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Human cooperation can be facilitated by the ability to create a mental representation of one's own actions, as well as the actions of a partner, known as action co-representation. Even though other species also cooperate extensively, it is still unclear whether they have similar capacities. The Joint Simon task is a two-player task developed to investigate this action co-representation. We tested brown capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella), a highly cooperative species, on a computerized Joint Simon task and found that, in line with previous research, the capuchins' performance was compatible with co-representation. However, a deeper exploration of the monkeys' responses showed that they, and potentially monkeys in previous studies, did not understand the control conditions, which precludes the interpretation of the results as a social phenomenon. Indeed, further testing to investigate alternative explanations demonstrated that our results were due to low-level cues, rather than action co-representation. This suggests that the Joint Simon task, at least in its current form, cannot determine whether non-human species co-represent their partner's role in joint tasks., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Humans often experience striking performance deficits when their outcomes are determined by their own performance, colloquially referred to as "choking under pressure." Physiological stress responses that have been linked to both choking and thriving are well-conserved in primates, but it is unknown whether other primates experience similar effects of pressure. Understanding whether this occurs and, if so, its physiological correlates, will help clarify the evolution and proximate causes of choking in humans. To address this, we trained capuchin monkeys on a computer game that had clearly denoted high- and low-pressure trials, then tested them on trials with the same signals of high pressure, but no difference in task difficulty. Monkeys significantly varied in whether they performed worse or better on high-pressure testing trials and performance improved as monkeys gained experience with performing under pressure. Baseline levels of cortisol were significantly negatively related to performance on high-pressure trials as compared to low-pressure trials. Taken together, this indicates that less experience with pressure may interact with long-term stress to produce choking behavior in early sessions of a task. Our results suggest that performance deficits (or improvements) under pressure are not solely due to human specific factors but are rooted in evolutionarily conserved biological factors., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Large-scale studies of individual differences in innovative behavior among nonhuman animals are rare because of logistical difficulties associated with obtaining observational data on a large number of innovative individuals across multiple locations. Here, we take a different approach, using observer ratings to study individual differences in innovative behavior in 127 brown capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] sp.) from 15 social groups and 7 facilities. Capuchins were reliably rated by 1 to 7 raters (mean 3.2 ± 1.6 raters/monkey) on a 7-point Likert scale for levels of innovative behavior, task motivation, sociality, and dominance. In a subsample, we demonstrate these ratings are valid: Rated innovation predicted performance on a learning task, rated motivation predicted participation in the task, rated dominance predicted social rank based on win/loss aggressive outcomes, and rated sociality predicted the time that monkeys spent in proximity to others. Across all 127 capuchins, individuals that were rated as being more innovative were significantly younger, more social, and more motivated to engage in tasks. Age, sociality, and task motivation all had independent effects on innovativeness, whereas sex, dominance, and group size were nonsignificant. Our findings are consistent with long-term behavioral observations of innovation in wild white-faced capuchins. Observer ratings may, therefore, be a valid tool for studies of animal innovation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Human decision-making is often swayed by irrecoverable investments even though it should only be based on future-and not past-costs and benefits. Although this sunk cost effect is widely documented and can lead to devastating losses, the underlying psychological mechanisms are unclear. To tease apart possible explanations through a comparative approach, we assessed capuchin and rhesus monkeys' susceptibility to sunk costs in a psychomotor task. Monkeys needed to track a moving target with a joystick-controlled cursor for variable durations. They could stop at any time, ending the trial without reward. To minimize the work required for a reward, monkeys should have always persisted for at least 1 s, but should have abandoned the trial if that did not yield a reward. Capuchin monkeys and especially rhesus macaques persisted to trial completion even when it was suboptimal, and were more likely to complete the trial the longer they had already tracked the target. These effects were less pronounced, although still present, when the change in expected tracking duration was signalled visually. These results show that sunk cost effects can arise in the absence of human-unique factors and may emerge, in part, because persisting can resolve uncertainty.

Recent evidence within the field of comparative psychology has demonstrated that small differences in procedure may lead to significant differences in outcome. Therefore, failing to fully explore the impact of different contexts on a behavior limits our ability to fully understand that behavior. A behavior that has exhibited substantial variation, both within and across studies, is animals' responses to violations of their expectations, either when expectations were based on another's outcome (inequity) or one's previous outcome (contrast). We explored this further in capuchin monkeys, focusing on the following 2 factors that often vary in such tests but have not yet been rigorously explored: the relative values of the food rewards and the degree of separation of the subjects. Concerning the first, we examined responses to violation of expectations when the difference between what was expected (or what the partner got) and what was received differed in either quality or quantity. Concerning the second, we compared responses when the 2 individuals were separated by a clear partition (barrier condition) versus sharing the same enclosure without the partition (no-barrier condition). Our results suggest that responses to inequity are most likely to emerge when the food received is low-value food, regardless of the difference between the actual and the expected outcome. However, capuchins did not respond differently to different quantities of rewards, nor did the degree of separation between subjects significantly affect results. We consider the implications of this work for both studies of violation of expectation and other cognitive and behavioral tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

One way to gain insights into personality evolution is by comparing the personality structures of related species. We compared the personality structure of 240 wild white-faced capuchin monkeys to the personality structure of 100 captive brown capuchin monkeys. An ancillary goal was to test the degree to which different personality questionnaires yielded similar personality dimensions. Both species were rated on a common set of 26 antonym pairs. The brown capuchin monkeys were also rated on the 54-item Hominoid Personality Questionnaire. Our cross-species comparisons revealed 3 personality dimensions-Assertiveness, Openness, and Neuroticism-shared by brown and white-faced capuchins, suggesting that these dimensions were present in the common ancestor of these species. Our comparison of the dimensions derived from the antonym pairs and the Hominoid Personality Questionnaire revealed that three common dimensions were identified by both questionnaires. In addition, the dimension Attentiveness was only identified using the Hominoid Personality Questionnaire. These results indicate that major features of capuchin personality are conserved and that the structure of some traits, such as those related to focus, persistence, and attention, diverged. Further work is needed to identify the evolutionary bases that led to the conservation of some dimensions but not others. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

Behavioural responses to photos are often used to infer what animals understand about their social environment, but are rarely validated against the same stimuli in real life. If subjects' responses to photos do not reflect responses to the same live stimuli, it is difficult to conclude what happens in reality based on photo responses alone. We compared capuchins' responses to photos versus live stimuli in an identical scenario within research cubicles. Subjects had the opportunity to approach food placed in front of an alpha group member and, in a separate condition, photos depicting the same individual. Subjects' latencies to approach food when placed in front of the real alpha negatively correlated with time subjects spent in close proximity to the alpha in their main enclosure. We therefore predicted subjects' latencies to approach food in the presence of photos would positively correlate with their latencies to approach food in the presence of the real alpha inside the cubicles, but negatively correlate with time they spent in proximity to the alpha in their enclosure. Neither prediction was supported. While not necessarily surprising, we explain why these results should be an important reminder that care is needed when interpreting results from photo studies., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Studying visual illusions is critical to understanding typical visual perception. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) perceived the Delboeuf illusion in a similar manner as human adults (Homo sapiens). To test this, in Experiment 1, we presented monkeys and humans with a relative discrimination task that required subjects to choose the larger of 2 central dots that were sometimes encircled by concentric rings. As predicted, humans demonstrated evidence of the Delboeuf illusion, overestimating central dots when small rings surrounded them and underestimating the size of central dots when large rings surrounded them. However, monkeys did not show evidence of the illusion. To rule out an alternate explanation, in Experiment 2, we presented all species with an absolute classification task that required them to classify a central dot as "small" or "large." We presented a range of ring sizes to determine whether the Delboeuf illusion would occur for any dot-to-ring ratios. Here, we found evidence of the Delboeuf illusion in all 3 species. Humans and monkeys underestimated central dot size to a progressively greater degree with progressively larger rings. The Delboeuf illusion now has been extended to include capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys, and through such comparative investigations we can better evaluate hypotheses regarding illusion perception among nonhuman animals., ((c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).)

Humans will, at times, act against their own economic self-interest, for example, in gambling situations. To explore the evolutionary roots of this behavior, we modified a traditional human gambling task, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), for use with chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys and humans. We expanded the traditional task to include two additional payoff structures to fully elucidate the ways in which these primate species respond to differing reward distributions versus overall quantities of rewards, a component often missing in the existing literature. We found that while all three species respond as typical humans do in the standard IGT payoff structure, species and individual differences emerge in our new payoff structures. Specifically, when variance avoidance and reward maximization conflicted, roughly equivalent numbers of apes maximized their rewards and avoided variance, indicating that the traditional payoff structure of the IGT is insufficient to disentangle these competing strategies. Capuchin monkeys showed little consistency in their choices. To determine whether this was a true species difference or an effect of task presentation, we replicated the experiment but increased the intertrial interval. In this case, several capuchin monkeys followed a reward maximization strategy, while chimpanzees retained the same strategy they had used previously. This suggests that individual differences in strategies for interacting with variance and reward maximization are present in apes, but not in capuchin monkeys. The primate gambling task presented here is a useful methodology for disentangling strategies of variance avoidance and reward maximization.

Social dominance hierarchies play a pivotal role in shaping the behaviour of many species, and sex differences within these hierarchies often exist. To date, however, few physical markers of dominance have been identified. Such markers would be valuable in terms of understanding the etiology of dominant behaviour and changes in social hierarchies over time. Animals may also use such traits to evaluate the potential dominance of others relative to themselves (i.e. a physical "cue"). Facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR), for example, has been suggested as a cue to dominance in humans, with links to both dominant behaviour and the perception of dominance in other individuals. Whether this association is present in non-human animals is currently not known. Therefore, here we examine within-species links between fWHR and dominant behaviour in 64 brown capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) aged between 2 and 40 years. fWHR was positively associated with alpha status and with a dimensional rating of assertive personality in both males and females. Moreover, fWHR showed significant sexual dimorphism in adults but not juveniles, suggesting a developmental change may occur during puberty. In a sub-sample, sex differences were mediated by weight, suggesting fWHR dimorphism does not exceed what would be expected by differences in body weight. This is the first report of an association between face shape and behaviour in a non-human species. Results are discussed in terms of the role that face-behaviour associations might play within capuchin societies, and the possible selective forces that might have led to the evolution of fWHR-dominance associations in humans.

Species comparisons of personality structure (i.e., how many personality dimensions and the characteristics of those dimensions) can facilitate questions about the adaptive function of personality in nonhuman primates. Here we investigate personality structure in the brown capuchin monkey (Sapajus apella), a New World primate species, and compare this structure to those of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), orangutans (Pongo spp.), and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Brown capuchins evolved behavioral and cognitive traits that are qualitatively similar to those of great apes, and individual differences in behavior and cognition often reflect differences in personality. Thus, we hypothesized that brown capuchin personality structure would overlap more with great apes than with rhesus macaques. We obtained personality ratings from seven sites, including 127 brown capuchin monkeys. Principal-components analysis identified five personality dimensions (Assertiveness, Openness, Neuroticism, Sociability, and Attentiveness), which were reliable across raters and, in a subset of subjects, significantly correlated with relevant behaviors up to a year later. Comparisons between species revealed that brown capuchins and great apes overlapped in personality structure, particularly chimpanzees in the case of Neuroticism. However, in some respects (i.e., capuchin Sociability and Openness) the similarities between capuchins and great apes were not significantly greater than those between capuchins and rhesus macaques. We discuss the relevance of our results to brown capuchin behavior and the evolution of personality structure in primates.

There is much debate about how humans' decision-making compares with that of other primates. One way to explore this is to compare species' performance using identical methodologies in games with strategical interactions. We presented a computerized Assurance Game, which was either functionally simultaneous or sequential, to investigate how humans, rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys used information in decision-making. All species coordinated via sequential play on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating that information about the partner's choice improved decisions. Furthermore, some humans and rhesus monkeys found the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game, even when it was the first condition presented. Thus, Old World primates solved the task without any external cues to their partner's choice. Finally, when not explicitly prohibited, humans spontaneously used language to coordinate on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating an alternative mechanism for converting a simultaneous move game into a sequential move game. This phylogenetic distribution implies that no single mechanism drives coordination decisions across the primates, while humans' ability to spontaneously use language to change the structure of the game emphasizes that multiple mechanisms may be used even within the same species. These results provide insight into the evolution of decision-making strategies across the primates.

The insight that animals' cognitive abilities are linked to their evolutionary history, and hence their ecology, provides the framework for the comparative approach. Despite primates renowned dietary complexity and social cognition, including cooperative abilities, we here demonstrate that cleaner wrasse outperform three primate species, capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees and orang-utans, in a foraging task involving a choice between two actions, both of which yield identical immediate rewards, but only one of which yields an additional delayed reward. The foraging task decisions involve partner choice in cleaners: they must service visiting client reef fish before resident clients to access both; otherwise the former switch to a different cleaner. Wild caught adult, but not juvenile, cleaners learned to solve the task quickly and relearned the task when it was reversed. The majority of primates failed to perform above chance after 100 trials, which is in sharp contrast to previous studies showing that primates easily learn to choose an action that yields immediate double rewards compared to an alternative action. In conclusion, the adult cleaners' ability to choose a superior action with initially neutral consequences is likely due to repeated exposure in nature, which leads to specific learned optimal foraging decision rules.

A recent study has shown that wild capuchins choose a functionally appropriate tool from a set of apparently similar tools, suggesting a surprising level of understanding of the contingencies of tool use.

Without joint benefits, joint actions could never have evolved. Cooperative animals need to monitor closely how large a share they receive relative to their investment toward collective goals. This work documents the sensitivity to reward division in brown, or tufted, capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). In addition to confirming previous results with a larger subject pool, this work rules out several alternative explanations and adds data on effort sensitivity. Thirteen adult monkeys exchanged tokens for rewards, showing negative reactions to receiving a less-favored reward than their partner. Because their negative reaction could not be attributed to the mere visibility of better rewards (greed hypothesis) nor to having received such rewards in the immediate past (frustration hypothesis), it must have been caused by seeing their partner obtain the better reward. Effort had a major effect in that by far the lowest level of performance in the entire study occurred in subjects required to expend a large effort while at the same time seeing their partner receive a better reward. It is unclear whether this effort-effect was based on comparisons with the partner, but it added significantly to the intensity of the inequity response. These effects are as expected if the inequity response evolved in the context of cooperative survival strategies.

It was recently demonstrated that capuchin monkeys notice and respond to distributional inequity, a trait that has been proposed to support the evolution of cooperation in the human species. However, it is unknown how capuchins react to inequitable rewards in an unrestricted cooperative paradigm in which they may freely choose both whether to participate and, within the bounds of their partner's behavior, which reward they will receive for their participation. We tested capuchin monkeys with such a design, using a cooperative barpull, which has been used with great success in the past. Contrary to our expectations, the equity of the reward distribution did not affect success or pulling behavior. However, the behavior of the partner in an unequal situation did affect overall success rates: pairs that had a tendency to alternate which individual received the higher-value food in unequal reward situations were more than twice as successful in obtaining rewards than pairs in which one individual dominated the higher-value food. This ability to equitably distribute rewards in inherently biased cooperative situations has profound implications for activities such as group hunts, in which multiple individuals work together for a single, monopolizable reward., ((c) 2005 Wiley-Liss, Inc.)

We evaluated the response of brown capuchin monkeys to two differentially valued tokens in an experimental exchange situation akin to a simple barter. Monkeys were given a series of three tests to evaluate their ability to associate tokens with food, then their responses were examined in a barter situation in which tokens were either limited or unlimited. Capuchins did not perform barter in the typical sense, returning the tokens which were associated with the reward. However, females, but not males, showed a different response, preferring the higher-value token. This may indicate that they learned to prefer one token over the other rather than to associate the tokens with their specific rewards. This sex difference parallels previous findings of greater reciprocity in female brown capuchins than in males.

During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model, and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. However, we are not the only cooperative animals, hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion.