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This study investigates the effects of leniency programs on cartel duration, cartel fines, and the length of investigations, providing empirical insights that contribute to the ongoing debate regarding their theoretical and empirical implications. The introduction of leniency programs in two different jurisdictions (EU and Spain) at different times and the exogeneity of the introduction date enable us to identify their impact using difference-in-differences estimations. We empirically show that leniency programs, by destabilizing existing cartels, allow for the detection of the longer-lasting ones in the short run. In the long run, our results suggest that destabilization effects prevail, and leniency programs discourage the creation of new cartels. Specifically, our findings indicate that the duration of detected cartels almost doubles in the short run and nearly halves in the long run. Finally, our study reveals that the introduction of leniency programs results in a significant increase in the average fines per cartel case, both before and after taking into account the fine reductions resulting from these programs. This suggests that leniency programs contribute to stronger sanctions against cartels, enhancing their general deterrent effect. However, our findings also indicate that leniency programs lengthen the average duration of cartel investigations, which may hinder the ability of competition authorities to proactively pursue other cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several theoretical propositions suggest that changes in economic activity can explain the decision to form a cartel. The majority of the propositions claim that cartel formation is more likely in expansionary and less likely in contractionary phases of the business cycle. The propositions are re-examined theoretically and by using data on detected cartels for the European Union. In both cases, the results cannot confirm that more cartels are formed in any of the business cycle phases and that correlated economic growth rates create higher incentives to collude. Furthermore, it cannot be confirmed that more cartels form shortly after respectively the trough or the peak in the business cycle. The conclusion is that cartel formation is unaffected by changes in the business cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores Europe's evolving stance on economic security amidst geopolitical shifts and crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.Topics include the historical evolution of economic security concepts, the importance of economic resilience, and key principles for Europe's future approach to economic security, emphasizing global engagement, embracing transformation, and fostering adaptable economic systems.

Proving a cartel as one of the agreements prohibited in Law Number 5 of 1999 concerning the prohibition of monopolistic practices and unfair business competition is not easy. Therefore, KPPU often uses indirect evidence as evidence in giving its decision, but this indirect evidence is not yet known in the legal system in Indonesia. This study aims to analyze the implementation of the use of indirect evidence in the process of proving cartel cases in Indonesia. The results of this study indicate that the implementation of the use of indirect evidence in the process of proving cartel cases in Indonesia has not been effective because it collides with the procedural law system in Indonesia, which has not accommodated indirect evidence so that many KPPU decisions have been cancelled both at the level of objection and cassation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: Antitrust; Cartels; Serial Collusion; K21; K42; L40 EN Antitrust Cartels Serial Collusion K21 K42 L40 215 222 8 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 In some product markets suppliers interact with one another only as sellers of one product. Scenario 1: Rogue division managers of serial colluding firms met without any experience in initiating or implementing a cartel, and without any advice or guidance from anyone at their firms, and were able to agree on effective cartel structures. Collusion is likely to be more profitable, more stable, and more frequent when a set of collusion-minded firms are linked in various ways.[1] Links can be forged by multi-product, multi-national firms in competition across product markets and geographic markets. FIRM PARTICIPATION IN APPREHENDED CARTELS We examined the entire record of cartel prohibition decisions by the European Commission. [Extracted from the article]

Case C-117/20 bpost SA and Case C-151/20 Nordzucker AG, Zudzucker AG, Agrana Zucker GmbH, Judgments of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 22 March 2022 The Court of Justice of the European Union in two Grand Chamber rulings has overturned its established case law on the conditions that must be satisfied in order for the protection against double jeopardy provided by Article 50 of the EU Charter of Fundamental rights to be applicable. The controversial and doctrinally weak third condition concerning the identity of the legal interest , in addition to the identity of the facts and persons, has now been abandoned. It has been replaced by the legal exception rule provided for in Article 52 of the Charter. In essence, this means that the double jeopardy rule will not be infringed by enforcers of EU Competition Law in parallel or subsequent enforcement proceedings including complementary proceedings and penalties based on distinct legal grounds as long as the requirements of Article 52, as clarified by the Court are respected. The rulings thus ends EU Competition law enforcement exceptionalism compared two other areas of EU law regarding the conditions that must be met in order for the protection against 'criminal' proceedings and penalties to be satisfied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports that the collection of contributions edited by Rafael Amaro is a most welcome addition to the literature on the topic of private enforcement of competition law in Europe, focusing on the Damages Directive. It mentions that the principle covers the impact of the directive and the main principles established, including disclosure of evidence, the effects of national decisions, limitation periods, quantification of harm and consensual dispute resolution.

E-commerce already covers the entire spectrum of commercial activities. Transacting electronically still causes debate in the legal and non-legal fields. From a competition perspective, e-commerce on the one hand provides an opportunity to compete, but on the other hand there is also anti-competitive potential. For this reason, the purpose of this paper is to examine the potential for unfair business competition in e-commerce. The problems to be studied are: What competition issues exist in e-commerce and what problems are faced by the competition agency regarding the issue of competition in e-commerce. Based on the results of the discussion and analysis, it is concluded that: the issue of competition in e-commerce consists of infrastructure issues and transaction issues. In the issue of infrastructure, the perspective of business competition will arise problems of interconnection agreements between providers that lead to vertical integration, which of course will reduce the benefits of competition in internet access. On the issue of e-commerce transactions, in addition to providing convenience in transactions and efficiency in business transactions from the perspective of business competition, it will provide potential difficulties in determining market relevance, price dispersion, and price discrimination as well as the possibility of dominant position power and even monopoly in interconnection and the existence of potential price cartel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ekonomske Ideje i Praksa is the property of Centar za Izdavacku Delatnost Ekonomskog Fakulteta u Beogradu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Most states have a national anti-trust or competition law to regulate anti-competitive activities. There is no doubt that, in purely domestic cases, where an anti-competitive activity and its anti-competitive effects have occurred within a state, that state's national competition authority can regulate the activity by applying its competition law. For cross-border cases such as where anti-competitive activities are carried out abroad but have anti-competitive effects on the domestic or internal market of that state or region, it has been gradually accepted that a state can apply its competition law to the activities on the basis of the effects within its territory. However, it should be noted that states have approached such cases differently. In 2017, the Supreme Court of Japan first decided the international scope of the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act (JAMA) in cross-border cartel cases and clarified that the JAMA could apply to anti-competitive activities conducted outside of Japan if the activities in question disturbed the free competition economic order of Japan. The court did not mention the effects doctrine or the territorial principle. This article examines on what grounds and how far the JAMA can and should apply to cross-border cartel cases by analysing the Supreme Court judgement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues against the current strict liability approach of the cartel offence by presenting a case for the introduction of a mens rea of cartel crime. The cartel offence is presented as a serious and normatively stigmatic crime which requires a mens rea iffair criminalisation is to occur. A mens rea of intention is presented as the ideal candidate and the applicability of intention is explored. The issue of omission in the cartel context is also addressed and this in turn leads to a call for the creation of a new offence offailing to report carte! activity to the competition authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the use of cartels through vertical restraints and ways that distributors may facilitate collusion. It mentions collusive arrangement or play upstream firms against one another, consumers benefit, competition policy's laissez-faire attitude toward vertical relationships. It also mentions European Commission documented cartel organizational mechanisms in sufficient detail to reveal the continued existence of these behaviors and arrangements.

An arrangement to fix, control or maintain prices is the classic competition law per se offence, and is deemed to substantially lessen competition under s 30 of the Commerce Act 1986. However, it is currently unclear when arrangements that do not explicitly concern price fall within the ambit of s 30. This article examines the recent Court of Appeal decision in Commerce Commission v Lodge Real Estate Ltd which found that the defendants were liable under the per se offence provisions.1 It contends that the Court of Appeal took the overseas case law out of context, misunderstood key factual findings made by the High Court at first instance and overlooked important legal and policy considerations. As a result it is argued that Lodge sets an unfortunate precedent that should be overruled or strictly confined to its own facts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the largest problems facing competition authorities worldwide is the detection, investigation, and prosecution of business cartels, which collude in illegal practices like price-fixing and bid-rigging. While even the largest nations and enforcement bodies face difficulty confronting these practices, small nations face an even steeper battle towards eliminating these harmful practices because of their limited resources. A fully integrated cooperation body is a step towards relieving this problem through shared investigatory and adjudicatory resources in this field, and the European Union presents an ideal landscape for this solution. Creating a strong, central competition authority inside the European Union with shared resources for both investigation and adjudication from all of the member states will produce the strongest possible results in both case efficiency and future deterrence to crime. A single investigation will allow all affected nations to determine their own affected market share and a single verdict will eliminate multiple jeopardy, a major deterrence to whistle-blowing. This cooperation will allow all member nations, large and small, to introduce appropriate fines for their affected markets, further decreasing the chance that businesses will undertake illegal activity in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conducts an event study analysis to empirically assess the industry-wide impact of cartels. Using a sample of recent European cartel cases, we estimate the effect of the surprise inspection and final decision on the stock market value of cartel and noncartel firms. The overall effect of both events is negative for cartel members and statistically insignificant for noncartel members. However, the impact of the inspection is significantly negative for European noncartel suppliers and for noncartel suppliers in nonchemicals industries. This is consistent with the theory that cartels can create additional damages through positively affecting the performance of their competitors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a response to the article published in this Journal by Michael Polemis and Aikaterina Oikonomou, from the Hellenic Competition Commission ("HCC") and the Hellenic Single Public Procurement Authority respectively (the "Article"), which in turn analyses a 2008 decision of the HCC in the retail fuel sector. Our response reaffirms the position that tacit collusion can, unless there is a cogent economic rationale, under no circumstance be considered as a cartel. We discuss: The Article and the HCC decision it refers to; Why we believe tacit collusion should not be sanctioned as a cartel; Why, even in the set of factual circumstances put forward, there were credible alternative economic explanations; and How tacit collusion can be challenged on the basis of other competition instruments [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cartel cases may involve recurrent collusion, with cartel periods interspersed by periods of greater competition. An empirical model of recurrent collusion must account for different data generating processes during collusive and non-collusive episodes and allow for the dating of such episodes. It should also allow for the possibility of flexible transitions between collusive and non-collusive episodes. This paper proposes a Markov regime-switching model to detect recurrent periods of collusive damages and to estimate cartel effectiveness in any given time period. We use this information to estimate overcharges, which we show are much higher than those suggested by conventional approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The framework of EU law on cartel damages actions consists in part of rules established by the ECJ based on arts 101 and 102 TFEU in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness. These rules are an integral part of EU primary law. The notion of institutional balance, however, requires the Court to consider its own inherent limits on democratic legitimacy, accountability and expertise. In particular, the Court has to ensure that adequate scope remains for the EU legislature to exercise its legislative power pursuant to art. 103 TFEU. It is argued that the ECJ has disregarded these restrictions and overstretched the principle of effectiveness--for instance, in its adjudication on liability for umbrella pricing and on access to leniency files, respectively. Consequently, the EU legislature must not consider itself bound by these standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the increasing number of countries opting for a criminal antitrust enforcement, outside the US, the implementation of criminal penalties has been quite deficient. Among the main arguments provided by the relevant literature to explain such deficiency, in addition to the procedural obstacles, there is a belief that the criminalization of cartels is often the product of a top-down process led by transnational enforcement interests rather than domestic bottom up pressures. And, as such, it bears the original sin of missing the required enforcement culture and support of the decisive stakeholders. Against this background, the present article provides an empirical investigation exploring the law making processes that led to the criminalization of cartels in Chile. We observe that, when the policy decision is highly politicized, i.e. the consensus building motive is predominant, even if the decision making is not driven by transnational interests but by purely domestic pressures, a regulatory populism might still overcome important balancing policy considerations, with the risk of jeopardizing the results' effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how price-fixing conspiracies use inter-competitor sales to enforce their cartel arrangements in the U.S. It mentions about the role of judges in dismissing price-fixing claims or granting summary judgment to defendants who have, in fact, conspired to fix prices; enactment of Sherman Act for addressing issues of bad competition in the country; and Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. court case on the same.

Abstract: A challenge for many cartels is avoiding a destabilizing increase in noncartel supply in response to having raised price. In the case of the German cement cartel that operated over 1991–2002, the primary source of noncartel supply was imports from Eastern European cement manufacturers. Testimonies in a private enforcement case have claimed that the cartel sought to control imports by sharing rents with intermediaries in order to discourage them from sourcing foreign supply. Specifically, cartel members would allow an intermediary to issue the invoice for a transaction and charge a fee even though the output went directly from the cartel member's plant to the customer. We investigate this claim by first developing a theory of collusive pricing that takes account of the option of bribing intermediaries. The theory predicts that the cement cartel members are more likely to share rents with an intermediary when the nearest Eastern European plant is closer and there is more Eastern European capacity outside of the control of the cartel. Estimating a logit model that predicts when a cartel member sells through an intermediary, the empirical analysis supports both predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many competition authorities employ a leniency programme to fight cartels. We examine the impact of the introduction of sanctions and leniency for individuals responsible for the cartel, on the number of cartel discoveries. In our empirical study of the Dutch leniency programme, we find that this did not lead to more cartels being desisted as the number of cartel discoveries decreases over time. An analysis of characteristics of cartel members shows harsher enforcement after the revision, which indicates that the decrease in cartel discoveries is in line with higher cartel deterrence. Nevertheless, the number of cartel cases involving leniency actually decreases after the revision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, we investigate the effect of reference prices on oligopolistic firms' behavior. Specifically, we analyze pricing strategies and equilibrium outcomes when differentiated firms compete in Bertrand fashion and reference prices act as anchors. We show that anchoring may lower the prices charged in the long run. Furthermore, we claim that the existence of anchoring makes collusion less stable. This might have implications on the optimal allocation of regulatory resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their desire to gain market share and profit, companies often resort to certain anti-competitive practices. Among them, it is well known that cartels are considered the most serious infringement of competition law. Cartels aim to increase their prices and profits at the expense of the consumers' welfare by avoiding the risks of competition and reducing the uncertainty in the market. In order to uncover cartels, screens can be a useful tool for competition authorities, using them to support opening an investigation or to filter industries prone to anticompetitive behaviour for further investigation. Screens can also help authorities to estimate the duration of the infringement, by identifying the starting point and the ending of the respective practice. This paper reviews the main screens identified in the empirical literature and also used by competition authorities in order to uncover firms' behaviours which are more likely to be consistent with collusion than with competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A decade ago, Leegin overruled Dr. Miles and subjected RPM to rule-of-reason treatment, under which the potential for anticompetitive conduct should be analyzed (rather than automatically assumed to be present). In its Leegin decision, the Supreme Court identified four ways in which RPM could be used to retard competition and consequently reduce consumer welfare: The first two involve the well-known concerns that RPM could be used to support either a manufacturer cartel or a dealer cartel; the last two involve unilateral conduct designed to foreclose entry or hinder smaller rivals. In this paper, we analyze these potentially harmful uses of RPM. We conclude that RPM does not pose a substantial anticompetitive threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to analyze the competitive economic environment in the European Union in the period 2010-2015. In the first part of the research we have presented a few theoretical aspects relating to competition and then we analyzed the main investigations triggered by the European Commission in the field of competition for the period under review. Commission policies in matters of antitrust and mergers and application with their bigger efficacy had brought into the spotlight the welfare of consumers, in particular through a thorough economic analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses what the authors refer to as the causes of competition agency ineffectiveness in developing countries as of 2016, and it mentions antitrust enforcement activities and the economic influence of business groups, industries, and regional associations. A distinction between private "naked" cartels and cartels that success by their association with the state is examined, along with variations in business practices, private social networks, and antitrust enforcement errors.

This article discusses the reasons for cartel stability by using the Swedish Steel Casting Cartel as an example. Previous research points out organisational structure and the ability to deal with exit entry and cheating as crucial for stability. In this article, the development of social norms, morally legitimised within the cartel, is discussed as a possible explanation for cartel stability. The organisational structure developed was flexible enough to deal with problems of exit entry and cheating. The discussions on quotas and prices led to a common view on fair prices. The conclusion is that the organisational structure can partly explain why the Steel Casting Group was relatively stable but that there are indications that the development of common social norms related to the value of fairness was also an important explanatory factor. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although often mentioned in Court cases, the "public distancing requirement" has so far never been accepted as a defense. The key function of this requirement is to rebut the so-called Anic presumption, according to which an undertaking that has attended (even passively) an anticompetitive meeting is deemed to have participated in a "concerted practice" within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. The key function of the "public distancing requirement" is, therefore, to rebut a presumption of liability. From this point of view, the public distancing requirement performs a central role, in that it helps resolve the inherent tension between the "Anic presumption" and the presumption of innocence. With that role in mind, this article discusses the scope, stringency and judicial review of the public distancing requirement in light of the most recent case law of the EU courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Court of Justice's endorsement in InnoLux Corp v. Commission of the concept 'direct European Economic Area (EEA) sales through transformed products' for EU competition law fining purposes is not wholly uncontroversial. Infelicitous consequences arising from the application of this novel concept potentially include: (i) the imposition of excessive and disproportionate penalties, and (ii) the same sales being penalized by a competition authority in a country in which internal sales were made in addition to being penalized by the European Commission. The authors therefore advocate that the EU rules determining which acts can be taken into account for the purposes of determining a fine should be strictly coterminous with the rules on jurisdiction and that third-country competition authorities be encouraged to adopt a similar approach. It is believed that greater legal certainty can be achieved by having symmetry between the rules on jurisdiction and the rules on the sales to be taken into account for the purposes of determining fines. This solution does not exclude an application of the 'qualified effects' doctrine to downstream sales by related parties, provided there is adequate evidence to establish the existence of the 'qualified effects' in the first place. The rigours of that doctrine are necessary to ensure that the objective of ensuring effective deterrence does not become an autonomous and unruly principle of policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a unique dataset of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the price behavior before and after the breakdown of a German cement cartel. We find that, first, while the cartel agreement was active, cartel members set higher list prices than non-cartel members; however, larger rebates granted by the cartel members led to similar transaction prices. Second, after the cartel breakdown, both cartel- and non-cartel members reduced transaction prices to a far larger extent than list prices. We build on these results and discuss implications for competition policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various presentations made at a conference on the postwar consensus and revolution in Germany in the 20th century. Topics discussed at the conference included competition among corporations, which depended on the welfare of male industrial workers; the role of corporatism and cartels that restricted competition in Germany; and development of the welfare state in Germany since the 1970s.

Cartel conduct subverts competition and as a result can harm consumers, businesses and the economy. Because it often takes place covertly, cartel conduct can be difficult to detect. A financial rewards scheme for informants should be considered as a future way forward for cartel detection in Australia. This article considers the rationales for a financial rewards scheme for cartel informants, the potential shortcomings of such a scheme, and how overseas jurisdictions, in particular the United States through its False Claims Act and Dodd-Frank Act, could provide guidance for Australia in implementing such a scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]