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We study risk management in financial institutions using data on hedging of interest rate and foreign exchange risk. We find strong evidence that institutions with higher net worth hedge more, controlling for risk exposures, across institutions and within institutions over time. For identification, we exploit net worth shocks resulting from loan losses due to declines in house prices. Institutions that sustain such shocks reduce hedging significantly relative to otherwise‐similar institutions. The reduction in hedging is differentially larger among institutions with high real estate exposure. The evidence is consistent with the theory that financial constraints impede both financing and hedging.

We study the allocation of interest rate risk within the European banking sector using novel data. Banks’ exposure to interest rate risk is small on aggregate, but heterogeneous in the cross-section. Contrary to conventional wisdom, net worth is increasing in interest rates for approximately half of the institutions in our sample. Cross-sectional variation in banks’ exposures is driven by cross-country differences in loan-rate fixation conventions for mortgages. Banks use derivatives to partially hedge on-balance-sheet exposures. Residual exposures imply that changes in interest rates have redistributive effects within the banking sector.Received October 31, 2017; editorial decision August 30, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We study risk management in financial institutions using data on hedging of interest rate and foreign exchange risk. We find strong evidence that institutions with higher net worth hedge more, controlling for risk exposures, both across institutions and within institutions over time. For identification, we exploit net worth shocks resulting from loan losses due to drops in house prices. Institutions that sustain such shocks reduce hedging significantly relative to otherwise similar institutions. The reduction in hedging is differentially larger among institutions with high real estate exposure. The evidence is consistent with the theory that financial constraints impede both financing and hedging.

Do claims on the private sector serve the role of safe assets? We answer this question using high-frequency panel data on prices and quantities of certificates of deposit (CD) and commercial paper (CP) issued in Europe. We show that only very short-term private securities benefit from a premium for safety. Using several identification strategies, we show that the issuance of short-term CDs, but not of CPs, strongly responds to measures of safety demand. The private production of safe assets is stronger for issuers with high credit worthiness, and breaks down during episodes of market stress. We conclude that even very short-term private assets are sensitive to changes in the information environment and should not be treated as equally safe at all times.

We empirically explore the fragility of wholesale funding of banks, using transaction level data on short-term, unsecured certificates of deposits in the European market. We do not observe any market-wide freeze during the 2008-2014 period. Yet, many banks suddenly experience funding dry-ups. Dry-ups predict, but do not cause, future deterioration of bank performance. Furthermore, in periods of market stress, banks with high future performance tend to increase reliance on wholesale funding. Thus, we fail to find evidence consistent with adverse selection models of funding market freezes. Our results are in line with theories highlighting heterogeneity between informed and uninformed lenders.

We study risk management in financial institutions using data on hedging of interest rate risk by banks and bank holding companies. We find strong evidence that better capitalized institutions hedge more both in the cross-section and within institutions over time. For identification, we exploit net worth shocks resulting from loan losses due to drops in house prices. Institutions that sustain such losses reduce hedging substantially relative to otherwise similar institutions. The evidence is consistent with the theory that financial constraints impede both financing and hedging. We find no evidence that risk shifting, adjustments of interest rate risk exposures, or regulatory capital explain hedging behavior.

We introduce interest rate derivatives in a model of bank capital structure. Distinct motives to engage in risk management imply that both increases and decreases in the short rate can be hedged. Moreover, derivatives are a partial substitute to financial flexibility for risk management. Substitutability implies that derivatives users are more leveraged and have a more procyclical lending policy. These predictions are consistent with the data and have novel testable content.