Canadian civil-military relations have undergone a significant shift since 2005. From 1968 to the turn of the century, Canadian politicians and civilian bureaucrats exercised strict control over the Canadian Armed Forces (CF). Serving both to minimize the CF's role in defense policymaking and its ability to evade civilian authority, this system of strict civilian control appeared to be the unshakable foundation of contemporary Canadian civil-military relations. Yet in 2005 civilian control was loosened by the minority Liberal government of Prime Minister Paul Martin, giving the Canadian military leadership a remarkable degree of direction over defense policymaking and a political presence unseen in Canada since the Korean War. Martin believed this decision would distinguish him from his purportedly anti-military predecessor, enhance Canada's international reputation, and help rebuild what many at home and abroad judged to be the overstretched and under funded CF. Appointed Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) by Martin in February 2005, former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander General Rick Hiller used this newly bestowed influence and clout to draft novel defense policies, undertake transformations of the CF command and force structures, and put down a larger "footprint" for the CF in Ottawa. Hillier's actions were initially applauded and backed by most political parties, the media, and the public. Recently, however, the minority Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper has begun to reassert a more traditionally Canadian degree of civilian control over Hillier and the CF. However the Harper government has been cautious in its efforts to re-impose strict civilian control on the senior CF leadership. With their soldiers fighting and taking casualties in southern Afghanistan, Canadians have expressed immense and justifiable support for the CF and the CDS. To avoid a dip in its own popularity, the Harper government appears anxious to keep its confrontation with Hillier out of sight. As long as the CF is at war, efforts to re-impose strict civilian control are limited to those within the bureaucracy of the Department of National Defence (DND), beyond the public's gaze. In the end, though, the bureaucratic measures can only accomplish so much, which suggests that as long as support for the CF remains high, the senior military leadership will continue to publicly voice their disagreements with government policies and priorities they view as contrary to the interests of the armed forces, especially with respect to the war in Afghanistan. In turn, this implies that a new norm of Canadian civil-military relations is emerging, one that leaves defence policymaking with civilians while allowing the military to publicly disagree with their political masters.This paper analyzes this recent evolution of Canadian civil-military relations. It begins with an analysis of the parameters of the Canadian civil-military experience from 1968 to 2003 and provides an overview of the strict system of civilian control that existed in Canada at that time. The paper then explores the conditions that allowed the military to challenge and circumvent this tradition of strict civilian control from 2004 to 2006. Finally, the paper examines how the Harper government has sought to re-impose a stricter form of civilian control and why this effort is likely to meet with limited success. The argument here is that the CF's presence and successes in Afghanistan allowed a new generation of battle-tested Canadian military leaders, and their savvy and inspiring CDS in particular, to secure higher ground on Ottawa's political and bureaucratic battlefields. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]