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Most of the work in default logic is about default theories that are completely specified. In this category are the proposals of appropriate semantics for default logic, the characterizations of the complexity of reasoning with a default theory, the algorithms for finding consequences of default theories, etc. Relatively little attention has been paid to the process of building a default theory, and most of the work on this topic is about translating knowledge bases from other formalisms (such as circumscription, autoepistemic logic, and action description languages) into default logic. This paper is about expressing knowledge in default logic. In particular, we assume that defaults are initially formulated as normal, and are then corrected using specific inference examples.

When looking for a propositional abductive explanation of a given set of manifestations, an ordering between possible solutions is often assumed. While the complexity of computing optimal solutions is already known, in this paper we consider second-best solutions with respect to different orderings, and different definitions of what a second-best solution is: an optimal solution not already found, or a solution that is optimal among the ones not previously found.

Several methods have been proposed as an attempt to deal with dynamically changing scenarios. From a computational point of view, different formalisms have different computational properties. In this article we consider knowledge bases represented as sets of Horn clauses. The importance of this case is twofold: first, inference is polynomial, thus tractable; second, Horn clauses represents causal relations between facts, thus they are of great practical importance, although not all propositional knowledge bases can be represented in Horn form. The complexity of Horn revision is still high, and in some cases coincides with the complexity of the general (non-Horn) case. We analyze the complexity of belief revision from the point of view of the compilation [Cadoli et al. 1999]: we study the possibility of reducing the complexity by allowing a (possibly expensive) preprocessing of part of the input of the problem. Extending the work of Cadoli et al.[1996], we consider the problem of compact representation of revision in the Horn case, i.e., given a knowledge base T and an update P (both represented by Horn clauses) decide whether T * P , the result of the revision, can be represented with a propositional formula whose size is polynomial in the size of T and P . We give this representation for all formalisms for which it exists, and we show that the existence of a compact representation is related to the possibility of decreasing the complexity of a formalism via a proprocessing.

Belief revision and belief update are two different forms of belief change, and they serve different purposes. In this paper we focus on belief update, the formalization of change in beliefs due to changes in the world. The complexity of the basic update (introduced by Winslett, 1990) has been determined by Eiter and Gottlob (1992). Since then, many other formalizations have been proposed to overcome the limitations and drawbacks of Winslett's update. In this paper we analyze the complexity of the proposals presented in the literature: the standard semantics by Winslett (1986), the minimal change with exception and the minimal change with maximal disjunctive information by Zhang and Foo (1996), the update with disjunctive function by Herzig (1996), the abduction-based update and the generalized update by Boutilier (1996). We relate some of these approaches to belief update to previous work on closed world reasoning.

Knowledge-based systems must be able to "intelligently" manage a large amount of information coming from different sources and at different moments in time. Intelligent systems must be able to cope with a changing world by adopting a "principled" strategy. Many formalisms have been put forward in the artificial intelligence (AI) and database (DB) literature to address this problem. Among them, belief revision is one of the most successful frameworks to deal with dynamically changing worlds. Formal properties of belief revision have been investigated by Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson, who put forward a set of postulates stating the properties that a belief revision operator should satisfy. Among these properties, a basic assumption of revision is that the new piece of information is totally reliable and, therefore, must be in the revised knowledge base. Different principles must be applied when there are two different sources of information and each one has a different view of the situation-the two views contradicting each other. If we do not have any reason to consider any of the sources completely unreliable, the best we can do is to "merge" the two views in a new and consistent one, trying to preserve as much information as possible. We call this merging process arbitration. In this paper, we investigate the properties that any arbitration operator should satisfy. In the style of Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson we propose a set of postulates, analyze their properties, and propose actual operators for arbitration.

Nonmonotonic formalisms and belief revision operators have been introduced as useful tools to describe and reason about evolving scenarios. Both approaches have been proven effective in a number of different situations. However, little is known about their relationship. Previous work by Winslett has shown some correlations between a specific operator and circumscription. In this paper we greatly extend Winslett's work by establishing new relations between circumscription and a large number of belief revision operators. This highlights similarities and differences between these formalisms. Furthermore, these connections provide us with the possibility of importing results in one field into the other one.

Many variants of default logics exist. Two of the main differences among them arise from the choice between local and global consistency, and the choice of whether or not to accept maximally successful sets of defaults. In this paper, we characterize theories that do not depend at all on what makes the semantics different, that is, theories for which these two choices do not matter. A result that is proved for such theories holds not only for all the considered semantics, but also for every other semantics that differs from them on the two choices.

In this paper we show how several different semantics for belief update can be expressed in a framework for reasoning about actions. This framework can therefore be considered as a common core of all these update formalisms, thus making it clear what they have in common. This framework also allows expressing scenarios that are problematic for the classical formalization of belief update.

In this paper we address a specific computational aspect of belief revision: the size of the propositional formula obtained by means of the revision of a formula with a new one. In particular, we focus on the size of the smallest formula which is logically equivalent to the revised knowledge base. The main result of this paper is that not all formalizations of belief revision are equal from this point of view. For some of them we show that the revised knowledge base can be represented by a polynomial-size formula (we call these results “compactability” results). On the other hand, for other ones the revised knowledge base does not always admit a polynomial-space representation, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses at a sufficiently low level (“non-compactability” results). We also show that the time complexity of query answering for the revised knowledge base has definitely an impact on being able to represent the result of the revision compactly. Nevertheless, formalisms with the same complexity may have different compactability properties. We also study compactability properties for a weaker form of equivalence, called query equivalence, which allows to introduce new propositional symbols. Moreover, we extend our analysis to the special case in which the new formula has constant size and to the case of sequences of revisions (i.e., iterated belief revision). A complete analysis along these four coordinates is shown. ∗An extended abstract of this paper appeared as [5]. †Current address: Politecnico di Bari, Dipartimento di Elettrotecnica ed Elettronica, Via E. Orabona 4, I-70125 Bari, Italy.

In this paper we analyze the complexity of revising a knowledge base when an iteration of this process is necessary. The analysis concerns both the classical problems of belief revision (inference, model checking, computation of the new base) and new issues, related to the problem of “committing” the changes.

Reiter's original definition of default logic allows for the application of a default that contradicts one previously applied. We call this condition failure . The possibility of generating failures has been in the past considered a semantical problem, and variants have been proposed to solve it. We show that it is instead a computational feature that is needed to encode some domains into default logic.

Abduction is one of the most important forms of reasoning; it has been successfully applied to several practical problems, such as diagnosis. In this article we investigate whether the computational complexity of abduction can be reduced by an appropriate use of preprocessing. This is motivated by the fact that part of the data of the problem (namely, the set of all possible assumptions and the theory relating assumptions and manifestations) is often known before the rest of the problem. In this article, we show some complexity results about abduction when compilation is allowed.

One of the main challenges in the formal modeling of common-sense reasoning is the ability to cope with the dynamic nature of the world. Among the approaches put forward to address this problem are belief revision and update. Given a knowledge base T, representing our knowledge of the “state of affairs” of the world of interest, it is possible that we are led to trust another piece of information P, possibly inconsistent with the old one T. The aim of revision and update operators is to characterize the revised knowledge base T′ that incorporates the new formula P into the old one T while preserving consistency and, at the same time, avoiding the loss of too much information. In this paper we study the computational complexity, in the propositional case, of one of the main reasoning problems of belief revision and update: deciding if an interpretation M is a model of the revised knowledge base.

Independence -- the study of what is relevant to a given problem of reasoning -- has received an increasing attention from the AI community. In this paper, we consider two basic forms of independence, namely, a syntactic one and a semantic one. We show features and drawbacks of them. In particular, while the syntactic form of independence is computationally easy to check, there are cases in which things that intuitively are not relevant are not recognized as such. We also consider the problem of forgetting, i.e., distilling from a knowledge base only the part that is relevant to the set of queries constructed from a subset of the alphabet. While such process is computationally hard, it allows for a simplification of subsequent reasoning, and can thus be viewed as a form of compilation: once the relevant part of a knowledge base has been extracted, all reasoning tasks to be performed can be simplified.

An action is redundant in a planning domain if it is not needed to reach the goal. In this paper, we study the computational complexity of some problems related to the redundancy of actions: checking whether a domain contains a redundant action, what is the minimal number of actions needed to make the goal reachable, checking whether the removal of an action does not increase the minimal plan length, etc.