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Are voters willing to punish a prime minister for calling an ‘unnecessary’ snap election for purely opportunistic reasons? This paper examines voters’ reactions to the Canadian prime minister's decision to call a snap election in November 2000. The decision provoked limited resentment, and that resentment was strongest among partisans of the opposition parties and among those who follow politics closely. Those who do not keep up with politics, it seems, either did not realize that the election was precipitous or simply did not care. The paper shows that resentment about the election call was a consideration in vote choice, but it was a decisive consideration for a very small group of voters. We estimate that the electoral cost to the incumbent Liberal Party was one percentage point. Some voters are prepared to punish prime ministers for opportunistically calling a snap election, but in this case the electoral penalty was small. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Canadian federal cabinet stands out among Westminster parliamentary democracies because of the large number of first-time ministers who are appointed to cabinet without any previous parliamentary or political experience. Several explanations have been put forward to account for this peculiarity but no attempt has been made to examine how Canadian prime ministers overcome the information deficit associated with appointing ministers with no experience. How can prime ministers be confident that they are making the right choice? This paper explores the subject by estimating the survival functions of ministerial turnover for potential, but not yet appointed, cabinet ministers were they to survive to a defined political benchmark; these survival rates are included in a logit model of Canadian ministerial appointment following four general elections (1957, 1979, 1984 and 2006) in which the prime minister was tasked with appointing a cabinet with ministerial neophytes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]