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Current scholarship emphasises the correlation between enforcement of corporate and securities laws and strong capital markets. Yet, the issue of how private and public enforcement may achieve the objectives of compensation and optimal deterrence remains controversial. While enforcement strategies have been studied extensively in the US and the UK, comparatively less attention is placed on Asia, where concentrated shareholdings are the norm. This study fills the gap by focusing on Hong Kong and Singapore, two leading international financial centres in Asia. Post Asian financial crisis of 1997, Hong Kong and Singapore have changed their laws to strengthen the private enforcement framework. Public enforcement activities have also been significant. The question is whether these reforms and enforcement activities succeed in reaching the afore-mentioned objectives. Based on our study of ex post enforcement actions, which are actions that may lead to sanctions (such as prosecutions or administrative proceedings) or compensation orders, arising from breaches of directorial duties and corporate disclosure violations involving listed companies from 2000 to 2015, we find that (1) public enforcement dominates over private enforcement; and (2) there are important, but limited, substitutes for private enforcement: securities regulators use public enforcement to obtain compensation for investors, and shareholders file requisitions to remove errant directors. We argue that: (a) there is a significant gap in enforcement strategies for directorial wrongdoing in Singapore; (b) for public enforcement of corporate disclosure violations, the beneficiaries of the compensation should be the investors (rather than the company) and the defendants should only be the errant directors (and not the company). Our study is relevant to those jurisdictions considering the powers of regulators and improving their enforcement framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chamber risk of central counterpart have become one of the most important structural pillars of the financial markets in the world, both stand as a central counterparty for all transactions in capital markets and some OTC, establish schedules for operating the highly weighted Systems Robust Risk Management. This paper aims to outline the structure of this system, emphasizing on how to model the risk that these institutions take in pursuit of its objects. In this sense, the establishment of margins is established as a critical step and function of a schematic approach that integrates securities risk, stress scenarios, the most recent behavior of volatility, collateral formation, and the financial capacity of operators to settle its obligations on time. As a result, the margin / collateral, and limits on open positions is the end product of a Risk Management System to guarantee the integrity of the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the relative risks and motivations of each Synthetic Total Return Structure from the perspective of the senior debt collateral manager and the capital markets investor. Comparison of the legal parameters, including related tax issues, of two such structured vehicles that utilize senior debt as collateral; Issuance of debt and equity securities in the domestic and foreign capital markets on a fully funded basis; Overview of the Synthetic Return Structure that may be formed in an offshore, tax-advantage jurisdiction.