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This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labor union). We show that the standard result that Cournot equilibrium profits exceed those under Bertrand competition--when the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes--is reversible. Whether equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition is shown to depend upon the nature of the upstream agents' preferences and on the distribution of bargaining power over the input price. We find that the standard result holds unless unions are both powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function. JEL classification: D43; J50; L13 Keywords: Differentiated duopoly; Wage bargaining; Cournot; Bertrand

The influence of the type of school, local education authority or Independent, attended and other determinants of occupational earnings of UK 1993 graduates are studied. The paper finds that Independent school graduate receives an earnings premium of 3% to 3.5% greater than one from a LEA school.

A statistical analysis of the 1993 university graduates in Great Britain indicates that social class is significant in college student success. Reasons for differences in female success were not discerned in this analysis.

The UK government is introducing new sets of indicators designed to measure the performance of universities. A first wave of indicators was published in December 1999. A performance indicator based on graduate employment outcomes will follow. This paper proposes a method for developing employment-related performance indicators based on the analysis of data on the first destinations of a full cohort of leavers from pre-1992 universities in the United Kingdom. We analyse the determinants of graduate first destinations and suggest a method for the construction of university performance indicators. We also discuss limitations of league tables based on university performance indicators.

The paper develops a theoretical framework in which international trade occurs between economies with imperfectly competitive product markets and unionised labour markets. We are able to investigate the impact on both product and labour market outcomes of increased product market integration across the trading economies. Our strongest result is the finding that increased integration leads monopoly unions to set higher Nash equilibrium wages. In other words, a more competitive product market does not necessarily generate a more competitive labour market. All rights reserved. Keywords: International trade; Reciprocal dumping; Tariffs; Economic integration; Wage determination; Union bargaining

There has been significant interest recently both in the empirical investigation of the determinants of trade union membership, in the U.K. and elsewhere, and in the theoretical analysis of the economic effects of the closed shop trade union. However, there is little rigorous microeconomic explanation of union membership which is relevant for much of the U.K. and similar labour markets where the 'open shop' union is prevalent. This paper attempts to overcome the free-rider problem of explaining union membership in the open shop. We argue that both private pecuniary gains and social influences affect the individuals' union membership decisions, citing evidence in support of these basic assumptions. We show that stable intermediate union density is a possible equilibrium outcome in a generalised social custom model. We also analyse the simultaneous determination of wages and union membership, deriving a number of comparative static results. In particular, we find that both wages and union density depend upon, inter alia, the level of strike pay, the net cost of union membership and the individual's sensitivity to social custom and associated solidarity effects. We argue that the approach is consistent with various stylised facts concerning both wage bargaining and union membership and is able to explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of union membership.

The 'open shop trade union,' a tool for bargaining between a firm and a union, is theoretically concerned only with closed shop, fixed union memberships. Empirical evidence supports the influence of management opposition on union membership. Firms can spend their resources to reduce union memberships, so that wage bargaining equals competitive wages or accepts unions implicitly. This static model can reflect on most parameters and make more predictions consistent with economic evidence, when market conditions and bargaining combine, to determine the unions' capacity to increase wages.

A study was conducted to characterize a set of international trade regimes for various combinations of wages in a two-country framework of oligopoly supporting a homogeneous product. The nature of any equilibrium trade was shown to be either one way or two-way based on union choices between high and low-wages schemes. Possible wage strategies of rival unions were also analyzed. Results indicated that the decline of trade costs correlated with a reduction in the range of values of the rival wage associated with one-way trade.

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02036.x Byline: Bernt Bratsberg (1), Knut Roed (2), Oddbjorn Raaum (3), Robin Naylor (4), Markus Ja[umlaut]ntti (5), Tor Eriksson (6), Eva O[umlaut]sterbacka (7) Abstract: We show that the patterns of intergenerational earnings mobility in Denmark, Finland and Norway, unlike those for the US and the UK, are highly nonlinear. The Nordic relationship between log earnings of sons and fathers is flat in the lower segments of the fathers' earnings distribution - sons growing up in the poorest households have the same adult earnings prospects as sons in moderately poor households - and is increasingly positive in middle and upper segments. This convex pattern contrasts sharply with our findings for the US and the UK, where the relationship is much closer to being linear. As a result, cross-country comparisons of intergenerational earnings elasticities may be misleading with respect to transmission mechanisms in the central parts of the earnings distribution and uninformative in the tails of the distribution. Author Affiliation: (1)Frisch Centre for Economic Research (2)Frisch Centre for Economic Research (3)Frisch Centre for Economic Research (4)University of Warwick (5)A˚bo Akademi (6)A˚rhus Business School (7)A˚bo Akademi Article History: Submitted: 24 April 2006 Accepted: 19 September 2006

Shows that whether trade is one-way or two-way depends on wage strategies adopted by trade unions. Theoretical framework; Discussion on the issue of endogeneity between trade regime and union behavior; Conclusions.