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Research has demonstrated that pilots contain multiple shifting purposes, not all of which relate to simple policy testing or refinement. Judging the success of policy pilots is therefore complex, requiring more than a simple judgement against declared goals. Marsh and McConnell provide a framework against which policy success can be judged, distinguishing programme success from process and political success. We adapt Boven's modification of this framework and apply it to policy pilots, arguing that pilot process, outcomes and longer term effects can all be judged in both programme and political terms. We test this new framework in a pilot programme in the English National Health Service, the Vanguard programme, showing how consideration of these different aspects of success sheds light on the programme and its aftermath. We consider the implications of the framework for the comprehensive and multi-faceted evaluation of policy pilots.

Purpose Neo-liberal “reform” has in many countries shifted services across the boundary between the public and private sector. This policy re-opens the question of what structural and managerial differences, if any, differences of ownership make to healthcare providers. The purpose of this paper is to examine the connections between ownership, organisational structure and managerial regime within an elaboration of Donabedian’s reasoning about organisational structures. Using new data from England, it considers: how do the internal managerial regimes of differently owned healthcare providers differ, or not? In what respects did any such differences arise from differences in ownership or for other reasons? Design/methodology/approach An observational systematic qualitative comparison of differently owned providers was the strongest feasible research design. The authors systematically compared a maximum variety (by ownership) sample of community health services; out-of-hours primary care; and hospital planned orthopaedics and ophthalmology providers (n=12 cases). The framework of comparison was the ownership theory mentioned above. Findings The connection between ownership (on the one hand) and organisation structures and managerial regimes (on the other) differed at different organisational levels. Top-level governance structures diverged by organisational ownership and objectives among the case-study organisations. All the case-study organisations irrespective of ownership had hierarchical, bureaucratic structures and managerial regimes for coordinating everyday service production, but to differing extents. In doctor-owned organisations, the doctors’, but not other occupations’, work was controlled and coordinated in a more-or-less democratic, self-governing ways. Research limitations/implications This study was empirically limited to just one sector in one country, although within that sector the case-study organisations were typical of their kinds. It focussed on formal structures, omitting to varying extents other technologies of power and the differences in care processes and patient experiences within differently owned organisations. Practical implications Type of ownership does appear, overall, to make a difference to at least some important aspects of an organisation’s governance structures and managerial regime. For the broader field of health organisational research, these findings highlight the importance of the owners’ agency in explaining organisational change. The findings also call into question the practice of copying managerial techniques (and “fads”) across the public–private boundary. Originality/value Ownership does make important differences to healthcare providers’ top-level governance structures and accountabilities and to work coordination activity, but with different patterns at different organisational levels. These findings have implications for understanding the legitimacy, governance and accountability of healthcare organisations, the distribution and use power within them, and system-wide policy interventions, for instance to improve care coordination and for the correspondingly required foci of healthcare organisational research.

Chapter 2 provides the context, setting out the organisation and governance of commissioning in the NHS. It includes a short summary of the architecture of commissioning pre-Health and Social Care Act (HSCA12), and highlights the important changes which were brought about by the Act, including the abolition of Primary Care Trusts and Strategic Health Authorities, the establishment of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), the creation of NHS England, transfer of commissioning responsibilities to different bodies (e.g. public health) and the setting up of local Health and Wellbeing Boards. The chapter also highlights the programme theories underlying the HSCA12, in particular the commitment to competition as a means of improving services and the expected benefits of greater clinical involvement in commissioning.

Chapter 7 reports two aspects of research on contracting in the NHS. The first investigates how the policies to use contractual mechanisms including financial risk allocation work in practice. Most of the contractual relationships between NHS owned acute providers and commissioners were characterised by the use of general annual financial settlements outside the terms of the contract. This behaviour appeared to be increasing over time. The second study comprises a review of the evidence concerning new forms of contract being introduced into the NHS: alliance and outcome based contracts. These are aimed at facilitating the integration of services and improving quality of care. Evidence from other sectors indicates that new models of contracting may result in cost savings including a reduction in capital costs, the development of innovations and benefits in relation to time. But there are high transaction costs in relation to the process of contract negotiation and specification. The evidence base regarding improvements in the quality of services is not convincing. These models carry a number of potential governance issues in relation to their implementation in the NHS, and are at risk of failing to satisfy public sector governance objectives including accountability, integrity and transparency.

The aim of this book is to bring together in one volume the most important research which the Policy Research Unit in Commissioning and the Healthcare System (PRUComm) has undertaken during the period 2011 to 2018. PRUComm is a multicentre research unit based at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, the University of Manchester and the University of Kent. PRUComm is funded by the Policy Research Programme of the English Department of Health and Social Care from 2011 onwards to provide evidence to the DHSC to inform the development of policy on commissioning and the healthcare system. The analytical work supports understanding of how NHS commissioning operates and how it can improve services and access, increase effectiveness and respond better to patient and population needs. The structural changes introduced by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 pursuant to the twin policies of increasing clinical involvement in commissioning and accelerating market forces have had large effects on the practice of commissioning across the NHS. There has been a great increase in the complexity of health system governance. The number of bodies undertaking commissioning has increased and there has also been a proliferation of other NHS organisations required to regulate the complex system. The effect of this increase in complexity in the governance of the NHS has been wide-ranging. As a result, local autonomy is severely limited and the original policy aspirations to deliver freedom from government control and greater accountability to patients and greater democratic legitimacy have not been realised to any significant degree. In addition, the fragmentation of commissioning roles has been damaging to the planning and delivery of services which are subject to several commissioning regimes. Not only is there evidence of deterioration in patient outcomes, but the research has also demonstrated that significant effort, and thus opportunity cost, is required from commissioners to ‘knit back together’ pre-existing systems of service planning and delivery. The issue of accountability of commissioners is closely related to the problem of increased complexity of commissioning and system governance. Local Clinical Commissioning Groups are stated to be membership organisations whose primary accountability is internally to their GP members. But in fact the strongest form of accountability would seem to be their hierarchical upwards accountability to NHS England, the national body running the NHS. In addition, the delegation of responsibility for commissioning of primary care to CCGs presents a risk that groups of GPs will commission themselves to provide services, creating a structural conflict of interest, which may undermine their public stewardship role in respect of commissioning budgets. The complex regulatory structures of the NHS required to police the marketised system introduced by the HSCA 2012 have effects on the efficiency of the system as a whole. Inappropriate use of market institutional structures, as opposed to integrated hierarchies, can decrease overall efficiency by increasing costs of undertaking transactions. A further effect of the changes to commissioning introduced by the HSCA 2012 has been on clinicians in primary care. Despite the fact that the research has indicated that they can make a useful contribution to commissioning by CCGs, the workload associated with such involvement is substantial, with a potentially damaging effect on the working lives of GPs, who are already under stress from excessive demands on their time. This makes the sustainability of the model of GP involvement in CCGs dubious. Despite the problems associated with the HSCA 2012, we argue that there will always be a role for planning, and thus a degree of commissioning in the NHS, as a publicly funded system. Strategic decisions need to be made about the allocation of public resources between different services in order to optimise population health and wellbeing. It is also necessary to monitor the performance of providers of care and make improvements where care is substandard. Thus, the core activities of commissioning are necessary whether pro-competitive quasi-market aspects of the English NHS are retained or not. But commissioning in its current form is unlikely to continue, given plans being developed at national level merge CCGs and introduce intermediate tiers of supervision.

Background High-quality nursing care is crucial for patients with complex conditions and comorbidities living at home, but such care is largely invisible to health planners and managers. Nursing care quality in acute settings is typically measured using a range of different quality measures; however, little is known about how service quality is measured in community nursing. Objective To establish which quality indicators (QIs) are selected for community nursing; how these are selected and applied; and their usefulness to service users (patients and/or carers), commissioners and provider staff. Design A mixed-methods study comprising three phases. (1) A national survey was undertaken of ‘Commissioning for Quality and Innovation’ indicators applied to community nursing care in 2014/15. The data were analysed descriptively using IBM SPSS Statistics 20.0 (IBM Corporation, Armonk, NY, USA). (2) An in-depth case study was conducted in five sites. Qualitative data were collected through observations, interviews, focus groups and documents. A thematic analysis was conducted using QSR NVivo 10 (QSR International, Warrington, UK). The findings from the first two phases were synthesised using a theoretical framework to examine how local and distal contexts affecting care provision impacted on the selection and application of QIs for community nursing. (3) Validity testing the findings and associated draft good practice guidance through a series of stakeholder engagement events held in venues across England. Setting The national survey was conducted by telephone and e-mail. Each case study site comprised a Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) and its associated provider of community nursing services. Participants Survey – 145 (68.7%) CCGs across England. Case study NHS England national and regional quality leads (n = 5), commissioners (n = 19), provider managers (n = 32), registered community nurses (n = 45); and adult patients (n = 14) receiving care in their own homes and/or carers (n = 7). Findings A wide range of indicators was used nationally, with a major focus on organisational processes. Lack of nurse and service user involvement in indicator selection processes had a negative impact on their application and perceived usefulness. Indicator data collection was hampered by problematic information technology (IT) software and connectivity and interorganisational system incompatibility. Front-line staff considered indicators designed for acute settings inappropriate for use in community settings. Indicators did not reflect aspects of care, such as time spent, kindness and respect, that were highly valued by front-line staff and service user participants. Workshop delegates (commissioners, provider managers, front-line staff and service users, n = 242) endorsed the findings and drafted good practice guidance. Limitations Ongoing service reorganisation during the study period affected access to participants in some sites. The limited available data precluded an in-depth documentary analysis. Conclusions The current QIs for community nursing are of limited use. Indicators will be enhanced by involving service users and front-line staff in identification of suitable measures. Resolution of connectivity and compatibility challenges should assist implementation of new IT packages into practice. Modifications are likely to be required to ensure that indicators developed for acute settings are suitable for community. A mix of qualitative and quantitative methods will better represent community nursing service quality. Future work Future research should investigate the appropriate modifications and associated costs of administering QI schemes in integrated care settings. Funding The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.

The coordination of public services is an enduring challenge and an important policy priority. One way to achieve collaboration across organizational boundaries, which is being considered in public services such as the English National Health Service (NHS), is through the adoption of alliance contracting, prime provider contracting and outcome-based contracting. This article reviews the cross-sectoral literature concerning the characteristics of these new contractual models, how they function, their impact, and their relation to public sector governance objectives. These new contractual forms are characterized as models which, in line with the New Public Management (NPM)/post-NPM agenda, seek to incentivize providers through the transfer of risk from the commissioners to the providers of services. Key findings are that the models are likely to incur high transaction costs relating to the negotiation and specification of outcomes and rely heavily on the relational aspects of contracting. There is also found to be a lack of convincing cross-sectoral evidence of the impact of the models, particularly in relation to improving coordination across organizations. The article questions the reconciliation of the use of these new contractual models in settings such as the English NHS with the requirements of public sector governance for transparency and accountability. The models serve to highlight the problems inherent in the NPM/post-NPM agenda of the transfer of risk away from commissioners of services in terms of transparency and accountability.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the perceptions of key informants on a national support programme for the development of new care models (NCM) in England (2015/2016–2017/2018). It focuses on the perceived facilitators and barriers affecting the development and implementation of the NCM programme and offers some insight into the role of national level support in enabling local integration initiatives. Design/methodology/approach A set of 29 interviews were carried out with a variety of respondents at the national level (including current and past programme leads, strategic account managers, advisors to the programme and external regulators) between October 2017 and March 2018, and analysed thematically. Findings A set of facilitative elements of the programme were identified: the development of relationships and alliances, strong local and national leadership, the availability of expert knowledge and skills, and additional funding. Challenges to success included perceived expectations from the national Vanguard programme, oversight and performance monitoring, engagement with regulators, data availability and quality, as well as timetables and timescales. Crucially, the facilitators and challenges were found to interact in dynamic and complex ways, which resulted in significant tensions and ambiguities within the support programme. Research limitations/implications While the sample was drawn from a range of different senior players and the authors ensured a diverse sample associated with the NCM support programme, it inevitably cannot be complete and there may have been valuable perspectives absent. Originality/value The paper demonstrates that the analysis of facilitators and challenges with respect to the national support of implementation of integrated care initiatives should move beyond the focus on separate influencing factors and address the tensions that the complex interplay among these factors create.

Since 1990, market mechanisms have occurred in the predominantly hierarchical National Health Service (NHS). The Health and Social Care Act 2012 led to concerns that market principles had been irrevocably embedded in the NHS and that the regulators would acquire unwarranted power compared with politicians (known as ‘juridification’). To assess this concern, we analysed regulatory activity in the period from 2015 to 2018. We explored how economic regulation of the NHS had changed in light of the policy turn back to hierarchy in 2014 and the changes in the legislative framework under Public Contracts Regulations 2015. We found the continuing dominance of hierarchical modes of control was reflected in the relative dominance and behaviour of the sector economic regulator. But there had also been a limited degree of juridification involving the courts. Generally, the regulatory decisions were consistent with the 2014 policy shift away from market principles and with the enduring role of hierarchy in the NHS, but the existing legislative regime did allow the incursion of pro market regulatory decision making, and instances of such decisions were identified.

Metaphors are inescapable in human discourse. Policy researchers have suggested that the use of particular metaphors by those implementing policy changes both influences perceptions of underlying reality and determines what solutions seem possible, and that exploring ‘practice languages’ is important in understanding how policy is enacted. This paper contributes to the literature exploring the generative nature of metaphors in policy implementation, demonstrating their role in not just describing the world, but also framing it, determining what is seen/unseen, and what solutions seem possible. The metaphor ‘care pathway’ is ubiquitous and institutionalised in healthcare. We build upon existing work critiquing its use in care delivery, and explore its use in health care commissioning, using evidence from the recent reorganisation of the English NHS. We show that the pathways metaphor is ubiquitous, but not necessarily straightforward. Conceptualising health care planning as ‘designing a pathway’ may make the task more difficult, suggesting a limited range of approaches and solutions. We offer an alternative metaphor: the service map. We discuss how approaches to care design might be altered by using this different metaphor, and explore what it might offer. We argue not for a barren language devoid of metaphors, but for their more conscious use.

The optimal balance between central governmental authority and the degree of autonomy of local public bodies is an enduring issue in public policy. The UK National Health Service is no exception, with NHS history, in part at least, a history of repeated cycles of centralisation and decentralisation of decision-making power. Most recently, a significant reorganisation of the NHS in 2012–13 was built around the creation of new and supposedly more autonomous commissioning organisations (Clinical Commissioning Groups – CCGs). Using Bossert's (1998) concept of ‘decision space’, we explored the experiences of local commissioners as they took on their new responsibilities. We interviewed commissioning staff from all of the CCGs in two regional health care ‘economies’, exploring their perceptions of autonomy and their experiences over time. We found significant early enthusiasm for, and perceptions of, increased autonomy tempered in the vertical dimension by increasingly onerous and prescriptive monitoring regimes, and in the horizontal dimension by the proliferation of overlapping networks, inter-organisational groups and relationships. We propose that, whatever the balance between central and local control that is adopted, complex public services require some sort of meso-level oversight from organisations able to ‘hold the ring’ between competing interests and to take a regional view of the needs of the local health system. This suggests that local organisational autonomy in such services will always be constrained.

Since the beginning of the 1990s the public healthcare system in England has been subject to reforms. This has resulted in a structurally hybrid system of public service with elements of the market. Utilizing a theory of new institutionalism, this article explores National Health Service (NHS) managers' views on competition and cooperation as mechanisms for commissioning health services. We interrogate the extent of institutional change in the NHS by examining managers' understanding of the formal rules, normative positions and frameworks for action under the regime of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Interviews with managers showed an overall preference for cooperative approaches, but also evidence of marketization in the normative outlook and actions. This suggests that hybridity in the NHS has already spread from structure and rules to other institutional pillars. The study showed that managers were adept at navigating the complex policy environment despite its inherent contradictions.

The authors investigated how the formal national provisions for pricing in the National Health Service (which are a form of prospective payment, known as ‘Payment by Results’) are operationalized at local level. Transactions costs theory and existing evidence predict that actual practice often does not comply with contractual rules. A national study of pricing between 2011 and 2015 confirms this and indicates that such payment systems may not be appropriate to address the current financial and organizational challenges facing the NHS. As the NHS struggles radically to reconfigure services, it is necessary to reconsider the appropriateness of a wider range of pricing mechanisms to facilitate moving care out of hospitals.

Many countries use state-owned, for-profit, and third sector organizations to provide public services, generating ‘hybrid’ organizational forms. This article examines how the hybridization of organizations in the public sector is influenced by interaction between regulatory change and professional communities. It presents qualitative data on three areas of the UK public sector that have undergone marketization: healthcare, broadcasting, and postal services. Implementation of market-based reform in public sector organizations is shaped by sector-specific differences in professional communities, as these groups interact with reform processes. Sectoral differences in communities include their power to influence reform, their persistence despite reform, and their alignment with the direction of change or innovation. Equally, the dynamics of professional communities can be affected by reform. Policymakers need to take account of the ways that implementation of hybrid forms interacts with professional communities, including risk of disrupting existing relationships based on communities that contribute to learning.

ObjectivesExplore the impact of changes to commissioning introduced in England by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA) on cervical screening activity in areas identified empirically as particularly affected organisationally by the reforms.MethodsQualitative followed by quantitative methods. Qualitative: semi-structured interviews (with NHS commissioners, managers, clinicians, senior administrative staff from Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), local authorities, service providers), observations of commissioning meetings in two metropolitan areas of England. Quantitative: triple-difference analysis of national administrative data. Variability in the expected effects of HSCA on commissioning was measured by comparing CCGs working with one local authority with CCGs working with multiple local authorities. To control for unmeasured confounders, differential changes over time in cervical screening rates (among women, 25–64 years) between CCGs more and less likely to have been affected by HSCA commissioning organisational change were compared with another outcome—unassisted birth rates—largely unaffected by HSCA changes.ResultsInterviewees identified that cervical screening commissioning and provision was more complex and ‘fragmented’, with responsibilities less certain, following the HSCA. Interviewees predicted this would reduce cervical screening rates in some areas more than others. Quantitative findings supported these predictions. Areas where CCGs dealt with multiple local authorities experienced a larger decline in cervical screening rates (1.4%) than those dealing with one local authority (1.0%). Over the same period, unassisted deliveries decreased by 1.6% and 2.0%, respectively, in the two groups.ConclusionsArrangements for commissioning and delivering cervical screening were disrupted and made more complex by the HSCA. Areas most affected saw a greater decline in screening rates than others. The fact that this was identified qualitatively and then confirmed quantitatively strengthens this finding. The study suggests large-scale health system reforms may have unintended consequences, and that complex commissioning arrangements may be problematic.

Meta-governance involves orchestrating the ‘rules of the game’ in public management. Arm’s-length bodies are particularly important vehicles for this. We consider the case of an arm’s-length body (NHS England) created to oversee the English NHS’ day-to-day operation, and remove ‘political interference’. Although mandated by the Department of Health it has increasingly operated as policy-maker, developing policies in tension with existing legislation, while Ministers have faded from public-facing accounts of service operation. This suggests NHS England operates as a meta-governor, insulating government whilst pursuing its own agenda, and raises crucial questions about governmental accountability whilst simultaneously making answers harder to obtain.

In England, ‘policy experiments’ are largely synonymous with the use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to test whether one policy ‘works’ better than another. While advocacy of the use of RCTs in public policy presents this as relatively straightforward, even common sense, the reality is different, as shown through analysis of three high profile policy pilots and their evaluations undertaken in health and social care in England in the mid/late 2000s. The RCTs were expected to confirm the direction of policy by resolving any remaining uncertainty about the effectiveness of the chosen path and their existence was used largely as instruments of persuasion. The findings from the analysis of the three pilots confirm the continuing relevance of Campbell’s 1969 insight that governments struggle to experiment in the scientific sense and explain the limited effect of these policy experiments on policy decisions.

Since 2008, health policy in England has been focusing increasingly on improving quality in healthcare services. To ensure quality improvements in community nursing, providers are required to meet several quality targets, including an incentive scheme known as Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN). This paper reports on a study of how financial incentives are used in district nursing, an area of care which is particularly difficult to measure and monitor.

ObjectivesFrom April 2015, NHS England (NHSE) started to devolve responsibility for commissioning primary care services to clinical commissioning groups (CCGs). The aim of this paper is to explore how CCGs are managing potential conflicts of interest associated with groups of GPs commissioning themselves or their practices to provide services.DesignWe carried out two telephone surveys using a sample of CCGs. We also used a qualitative case study approach and collected data using interviews and meeting observations in four sites (CCGs).Setting/participantsWe conducted 57 telephone interviews and 42 face-to-face interviews with general practitioners (GPs) and CCG staff involved in primary care co-commissioning and observed 74 meetings of CCG committees responsible for primary care co-commissioning.ResultsConflicts of interest were seen as an inevitable consequence of CCGs commissioning primary care. Particular problems arose with obtaining unbiased clinical input for new incentive schemes and providing support to GP provider federations. Participants in meetings concerning primary care co-commissioning declared conflicts of interest at the outset of meetings. Different approaches were pursued regarding GPs involvement in subsequent discussions and decisions with inconsistency in the exclusion of GPs from meetings. CCG senior management felt confident that the new governance structures and policies dealt adequately with conflicts of interest, but we found these arrangements face limitations. While the revised NHSE statutory guidance on managing conflicts of interest (2016) was seen as an improvement on the original (2014), there still remained some confusion over various terms and concepts contained therein.ConclusionsDevolving responsibility for primary care co-commissioning to CCGs created a structural conflict of interest. The NHSE statutory guidance should be refined and clarified so that CCGs can properly manage conflicts of interest. Non-clinician members of committees involved in commissioning primary care require training in order to make decisions requiring clinical input in the absence of GPs.

Today, qualitative researchers are framing the relationship between qualitative case studies and quantitative evaluation research in positivist terms, seeking dialogue with quantitative researchers on the basis that qualitative case studies hold the potential to develop theory for evaluation programmes and to improve the quality of quantitative research. In the UK health policy literature, however, recent evaluations of major government programmes of reform have been conducted under largely quantitative and econometric strategies involving baskets of indicators, or routinely collected hospital statistics, set against the central stated aims of the programme: namely, to improve quality, efficiency, responsiveness, output and equity. For the wider evaluation literature, we detail the results of a qualitative case study of the impact of two key reforms, the 18 Week Patient Pathway and Payment by Results, on four English hospitals, demonstrating the value of the positivist frame to evaluation research based on its capacity to improve understandings of cause and effect and to direct quantitative researchers towards better measures and data sets. For the UK health policy literature, we demonstrate the value of qualitative case studies to the policy process in terms of their potential to reduce the risks for serious policy mistakes. © 2014 © 2014 Taylor & Francis.

A policy of separating all NHS community health services (CHS) from commissioning organisations (then primary care trusts) was launched in 2008. Some CHS were to become foundation trusts (FTs—in this case, CFTs). FTs are NHS organizations with greater autonomy from the centre, able to retain any surpluses, which are thought to be able to improve efficiency and quality of services. Those CHS not destined to become CFTs were to be merged with NHS mental health and/or hospital services, or to be ‘spun out’ of the NHS to become independent not-for-profit organisations. We observed the changes made during the preparatory period, and the expectations of the effects of FT status of the managers of CHS and their NHS commissioners, together with those CHS not on the CFT pathway. We found that all CHS in the study were becoming more business-like, and starting to improve service delivery and productivity, irrespective of whether they were destined to become CFTs. Although increased autonomy was appreciated, most CHS wanted to stay within the NHS. Some managers were concerned they would lose their autonomy when merging with other NHS services. The changes and uncertainty about organisational policy for CHS have been disruptive and time consuming.

Personal or individual budgets for purchasing health and social care are intended to offer more choice, control and flexibility to service users when compared with agency-directed care. They are becoming an increasingly common feature in high-income countries for purchasing personal care that often lies on the border line between health and social care. In England, they have recently been introduced explicitly for the purchasing of health care. There are some key motivations behind their introduction: they are expected to give individuals more choice about care they receive; to expand options for care; to improve outcomes; and to reduce expenditure. This paper draws from a review of the international evidence on personal budgets which identified: descriptive detail on personal budget schemes in 11 OECD countries to examine their key features and implementation processes; empirical evidence on the experiences of, and outcomes for, people using these schemes, and; empirical evidence regarding the impact of the schemes on the healthcare system, particularly with regards to resources. The paper examines the motivating factors behind personal budget schemes in light of this evidence. It concludes that there is little in the evidence to suggest that international governments’ expectations for personal budget programmes are well-founded. The assumptions that they improve choice, and that more choice will in turn lead to greater autonomy and then improved outcomes at lower cost, are actually far more complex and generally unsupported by evidence.

Following decades of change in health care structures and modes of funding, China has recently been making pilot reforms to the governance of its public hospitals, primarily by increasing the autonomy of public hospitals and redefining the roles of the health authorities. In this paper, we analyse the historical evolution and current situation of public hospital governance in China, focussing the range of governance models being tried out in pilot cities across China. We then draw on the experiences of public hospital governance reform in a wide range of other countries to consider the nature of the Chinese pilots. We find that the key difference in China is that the public hospitals in the pilot schemes do not receive sufficient funding from government and are able to distribute profits to staff. This creates incentives to charge patients for excessive treatment. This situation has undermined public service orientation in Chinese public hospitals. We conclude that the pilot reforms of governance will not be sufficient to remedy all the problems facing these hospitals, although they are a step in the right direction.

English health policy has promoted the diversity of providers of health care to NHS patients in recent years. Little research has been done to map the extent of actual and possible supply. Using data from four local health economies England the authors found that there was a low supply of such organisations, but that it is growing. Despite the greater emphasis placed by policy makers and researchers on non-profits, there were substantially more for-profits. This suggests they should be subject to further scrutiny, as the pressure to increase diversity of supply increases under the Coalition government.

Objective: The Health and Social Care Act 2012(‘HSCA 2012’) introduced a new, statutory, form ofregulation of competition into the National HealthService (NHS), while at the same time recognising thatcooperation was necessary. NHS England’s policydocument, The Five Year Forward View (‘5YFV’) of2014 placed less emphasis on competition withoutaltering the legislation. We explored howcommissioners and providers understand the complexregulatory framework, and how they behave in relationto competition and cooperation.Design: We carried out detailed case studies in fourclinical commissioning groups, using interviews anddocumentary analysis to explore the commissioners’and providers’ understanding and experience ofcompetition and cooperation.Setting/participants: We conducted 42 interviewswith senior managers in commissioning organisationsand senior managers in NHS and independent providerorganisations (acute and community services).Results: Neither commissioners nor providers fullyunderstand the regulatory regime in respect ofcompetition in the NHS, and have not found that theregulatory authorities have provided adequateguidance. Despite the HSCA 2012 promotingcompetition, commissioners chose mainly to usecollaborative strategies to effect major servicereconfigurations, which is endorsed as a suitableapproach by providers. Nevertheless, commissionersare using competitive tendering in respect of moreperipheral services in order to improve quality of careand value for money.Conclusions: Commissioners regard the use ofcompetition and cooperation as appropriate in the NHScurrently, although collaborative strategies appear morehelpful in respect of large-scale changes. However, thecurrent regulatory framework contained in the HSCA2012, particularly since the publication of the 5YFV, isnot clear. Better guidance should be issued by theregulatory authorities.

This paper explores how 'place' is conceptualised and mobilized in health policy and considers the implications of this. Using the on-going spatial reorganizing of the English NHS as an exemplar, we draw upon relational geographies of place for illumination. We focus on the introduction of 'Sustainability and Transformation Plans' (STPs): positioned to support improvements in care and relieve financial pressures within the health and social care system. STP implementation requires collaboration between organizations within 44 bounded territories that must reach 'local' consensus about service redesign under conditions of unprecedented financial constraint. Emphasising the continued influence of previous reorganizations, we argue that such spatialized practices elude neat containment within coherent territorial geographies. Rather than a technical process financially and spatially 'fixing' health and care systems, STPs exemplify post-politics-closing down the political dimensions of policy-making by associating 'place' with 'local' empowerment to undertake highly resource-constrained management of health systems, distancing responsibility from national political processes. Relational understandings of place thus provide value in understanding health policies and systems, and help to identify where and how STPs might experience difficulties.

Preferences have been analyzed extensively in health care, but few studies have examined how culture driven preference formation may impact on resource allocation decisions in public and private health service delivery. This paper explores and develops a theoretical framework that distinguishes different approaches to institutionally and culturally informed preferences. The analysis shows that the appropriate approach depends on normative considerations and the particular health policy context which it is applied. In particular health policy cultures, mediating culture driven preferences (such as fatalism, hierarchism, individualism, egalitarianism and autonomy) which have not been used as part of health policy analysis before, challenge the roles of public and private health service providers. In view of the scarcity of studies in this field, the authors suggest a rationale for studies that enhance the understanding of how health policy cultures are embedded in normative health policy and propose a research agenda on cultural biases.

Background: market reforms in England have been identified as making a clear distinction between English health policy and health policy in the devolved systems in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Patient choice is a high profile policy in the English National Health Service that constitutes significant changes to the demand side of health care. It is not clear what national differences this has led to regarding implementation of policy. This article presents the findings from a large UK-wide study on the development and implementation of policies related to patient choice of provider. The findings reported here relate specifically to the policy development and organizational implementation of choice in order to examine the impact of devolution on health care policy. Aim: this study examines patient choice of provider across all four countries of the UK to understand the effect of differences in national policies on the organization and service how choice of provider presented to patients. Methods: at the macro-level, we interviewed policymakers and examined policy and guidance documents to analyze the provenance and determinants of national policy in each UK nation. At the Primary Care Trust or Health Board level, we interviewed a range of public and private health service providers to identify the range of referral pathways and where and when choices might be made. Finally, we interviewed ear, nose and throat, and orthopaedics patients to understand how such choices were experienced. Findings: while we found that distinct rhetorical differences were identifiable at a national policy level, these were less visible at the level of service organization and the way choices were provided to patients. Conclusion: historical similarities in both the structure and operation of health care, coupled with common operational objectives around efficient resource use and waiting times, mediate how strategic policy is implemented and experienced in the devolved nations of the UK.

In addition to introducing markets and market-like structures into public services, New Labour wished to promote the involvement of users and the public in decision-making in other ways than as individual consumers. One way was to involve the public in the governance of organizations. This could be done by removing public services from state control, and transferring them to mutual ownership; or by increasing public involvement in the governance of public bodies. NHS foundation trusts (FTs) were presented as mutuals. Our study shows FTs are not mutuals, as they continue to be owned by the state. Moreover, staff of FTs were generally not engaging with the new governance structures. In general, there was mixed experience of the new structures enabling governors to increase accountability of the hospitals to the public. On the other hand, having a membership did enhance the legitimacy of FTs, as opposed to other NHS organizations. The findings of the study are of current interest as the coalition government is continuing with the policy of FTs, and also encouraging mutuals and other forms of public involvement.

Over the past two decades, an international trend of exposing public health services to different forms of economic organisation has emerged. In the English National Health Service (NHS), care is currently provided through a quasi-market including 'diverse' providers from the private and third sector. The predominant scheme through which private sector companies have been awarded NHS contracts is the Independent Sector Treatment Centre (ISTC) programme. ISTCs were designed to produce innovative models of service delivery for elective care and stimulate innovation among incumbent NHS providers. This paper investigates these claims using qualitative data on the impact of an ISTC upon a local health economy (LHE) composed of NHS organisations in England. Using the case of elective orthopaedic surgery, we conducted semi-structured interviews with senior managers from incumbent NHS providers and an ISTC in 2009. We show that ISTCs exhibit a different relationship with frontline clinicians because they counteract the power of professional communities associated with the NHS. This has positive and negative consequences for innovation. ISTCs have introduced new routines unencumbered by the extant norms of professional communities, but they appear to represent weaker learning environments and do not reproduce cooperation across organisational boundaries to the same extent as incumbent NHS providers.

The use of contracts is vital to market transactions. The introduction of market reforms in health care in the U.K. and other developed countries twenty years ago meant greater use of contracts. In the U.K., health care contracting was widely researched in the 1990s. Yet, despite the changing policy context, the subject has attracted less interest in recent years. This paper seeks to fill a gap by reporting findings from a study of contracting in the English National Health Service (NHS) after the introduction of the national standard contract in 2007. By using economic and socio-legal theories and two case studies we examine the way in which the new contract was implemented in practice and the extent to which implementation conformed to policy intentions and to our theoretical predictions. Data were collected using non-participant observation of 36 contracting meetings, 24 semi-structured interviews, and analysis of documents. We found that despite efforts to introduce a more detailed ('complete') contract, in practice, purchasers and providers often reverted to a more relational style of contracting. Frequently reliance on the NHS hierarchy proved to be indispensable; in particular, formal dispute resolution was avoided and financial risk was re-allocated in compromises that sometimes ignored contractual provisions. Serious data deficiencies and shortages of skilled personnel still caused major difficulties. We conclude that contracting for health care continues to raise serious problems, which may be exacerbated by the impending transfer of responsibility to groups of general practitioners (GPs) who generally lack experience and expertise in large-scale, secondary care contracting.

In recent years it has been noted that boundaries between public and private providers of many types of welfare have become blurred. This paper uses three dimensions of publicness to analyse this blurring of boundaries in relation to providers of healthcare in England. The authors find that, although most care is still funded and provided by the state, there are significant additional factors in respect of ownership and social control which indicate that many English healthcare providers are better understood as hybrids. Furthermore, the authors raise concerns about the possible deleterious effects of diminishing aspects of publicness on English healthcare. The most important of these is a decrease in accountability.

A wide ranging set of reforms is being introduced into the English National Health Service (NHS). They are designed to increase the market- like behaviour of providers of care with a view to improving efficiency, quality and responsiveness of services. This paper is concerned with one aspect of those reforms: namely the policy to increase the diversity of types of providers of care to NHS patients. In this context, increasing diversity means that providers will not all be standard publicly owned NHS organizations. They can be publicly owned but autonomous, or independent (both in for-profit and not for profit). The paper discusses the wide range of organizational forms available, analyzing their governance structures It then discusses the small amount of evidence currently available about the performance of diverse providers of health care. Introduction: policy of increasing diversity of providers in the NHS Recent history of the NHS The English National Health Service (NHS) was established in 1948. It is a tax funded healthcare system, free at the point of use for all patients. It is a

© 2009 The Author(s) Journal Compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Introducing market-like structures to public services is a key aspect of New Public Management. The restructuring of the NHS into an internal market of the 1990s is an example. Recent policies have further developed this notion. A new aspect of the restructuring is a focus on increasing the diversity of types of provider of healthcare organisations. The objectives of the restructuring policy entailing the increase in supply side diversity are examined, and the challenges raised by these changes are discussed. It is argued that the government is too optimistic about the benefits, and insufficiently concerned about possible undesirable consequences.

The promotion of public mental health is a challenging endeavour for policy actors and stakeholders. In particular, the implementation of public mental health initiatives highlighted in Standard One of the National Service Framework for Mental Health has been poor and patchy (Department of Health, 2004a). This paper attempts to illuminate the complex process of public mental health policy implementation at local level through the exploration of stakeholders' actions.An exploratory case study design was selected, focusing on one local health and social care community within inner London. A conceptual framework about policy implementation and the concept of partnership working are used to shape the analysis of the empirical findings.This paper addresses the challenges associated with the promotion of public mental health initiatives within one local NHS health and social care community. It attempts to increase the understanding and insights into public mental health policy and practice at local level from a policy implementation standpoint. Using an empirical case study of public mental health in an English locality, some of the key issues explored in this paper are about perceptions of public mental health concepts among key policy actors and also stakeholders' behaviour in Local Implementation team (LIT) partnerships. Furthermore, the authors address the issue of how local policy actors engage the local community in supporting the needs of vulnerable groups such as service users and black and minority ethnic (BME) groups.Although functional partnership are essential for the promotion of public mental health initiatives, the interdependencies of the stakeholders, competition for resources, power dynamics and the difficulty of engaging a diverse range of voices have a significant limiting effect on achieving successful policy implementation on the ground.

The MDS/RAI (Minimum Data Set Resident Assessment Instrument)is a standardised assessment system developed by interRAI used internationally to raise standards of care in long-term care homes. Implementation in the UK has been sparse and currently there are no well-established demonstration sites for use in long-term care (although Cheshire has adopted and successfully implemented the (MDS-HC (Minimum Data Set Home Care) for community care). Successful implementation of the MDS/RAI requires a methodical approach and commitment: it is a way of developing best practice that goes far beyond just gathering information about care needs. This project aimed to develop an implementation process model for MDS/RAI use in three UK care homes through an iterative and collaborative process.

Contracting in the public sector is designed to enhance the accountability of service providers to their funders. The idea is that quality is improved by the use of service specifications, monitoring of performance and imposition of contractual sanctions. Socio-legal and economic theories of contract indicate that it will be difficult to make and enforce contracts to achieve this. The results of a study of National Health Services contracting in England and Wales are reported. We conclude that contracts alone are not sufficient to improve accountability – collibration of various regulatory measures (including more hierarchical mechanisms such as performance targets) is required.

English This article discusses the experiences of the NHS Service Delivery and Organisation Research and Development Programme (the SDO) in transferring knowledge from research into practice. In the context of relevant theories, four main difficulties in achieving knowledge transfer are described and two modes of knowledge production are uncovered: one being discipline based, and the other valuing research for its usefulness. In attempting to hold a balance between the two modes, the article shows how the SDO has dealt with the difficulties in knowledge transfer and concludes that a key to successful knowledge transfer is to achieve significant interaction between decision makers and research commissioners at the earliest possible stage.

The aim of this paper is to ascertain the impact of quasi-markets on contracting processes and factors affecting the costs of contracting in Finnish health care in the specific case of laboratory services. By means of a comparative case analysis, we ascertained the changes in organizational contracting practices and identified the actions affecting the transaction costs of contracting in the case of an autonomous municipal enterprise laboratory compared with the same laboratory as a hierarchically run municipal unit. The research was conducted during the years 2007–2011. The results suggest that introducing quasi-markets into laboratory services increased the cost factors of contracting; and had a negative impact on the laboratories’ willingness to create new market relationships.

In England, policy piloting has become firmly established in almost all areas of public policy and is seen as good practice in establishing ‘what works’. However, equating piloting with evaluation can risk oversimplifying the relationship between piloting and policy-making.Using three case studies from health and social care – the Partnerships for Older People Projects (POPP) pilots, the Individual Budgets pilots and the Whole System Demonstrators (WSD) – the paper identifies multiple purposes of piloting, of which piloting for generating evidence of effectiveness was only one. Importantly, piloting was also aimed at promoting policy change and driving implementation, both in pilot sites and nationally. Indeed, policy makers appeared to be using pilots mainly to promote government policy, using evaluation as a strategy to strengthen the legitimacy of their decisions and to convince critical audiences. These findings highlight the ambiguous nature of piloting and thus question the extent to which piloting contributes to the agenda of evidence-based policy-making.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore government efforts to enhance the autonomy of community health services (CHS) in England through the creation of Foundation Trusts status. It considers why some CHS elected to become nascent Community Foundation Trusts (CFTs) while others had not and what advantages they thought increased levels of autonomy offered. Design/methodology/approach – Data are drawn from the evaluation of the Department of Health’s CFT pilot programme. Participants were purposively selected from pilot sites, as well as from comparator non-pilot organisations. A total of 44 staff from 14 organisations were interviewed. Findings – The data reveals that regardless of the different pathways that organisations were on, they all shared the same goal, a desire for greater autonomy, but specifically within the NHS. Additionally, irrespective of their organisational form most organisations were considering an almost identical set of initiatives as a means to improve service delivery and productivity. Research limitations/implications – Despite the expectations of policy makers no CFTs were established during the course of the study, so it is not possible to find out what the effect of such changes were. Nevertheless, the authors were able to investigate the attitudes of all the providers of CHS to the plans to increase their managerial autonomy, whether simply by separating from PCTs or by becoming CFTs. Originality/value – As no CFTs have yet been formed, this study provides the only evidence to date about increasing autonomy for CHS in England.

Objectives There is a need to develop a payment system for services for children with mental health problems that allows more targeted commissioning based on fairness and need. This is currently constrained by lack of clinical consensus on the best way forward, wide variation in practice, and lack of data about activity and outcomes. In the context of a national initiative in England our aim was to develop a basis for an improved payment system. Methods Three inter-related studies: a qualitative consultation with child and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS) stakeholders on what the key principles for establishing a payment system should be, via online survey ( n = 180) and two participatory workshops ( n = 91); review of relevant national clinical guidelines ( n = 15); and a quantitative study of the relationship between disorders and resource use ( n = 1774 children from 23 teams). Results CAMHS stakeholders stressed the need for a broader definition of need than only diagnosis, including the measurement of indirect service activities and appropriate outcome measurement. National clinical guidance suggested key aspects of best practice for care packages but did not include consideration of contextual factors such as complexity. Modelling data on cases found that problem type and degree of impairment independently predicted resource use, alongside evidence for substantial service variation in the allocation of resources for similar problems. Conclusions A framework for an episode-based payment system for CAMHS should include consideration of: complexity and indirect service activities; evidence-based care packages; different needs in terms of impairment and symptoms; and outcome measurement as a core component.

This paper examines how consumer information is related to attempts to improve quality of healthcare in England and Germany, both being non-market systems. The paper traces the changes in policy between the first and second electoral terms of the respective 'third way' governments. Both systems are attempting to give consumers more information. But the question is how that information can be used. A degree of convergence can be observed concerning the amount of choice permitted to consumers. In the case of England, the amount of choice consumers have is gradually increasing, while in Germany, attempts are being made to restrict the wide choice of providers in order to cap expenditure.

This study of the mariology of the letters of Augustine is part of an international project investigating the development of the cult of Mary before 431. The study argues that the works of authors before this date need to be considered individually, and that negative, ambiguous, or seemingly contradictory findings, as well as data in which Mary figures abundantly, are all valid. The scant role assigned to Mary in Augustine's letters, where she is mostly a credal commodity, stands in stark contrast to the high mariology found in some of his other works, indicating that genre affects the data. An aggregate score of high mariology in the one author, Augustine in this case, does not mean that this score holds true for all his works. A low score must be also taken into serious consideration, and indeed it can be just as important in understanding the development of the cult of Mary before 431.

This paper presents findings from a study of the context and processes of provider mergers in the NHS in England. Mergers are an example of organisational restructuring, a key lever for change in the UK health care sector and elsewhere, although it is only one strategy for organisational change. The framework for the study is key themes from the organisational change literature: the complexity of the effects of change; the importance of context; and the role of organisational culture. The drivers for health care mergers and the evidence for these are analysed. Using documentary analysis and in-depth qualitative interviews with internal and external stakeholders, the first part of the paper reports on stated and unstated drivers in nine mergers. This provides the context for four in-depth case studies of the process of merger in the second and third years post-merger. Our study shows that the contexts of mergers, including drivers of change, are important. Merger is a process without clear boundaries, and this study shows problems persisting into the third year post-merger. Loss of management control and focus led to delays in service developments. Difficulties in the merger process included perceived differences in organisational culture and perceptions of 'takeover' which limited sharing of 'good practice' across newly merged organisations. Merger policy was based on simplistic assumptions about processes of organisational change that do not take into account the dynamic relationship between the organisation and its context and between the organisation and individuals within it. Understanding the process of merger better should lead to a more cautious approach to the likely gains, provide understanding of the problems that are likely in the period of change, and anticipate and avoid harmful consequences.

In the last decade, explicit priority setting has become an integral part of health care systems. Indeed, there is even an International Society on Priorities in Health Care, created in 1997 (Ham 1997). Whether it is Oregon's priority ordering of symptom treatment pairs to maximize the impact of a limited Medicaid budget (Fox and Leichter 1991), England's National Institute for Clinical Excellence's assessing priorities for therapeutic innovations in the National Health Service (Rawlins 1999), or New Zealand's setting priorities for patients’ access to cardiovascular treatment (Hadorn and Holmes 1997), techniques for judging the relative worth of different health service investments abound. As these techniques are refined, the most common addition is the incorporation of public values as part of the assessment. Priority setting is increasingly seen as combining an objective assessment of costs and effects with a more subjective assessment of patient or public preferences (Lenaghan, New, and Mitchell 1996; Lomas 1997; National Institute for Clinical Excellence 2002; Stronks et al. 1997). The incorporation of the service users’ values has led some commentators to conclude that the process is more important than the science. For instance, Klein declared: Given conflicting values, the process of setting priorities for health care must inevitably be a process of debate. It is a debate, moreover, which cannot be resolved by an appeal to science and where the search for some formula or set of principles designed to provide decision-making rules will always prove elusive. Hence the crucial importance of getting the institutional setting of the debate right … the right process will produce socially acceptable answers—and this is the best we can hope for. (Klein and Williams 1999, 20–21) Our article is a response to Callahan's recent observation that “the effort to devise priorities for health care systems is far more advanced and sophisticated than for biomedical research. With the exception of the NIH, it is hard to discover much extended debate anywhere in the world on how best to prioritize research” (Callahan 1999, 116). We describe how the lessons learned from and the approaches to setting priorities for funding health services are translated into setting priorities for funding health services research, in which the paymasters want to use the finite human and financial resources for those areas most likely to improve health services delivery. We agree with Klein's and Callahan's views that getting the priority-setting process right—preventing domination by any particular interest, being transparent, and reflecting the values of all relevant users—is the most important consideration. Their approaches also reflect the emerging importance of involving users and their values in the process. In the case of research, however, the users include not only patients and providers but also managers and policymakers striving to make the best possible decisions in an evidence-based health service (Walshe and Rundall 2001). We begin with a review of previous approaches to setting priorities for health research and then state the case for the greater involvement of research users, at least for applied health services research. We use two case studies—one in England and one in Canada—to describe a “listening model” for setting user-driven health services research priorities. Finally, we draw lessons from the case studies before concluding that setting priorities for health services research is more an interpretive than a technical exercise.

The problems associated with hospital-acquired infection have been causing increasing concern in England in recent years. This paper reports the results of a nationwide survey of hospital infection control professionals' views concerning the organizational structures used to manage and obtain funding for control of infection. A complex picture with significant variation between hospitals emerges. Although government policy dictates that specific funding for hospital infection control is formally made available, it is not always the case that infection control professionals have adequate resources to undertake their roles. In some cases this reflects the failure of hospitals' infection control budgetary mechanisms; in others it reflects the effects of decentralizing budgets to directorate or ward level. Some use was made of informal mechanisms either to supplement or to substitute for the formal ones. But almost all infection control professionals still believed they were constrained in their ability to protect the hospital population from the risk of infectious disease. It is clear that recent government announcements that increased effort will be made to support local structures and thereby improve the control of hospital acquired infection are to be welcomed.

Mergers in the UK National Health Service have been Justified by their perceived benefits. This article reports the findings from a study exploring the financial outcome of trust mergers. The authors found that financial deficits in constituent trusts, anticipated management cost savings and their reinvestment in services are important drivers for merger However, savings achieved in the first two years following merger were below target and there was a lack of transparency in how savings had been reinvested. The merged trusts were able to partially address equity issues, a theme that emerged during the merger process. This article highlights important issues that need to be considered when planning mergers and reconfigurations.