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An efficient and equitable allocation scheme for renewable portfolio standard (RPS) quota is of great significance to renewable energy (RE) development and the improvement of the electricity trade market. This study establishes a quota allocation model based on the lowest cost of RE generation to determine the RPS targets (LC-RPS) of 30 Chinese provinces. Subsequently, an index system based on energy consumption, RE resource endowment, historical responsibility, and transmission facilities is constructed to determine the RPS targets (IN-RPS). Finally, the two scenarios mentioned above are compared with the RPS target allocation scenario published by the Chinese government (GM-RPS) and with the NO-RPS scenario. The results show that: Compared with those of GM-RPS and IN-RPS, the power generation cost associated with the LC-RPS is reduced by 8.5% and 49.4%, respectively, and the unit power generation cost is reduced by 9.4 and 39.7 RMB/MWh, respectively; the fairness of the LC-RPS is marginally worse than that of the other three scenarios, but the fairness of the power generation cost is still relative average, thereby demonstrating distribution fairness. This paper appeals to the Chinese government for the perfection of a national renewable energy certificates (REC) trade market and offering additional REC for solar generation.

In March 2015, the UK applied to become a founder member of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) despite objections from the Foreign Office and Washington, DC, and ahead of other major western countries although they were to follow quickly. What explains the British decision? The paper argues that the underlying long-run reasons included shifting perceptions of American and Chinese power, economic imperatives, the institutional opportunities offered to pursue “venue-shopping” strategies within the British state, and widespread ambivalence about UK policy towards China. Furthermore, although analyses often eschew “snapshot” perspectives, short-run perceptions that the UK could, by joining the AIIB at that point, gain a first mover advantage that would provide greater access to Chinese markets, secure contracts across Asia for British firms, and enable the City of London to win an even greater share of the offshore renminbi trade proved decisive.

PurposeThe purpose of this report is to demonstrate open and distance education (ODE) can support poverty alleviation. Taking the practices of the Open University of China (the OUC) as an example, this paper aims to reveal how open universities make contributions to local residents in rural and remote areas.Design/methodology/approachFocusing on 25 poverty-stricken counties, the OUC had invested 58 million RMB to its learning centers in these counties from 2017 to 2020. The first one is to improve ICT and educational facilities in these learning centers. The second approach is to cultivate local residents with degree programs through ODE so as to promote local economic development. The third one is to design and develop training programs according to local context to meet the specific needs of local villagers.FindingsAfter 3 years working, cloud-based classrooms and computer rooms have been set up. Bookstores have been founded and printed books have been donated. Hundreds of thousands of digital micro lectures have been supplied to these learning centers which have been improved and fully played their functions. Nearly 50,000 local residents have been directly benefited. Village leaders have helped lift local residents out of poverty. Poverty-stricken villagers have been financed to study on either undergraduate or diploma programs. Local residents have improved their skills by learning with the training programs offered by the OUC.Originality/valueODE is proved to be an effective way to eradicate poverty. Open universities are proved to be able to make contributions to social justice. By fulfilling its commitments to eliminate poverty within the national strategy framework, the OUC has built its brand nationwide.

Does environmental quality affect firms’ activities that might improve that quality? In this paper, we use China's public heating policy as a quasi-experiment to investigate the impact of exogenous pollution differences on green innovation behavior. We use a regression discontinuity model, and carry out a suite of robustness tests. We consistently find that firms located in cities with an exogenous source of heavy pollution tend to adopt green innovation at a lower rate while we find no difference in the rate at which they adopt non-green innovation. We find a strong causal effect: being north of the boundary, where pollution levels are higher, leads firms to adopt less green innovation. Firms located in the heating areas report roughly 1 less green innovation per billion RMB of assets, a substantial difference given the average number of green innovations per billion RMB of assets of northern firms is 0.641.

PurposeThis paper outlines the rapid rise of China's fintech companies over the past decade with a focus on their globalization strategies as they enter their next phase of development.Design/methodology/approachThe author examines China's current and prospective influence on global financial digitization trends, and assesses both domestic and foreign opportunities and challenges confronted by China's fintech firms as they look to expand abroad.FindingsThe Chinese government is experimenting with a radically new fintech system and a regulatory regime in response to it. Chinese ambitions to expand fintech influence through private companies and the state-led “digital RMB” (e-CNY) will likely provoke a wave of “digital protectionism” among developed nations to protect internal digital payments.Originality/valueThis paper is an original economic history research on China's fintech industry.

Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are Bitcoin-inspired currencies that combine aspects of virtual currencies with FIAT money. Many central banks and countries around the world are thinking about or planning to introduce some form of CBDC. Among them, China is leading the way, being the first country to issue their CBDC (Digital RMB) into circulation, even if it is yet a pilot program only. This article focuses not only on the Digital RMB and its legal implementation but also on the political, historical, and economic circumstances of its birth, which, when talking about anything related to China, is often crucial to understanding the phenomenon more than the legal provisions themselves. The aim is to deepen the understanding of legal policies in China and open a discussion about the Digital RMB.

Background To analyze the potential cost savings in dental care associated with increased sugar-free gum (SFG) use among Chinese teenagers and adults. Methods The amount of SFG chewed per year and decayed, missing and filled teeth (DMFT) was collected from a cross-sectional survey to create a dose–response curve assumption. A cost analysis of dental restoration costs was carried out. A budget impact analysis was performed to model the decrease in DMFT and the subsequent cost savings for dental care. Three different scenarios for the increase in the number of SFG were calculated. Results The average cost savings per person in the Chinese population due to increasing SFG use ranged from 45.95 RMB (6.94 USD) per year to 67.41 RMB (10.19 USD) per year. It was estimated that 21.51–31.55 billion RMB (3.25–4.77 billion USD) could be saved annually if all SFG chewers among Chinese teenagers and adults chewed SFG regularly. Conclusion This study suggests that dental care costs could be significantly reduced if SFG use increased in the Chinese population.

Purpose In the process of Renminbi (RMB) internationalization, the heterogeneity and complexity in knowledge under the multicultural contexts have been considered as important factors that can have profound impacts on the cross-border flow of the RMB currency. Moreover, COVID-19, an exogenous shock, also triggers more in-depth reflection on the relationship between cross-border knowledge management and the financial risk governance. In addition, the needs to effectively respond to global risks and crises prompt the necessity in systematically establishing an effective cross-border knowledge management mechanism and innovatively solidifying the knowledge bases needed for the further internationalization of the RMB. Design/methodology/approach Based on the analysis on the current status of the RMB internationalization, this paper qualitatively explores some major challenges and difficulties encountered in the process of RMB internationalization from the perspectives of knowledge management and cross-cultural theories. To effectively mitigate these challenges and difficulties, discussions and recommendations centered on three main aspects: cross-cultural management; cognition; and innovation for the further development of the RMB internationalization are also presented in this paper. Findings Based on the analysis on the cross-border knowledge management and cross-cultural perspectives, this paper identifies three major challenges and difficulties that the RMB internationalization is encountering, including: cultural heterogeneity and its adverse impacts on the communication amongst economic entities; the existence of knowledge iceberg; and the difficulty it presents to cognition and financial innovation. Meanwhile, the authors also present recommendations on the development of the cross-border knowledge management mechanism for furthering the progress of internationalizing the RMB currency. Research limitations/implications From the perspective of cross-border knowledge management, this study not only elaborates on the recommendations aimed at further promoting the RMB internationalization but also provides reference and guidance for the state, central banks and commercial banks to play better roles in furthering the RMB internationalization. Originality/value This paper creatively integrates the micro knowledge management into the macro process of RMB internationalization, thoroughly discusses two main challenges and difficulties encountered in the process of RMB internationalization from the unique perspective of cross-border knowledge management under the multicultural contexts and provides relevant recommendations for RMB’s further internationalization. This study also enriches the exploration of knowledge management outcome variables and further expands the research field of knowledge management.

Purpose To answer key questions about China’s forthcoming digital currency, the Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP) or “digital yuan.” Design/methodology/approach Discusses prospective legal standards and guidelines; expected features compared with traditional payment methods and other digital currencies; how DCEP works; status of pilot programs; use of DCEP for cross-border payments; transparency, data protection and cybersecurity issues; and key implications for foreign businesses and financial institutions in China. Findings When DCEP is officially launched in China, there is little doubt that the population can easily adapt to its use. The launch of DCEP can have significant ramifications on a global scale, as it could reduce China’s reliance on the SWIFT system for international banking and offers the first glimpse of the internationalization of the renminbi (RMB). Practical implications Foreign companies operating in China, hi-tech businesses, retailers, financial institutions, and mobile app developers need to track the development and acceptance of DCEP, monitor arising risks, assess how their financial products fit, and adjust business operations, reporting requirements and financial reserves related to the requirements and use of DCEP, expected growth in fintech surrounding digital currencies. Originality/value Practical advice from experienced mergers and acquisitions, private equity, strategic investment and capital markets lawyers.

Six financial markets were verified contagious to Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite (SSEC): domestic equity market (SSEC and China COSCO Shipping Co.), domestic currency market, international currency market, global shipping market, commodity future market and bulk shipping market (BDI) which regarded as a leading indicator of future economic growth instead of Li Keqiang index. This research analyzed intermarket contagion from March 14, 2008 to March 31, 2018. MIDAS-GARCH model was adopted to identify the spillover effect among the Shanghai Stock market and inter-market indices. The findings of this study were concluded as follows: (1) The commodity, global shipping market had significant volatility transmission to SSEC both before and after the crash crisis. (2) The volatility of domestic currency market was significantly contagious to SSEC only after the crash.

We analyse the determinants of RMB as an international reserve currency and the impact of joining the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) on the currency swap agreements between China and other countries....

Purpose To describe recent regulatory developments in China on digital renminbi (RMB), initial coin offerings (ICOs), cryptocurrency holdings, cryptocurrency exchanges and blockchain technology. Design/methodology/approach Describes a digital RMB pilot program, seven government agencies’ bans on ICOs and cryptocurrency exchanges, the legality of holding and trading cryptocurrencies in China and the government’s endorsement of blockchain technology. Findings No PRC law or regulation prohibits Chinese investors from holding or trading cryptocurrencies but Bitcoin is defined as a virtual commodity, not a currency. Despite a ban on ICOs and cryptocurrency exchanges, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and other government agencies endorse blockchain technology as long as its goal is to service the real economy. Originality/value Expert guidance from lawyer with experience in foreign investment, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, capital markets, fund formation and venture capital and private equity investments in China.

The existence of an uncovered liability has historically benefited foreign banks and lead currencies. Using the case of China’s efforts to fund its foreign exchange needs by exploiting loopholes in...

We use daily transaction data in 214 cities to study the impact of COVID-19 on consumption after China's outbreak in late January 2020. Based on difference-in-difference estimation, daily offline consumption--via bank card and mobile Quick Response code transactions--fell by 32 percent, or 18.57 million renminbi (RMB) per city, during the 12-week period. The effect is prevalent across cities and is more pronounced in the dining-and-entertainment and travel categories. We infer that China's offline consumption decreased by over 1.22 trillion RMB, or 1.2 percent of China's 2019 GDP, in the 3-month postoutbreak period.

Health and healthcare sector is a growing part of the national economies worldwide. China is no exception, with a total health expenditure estimated to reach 3 trillion Renminbi (RMB, 1 RMB=$0.16 a...

In only a few years, central bank digital currencies (CBDC) have gone from a fringe idea promoted by cryptocurrency bloggers to an idea now seriously explored by 80% of the world’s major central banks, including the People’s Bank of China and the United States Federal Reserve. This paper gives an overview of the drive at the world’s central banks to evaluate CBDCs and examines the reasons behind the world’s two leading economies’ stark divergence in central bank digital currency development. China committed much earlier to launching a CBDC, announcing its intention to do so in 2016, and it has since then taken more concrete steps towards piloting and issuing a CBDC than the Federal Reserve, which has yet to commit to ever issuing one. This article then critiques the common framing of CBDC development as a race and explores the implications of China becoming a first mover for both countries and the global monetary system, including the role of the Dollar and RMB internationally. China has already begun retail pilots and is likely to be the first major economy to issue a CBDC to the general public. The analysis hypothesizes that a first mover advantage in CBDC will to be short lived due to the rapid changes in the technology and global marketplace for digital currencies, and that the Federal Reserve may not be as far “behind” China in understanding digital currency as it might appear from their different public response to CBDC.

Exchange rate is one of the important factors that affect financing decisions of enterprises. With the acceleration of China’s opening up to the outside world, the transmission mechanism of the exchange rate through financial channel is more effective, and enterprises are more sensitive to exchange rate change in their decisions of external financing. Especially with the marketization of RMB exchange rate, how to avoid the adverse impact of exchange rate fluctuations is a difficult task faced by many Chinese export-oriented enterprises. This paper analyzes the spillover effect of RMB exchange rate transmitted through financial Channel and puts forward corresponding policies suggestions for Chinese enterprises.

The paper analyzes if the international monetary system calls for reform and whether China and the renminbi will play a decisive role in the post COVID-19 world. It also evaluates the main scenarios and trends that is being discussed since the global crisis – selecting the relevant authors, journals, institutions and opinions – examines present conditions and tries to extrapolate into future trends. Opting for a nontechnical approach, the article could be a good insight into the international monetary system, for academics, non-experts and policy makers. The paper concludes that if the 2008 crisis has induced the growth of the China role in the international monetary governance and the increase of the renminbi internationalization, the COVID-19 pandemic and post crisis reconstruction could generate a deeper reform of the international monetary system, in which the Chinese currency will strengthen its global position alongside the US dollar and the euro.

Objectives To develop a checklist that helps quantify the economic impact associated with fear of contagion and to illustrate how one might use the checklist by presenting a case study featuring China during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak. Methods Based on “fearonomic effects,” a qualitative framework that conceptualizes the direct and indirect economic effects caused by the fear of contagion, we created a checklist to facilitate empirical estimation. As a case study, we first identified relevant sectors affected by China’s lockdown policies implemented just before the Lunar New Year (LNY) week. To quantify the immediate impact, we then estimated the projected spending levels in 2020 in the absence of COVID-19 and compared these projections with actual spending during the LNY week. Data sources used include Chinese and global websites. To characterize uncertainty, we reported upper and lower bound estimates and calculated midpoints for each range. Results The COVID-19 epidemic is estimated to cost China’s economy $283 billion ($196-369 billion), that is, ¥2.0 trillion renminbi (¥1.4-¥2.6 trillion), during the LNY week. Reduced restaurant and movie theater business ($106 [$103-$109] billion, 37.5% [36.4%-38.5%]) and reduced public transportation utilization ($96 [$13-$179] billion dollars, 33.9% [4.6%-63.3%]) explain most of this loss, followed by travel restrictions and the resulting loss of hotel business and tourism ($80.36 billion, 28.4%). Conclusion Our checklist can help quantify the immediate and near-term impact of COVID-19 on a country’s economy. It can also help researchers and policy makers consider the broader economic and social consequences when valuing future vaccines and treatments., Highlights • A recent International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research special task force report has suggested “fear of contagion” as one of the important elements to consider when assessing the value of vaccination and other interventions, yet empirical estimates of such impact lack support. • Prior work provides a qualitative framework, called “fearonomic effects” that conceptualized the direct and indirect economic effects caused by the fear of contagion during an outbreak or an epidemic. • We provide a checklist that includes specific behavioral responses to the fear of contagion by individuals, businesses, and government. We also divide our checklist into 2 periods: the immediate period during the outbreak and a near-term (1-year) period. • Applying our checklist to quantify the immediate economic impact in response to the coronavirus disease 2019 epidemic in China, we estimated $275 billion loss during the Lunar New Year week, accounting for 1.9% of China’s 2019 gross domestic product. • Researchers and policy makers consider the broader economic and social consequences (ie, fear of contagion) when valuing future vaccines, treatments, and other strategies to address coronavirus disease 2019 and other infectious diseases.

The recent surge in protectionist sentiment in countries around the world has rekindled the long-standing debate over the determinants of citizens' trade policy preferences. We examine the influence of two understudied but increasingly relevant factors --- misinformation and economic threat --- on support for international trade in the United States. We first show that more than 6--in--10 Americans endorse a salient misperception about Chinese currency manipulation despite extensive evidence to the contrary. Then, based on a preregistered survey experiment, we show that misinformation can be corrected, regardless of whether the threatening frame is present or not. In contrast to these results on factual beliefs, however, we find that trade policy preferences are considerably stable: neither anti-trade misinformation nor an economically threatening frame significantly reduces support for international trade. These findings suggest that political elites' strategy of ``playing the China card'' by using misleading and threatening rhetoric is not so effective in mobilizing opposition to trade.

Despite rich literature on high-speed rail (HSR) and air transport interactions, the HSR's impact on the conventional (low-speed) rail service surprisingly has yet well studied. This paper fills in this research gap by providing empirical evidence in the Chinese intercity travel markets, where large-scale HSR expansion has been conducted since 2008. A nested logit utility model is developed to model passengers' travel mode choice between HSR and conventional train. A difference-in-differences (DID) method is then applied to measure HSR's impact on conventional train service frequency, price, and travel time. This paper then calculates and compares the welfare changes before and after the HSR entry for both the conventional and non-conventional rail passengers. It is found that entry of HSR has significantly reduced frequency of conventional train service, but not its travel time and ticket price. Such an adverse effect is more prominent on the shorter haul routes, probably as a result of the government's intervention to divert rail passengers to emerging HSR service. The calculated welfare loss to the conventional train passengers based on its current market size is approximately 3.41 billion RMB (487 million USD) as of 2017, a figure we consider on the side of conservative estimates. This loss accounts for 8% of the welfare gain brought by HSR to those non-conventional rail passengers. A special caution is, therefore, warranted when evaluating the benefit of the HSR development, as the welfare damage to the conventional train service and its passengers cannot be neglected.

China-US trade holds great significance for the world’s political and economic landscape. Since 2018, the US government has imposed additional tariffs on Chinese exports on the grounds of the US trade deficit with China. However, the transfer of pollutants embodied in trade and the differences in environmental costs between China and the US have not been widely recognized. In this study, we quantify the embodied carbon emissions (the “virtual” emissions associated with trade and consumption) in China-US trade by constructing a carbon dioxide emissions inventory and a multiregional input-output model. The study shows that the US benefits from a trade surplus of environmental costs by importing energy-intensive and pollution-intensive products from China, which increases China’s environmental pollution and abatement costs. In 2017, 288 Mt CO2 emissions were associated with products produced in China but finally consumed in the US, and only 46 Mt CO2 were associated with the US products that were consumed in China. From this perspective, China-US trade results in a net transfer of 242 Mt CO2 per year from the US to China, accounting for approximately 5% of the total CO2 emissions in the US. More importantly, for Chinese products exported to the US, the carbon emissions embodied in one unit of economic value amount to 0.92 kg/$ (RMB: USD=6.8:1), but for US products exported to China, the carbon emissions embodied in one unit of economic value amount to 0.53 kg/$, which means China will incur environmental costs that are 74% higher than those of the US while enjoying the same economic benefits. This environmental trade deficit has burdened China with higher environmental costs thaneconomic benefits. To address this environmental trade deficit, China should actively promote further industrial upgrading and energy structure adjustment and increase investment in innovation and R&D, thereby increasing the value added per unit of export products and reducing the environmental cost of producing export products.

This research empirically examines the impact of China’s renminbi (RMB) Bilateral Swap Agreements (BSAs) on the usage of the currency in cross-border trade transactions. By using a unique dataset f...

A global renminbi (RMB) needs to be backed by a large, deep and liquid RMB market with a world-class Chinese government bond (CGB) market as its core. It also needs the support from a bigger and mo...

Background Preliminary evaluations have found that family doctor contract services (FDCSs) have significantly controlled medical expenses, better managed chronic diseases, and increased patient satisfaction and service compliance. In 2016, China proposed the establishment of a family doctor system to carry out contract services, but studies have found the uptake and utilization of these services to be limited. This study aimed to investigate rural residents’ preferences for FDCSs from the perspective of the Chinese public. Methods A discrete choice experiment (DCE) was performed to elicit the preferences for FDCSs among rural residents in China. Attributes and levels were established based on a literature review and qualitative methods. Five attributes, i.e., cost, medicine availability, the reimbursement rate, family doctor competence, and family doctor attitude, were evaluated using a mixed logit model. Results A total of 609 residents were included in the main DCE analysis. The respondents valued the high competence (coefficient 2.44, [SE 0.13]) and the good attitude (coefficient 1.42, [SE 0.09]) of family doctors the most. Cost was negatively valued (coefficient − 0.01, [SE 0.01]), as expected. Preference heterogeneity analysis was conducted after adjusting the interaction terms, and we found that rural residents with higher educational attainment prefer a good attitude more than their counterparts with lower educational attainment. The estimated willingness to pay (WTP) for “high” relative to “low” competence was 441.13 RMB/year, and the WTP for a provider with a “good” attitude relative to a “poor” attitude was 255.77 RMB/year. Conclusion The present study suggests that strengthening and improving the quality of primary health care, including the competence and attitudes of family doctors, should be prioritized to increase the uptake of FDCSs. The contract service package, including the annual cost, the insurance reimbursement rate and individualized services, should be redesigned to be congruent with residents having different health statuses and their stated preferences.

We advocate that innovation carriers proactively grow their own intellectual property, including venture capital investment funds, local governments, industrial clusters, science and technology parks, and peculiarly to China, the High-speed Rail sector. We believe that the timing is right for this novel approach because China's innovation economy is fast becoming world's largest by some measure, and this economy increasingly puts IP at the core, which bridges innovation to value. Via a string of 2019 events and initiatives in China, the public was made much aware of the fact that IP is worth a lot of value: the July opening of the Sci-Tech innovAtion Board (STAR 科创板) of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, which has the explicit purpose of registering companies that are considered high-tech, thus regards highly a listed company's innovation capacity and intellectual property; the July estimate of 24 billion RMB value for the more than 53,000 invention patents granted in the year of 2018 to applicants from Guangdong Province; and the September sale of China's first-of-the-kind securitization of patent license fees. These initiatives show that IP manifests its value in different ways for different innovation carriers, which leads to our proposal that all innovation carriers grow their own IP serving their own purposes, and we consider our proposal an application of Paul Romer's endogenous growth model which encourages the production of knowledge and patents.

The China–US trade war during 2018–2019 has attracted attentions from academics, policy makers, businesses and investors around the world. Unlike previous researches which are mainly based on hypot...

The presented study analyzes the reasons for the need to move away from the US dollar (hereinafter referred to as the dollar) as a universal means of payment in international trade based on the existing threats, examines alternative means of international payments, and identifies their benefits and drawbacks in the context of Russia’s economic security.Aim. The study aims to identify and characterize the means of international payments that fall in line with Russia’s strategic priorities from the perspective of economic security.Tasks. The author considers the risks of using the dollar in international payments and reserves, assesses various means of international payments from the perspective of Russia’s strategic interests, and evaluates the possibility of substituting the dollar with alternative means of international payments.Methods. This study analyzes information from the International Economic Forums, statistics of the Central Bank of Russia, Federal State Statistics Service, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the economic security strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030, reports of news agencies, and works of Russian and foreign authors on the subject.Results. Based on the results of the conducted study, the author draws several conclusions. Due to many factors, the most important of them being the volume of trade in dollars, the dollar will remain the world’s leading currency in international trade. However, given that de-dollarization is a global process, the existing trends will amplify. A supranational currency is unlikely to appear for a number of reasons. First, the obvious opposition of the United States due to its unwillingness to let go of such a powerful lever of economic well-being and political influence as the use of the dollar as a global means of payment. The US would probably agree to creating a supranational currency in the medium term if the global process of de-dollarization reaches critical values. Second, the financial and trade centers of the euro and renminbi area are likely to focus on developing their own currencies, especially given the growing global GDP and China’s trade. Creating a supranational currency based on the existing structure of the International monetary Fund (hereinafter — the IMF), following the example of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), with the IMF virtually controlled by the United States, will not eliminate the threat of the currency being used as an instrument of political pressure on individual countries. Replacing the dollar with such kind of supranational currency does not serve the interests of Russia’s economic security. A potential alternative involves creating a supranational currency based on a structure that is independent of the IMF. In this case, the obstacles would include the obvious opposition of the US and its allies and the potential influence of the US on the emission of the supranational currency using its foreign political resources to affect the decisions made by other countries. Using national currencies in international trade in the medium term under the influence of globalization would lead to a formation of multiple currency centers. These centers would most likely be the dollar, euro, renminbi, and ruble.Conclusions. The creation of a ruble-based International Monetary Center with the CIS, BRIC countries (except China), and Turkey serves Russia’s strategic interests. Further consolidation around the ruble would require implementing a financial sustainability policy, maintaining the stability of the macroeconomic environment, creating an international bank similar to the IMF with payments made in rubles, strengthening offshore ruble areas, and increasing high-tech exports.

The objective of this paper is to conduct a comparative analysis of the real and potential CO2 emission intensity in China’s agricultural sector. In order to perform this goal, this paper combines the concept of the meta-frontier efficiency and the directional distance function to process empirical work. This methodology allows for the incorporation of technological heterogeneities into the efficiency analysis and implementation results of increment in desirable outputs and reduction in undesirable outputs. Empirical results indicate that the average total-factor CO2 emission efficiency is 0.481 and has a slight downward trend over the studied period, which is lower than that of the whole industry in China. CO2 emission efficiency and the technology gap ratios among different regions in China’s agricultural sector show different space–time characteristics. A comparative analysis is applied in this study to verify the relationship between the actual and potential CO2 intensities, whose average values are, respectively, 0.1972 and 0.0816 Mtc/billion yuan RMB. Research shows that there exists huge space for CO2 intensity reduction. Meanwhile, the major contributor to the potential CO2 intensity reduction varies across different regions, as managerial failure for most provinces in the eastern and central regions and technology gap in the western regions.

Travel physical energy expenditure for travellers has impact on travel mode choice behaviour. However, quantitative study on travel physical energy expenditure is rare. In this paper, the concept of travel physical energy expenditure coefficient has been presented. A case study has been carried out of young travellers in Beijing to get the value of physical energy expenditure per unit time under three transport modes, walking, car and public transportation. A series of experiments have been designed and conducted, which consider influence factors including age, gender, travel mode, riding posture, luggage level and crowded level. By analysing the travel data of money, travel time and physical energy expenditure, we determined that the value of travel physical energy expenditure coefficient δ is 0.058 RMB/KJ, which means that travellers can pay 0.058 RMB to reduce 1 KJ physical energy expenditure. Next, a travel mode choice model has been proposed using a multinomial logit model (MNL), considering economic cost, time cost and physical energy cost. Finally, the case study based on OD from Xizhimen to Tiantongyuan in Beijing was conducted. It is verified that it will be in better agreement with the actual travel behaviour when we take the physical energy expenditure for different types of travellers into account.

The Belt Road Initiative (BRI) is a global development plan that sets out to invest trillions of dollars in infrastructure within the coming decade in over 60 countries. Financing the BRI has come ...

This paper empirically discusses the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on enterprises’ export decisions by using the annual data of the database of China’s industrial enterprises and the database of China’s customs merged according to the hs6-digit code from 2000 to 2007. The study found that: 1) the appreciation of RMB real effective exchange rate will significantly increase the probability of enterprises exiting export markets and reduce the probability of enterprises entering export markets; 2) compared with state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, foreign-owned enterprises have stronger ability to fight against exchange rate risks, and enterprises in eastern China are more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuation; 3) based on the analysis of heterogeneity of enterprise characteristics, it is found that such factors as enterprise productivity, enterprise profit margin, enterprise size and enterprise export experience can reduce the positive impact of RMB real effective exchange rate appreciation on enterprises exiting from export markets. This paper provides some useful advice for enterprises to avoid exchange rate risks and make better export decisions.

Purpose - This paper investigates the causal nexus between the exchange rate and foreign equity investors’ behavior in Shanghai and Hong Kong by using daily time series data after the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect scheme was launched. Design/Methodology/Approach - The empirical data period is a sample of all daily trading data from the implementation of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect to April 12, 2019. In order to analyze the nexus between the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock Exchange, we employed the impulse response function analysis based on the vector autoregression (VAR) model. Findings - From estimation results on the Shanghai stock market, we found that exchange rates have not had a significant impact on foreign equity investors. Conversely, foreign equity flows have had a significant impact on exchange rate of the RMB. From estimation results on the Hong Kong stock market, it was found that mainland Chinese investors have not significantly affected the foreign exchange market of Hong Kong. On the other hand, the results show that exchange rates have had a significant impact on mainland Chinese investors in Hong Kong. Research Implications or Originality - In the Shanghai stock market, exchange rates have not had a significant impact on foreign equity investors, which is due to exchange rate risk management by foreign investors. Conversely, a large amount of foreign equity inflows led to the appreciation of the RMB. In the Hong Kong stock market, mainland Chinese investors have not significantly affected the foreign exchange market of Hong Kong, which is due to a limited share of mainland Chinese investment in Hong Kong market capitalization. Conversely, exchange rates have had a significant impact on mainland Chinese investors in Hong Kong, which reveal that mainland Chinese equity flows into Hong Kong increased when the RMB depreciated against the Hong Kong dollar.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative could be treated ambiguously. On the one hand, it is intended to transform the newly acquired economic potential of that country into its higher status in the world. China invites a lot of nations to build up gigantic transit corridors by joint efforts, and doing so it applies productively its capital and technologies. International transactions in RMB are also being expanded. But, on the other hand, the Belt and Road Initiative is also a necessity for China to cope with some evident problems of its current stage of development, such as industrial overcapacity, overdependence on imports of raw materials from a narrow circle of countries, and a subordinate status in global value chains. For Russia participation in the Belt and Road Initiative may be fruitful, since the very character of that project provides us with a space to manoeuvre. By now, Russian exports to China consist primarily of fuels and other commodities. More active industrial policy is needed to correct this situation . A flexible framework of the Belt and Road Initiative is more suitable for this objective to be achieved, rather than traditional forms of regional integration, such as a free trade zone.