy proneness was controlled. Dissociation was not reliably associated with suggestibility, nor was there evidence for the fantasy model prediction of greater inaccuracy of recovered memory. Instead, dissociation was positively related to a history of trauma memory recovery and negatively related to the more general measures of narrative cohesion. Research also supports the trauma theory of dissociation as a regulatory response to fear or other extreme emotion with measurable biological correlates. We conclude, on the basis of evidence related to these 8 predictions, that there is strong empirical support for the hypothesis that trauma causes dissociation, and that dissociation remains related to trauma history when fantasy proneness is controlled. We find little support for the hypothesis that the dissociation-trauma relationship is due to fantasy proneness or confabulated memories of trauma., (2012 APA, all rights reserved)

According to the sociocognitive model of dissociative identity disorder (DID; formerly, multiple personality disorder), DID is not a valid psychiatric disorder of posttraumatic origin; rather, it is a creation of psychotherapy and the media. Support for the model was recently presented by N.P. Spanos (1994). In this article, the author reexamines the evidence for the model and concludes that it is based on numerous false assumptions about the psychopathology, assessment, and treatment of DID. Most recent research on the dissociative disorders does not support (and in fact disconfirms) the sociocognitive model, and many inferences drawn from previous research appear unwarranted. No reason exists to doubt the connection between DID and childhood trauma. Treatment recommendations that follow from the sociocognitive model may be harmful because they involve ignoring the posttraumatic symptomatology of persons with DID.