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The issue of radiation exposure as a potential cause of cerebrovascular disease raises many concerns. The aim of the present study was to investigate the epidemiology of stroke and transient ischemic attacks (TIA) along with the associated risk factors among the population of East Kazakhstan exposed to ionising radiation from the former Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) in comparison with the unexposed population of the same region. This 5-year retrospective cross-sectional study included the data on 10,970 patients, of whom the majority (62.3%) suffered from ischemic stroke, 11.7% had hemorrhagic stroke and the remaining 26.0% had TIA. At the moment when stroke/TIA happened, exposed patients were younger than the unexposed (mean age 63 years versus 64 years, p

On July 16, 1945, the Trinity nuclear test exploded in the desert near Alamogordo, NM. A variety of new diagnostic experiments were fielded in an effort to understand the detailed performance of the nuclear device. This article describes a series of radiochemical experiments that were designed to measure the efficiency and neutron fluence of the test. These experiments, and the scientists who led them, laid the foundation of weapons radiochemistry for decades to come.

The recovery of seismic source parameters requires the use of calibrated velocity models. Although at long periods it is possible to use relatively simple plane-layered models, calibration is still needed to better constrain source parameters. For the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear tests, this is particularly true when considering the use of seismic stations in Japan where paths cross the Sea of Japan. In this study, we perform forward waveform modeling to calibrate velocity structures. We show that we can arrive at a set of models that minimizes Rayleigh group-velocity anomaly at stations located in China, South Korea, and Japan. Overall moment tensor capability with the new models is improved such that cross-correlation analysis of the 20–50 s period waveforms recovers the true time alignment of the data, enabling better automated source analysis. We performed source-type inversions for the moment tensor jointly for long-period regional waveforms and regional and teleseismic P-waves polarity data for the latest and largest DPRK nuclear test and examine event discrimination/screening capability, scalar moment, and yield estimates with uncertainty. We present the models for improved seismic source modeling of the region.

Seventy-six years after the atomic bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world continues to face challenges to the existing arms control framework, part of the broader problem of the stagnation of multilateralism. There is a desperate need to reinvent the architecture of nuclear disarmament. While it seems almost impossible for the political deadlock to be broken with regard to entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the power of science continues to create a unique avenue for confidence-building measures (CBMs) to meet the needs of both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. This paper re-examines the value of science as a tool for arms control verification by separating the issue of the CTBT’s non-entry into force from the immediate application of its verification regime. The progress of nuclear-test-ban monitoring can be measured against scientific indicators, irrespective of the status of the remaining Annex II countries. The CTBT has already practically satisfied its core function of monitoring nuclear testing with the existing structure. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization has been progressing as an agent of CBMs, the development of civilian and scientific applications of the verification regime, and a capacity-building effort to attract more states to join the cause, and by doing so, sustaining nuclear-test-ban moratoriums.

South Korea deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile system in response to North Korea’s nuclear test, leading to the Chinese government’s opposition to THAAD, citing na...

The complex postdetonation geologic structures that form after an underground nuclear explosion are hard to constrain because increased heterogeneity around the damage zone affects seismic waves that propagate through the explosion site. Generally, a vertical rubble-filled structure known as a chimney is formed after an underground nuclear explosion that is composed of debris that falls into the subsurface cavity generated by the explosion. Compared with chimneys that collapse fully, leaving a surface crater, partially collapsed chimneys can have remnant subsurface cavities left in place above collapsed rubble. The 1964 nuclear test HADDOCK, conducted at the Nevada test site (now the Nevada National Security Site), formed a partially collapsed chimney with no surface crater. Understanding the subsurface structure of these features has significant national security applications, such as aiding the study of suspected underground nuclear explosions under a treaty verification. In this study, we investigated the subsurface architecture of the HADDOCK legacy nuclear test using hybrid 2D–3D active source seismic reflection and refraction data. The seismic data were acquired using 275 survey shots from the Seismic Hammer (a 13,000 kg weight drop) and 65 survey shots from a smaller accelerated weight drop, both recorded by ∼1000 three-component 5 Hz geophones. First-arrival, P-wave tomographic modeling shows a low-velocity anomaly at ∼200 m depth, likely an air-filled cavity caused by partial collapse of the rock column into the temporary postdetonation cavity. A high-velocity anomaly between 20 and 60 m depth represents spall-related compaction of the shallow alluvium. Hints of low velocities are also present near the burial depth (∼364 m). The reflection seismic data show a prominent subhorizontal reflector at ∼300 m depth, a short-curved reflector at ∼200 m, and a high-amplitude reflector at ∼50 m depth. Comparisons of the reflection sections to synthetic data and borehole stratigraphy suggest that these features correspond to the alluvium–tuff contact, the partial collapse cavity, and the spalled layer, respectively.

Ultrasonic thermometry has great potential to improve temperature measurements in irradiation experiments performed in nuclear test reactors. The flexibility of the measurement makes it applicable to a wide range of potential test conditions, in terms of temperature, radiation, and chemical environment. However, the range of several typical ultrasonic thermometer configurations are not well defined. The research described in this document attempts to define an operational envelop for multiple configurations and sensor materials.

This chapter traces the history of attempts and achievements in regulating the use of nuclear energy and material, focusing on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Ever since its invention, the nuclear weapon has occupied a special place in the global security order, both militarily and politically, due to its extraordinary destructive power. This picture is further complicated by the fact that nuclear material has both military and civilian uses. Civilian use of nuclear material includes generating electricity through nuclear reactors. Nuclear material also has medical, agricultural, and other peaceful applications, such as its use in the treatment of cancer. The chapter assesses in detail such treaties as the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It also looks at the current challenges involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran.

Introduction: The article analyzes the results of 75 years of nuclear tests. The purpose of the work is to provide an economic assessment of the nuclear test damage to the environment.

North Korea’s nuclear programme remains a key foreign policy challenge for United States. After its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang has made an impressive progress in developing a credible nuclear deterrent through series of nuclear and missile tests. The diplomatic efforts to dissuade North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have not yielded positive results so far, as Pyongyang has not only developed a credible deterrent but continues to expand and strengthen it. The failure of Hanoi Summit, latest in the series of diplomatic initiatives to end the series has depended pessimism regarding future negations. Experts are skeptical about finding a diplomatic solution to the crises and the demand to explore other alternatives _____ limited surgical strike, regime change, treating North Korea as de-facto nuclear weapon state _____ to end the crises has intensified in recent years. However, dealing with the threat though these tools is highly risky and diplomatic outreach is the most preferred course to end the crises.

This article explores a set of protests challenging U.S. occupation of the Nevada Nuclear Test Site as a means of understanding the deployment of bordering rhetorics in colonial expansion and indig...

Kim Jong Un continued to consolidate his power through personnel changes, and North Korean society saw increasing consumerism, along with signs of growing inequality. The economy did well through early 2017 but the subsequent effects of sanctions remained uncertain. North Korea conducted its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and its sixth nuclear test, triggering heated debate in the US and elsewhere about how to respond. Kim clearly is not going to give up working on weapons of mass destruction.

China had historically considered North Korea as a strategic asset and provided substantial aid to it. After North Korea conducted nuclear test in 2006, China has begun to regard North Korea as a strategic liability and supported UN sanctions against it. This policy, however, is limited by China’s practical concern about peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and its strategic concern about a US policy of containment against China.

After North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China’s response was stern enough for certain China analysts to posit that the Middle Kingdom’s approach to its Cold War ally was changing. In reality, however, China’s imports from North Korea, especially coal, a crucial mineral for the North’s income but banned by United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, did not decrease. Politically, China also strived to maintain mutual relations with North Korea. Based on its strategic and other cost-benefit calculations, Beijing needs to maintain economic and political ties with Pyongyang and thus has no incentive to seriously observe the U.N. resolution. In this context, China is expected to virtually repeat the gestures it made in the past in dealing with the North. Under these circumstances, sanctioning North Korea through China is not considered a viable option in tackling the nuclear issue; rather, the USA and South Korea should change their policy approach toward this problem.

The year 2016 marked twenty years since the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature; the twenty-fifth anniversary of the US nuclear-testing moratorium occurred the followi...

I first heard of “radioactive coal” in the summer of 2012, when I was living in the small village of Koyan, one of many settlements in Eastern Kazakhstan that hosted the Soviet-era Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site. A scandal over the sale of radioactive coal had erupted in the fall of 2011 when local media began reporting on a train from Kazakhstan carrying more than eight thousand tons of it (in 130 wagons) to a heating plant in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Upon discovering that radioactivity in the shipment was eight times higher than normal, Kyrgyz authorities had it removed from the Bishkek's central heating plant. Rather than discarding it, they put it to use elsewhere, including in the heating stoves of more than one orphanage, a kindergarten, and several rural schools. When media covered this development, public outcry forced Kyrgyz politicians to demand that the coal be returned to Kazakhstan; allegations of corruption and arrests of Kyrgyz officials ensued. Political wrangling over responsibility and refunds meant that negotiations between Kazakh and Kyrgyz authorities took more than a year to complete. Finally, Kazakhstan allowed the coal to be returned.

This study analyzes the political viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline project. This analysis demonstrates that North Korea&rsquo, s fourth nuclear test in January 2016 changed the dynamic of the project. Before the test, when inter-Korean relations were good, South Korea and Russia could make efforts to secure political support for the project. However, after the fourth nuclear test, this was no longer the case. As North Korea&rsquo, s nuclear power status became more evident, this nuclear problem began to have profound implications for U.S. security. In response, Washington not only led the UN Security Council to impose very severe sanctions against North Korea, but also placed its own sanctions on the country. These sanctions began to contain provisions that could prevent the implementation of the pipeline project. In addition to these sanctions, the U.S. sanctions against Russia in 2017 over its intervention in the U.S. election and aggression against Ukraine also contained clauses that could hamper it. Therefore, unless the U.S. lifts or eases all of these sanctions, South Korea and Russia are unwilling to take any concrete actions to secure political support for the RNS pipeline project. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the U.S. now holds the most important key to its political viability.

To an observer, Japan’s approach to nuclear weapons can appear confused and contradictory. The only country to have been attacked with nuclear weapons is variously described as a pacifist and non-nuclear nation and as a proliferation threat. These widely varied and conflicting conclusions are understandable given that conflicting messages are sent by senior figures. However Japan’s stance is in fact a coherent, if not uncomplicated, response both to its security needs and to domestic public opinion. However, the security provided by US extended nuclear deterrence underlines and enables this approach. The key policies and decisions were taken in both Washington and Tokyo between China’s first nuclear test (1964) and Japan’s ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1976). How the United States came to offer this additional security guarantee to Japan and how Japan came to rely upon it underscore this complex stance and are crucial to understanding a longstanding and ongoing security arr...

The nuclear weapons program of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) threatens Northeast Asian regional security, the effectiveness of the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the overseas bases and home territory of the United States. North Korea might also provide nuclear weapons, materials or technology to hostile states or terror organizations. The DPRK conducted a test explosion of its first nuclear device in 2006 and has conducted additional nuclear test explosions in 2009, 2013 and twice in 2016. The DPRK is currently believed to have the ability to regionally deliver nuclear weapons by ballistic missile. Following months of military tension between the DPRK, the U.S. and its regional allies throughout 2017, a diplomatic process began to reduce regional tensions, formally end the Korean War and negotiate a verifiable elimination of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. This chapter assesses the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities, the nature of the regime and the 30-year history of international efforts to impede, confront or negotiate an end to the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions.

Greenpeace is the largest and one of the most respected environmental organisations in the world. Its story started in the 1960s with a handful of peace activists who gathered around the kitchen table and made plans to save the world. Initially the activity against nuclear tests was the principal focus of Greenpeace but soon the organisation’s scope widened and included anti-whaling and anti-sealing actions. Greenpeace’s rubber boats became world-famous. Every achievement of Greenpeace is a success for the environment, the Earth, human health, and our common future. Greenpeace is working for all of us.

In this study, we investigated the association between depression, anxiety and medication adherence in patients with arterial hypertension living in East Kazakhstan region. The sample size included 795 patients, of whom 403 patients were exposed to radiation at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site from 1949 to 1989, while 395 patients were unexposed to radiation due to their very remote residence from the Site at the same period. Both exposed and unexposed patients showed no significant differences concerning body mass index, smoking habit, the presence of hypercholesterolemia, and hypertension grade. Patients with arterial hypertension previously exposed to radiation had significantly higher rates of low medication adherence, subclinical and clinical depression, situational anxiety of moderate and severe grade, and personal anxiety of moderate grade. A logistic regression analysis allowed us to identify the presence of significant positive association between medication adherence and anxiety in exposed patients (OR = 4041 (95%CI:1709–9556) p = 0.001) and marginal association (OR = 2998 (95%CI:1008–8915) p = 0.048) between the same parameters in unexposed patients. It might prove to be useful to introduce psychological and medical counseling with an emphasis on strengthening of medication adherence and to inform the local population about radiation effects and dosimetry data.

The remote handling (RH) plays an important role in nuclear test facilities, such as in ITER, for in-vessel and ex-vessel maintenance operations. Unexpected situations may occur when RH devices fail. Since no human being is allowed during the RH operations, a Multi-purpose Rescue Vehicle (MPRV) must be required for providing support in site. This paper proposes a design of a MPRV, i.e., a mobile platform equipped with different sensors and two manipulators with different sets of end-effectors. A human–machine interface is also proposed to remotely operate the MPRV and to carry out rescue and recovery operations.

We have designed and tested software for the acquisition and analysis of high-resolution gamma-ray spectra during on-site inspections under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy—OSIRIS—software filters the spectral data to display only radioisotopic information relevant to CTBT on-site inspections, e.g., 131 I. A set of over 100 fission-product spectra was employed for OSIRIS testing. These spectra were measured where possible, or generated by modeling. The test spectral compositions include non-nuclear-explosion scenarios, e.g., a severe nuclear reactor accident, and nuclear-explosion scenarios such as a vented underground nuclear test. Comparing its computer-based analyses to expert visual analyses of the test spectra, O SIRIS correctly identifies CTBT-relevant fission product isotopes at the 95% level or better.

Since North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January, the Korean Peninsula has seemed more distant than ever from denuclearization. Leadership in Pyongyang, with its strongly realist incl...

Acoustic waves carry information about their source and collect information about their environment as they propagate. This article reviews how these information-carrying and -collecting features of acoustic waves that travel through fluids can be exploited for remote sensing. In nearly all cases, modern acoustic remote sensing involves array-recorded sounds and array signal processing to recover multidimensional results. The application realm for acoustic remote sensing spans an impressive range of signal frequencies (10−2 to 107 Hz) and distances (10−2 to 107 m) and involves biomedical ultrasound imaging, nondestructive evaluation, oil and gas exploration, military systems, and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty monitoring. In the past two decades, approaches have been developed to robustly localize remote sources; remove noise and multipath distortion from recorded signals; and determine the acoustic characteristics of the environment through which the sound waves have traveled, even when the recorded sounds originate from uncooperative sources or are merely ambient noise.

Online Material: Location uncertainty estimation; figures of waveform comparison, location maps, and Pg / Lg spectral ratios; tables of earthquake parameters and Lg ‐wave amplitude ratios. Three nuclear tests (in 2006, 2009, and 2013) conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) are all detected and confirmed by many governmental and international agencies (e.g., the U. S. Geological Survey [USGS] and the Comprehensive Nuclear‐Test‐Ban Treaty Organization [CTBTO]). The locations and yields of these tests have also been extensively studied by many research groups (e.g., Richards and Kim, 2007; Koper et al. , 2008; Zhao et al. , 2008, 2012, 2014; Murphy et al. , 2010; Wen and Long, 2010; Chun et al. , 2011; Zhang and Wen, 2013). However, it is under intensive debate among the governmental agencies and research groups whether North Korea has conducted other small nuclear tests. In particular, De Geer (2012) reported the detection of xenon and xenon daughter radionuclides between 13 and 23 May 2010 in four atmospheric radionuclide surveillance stations, located in South Korea, Japan, and the Russian Federation. He suggested the presence of barium‐140 can be explained only by a sudden nuclear event, with the corresponding trinitrotoluene equivalent in a range of 50–200 t and the estimated time‐zero at 6:00+18 hr/−30 hr UTC on 11 May 2010 (De Geer, 2012; see also Brumfiel, 2012). The fissile material of the possible mid‐May 2010 nuclear test is indicated as uranium‐235 rather than the plutonium‐239 inferred from the radioxenon signal detected at Geojin in South Korea (De Geer, 2012, 2013), although Wright (2013) suggested they cannot be clearly discriminated …

In the era of Web 2.0, managing risk communication on social networking sites has increasingly become crucial and complicated issues in the field of homeland security. The response to the 2013 nuclear test in North Korea was largely based on a coordinated effort by Korea's Ministry of Defense, the United Nations, and many countries from around the globe. By analyzing risk communication networks emerged from Twitter users for the period from January 30 to February 24, 2013, this study investigates the way in which citizens' risk communication is formulated through social media and how they transmit risk information in homeland security. Analysis results show the dynamic evolution of risk communication networks based on influential actors with critical information who played pivotal roles in distributing this information to other actors.

India is a non-party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, India argues its impeccable non-proliferation record shows the country as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology that should be allowed to acquire the same benefits and advantages of nuclear energy cooperation under the existing global nuclear non-proliferation regime. This statement needs careful analysis of whether or not the Japan-India civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement could be successfully concluded and acceded to. This paper elaborates on the possibilities and concerns related to the matter from a politico-legal point of view, in order to materialise a mutually satisfactory and legitimate bilateral agreement. The scope of possible civil nuclear energy cooperation may be limited, probably not exceeding the level that the US has agreed with India, right now. It is, however, a necessary initial step for dramatically reconstructing our relationship, which may allow for greater cooperation in the near future.

The strategic culture of the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) is based on three pillars: attaining prosperity and strength as an enduring national purpose and objective; countering the existential North Korean threat; and maintaining a strong alliance with the United States. This strategic culture is grounded in history, especially in Koreans' sense of themselves as an ancient and homogeneous people, the minjok, and in a constructed martial heritage. Keepers of strategic culture include the national security establishment, the National Assembly, the media, the public, and the United States, but the most important keeper is the president, who ultimately defines South Korea's strategic interests and how they should be attained or guarded. Contemporary illustrations of South Korean strategic culture in action include defence reform measures, shifts in the American alliance, and the ‘crisis of 2013', which included a North Korean nuclear test and extreme threats of war. This article reinforces t...

After North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, South Koreans are once again debating whether to go nuclear. Some advocates of South Korean nuclear possession argue that nuclear weapons are necessary for self-defence against the nuclear-armed North. Some support South Korea’s nuclearization as leverage vis-à-vis North Korea and China. Some argue that going nuclear will heighten the South’s national prestige. However, others counter that South Korea’s nuclearization is not desirable and, indeed, barely feasible. First, since North–South conflicts have not diminished since the 1953 truce, the nuclear armament of the two Koreas could result in a nuclear war. Second, the South’s nuclearization would only hasten North Korea’s ardent pursuit of securing and increasing its stock of nuclear warheads. Third, it would prompt a fierce arms race in Northeast Asia by pressing Japan and Taiwan to go nuclear. Finally, it would undermine Seoul’s close ties with Washington. In order to maintain a nuclear-free South Korea, the US needs to reinforce its nuclear umbrella and eradicate the North Korean nuclear threat through active and comprehensive negotiations with Pyongyang.

India's nuclear test in May 1974 created a predicament for US nuclear diplomacy. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's immediate response was low-key, but he became worried about the spread of nuclear capabilities to the ‘next country’. Abandoning his previously dismissive stance toward the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Kissinger concluded that Washington had to work with allies and even cold-war adversaries to check proliferation. He approved a number of initiatives, one of which was to co-ordinate the nuclear-export policies of major states, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. To make that possible, during 1974–5, Kissinger supported a complex diplomatic effort to create what became a major institution in the non-proliferation regime, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), and a set of guidelines for regulating the export of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.

There had long been speculation as to who would succeed Kim Jong Il, the ruler of North Korea. When he died in December 2011, it was his youngest son, Kim Jong Un who took over. Little enough is known about how N. Korea is run, but the difficulties of getting the country's leaders to modify their ways remain as great as ever. There were no obvious signs of change on the domestic front, though the military seemed somewhat less prominent. And continuity was also evident in relations with South Korea, now at a very low ebb. The issue of missile and nuclear development is equally bleak. The Leap Day Agreement with the US quickly became a dead letter, and as 2012 went on, North Korean belligerence was fuelled by UN resolutions. Much of this was routine theatre, but North Korea's third nuclear test on 12 February 2013 provoked sharper international criticism and a correspondingly shriller response from the North. In spite of calls for China to intervene, the real target for this hostility is the US. But with ea...

A tooth enamel electron spin resonance (ESR) dosimetry study was carried out with the purpose of obtaining the individual absorbed radiation doses of population from settlements in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan, which was exposed to radioactive fallout traces from nuclear explosions in the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site and Lop Nor test base, China. Most of the settlements are located near the central axis of radioactive fallout trace from the most contaminating surface nuclear test, which was conducted on 29 August 1949, with the maximum detected excess dose being 430 ± 93 mGy. A maximum dose of 268 ± 79 mGy was determined from the settlements located close to radioactive fallout trace resulting from surface nuclear tests on 24 August 1956 (Ust-Kamenogorsk, Znamenka, Shemonaikha, Glubokoe, Tavriya and Gagarino). An accidental dose of 56 ± 42 mGy was found in Kurchatov city residents located close to fallout trace after the nuclear test on 7 August 1962. This method was applied to human tooth enamel to obtain individual absorbed doses of residents of the Makanchi, Urdzhar and Taskesken settlements located near the Kazakhstan–Chinese border due to the influence of nuclear tests (1964–1981) at Lop Nor. The highest dose was 123 ± 32 mGy.

We explore how investor attention paid to dangerous nuclear tests in an adjacent country influences financial market outcomes. To measure the attention paid to North Korean nuclear threats, we introduce a weekly Google search volume index for keywords on North Korean nuclear events. Using a time-varying structural vector auto-regression model with block exogeneity restrictions, we find that investor attention paid to nuclear threats has heterogeneous effects on South Korea’s stock price across industries and over time: attention on only the first nuclear test was negatively related to stock price index, which vanished thereafter. Moreover, the investor attention paid to the nuclear risk reduced stock prices, especially in the banking industry, during the entire sample period.

The method of electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) dosimetry using extracted teeth has been applied to human tooth enamel to obtain individual absorbed doses of residents of settlements in the vicinity of the central axis of radioactive fallout trace from the contaminating surface nuclear test on 7 August 1962. Most of the settlements (Kurchatov, Akzhar, Begen, Buras, Grachi, Mayskoe, Semenovka) are located from 70 to 120 km to the North-East from the epicenter of the explosion at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS). This region is basically an agricultural region. A total of 57 teeth samples were collected from these sites. Eight teeth from residents of the Kokpekty settlement, which was not subjected to any radioactive contamination and located 400 km to the Southeast from SNTS, were chosen as a control. The principal findings, using this method, were that the average excess dose obtained after subtraction of the natural background radiation was 13 mGy and ranged up to about 100 mGy all for residents in this region.

This report is an update of report LA-13859-MS (Bowen et al., 2001). In that original report, the underground radionuclide inventory at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) was decay corrected to September 23, 1992, the date of the last underground nuclear test at the NNSS. In this report, the inventory is updated to account for the decay of radionuclides over two additional decades (1992-2012) and revised tritium, fission product and actinide inventory figures and tables are presented. The maximum contaminant levels for radionuclides were also updated to Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) (CFR, 2013). Also, a number of minor errata found in the original publication were corrected. An inventory of radionuclides produced by 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the NNSS by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 includes tritium, fission products, actinides, and activation products. The inventory presented in this report provides an estimate of radioactivity remaining underground at the NNSS after nuclear testing. The original test inventory is decayed to September 30, 2012, and predictions of inventory decay over the subsequent 1000 years are presented. For the purposes of summary andmore » publication, the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory authors of this report subdivided the inventory into five areas corresponding to the principal geographic test centers at the NNSS. The five areas roughly correspond to Underground Test Area “Corrective Action Units” (CAUs) for remediation of groundwater. In addition, the inventory is further subdivided for the Yucca Flat region by tests where the working point depth is more than 328 feet (100 meters) above the water table and tests that were detonated below that level. Water levels used were those from the U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (1997), now called the Nevada Field Office. Curie activities and atoms are reported as of September 30, 2012. This inventory is strictly a compilation of the residual radiologic inventory remaining from the underground nuclear tests conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 and does not include radioactivity from other types of nuclear testing (e.g., atmospheric, reactors, rocket engines). A companion classified report (Miller et al., 2002) contains test-specific data for each test performed at the NNSS. This work has been sponsored by the U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office.« less

Well-resolved moment-tensor solutions reveal information about the sources of seismic waves. In this paper, we introduce a new way of assessing confidence in the regional full moment-tensor inversion via the introduction of the network sensitivity solution (NSS). The NSS takes into account the unique station distribution, frequency band, and signal-to-noise ratio of a given event scenario. The NSS compares both a hypothetical pure source (for example, an explosion or an earthquake) and the actual data with several thousand sets of synthetic data from a uniform distribution of all possible sources. The comparison with a hypothetical pure source provides the theoretically best-constrained source-type distribution for a given set of stations; and with it, one can determine whether further analysis with the data is warranted. The NSS that employs the actual data gives a direct comparison of all other source types with the best-fit source. In this way, one can choose a threshold level of fit in which the solution is comfortably constrained. The method is tested for the well-recorded nuclear test, JUNCTION, at the Nevada Test Site. Sources that fit comparably well to a hypothetical pure explosion recorded with no noise at the JUNCTION data stations have a large volumetric component and are not described well by a double-couple (DC) source. The NSS using the real data from JUNCTION is even more tightly constrained to an explosion because the data contain some energy that precludes fitting with any type of deviatoric source. We also calculate the NSS for the October 2006 North Korea test and a nearby earthquake, where the station coverage is poor and the event magnitude is small. The earthquake solution is very well fit by a DC source, and the best-fit solution to the nuclear test ( M w 4.1) is dominantly explosion.

BACKGROUND: Between 1966 and 1974, France conducted 41 atmospheric nuclear tests in Polynesia, but their potential health effects have not previously been investigated. METHODS: In a case-control study, we compared the radiation exposure of almost all the French Polynesians diagnosed with differentiated thyroid carcinoma between 1981 and 2003 (n = 229) to the exposure of 373 French Polynesian control individuals without cancer from the general population. Radiation exposures were estimated using measurements after the nuclear tests, age at time of each test, residential and dietary information. RESULTS: The average thyroid dose before 15 years of age was about 1.8 mGy, and 5% of the cases and 3% of the controls received a dose above 10 mGy. Despite this low level of dose, and after adjusting for ethnic group, level of education, body surface area, family history of thyroid cancer and number of pregnancies for women, we observed an increasing risk (P = 0.04) of thyroid cancer with increasing thyroid dose received before age of 15 years, which remained after excluding non-aggressive differentiated thyroid micro-carcinomas. This increase of risk per unit of thyroid radiation dose was higher (P = 0.03) in women who later experienced four or more pregnancies than among other women. CONCLUSION: The risk estimate is low, but is based on limited exposure data. The release of information on exposure, currently classified, would greatly improve the reliability of the risk estimation. British Journal of Cancer (2010) 103, 1115-1121. doi: 10.1038/sj.bjc.6605862 www.bjcancer.com Published online 31 August 2010 (c) 2010 Cancer Research UK

As a small country dependent on foreign trade and investment, North Korea should be highly vulnerable to external economic pressure. In June 2009, following North Korea's second nuclear test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1874, broadening existing economic sanctions and tightening their enforcement. However, an unintended consequence of the nuclear crisis has been to push North Korea into closer economic relations with China and other trading partners that show little interest in cooperating with international efforts to pressure North Korea, let alone in supporting sanctions. North Korea appears to have rearranged its external economic relations to reduce any impact that traditional sanctions could have.Given the extremely high priority the North Korean regime places on its military capacity, it is unlikely that the pressure the world can bring to bear on North Korea will be sufficient to induce the country to surrender its nuclear weapons. The promise of lifting existing sanctions may provide one incentive for a successor government to reassess the country's military and diplomatic positions, but sanctions alone are unlikely to have a strong effect in the short run. Yet the United States and other countries can still exercise some leverage if they aggressively pursue North Korea's international financial intermediaries as they have done at times in the past.