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As the American death toll in Iraq rises toward 1,000, some IR scholars may be per-plexed. Only a few years ago foreign policymakers in Western democracies, including the United States, were described as being extremely sensitive to the political cost of military com-bat casualties. I argue that the number of casualties a democracy will experience is influenced by several factors, including its military manpower system. I contend that democracies with conscript armies will experience fewer combat casualties than democracies with volunteer or professional forces, because the societal actors most closely impacted by conscript casualties are more likely to have the political power and access with which to constrain policymakers. Using several selection models I find that democracies with conscripts suffer the fewest casualties and democracies with volunteers experience the most casualties with democracy alone being respon-sible for numbers that lie between the previous two types of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the American death toll in Iraq rises toward 1,000, some IR scholars may be perplexed. Only a few years ago foreign policymakers in Western democracies, including the United States, were described as being extremely sensitive to the political cost of military combat casualties. I argue that the number of casualties a democracy will experience is influenced by several factors, including its military manpower system. I contend that democracies with conscript armies will experience fewer combat casualties than democracies with volunteer or professional forces, because the societal actors most closely impacted by conscript casualties are more likely to have the political power and access with which to constrain policymakers. Using several selection models I find that democracies with conscripts suffer the fewest casualties and democracies with volunteers experience the most casualties with democracy alone being respon-sible for numbers that lie between the previous two types of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For centuries students of international conflict have considered variables related to military power in their theories and hypotheses. While this is appropriate, no one in modern times has studied whether and how the social composition of militaries either constrains or frees political leaders to pursue their objectives on the international stage in a manner that is generalizable. In this paper, I begin my attempt to do just that. Specifically, I examine whether the social representativeness of armed forces affects democracies tolerance of fatalities in militarized disputes. Through the use of regression analysis, I find some support for a negative relationship between the social composition of militaries and the apparent willingness of democratic states to incur fatalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]