Search

Attitudes towards migrants and refugees are created and reflected at the level of public policies, as well as in local communities which cultivate traditional approaches and a specific worldview. The refugee crisis in Europe in the mid-2010s showed how public opinion translated into voting behaviour and became a source of strength for nationalist anti-immigrant movements and parties across the continent. East-Central Europe was no exception, regardless of the absence of a long-term, massive inflow of refugees. Nevertheless, the migration crisis created a new political narrative which exploited deeply rooted resentments, complexes, and fears. This article aims to analyse the official policy responses to the refugee crisis in the four East-Central European countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, which together constitute the so-called Visegrad Four. It puts the emphasis on the discriminatory practice of misnaming the refugees, which became deeply anchored in the political discourse of these countries. Based on a qualitative content analysis supplemented by the findings of public opinion polls, the argument developed in the article is that reluctant and defensive attitudes towards the refugees have been determined by the revival of parochialism as a radical reaction to the challenges of global trends and supra-local processes. The theoretical framing of the refugee problem is built on politicization, in connection with the concept of parochialism, seen from political and social perspectives, and the meaning of the use of the misnomer as a policy instrument. The article concludes that the migration crisis petrified traditional cleavages at the supra-local level, reinforcing simultaneously the sense of parochial altruism and hostility towards “the other.”

This chapter identifies and analyses synergetic mechanisms emerging in institutional, political and strategic domains of the EU intelligence community. A multi-variant exercise in the central section tests the viability of interactions among particular intelligence hubs which function in permeable and intersecting security fields. The concept of fusion centres is discussed as a practical example of synergy building among diverse intelligence stakeholders. In the final part, a map of intelligence synergies in the EU is presented and explained. It draws on a comprehensive approach to intelligence in the EU and functional relationships between institutional entities concentrated in the hubs. The complex network organisation is verified with reference to interactions, connections, dependencies and feedbacks among the hubs.

This chapter is devoted to crisis management in the EU and the role of intelligence in developing early warning and crisis-management capabilities. The mechanisms comprising the Crisis Management Procedures are considered against the need to process and efficiently direct a large flow of information to appropriate EU agencies, such as the Situation Room or Watch-Keeping Capability. The EU Crisis Response System is also examined in the light of institutional capabilities of translating intelligence into effective decisions and actions. The chapter concludes with remarks on the EU’s capacity for forecast analysis and scenario planning in terms of effective risk management and threat assessment.

Military intelligence cooperation illustrates the predominance of vertical cooperation driven by Member States’ strategies and doctrines of national security. The problem of defence through military means and support for operations ‘out of EU area’ is tackled in the context of the deficit of political will on the part of EU Member States and the political ambitions of the Commission and the High Representative for CFSP. Political endorsement for the concept of CSDP is considered as a catalyst for the progressive expansion of military intelligence cooperation at the EU level. The establishment of intelligence-led units in the field of security and defence policy is explained in relation to military tasks corresponding to overseas missions and operations conducted by EU forces.

Intelligence tradecraft is defined as the methods developed and practised by every single actor involved in information management and intelligence production. This chapter reflects upon the relevance of secrecy and openness in today’s intelligence analysis. It also highlights the selective presence of the main intelligence disciplines at the strategic level of EU intelligence cooperation. The intelligence cycle inherent in strategic analyses of military aspects of security is juxtaposed with the policy cycle applicable to internal security and criminal intelligence. A general assessment of EU intelligence tradecraft captures horizontal and vertical determinants stemming from variable interactions between national and supranational actors. This chapter also offers some explanation of the quintessence of EU intelligence cooperation in technical and organisational terms.

Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) have been established throughout the Schengen area as an important institution reinforcing mechanisms and procedures of cross-border law enforcement cooperation. Since the first PCCC became operational in Offenburg in 1999, about 40 centres have emerged, performing various functions and tasks in the area of internal security and law enforcement and constituting a valuable local tool of direct cross-border cooperation. In the reflection period preceding the 2009 Stockholm Programme, the so-called Future Group (High Level Advisory Group on EU Internal Security) suggested that the EU should establish a model of PCCC applicable to all member states and serving as "real police-customs centres of crisis management capable of handling events on an international scale." This chapter seeks to verify the above proposal and to reflect further on the importance of PCCCs for internal security of the EU and for cross-border cooperation in the Schengen zone. Several PCCCs will be analysed in order to extract similarities and differences as functional and institutional prerequisites for the elaboration of a framework PCCC. The evaluation of the role that PCCCs perform in everyday cross-border police cooperation will be juxtaposed with new instruments of Schengen governance, adopted in October 2013, particularly new provisions on common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders.

This chapter introduces the concept of intelligence and elaborates on its meaning, theoretical foundations, explanatory properties and cognitive values. The meaning of strategic intelligence is also explained. The concept of intelligence community is presented and discussed with reference to the related terms ‘security community’ and ‘epistemic community’. The cognitive framework explained in this chapter focuses on transnational network structures of bilateral or multilateral interconnections built on common strategic interests, congenial ideological bases and like-minded attitudes to national interests. Considerable differences in the understandings of the intelligence community by EU officials and government representatives are explained by the interpretation of the EU intelligence community as a distorted epistemic community.

The EU intelligence community has emerged in a global context of transnational threats, external pressures and global risks. This chapter describes the partnerships, collaborative efforts and tactical deals made by the EU with actors in the international arena. It explores both opportunities and benefits, and emerging and improving patterns of international intelligence cooperation. The emphasis is on NATO and the United States as strategic partners in security policy. The external dimension of the criminal intelligence hub is presented as an area that complements EU law-enforcement cooperation. The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of third countries’ relevance for strategic intelligence in the EU.

The concluding chapter makes an overall assessment of the EU intelligence community as a cooperative network based on an enhanced capacity to deliver and share. It highlights specific features of this community as a complex network of agencies and practices dedicated to securing strategic EU interests. Referring to the metaphor of ‘hunters and gatherers’, it discusses the impediments to the establishment of a single EU intelligence agency. It concludes with a thesis that the complex network of institutions, agencies and services involved in the gathering, processing, analysing and exchanging of intelligence in the framework of EU law makes a remarkable contribution to EU security policies and strengthens the preventive capability of EU agencies and national authorities.