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The paper describes factors that lead to the United States trade restrictions, particularly export control at the end of the second decade; the challenges of the United States policy, prospects for international trade relations. World trade is expected to grow this year after reducing in the previous one. The outlook for trade development remains with a large degree of uncertainty due to economic, financial risks, effects of struggle against pandemia; national policies. The US trade restriction policies are in focus. Besides imposing import tariffs; controlling exports of software, sensitive equipment, technology has been transformed under Trump’s administration in the context of national security, foreign policy objectives. Limiting access to the most sensitive U.S. technology has been putting in practice along with new export controls on software; restrictions on the emerging and foundational technologies. Export Control Reform that was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Trump has determined a new stage in US policy and may bring more uncertainty as concerning relations with other countries.

The paper estimates the effect of product standards on firms’ export decisions using two novel datasets. The first covers all exporting firms in 42 developing countries. The second covers pesticide standards for 243 agricultural and food products in 63 importing countries over 2006–12. The analysis shows that product standards significantly affect foreign market access. More restrictive standards in the importing country, relative to the exporting country, lower firms’ probability of exporting as well as their export values and quantities. The relative restrictiveness of standards also deters exporting firms from entering new markets and leads to higher exit rates from those markets. Moreover, firm characteristics mediate the effect of product standards on firms’ export decisions. Smaller exporters are more negatively affected in their market entry and exit decisions by the relative stringency of standards than larger exporters. Positive network effects of exporters from the same country may help reduce the burden of importing countries’ standards on firms’ decisions to enter new markets.

Used tires are traded internationally. Some are subject to direct reuse, whereas others become cores for retread tires, which are also traded internationally. Such international trade contributes to improved resource efficiency and reduced transportation costs in the importing countries. However, importing worn-out used tires may pose a safety problem. The international trade of used tires can transfer mosquitos, which are vectors for disease, to other countries, thereby spreading mosquito-borne diseases such as dengue fever. This chapter reviews the trade statistics for used and retread tires since 1990 and identifies factors that affect trade flows. The important factors are income level, trade restriction, car inspection system, and road condition. The impacts of these factors differ according to the type of tire. The effectiveness, justification, and impact of trade restrictions are also discussed. In addition, appropriate trade policies on used and retread tires are discussed from the viewpoints of global resource efficiency and safety.

This paper describes the Services Trade Policy Database, a joint initiative by the World Bank and the World Trade Organization Secretariat, which builds on a database developed by the World Bank nearly 10 years ago and draws on a recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development database. The Services Trade Policy Database offers comparable information on services trade policies for 68 economies in 23 subsectors across five broad areas -- financial services, telecommunications, distribution, transportation, and professional services. The database features several improvements. First, the data are collected according to a newly developed policy classification, consistent with the earlier World Bank database and the current Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development database, enabling a comparison of services policies over a significant period and across a large cross-section of industrial and developing economies. Second, in addition to trade policies, the database contains information on licensing conditions and data restrictions. Third, policy restrictiveness is quantified following a more systematic approach that aggregates the information within a single consistent and transparent framework. Building on these innovations will make it possible to identify global patterns of services trade policies and secular trends in policy making over the past decade.

Are changes in services markets provoking reform, restrictions, or inertia? To address this question, this paper draws on a new World Bank-World Trade Organization Services Trade Policy Database. The paper analyzes the services trade policies of 68 economies in 23 subsectors across five broad areas -- financial services, telecommunications, distribution, transportation, and professional services. Policy measures are quantified into a Services Trade Restrictions Index (STRI) following a novel, consistent and transparent framework. The paper identifies patterns of services trade policies across sectors and economies, and secular trends over the past decade. Higher income economies are still more open on average than developing economies, but the chronology of reform differs markedly across sectors. In telecommunications and finance, there is convergence toward greater openness driven by liberalization in the previously more restrictive developing economies. In the hitherto universally protected transport and professional services, there is policy divergence, as some higher income economies pioneer reform. But while explicit restrictions are being lowered in most services sectors—in contrast to recent developments in goods trade policy -- there is greater recourse to regulatory scrutiny, especially in higher income economies. These measures could reflect legitimate prudential or security concerns, but they could also reflect recourse to less transparent forms of protection.

In 2016, the Government of India proposed negotiations on an agreement to facilitate trade in services to complement the 2013 World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement in goods. The proposal did not find much support, but plurilateral talks launched in 2017 on various policy areas encompass areas that are very relevant from a services trade facilitation perspective. This paper argues that participating in the current plurilateral talks can do much to achieve services trade facilitation objectives by identifying good regulatory practices. Although elements relevant to services trade facilitation are on the table in the World Trade Organization, there are important gaps. Identifying priorities for complementary international cooperation to facilitate trade in services on a plurilateral basis requires initiatives that bring together governments, services industry associations, and sectoral regulators.

The COVID-19 (coronavirus) health crisis can lead to a food security crisis in Bangladesh if proper measures are not put in place. Trade policies can be an essential instrument in the management of the COVID-19 (coronavirus) related food security issues. Trade responses such as eliminating tariffs, refraining from imposing export restrictions, and facilitating trade flows can play an important role in maintaining access to and reducing the cost of essential food products.

Countries in Africa should strive to maintain trade flows during the crisis to secure access to medical goods and services, and food and other essential items such as farm inputs. This requires keeping borders open to the largest extent possible and avoiding measures such as export bans or taxes. Countries should take action to reduce taxes and duties on trade, to streamline trade procedures and to support transport and logistics services in maintaining cross-border and international value chains. By joining together, countries in Africa can implement coordinated trade measures that result in better responses to the crisis. Joint actions include bilateral cooperation on border management, joint information campaigns, coordinated purchasing of medical equipment, partnering on repurposing production to produce medical goods, and management of health specialists to deal with emerging hotspots on the continent. Development partners should support coordinated actions by regional institutions through analysis, technical assistance and perhaps operational projects. Identifying the appropriate level (sub-national, national, regional, continental) for interventions and the most effective institutions, in terms of relevance and capacity, to manage coordinated actions will be essential.

The problem of statutory restrictions of the freedom to conduct business activities is a subject addressed by many researchers. On the other hand, there is little research into the spatial aspect of this phenomenon and its impact on the quality of life of the inhabitants of urban centres in terms of their exclusion from one of the key motivations for travelling, namely shopping trips. The main purpose of the article is to determine the impact of the introduction of a statutory restriction on Sunday trading on sustainable urban development in terms of identifying areas excluded from free access to such services within a large urban settlement in Poland. Our studies on accessibility by car utilised data from ITS systems, the assumptions of the probabilistic Huff Model, and methods to determine market catchment areas. The data used in the study were based on the results of a questionnaire survey. The research procedure was conducted for eight scenarios that covered two periods (March 2019 and November 2020) on trading and non-trading Sundays. The conducted research shows that changes in the temporal accessibility of grocery shops in Łódź within the analysed periods are noticeable for trading and non-trading Sundays. In both cases, accessibility by private car is decidedly worse on non-trading Sundays. Transport exclusion from accessibility to grocery shops applies, in particular, to residents of peripheral areas of the city and is further compounded by the statutory Sunday retail restrictions implemented nationwide.

For decades, manufacturers around the world have outsourced production to countries with lower labor costs. However, there is a concern that robotization in high-income countries will challenge this shifting international division of labor known as the"flying geese"paradigm. Greenfield foreign direct investment decisions constitute a forward-looking indicator of where production is expected, rather than trade flows that reflect past investment decisions. Exploiting differences across countries and industries, the intensity of robot use in high-income countries has a positive impact on foreign direct investment growth from high-income countries to low- and middle-income countries over 2004-15. Past a threshold, however, increased robotization in high-income countries has a negative impact on foreign direct investment growth. Only 3 percent of the sample exceeds the threshold level beyond which further automation results in negative foreign direct investment growth and is consistent with re-shoring. For another 25 percent of the sample, the impact of robotization on the growth of foreign direct investment is positive, but at a rate that is declining. So, although these are early warning signs, automation in high-income countries has resulted in growing foreign direct investment for more than two-thirds of the sample under consideration. Some geese may be slowing, but for now, most continue to fly.

If trade tensions between the United States and certain trading partners escalate into a full-blown trade war, what should developing countries do? Using a global, general-equilibrium model, this paper first simulates the effects of an increase in U.S. tariffs on imports from all regions to about 30 percent (the average non-Most Favored Nation tariff currently applied to imports from Cuba and the Democratic Republic of Korea) and retaliation in kind by major trading partners—the European Union, China, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. The paper then considers four possible responses by developing countries to this trade war: (i) join the trade war; (ii) do nothing; (iii) pursue regional trade agreements (RTAs) with all regions outside the United States; and (iv) option (iii) and unilaterally liberalize tariffs on imports from the United States. The results show that joining the trade war is the worst option for developing countries (twice as bad as doing nothing), while forming RTAs with non-U.S. regions and liberalizing tariffs on U.S. imports (“turning the other cheek”) is the best. The reason is that a trade war between the United States and its major trading partners creates opportunities for developing countries to increase their exports to these markets. Liberalizing tariffs increases developing countries’ competitiveness, enabling them to capitalize on these opportunities.

One reason that poor people may not capture the full benefit from participation in international markets is that the goods they produce tend to be subject to relatively high trade barriers. This paper analyzes market access barriers faced by households in different income deciles by matching household survey data from India based on the industrial classification of their economic activity. Tariffs in international markets are higher, and nontariff measures more numerous, on goods produced by poor workers than on goods produced by rich workers. Tariffs faced by exporters are higher on goods produced in rural and more remote areas than on those in urban centers, on goods produced by informal enterprises than by formal ones, and on goods produced by women than by men. Furthermore, the global reduction in tariffs from 1996 to 2012 failed to ameliorate these differences. How did we get there? Efforts to protect poor workers across countries resulted in a coordination problem. Indeed, tariff protection in China and the United States is higher on goods produced by poor workers than on goods produced by rich workers. Therefore, if poor workers are employed in similar sectors, then each country's attempts to protect its poor workers by imposing higher tariffs and more nontariff measures on such goods will reduce the access of all poor workers to international markets, and thus limit the gains from trade.

In response to the widespread use of food safety standards as a tool for restricting international trade, this study attempts to answer whether Southeast Asian countries follow this protectionist trend or not. It employs the political economy framework and focuses on the case of the implementation of maximum residue limits (MRLs) on 113 food products which these countries import from their trading partners. The study utilizes the logit model and marginal effects to find the determinants of MRLs implementation. The estimation includes both the seven-countries and the single-country models. As for the former, the result indicates that Southeast Asian countries simultaneously use MRLs both to raise people’s quality of life via food safety implementation and to protect import-competing producers. On the other hand, each single-country model provides a clearer picture of the reasons for its enforcement of MRLs; one is with trade restriction motive, while the others are with welfare improving purpose.

Surprisingly little is known about policies that affect international trade in services. Previous analyses have focused on policy commitments made by countries in international agreements but these commitments do not in many cases reflect actual policy. This paper describes a new initiative to collect comparable information on services trade policies for 103 countries, across a range of service sectors and the relevant modes of service delivery. The resultant database reveals interesting patterns in policy. Across regions, some of the fastest growing countries in Asia and the oil-rich Gulf states have the most restrictive policies in services, whereas some of the poorest countries are remarkably open. Across sectors, professional and transportation services are among the most protected in both industrial and developing countries, while retail, telecommunications and even finance tend to be more open. An illustrative set of results suggests that trade policies matter for investment flows and access to services. In particular, restrictions on foreign acquisitions, discrimination in licensing, restrictions on the repatriation of earnings and lack of legal recourse all have a significant and sizable negative effect, reducing the expected value of sectoral foreign investment by $2.2 billion over a 7-year period, compared with"open"policy regimes. In terms of access to services, credit as a share of gross domestic product is on average 3.3 percentage points lower in countries with major restrictions on the establishment of foreign banks as compared with those that only impose operational restrictions.

Log export bans (LEBs) are a popular development tool utilised by developing nations with sizable endowments of timber; however, the actual impact of these policies is debatable. British Columbia has a developed forestry sector and still maintains a LEB. This trade restriction continually creates conflicts with Canada's international trade partners, including the United States. This paper examines the efficiency implications of a hypothetical removal of roundwood export restrictions in British Columbia using roundwood price and quantity data from 1995 to 2008. A time-series econometric approach is utilised to determine supply and demand elasticities for British Columbia's roundwood. Empirical results from a vector error correction model suggest that a removal of export restrictions will generate an overall increase of approximately $347.91 million US dollars per year to British Columbia's forest economy.

(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)I.INTRODUCTIONSince the global economic crisis of 2008, international trade communities have expressed concern about the rise of protectionism, as protectionist measures such as import restriction and tariff increase have been historically prevalent in the period of an economic slowdown.1 Moreover, US President Donald Trump maintained a protectionist stance throughout his campaign. Specifically, he claimed that foreign countries were driving US products out of the domestic market by dumping underpriced products into the US market. He announced that he would use the powers of his presidency to increase tariff rates and accused China and Mexico of unfair trade practices.Previous research has focused on the effects that anti-dumping duties have on import. Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) studied the effects of anti-dumping duties on bilateral trade from the period of 1980 to 2000, using the gravity model. They found that anti-dumping duties have a chilling effect on total import volume but that the effect varies by industry. Besedes and Prusa (2016) estimated the import reduction effects of anti-dumping duties using a random effects probit model. Their research indicated that the effects of US anti-dumping duties on trade are greater during the stage of investigation and preliminary decision than after actually reaching a final decision. They also found that it is difficult for the target countries to recover the previous level of trade after the termination of an anti-dumping duty. Bellora and Jean (2016) investigated the possible effects of anti-dumping cases on import volume and unit value in the event that the European Union granted market economy status (MES) to China. The study used European trade and tariff data from 1988 to 2015, indicating that European import from China would increase by 3.9% to 5.3%.Lee (2009) compared the import reduction effects against the target countries and the import diversion effects on the third countries, showing that anti-dumping duties have import restricting effects. The study applied a random-effect GLS regression and a dynamic panel data methodology based on the Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) model to US data from 1990 to 1996. Park (2009) studies the effect of anti-dumping duties on import using Chinese data from 2002 to 2004, employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. The results show that anti-dumping protection has significant trade depressing and trade diversion effects.Most previous studies focus on only the import restriction effect of anti-dumping measures, dealing with a single country (Besedes and Prusa, 2016; Bellora and Jean, 2016; Lee, 2009; Park, 2009; Prusa, 1996; Blonigen, 2006). They fail to provide comparable results on the economic effects of an anti-dumping duty. In addition, they do not deal with recent trends, such as how investigations of anti-dumping duties have become prevalent in both developed and developing countries. Considering the ever-increasing political demands in the economic sector for an anti-dumping duty in major economies, we need to investigate whether this would be a protectionist measure or trade remedy.In this respect, this paper will provide the answers to the following open questions. First, is the argument that anti-dumping duties exert a dominant trade restriction effect valid for all of the major countries? This paper investigates the effects of anti-dumping measures on the imports applying a two-stage methodology to the data on the US, the EU, China and India.Second, are anti-dumping duties terminated in the case that "the injury would not be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed"?2 This paper analyzes the determinants of termination of an anti-dumping duty using the Cox proportional hazards model, thereby reviewing whether it is operated as a trade remedy measure within a certain period of time. This is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to investigate the determinants of the termination of an anti-dumping duty. …

The proper way to measure differences in trade protection across countries and economic sectors has been a vexing problem for economists studying international trade. Based on research by Anderson and Neary (2005) and Kee et al. (KNO) (2009), this article proposes the use of Trade Restriction Indices (TRIs) when studying US trade policy. TRIs can potentially solve several problems related to measuring the restrictiveness of trade policy. To this end, this article creates a data set of TRIs for US imports by sector at several different levels of aggregation using the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HS), the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and the Standard International Trade Classification industry coding systems.

The emission limits in the Kyoto Protocol are too generous. Simply tightening these limits, however, will not make a new climate treaty any more effective at addressing climate change unless the other problems with Kyoto are also addressed. A new climate treaty arrangement must enforce both participation and compliance. This might be done by applying an enforcement mechanism, such as a trade restriction, to a new treaty styled after Kyoto. Potent trade restrictions, however, may lack credibility and legitimacy. An alternative approach recommended here is to break the problem up, with separate (but linked) agreements addressing individual gases and sectors, using the most appropriate means to enforce each component of the system. In bundling together all sectors and greenhouse gases in a single agreement, Kyoto has aimed to achieve cost-effectiveness at the expense of enforcement, which depends on the treaty's weakest enforcement link. The imperative must be to ensure that any future treaty arrangement can be enforced.

Approximately 850 Million people of the 28 EU Member States and the population of the USA will be affected by the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The TTIP Member States will represent 60% of global GDP, 33% of world trade in goods and 42% of world trade services. Hence, TTIP is by far more than the well-cited and extensively disputed chlorinated chicken. A core element of TTIP is the protection of property and investment expectations which are enforced by mechanisms such as bidding procedures for land and estates. Investment – symbolized by the ‘I’ within TTIP – protection is the raison d´ etre of the treaty as a transatlantic corporate bill of rights. Originally designed as an extraterritorial and extrajudicial instrument to eliminate trade restriction and invent global standardization processes, TTIP could lead to diversified land policies and monopolized landownership regimes. The purpose test of TTIP is fairness, equality, and the balancing interests of investors and the public. According to the road map of the European Commission, 2016 will be the year when TTIP sees the light of the day. Unlike the numerous Bilateral Investment Treaties and the TTIP-sibling CETA, the transatlantic trade and investment partnership is unique in respect of the competency to “overrule” national laws and to introduce standards, norms and regulations above and beside national legislation (“right to regulate”). To date, TTIP violates Articles 14 and 92 of the German Constitution. What will be the consequences for the land policies in the Member States in respect to the three TTIP market access, regulatory cooperation, and rules? Take the case MTD Equity v. Chile as the leading case in point. The case study Berlin demonstrates the necessity of “marrying” investment protection procedures, fair and equitable treatment standards, and the right to undisturbed investments (investment-backed expectations) with the domestic rule of law and the instruments for an effective land policy at hand. The purpose test of TTIP – transparency, justice, due process of law, and minimum treatment of national investors – before the background of consistency of governmental action, the stability of long-term arrangements and commitments – has still to be passed. Can land policy be interpreted as a sub-category of investment planning and business of managing public affairs, serving as a “gold standard” for investment in areas such as energy, transport, water, and housing?

Using a two-country, general-equilibrium model of international trade, this paper incorporates pre-existing quantitative trade restrictions and international factor mobility into the transfer problem analysis. The effects of foreign aid on the welfare of both the donor and recipient nations are identified under each form of quantitative trade restriction: quotas and voluntary export restraints (VERs). In doing so, this paper identifies conditions under which international transfers are strictly Pareto-improving (i.e. increase global welfare). A central result of this analysis is the direct welfare effect of a transfer received by a nation with quota-constrained (VER-constrained) imports is enhanced (may be enhanced) by a worsening of the recipient’s terms of trade.

The entanglement of trade and sustainable development agenda raises two different and obvious concerns we would like to dwell upon. The first one basically deals with the definition of sustainable development and the fear that the concept might become looser and looser the more it pervades trade and corporate arenas. The second concern pertains to the compatibility of internationdal trade laws embodied within the WTO, with international environment and labour agreements hosted by the UN. This paper provides some argument to the debate by focusing on the implications, on these two areas of concerns, of sustainable development pervading the WTO. Our two main arguments are as follows. Firstly, the social component of sustainable development is today the poor relation of sustainable development’s inscription among the WTO objectives. Secondly, effective restrictions on trade for either health or natural resource preservation are extremely rare. Article XX of the Gatt, allowing for such a restriction (“exception” is the appropriate word), cannot be referred to as long as WTO members omit to abide to non-discriminatory principles in their trade policies. Whatever the reasons one country requests to escape WTO rules, it has to do so while treating its trading partners on the same foot. These two results may reassure those developing countries that fear a “new” or “green” protectionism (which seems more fantasized than real in so far) from rich countries. Does it all suggest that WTO principle-compatible trade and sustainable trade is the same animal? The case law would rather suggest that WTO and its sustainable development objective seems more an organisation aimed at preventing countries from using sustainable development as a fallacious argument for trade restriction than an organisation dedicated to promoting sustainable trade per se.

Cross-border trade in services is growing rapidly, with both industrial and developing countries among the most dynamic exporters. Despite the substantial global benefits from such trade, the adjustment pressures created in importing countries could provoke a protectionist backlash-some signs of which are already visible in procurement and regulatory restrictions. The current negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda offer an opportunity to lock in current openness and preempt protectionism. This paper describes how a bold initiative under the General Agreement on Trade in Services can help secure openness.

The maturation of the US beef and pork markets and increasing consumer demands for convenience, safety, and nutrition suggests that the beef and pork industries must focus on product development and promotion. New marketing arrangements are developing that help coordinate production with consumer demands. The relative high levels of incomes in the United States are likely to increase the demands for branded products rather than increase total per capita consumption. Foreign markets represent the greatest opportunity for increased demand for commodity beef and pork products. Increasing incomes in developing countries will likely allow consumers to increase consumption of animal-source proteins. Real prices of beef and pork have declined substantially because of sagging domestic demand and increasing farm-level production technologies. Increasing US beef and pork exports have obviated some of the price declines. Pork attained a net export position from a quantity perspective in 1995. The United States continues to be a net importer of beef on a quantity basis but is close to becoming a net exporter in terms of value. By-products continue to play a critical role in determining the red meat trade balance and producer prices. The United States, however, must continue to become cost, price, and quality competitive with other suppliers and must secure additional market access if it is to sustain recent trade trends. Several trade tensions remain in the red meat industry. For example, mandated COOL will undoubtedly have domestic and international effects on the beef and pork sectors. Domestically, uncertainty regarding consumer demand responses or quality perceptions regarding product origin, as well as added processor-retailer costs will be nontrivial. How these factors balance out in terms of benefits versus costs to the industry is uncertain. From an international perspective, some beef and pork export suppliers to the United States could view required labeling as a trade restriction, which could ultimately impact future US red meat exports. Conversely, some countries may view such labeling requirements as an opportunity to brand high-quality products. The US lamb meat industry has experienced declining real prices, domestic production, and demand. The cessation of wool incentive payments, increased environmental regulations, and competition by imports have significantly affected the industry. Import suppliers have capitalized on product quality in this niche market. Trade restrictions initially imposed in 1999 by the US Government were ruled illegal by the WTO. The US Government responded by providing financial assistance to lamb producers. Product quality improvements and promotion aimed at the domestic market, however, will be critical factors in shaping the economic viability of the US lamb meat industry.

The implications of a potential ban on shrimp imports by the US from countries that do not utilize the Turtle Excluder Device on commercial shrimp nets is explored in this paper. A Linear Expenditure System (LES) was used to determine the own-price elasticities of demand for shrimp imports. The system of estimated equations was then solved for quantity levels under assumptions made about the trade restrictions, resulting in a set of prices for those import levels. These estimated prices were then used to estimate the compensating variation impact of the trade restrictions. Findings suggest that the environmental regulation would have a negative impact on US consumers, but the magnitude of that effect depends on assumptions made regarding the distribution of US imports after the trade restriction is imposed.

This paper analyzes Zambian export patterns using a new transaction-level trade data set for the period 1999-2011. The data show that, in international comparison, Zambian exports are exceptionally concentrated (on mining products). This reliance has been increasing in recent years. Zambia's exports are also characterized by a high level of churning of firms and products. Multivariate models of survival probabilities suggest that exchange rate volatility and difficult access to imported inputs significantly inhibit diversified and stable exports. The econometric analysis is complemented with a qualitative study of the Zambian export sector. The analysis concludes that one of the main policy levers for unleashing Zambia's full potential as an exporter is by facilitating access to imported inputs. Additional measures that ease foreign exchange transactions, simplify export and certification requirements, and increase the predictability of Zambia's trade regime could be effective to promote Zambia's nontraditional exports.

Indonesia insists to defend its regulation on trade of horticulture, animals, and animal products after its loss on New Zaeland’s indictment in Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of World Trade Organization (WTO). Indonesia appealed the DSB decision, despite previous findings in DSB panel which reports that Indonesia’s regulations contains trade restriction and various trade barriers. This paper analyzes the reason why Indonesia appealed the DSB Panel decision, despite the fact that Indonesia violates WTO principles which lead to free trade barriers. This paper uses law perspective to find out whether Indonesia really violates the law or not. Besides, this paper also uses developmental state theory to analyze the case. The theory takes root in the merchantilism which emphasizes on export, domestic production, and national welfare. Developmental state’s position lies between liberalization and centered-plan policy which means that the country that applying this policy joins the globalization and plays its role in international order to reach national welfare.Keywords: developmental state, trade dispute settlement, trade restriction

The report of the WTO Appellate Body in the shrimp-turtle case may prove to be of fundamental importance for the development of the GATT/WTO system. It asserts that a WTO member can unilaterally condition access to its market on compliance with environmental policies, as long as the regulations are administered in an even-handed manner and do not amount to disguised protectionism. Will the incidence of unilateral trade measures increase dramatically as a result of this decision?

Technical Barrier to Trade is widespread and has increasing impact on Chinese export enterprises. It has both trade promotion and trade restriction. In this paper we investigate the interrelationships between technical barriers, enterprise profit and social welfare. Technical regulations raise the quality of both the domestic and foreign enterprises. The quality difference is narrowed. Also, reasonable technical barriers have positive effects on social welfare in the long term. China should strengthen independent innovation to leap technical barriers to trade.

The last thirty years have witnessed a general liberalization process of merchandize trade flows. Indeed, tariffs have sharply decreased thanks to the multilateral, regional and/or bilateral trade integration agreements. However, concerns have been raised about the use of Non-Tariffs Measures (NTMs) as trade restriction policies. This paper aims to investigate the impact of NTMs on Tunisian and Egyptian imports. In addition to the distinction between different categories of NTMs (Sanitary and Phytosanitary, Technical Barriers to Trade, Export Related measures…), we study the impact of NTMs on the extensive and intensive margins to trade. The extensive margin has two dimensions: the number of varieties imported from each supplier and the number of supplying countries for each product. Using a traditional gravity model of international trade, we show that NTMs have been used more in Egypt than in Tunisia as a trade restriction measure. Moreover, they act on the intensive rather than the extensive margin.

A major reason of the sharp increase of Japan's FDI in manufacturing sector was due to vigorous technological innovation. It enabled Japanese firms to generate a variety of new manufactured products and have exported them to overseas, and also enabled them to transfer old technology to Southeast Asia. Under a dynamic change, Japan's FDI and export were not substitute. However, Japan's FDI induced by the trade restriction accompanied the decrease of export from Japan. Whether or not FDI and export are substitute should be discussed in the context of dynamic changes in the comparative advantage and the industrial structure.

Based upon our previous research which showing that there exists salient dispersion in trade restriction policies and the dispersion remains over time. In particular, there is no trend toward more liberalization in the banking service sector, the impacts of the banking service barriers are further investigated. The micro and macro effects of the restrictions on trade in banking are, however, complex. Our study provides an indication of the real income gains and the cost increase. The macro-stability effects vary by country.

Although there are extensive research on ASEAN+3 discovering the synchronization of economic patterns including exchange rate management policies in the region, the research on the pattern of trade policies in banking sector is still limited. In this paper, we evaluate the trade barriers in banking and its evolution over time using three sequential survey data from World Bank as well as other international organizations. It was found that there exists salient dispersions in trade restriction policies and the dispersion remains over time. There is no trend toward more liberalization in the sector either.

The purpose of this paper is to benchmark Tunisia against other emerging economies in terms of the regulatory barriers affecting particular services sectors, and to assess the economy-wide effects of further liberalizing these services trade restrictions, compared with reducing the dispersion in barriers to its merchandise trade. On the basis of a rather restricted sample of services sectors, partial regulatory reform would yield gains roughly equivalent to full unilateral reform of manufacturing tariffs, but roughly one-tenth the gains from full bilateral reform of border protection in agriculture with the European Union. The adjustment costs associated with these services trade reforms would be minimal. The paper identifies the reasons why the gains from these services reforms are relatively small, and argues that a wider set of reforms could provide win-win outcomes and even fewer adjustment costs. By contrast, the gains in agriculture and manufacturing tend to come at the expense of domestic output in the reforming sectors -- the gains are greater, but so too are the adjustment costs.

Voluntary export restraints have been a popular resort of industrial countries faced with increasing competition from exports of developing countries. As a strategy for circumventing the rules of the General Agreement on Trade in Services; (GATT) (whose regulations preclude increases in tariffs), these nontariff barriers have been rather successful; whether they have been as successful in their aim of protecting and stimulating the industry concerned is another matter. This article looks at what happened when industrial countries imposed and then removed-voluntary export restraints on the footwear industry during the 1970s and 1980s. Why did protectionism spread so fast and then dissipate almost as rapidly, and what effects did this coming and going have on the exporting countries? We suggest that industrial countries removed the restraints because they found them either superfluous (the expected employment effect failed to materialize) or ineffective (the principal exporters maintained their market share during the height of the restrictions), or else because the industry was able to adjust by importing footwear at a profit. The results of detailed study of a representative industry, summarized here, may assist in the prediction and determination.

The Ozone Layer Protection Ordinance was recently enacted in response to Hong Kong's international obligations under the 1987 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Commencing July 1 1989, chlorofluorocarbon production and consumption in Hong kong will be frozen at 1986 levels. A further reduction in two stages to 50% of 1986 levels will be implemented by 1999. The production and consumption of halon substances will also be frozen at their 1986 levels from January 1 1992. The Ozone Layer Protection Ordinance seeks to reduce the consumption and production of ozone depleting substances by a system of quota allocations. Importers of scheduled chlorofluorocarbons will need to be registered with the Environmental Protection Department. Only registered persons will be issued an import or export licence. Many practical problems remain in giving effect to the Protocol. The Protocol does not initially prohibit the export of scheduled substances to countries who are not parties to its provisions. However, commencing January 1 1993, a series of trade restrictions will be brought to bear on countries who are not parties to the Protocol. Graduated sanctions include: a ban on exporting prohibited substances to non-member countries; a total prohibition against importing items containing controlled substances from non-member states; a prohibition against exporting technology or equipment used in the production of such substances. The Protocol has major implications for Hong Kong. In the first place it must find a suitable substitute for controlled substances in various manufacturing processes. In addition, as almost 100% of Hong Kong's re-exports of chlorofluorocarbons and halon substances are to non-signatory countries, there will be implications in giving full effect to the provisions of the Protocol in that regard as well.

Trade policy is, and has been for a long time, an area of great contention in the public arena. There are many who believe strongly in the benefits of free trade, and there are many who believe with passion that trade policy must be used to protect domestic interests. Despite a large academic literature supporting the idea of a positive relationship between trade openness and economic growth1 and belief by many policymakers that “Openness to trade and more liberal trade policies are associated with faster rates of economic growth both in the United States and abroad,”2 trade restrictions are pervasive even after numerous rounds of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations. We continue to hear frequent calls from the governments of the United States and other industrialized countries for greater trade liberalization and openness.

The use of non-tariff barriers to trade, which began to be important in the 1970s, has continued to increase throughout the 1980s. Notwithstanding the difficulties and limitations it faces, the Uruguay Round probably presents the only present opportunity of coming to grips with many existing exemptions to, and distortions of, GATT rules.

What is the impact of terrorism on trade through higher security at the borders? The authors set up a theory which shows that the impact goes not only from terrorism to trade. Higher trade with a partner might, in turn, increase the probability of terrorism acts and make security measures more costly for total welfare. To identify the true impact of terrorism, their theory allows for a strategy to condition out the latter mechanism. The authors show in particular how past incidents perpetrated in third countries (anywhere in the world except the origin or targeted country) constitute good exogenous factors for current security measures at the borders. Their tests suggest that terrorist incidents have a small effect on U.S. imports on average, but a much higher effect for those origin countries at the top of the distribution of incidents. In addition, the level of the impact is up to three times higher when the acts result in a relatively high number of victims, the products are sensitive to shipping time, and the size of the partner is small. The authors further show how terrorism affects the number of business visas given by the United States, thereby affecting significantly U.S. imports in differentiated products. These results suggest that security to prevent terrorism does matter for trade.

The basic objective of the WTO anti - dumping agreement is to restrict "dumping" that leads to material injury to the domestic industry in the host country. Unbridled and protectionist use of anti - dumping duties has impacted the international trade negatively in the form of trade loss, trade restriction, trade deviation retaliations, hardship to the consumers on account of choice of variety, and price of the products. While WTO in general advocates for free trade, the concept of dumping appears contrary to the very purpose for which WTO was created. However, free trade should be fair trade also, and therefore, the concept of free trade should not lead to a situation where an established industry in the importing country collapses and dumping by foreign exporters results into monopolization of markets in due course. Certain loopholes in the GATT/WTO agreement on anti - dumping are : No definition of like products, low prices charged for sales in the domestic markets are normally ignored to boost up the domestic sales price, investigating authorities typically follow accounting practices of the importing country, confusion of date of sale and exchange rates, fixation of dumping margin and circumvention lead to controversial practices and methodologies. Particularly, the "Zeroing Methodology" used by the industrialized countries in calculation of the dumping margin has further aggravated the situation. The fact remains that the anti - dumping actions are increasing substantially. During 1.1.1995 to 30.6. 2014, total 4627 anti - dumping investigations were made throughout the world, and 2966 antidumping actions are in force. Base metals&articles (1328 cases) and chemical and allied products (928 cases) are the most targeted sectors facing anti - dumping actions worldwide. India has imposed 529 measures and is also facing 104 anti - dumping measures on its products. The U.S. has imposed 326 measures and is facing 157 anti - dumping measures. Out of the 106 disputes pending in DSB on anti - dumping, the U.S. is involved in 57 cases, and India is involved in 17 cases. Trading countries are almost engaged in a trade war and anti - dumping measures are being challenged at the WTO frequently, but no solution has been found so far to restrict the anti - dumping war. The present paper presented a workable solution in the form of a proposed theory - The New Anti - Dumping Theory of Cost Averages or NATOCA.

The number of national export promotion agencies (EPAs) has tripled over the past two decades. While more countries have made them part of their national export strategy, studies have criticized their efficiency in developing countries (Hogan, Keesing, and Singer 1991). Partly in reaction to these critiques, EPAs have been retooled (see International Trade Centre, ITC, 1998 or 2000, for example). This paper studies the impact of existing EPAs and their strategies based on a new data set covering 104 industrial and developing countries. Results suggest that on average they have a strong and statistically significant impact on exports. For each $1 of export promotion, the paper estimates a $40 increase in exports for the median EPA. However, there is heterogeneity across regions, levels of development, and types of instruments. Furthermore, there are strong diminishing returns, suggesting that as far as EPAs are concerned, small is beautiful.

Since the 1995 inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO), developing countries have become some of the most frequent users of the WTO-sanctioned antidumping trade policy instrument. This paper exploits newly available data to examine the pattern of actual industrial use of antidumping in nine of the major “new user” developing countries – Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela. For these countries we are able to match data from two newly available sources: data on production in 28 different 3-digit ISIC industries from the Trade, Production and Protection Database to data on antidumping investigations, outcomes and imports at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) product level from the Global Antidumping Database. Our econometric analysis is to estimate a two-stage model of the industry-level decision to pursue an antidumping investigation and the national government’s decision of whether and how much antidumping import protection to provide. First, we find evidence consistent with the theory of endogenous trade policy: larger industries that face substantial import competition are more likely to pursue an antidumping investigation, and larger and more concentrated industries receive greater antidumping protection from imports. Second, we find that industries that use antidumping are more likely to face the changing economic conditions specified by the technical evidentiary criteria of the WTO Antidumping Agreement: industries that face rapidly falling import prices are more likely to pursue an investigation, and industries that are more susceptible to cyclical dumping due to greater capital investment expenditures and that face rapidly increasing competition from imports receive greater antidumping protection.

Beginning in the late 1980s, Argentina implemented a series of reforms that were revolutionary in speed and scope, including trade liberalization. After the implementation of these policies, a record number of antidumping petitions came forward. Under a situation of high inflation, the government reinforced its fiscal and monetary policies by announcing that it would minimize the use of such measures. The flexible disciplines of the existing domestic antidumping regulations facilitated this objective. Later, when the GATT/WTO-sanctioned trade remedies were implemented, the government made a serious attempt to establish discipline by including liberal regulations and creating special institutional arrangements. A presumption built into the construction of the new mechanisms was that adhering to WTO requirements would strengthen the resistance against protection. This presumption turned out to be false. Changing circumstances, including severe peso overvaluation, had significant effects on the number and outcome of antidumping investigations. Regarding safeguards, the government followed the letter and the spirit of the WTO agreement. In relation to the number of petitions, few measures have been implemented. Rejections were based on a concern for consumer costs and on failure of the industry seeking protection to provide a convincing modernization plan. This, plus the fact that some cases were brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, have made safeguards a less attractive instrument for protection-seekers than antidumping. An important positive side of the story is that unlike previous balance of payments adjustments, in spite of the major crisis that followed the recent devaluation, the hard-won liberalization has been maintained.

The emergence of transboundary environmental problems, including climate change and the depletion of the ozone layer, has led to the establishment of a number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). To date, over two hundred such agreements have been made. These MEAs may have important impacts on trade, either directly through trade measures or indirectly through the changing of relative prices through mitigation measures. This paper will investigate these impacts on trade of MEAs.