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dimensions of most conflicts involving man since time immemorial. Of all resources, however, land has remained an overwhelming source of conflicts among various user groups as well as individuals at varying thresholds. In particular, conflicts between farmers and herdsmen in the use of agricultural land are becoming fiercer and increasingly widespread in Nigeria, largely due to ‘intensification and extensification’ of production activities that are necessitated by increasing human population (Gefu and Kolawole 2005; Fasona and Omojola 2005 cited in Adisa and Adekunle, 2010). The vital role of agriculture in the development of conflicts between pastoralists and farmers have been noted as an example of Low Intensity Conflict emanating from environmental degradation, resource scarcity, demographic and climate change (Shettima and Tar, 2008).

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to propose that a more optimal regulatory focus in conflict reflects a mix of promotion and prevention considerations because conflict often elicits needs for promoting well-being as well as needs for preventing threats to security and interests. Two studies using distinct methodologies tested the hypothesis that social conflict is associated with better outcomes when the parties construe the conflict with a regulatory focus that reflects a combination of both promotion and prevention orientations. Design/methodology/approachStudy 1 was an experiment that framed the same low-intensity conflict scenario as either prevention- or promotion-focused, or as both. In Study 2, we mouse-coded stream-of-thought accounts of participants’ actual ongoing high-intensity conflicts for time spent in both promotion and prevention focus. FindingsIn Study 1, the combined framing resulted in greater satisfaction with expected conflict outcomes and goal attainment than did either prevention or promotion framing alone. However, a promotion frame alone was associated with greater process and relationship satisfaction. These results were replicated in Study 2. Originality/valuePrior research on regulatory focus has emphasized the benefits of a promotion focus over prevention when managing conflict. The present research offers new insight into how these seemingly opposing motives can operate in tandem to increase conflict satisfaction. Thus, this research illustrates the value of moving beyond dichotomized motivational distinctions in conflict research, to understand the dynamic interplay of how these distinctions may be navigated in concert for more effective conflict engagement. It also illustrates the value of mouse-coding methods for capturing the dynamic interplay of motives as they rise and fall in salience over time.

Russia has historically succeeded in using various hostile measures to sow disorder, weaken democratic institutions, and undermine Western alliances. However, it also has a long track record of strategic shortfalls and even ineptitude. Exploring opportunities to deter, prevent, and counter Russian hostile behavior will benefit NATO and other Western powers in the so-called gray zone short of war, as well as in a conventional warfare scenario.

This Perspective examines the interests that inspire Russia's use of subversion, the means involved, and recent events that illustrate Russia's attempts at subversion. The authors propose ensuring that any responses to such actions are closely and clearly linked with particular acts of subversion, conducting additional research on what makes some Russian subversion effective, and improving rapid attribution of subversion.

The most potent symbol of conflict and violence in the closing years of the 20th century is the AK-47 assault rifle, and the increasingly widespread incidence of low intensity conflict is rapidly becoming the major security threat of this era. A critical aspect of the trend toward political and military violence is the growing availability of light weapons and small arms which were originally produced and procured for use primarily by armed forces. The main source of concern regarding the present and future supply of light weapons is the former Eastern bloc and former republics of the Soviet Union (FSU). Weapons are flowing out of and around this region in considerable quantities, to several destinations—in Europe, Central Asia and beyond—via numerous networks. There are two basic sources of demand for light weapons-including small arms-in South Africa, the first political and the second criminal. Of the 18,312 murders in 1994, 5,872 were committed with small arms and light weapons.

This report uses an original data set of U.S. ground interventions to identify factors that determine where and when the United States is most likely to intervene militarily. The report focuses on interventions into armed conflicts, stability operations, and deterrence missions. It identifies signposts of future interventions that can be used by Army planners and also explores intervention lead time, duration, and resource constraints.

A Joint Force Commander (JFC) leading military joint operations faces several complex challenges. The purpose of this article is to investigate some of the challenges a Joint Force Commander may face when a conflict changes character from being a high-intensity conflict to becoming a low-intensity conflict. Sources of evidence: In connection with command and control, especially issues concerning different cultures and the understanding of this can be the biggest challenge for a Joint Force Commander during the transition to a low intensity conflict as a peace support operation setting. Main argument: Being able to anticipate some of these problems will be essential to a Joint Force Commander's ability to exercise leadership and command and control. Conclusions: Furthermore, target selection and information operations have proven to be two factors that will have a greater importance in the planning and conduct of operations during a transition from a high-intensity conflict to a low-intensity conflict.

This report describes how the Israel Defense Force evolved to meet an adaptive and determined hybrid adversary during its wars in Gaza. It then draws a series of lessons from the Israeli experience for the U.S. Army and the joint force: from the importance of armored vehicles and active protection systems to the limitations of airpower in urban terrain and of conventional militaries to deter nonstate actors.

Purpose This paper aims to identify antecedents for, and consequences of, low-intensity inter-unit conflict in multinational corporations (MNCs). Inter-unit conflict in MNCs is an important and well-researched theme. However, while most studies have focused on open conflict acknowledged by both parties, much less research has dealt with low-intensity conflicts. Still, low-intensity conflicts can be highly damaging – not least because they are rarely resolved. Design/methodology/approach The authors used a qualitative approach to understanding low-intensity conflict relying on 170 interviews in four Danish MNCs. Findings They describe consequences of low-intensity conflict and identify three types of actions by headquarters’ representatives that could lead to the development of low-intensity conflicts, namely, ignoring, bypassing and educating. Originality/value Very few studies have dealt with low-intensity conflict – not least in international business research. The authors argue that the study of low-intensity conflict in MNCs can provide relevant, novel knowledge of MNC functioning.

This brief summarizes a RAND report that explores lessons that the U.S. Army and the Joint force can draw from Israel's military operations in Gaza from 2009 to 2014 and how Israel adapted to hybrid adversaries in complex urban terrain.

This paper focuses on the impact of maritime piracy on international trade. Piracy increases the cost of international maritime transport through an increase in insecurity regarding goods deliveries. Bilateral trade flows between the main European and Asian countries over the 1999 to 2008 period are used to estimate an augmented gravity model that includes various measures of piracy acts. We found robust evidence indicating that maritime piracy reduces the volume of trade; the effect of ten additional vessels hijacked being associated to an 11% decrease in exports. Using these results, the international cost of piracy in terms of trade destruction is estimated to be 28 billion dollars. Finally, we compare the cost of low intensity conflict like Somalia, to the cost of a full scale conflict (Afghanistan) and to the cost of an autarkic state (North Korea) for the international community in the year 2008.The results indicate that the cost of war more than doubles the cost of low intensity conflict.

This paper will illustrate the utilization of systemic family therapy services inside a hospital in a war-affected region of the Central African Republic. Through an international non-governmental organization (NGO), the author, a family therapist, provided counselling supervision and services to hospital staff and patients in an area of open conflict in the northern region of the country. In circumstances of chronic insecurity fuelled by both government and rebel forces, families displaced in this region are vulnerable to numerous health conditions and social problems. Family therapy techniques and ideas were used to work with individuals, couples and families presenting with health and social problems resulting from HIV-TB, infections, chronic malnutrition, acute poisoning and beliefs about sorcery. Case examples illustrate the systems consultation model used with the mental health team in order to expand and promote the sustainability of patient mental healthcare in this underserved region.

Cyber attacks represent a new set of tools in international relations and conflict. Employment of cyber attacks is attractive because the means necessary for subverting or compromising networked information systems are low and can yield significant impact, often with a reasonably low degree of confidence for attribution. We are likely witnessing a blending of cyber tactics into low-intensity and economic forms of conflict. The capacity to launch cyber attacks is increasingly desired by non-state actors and participants in terror or insurgent campaigns. At the same time, cyber combatants have come to be viewed as legitimate targets for kinetic military action. An important complicating factor of incorporating cyber tools into international conflict is how the opportunities presented by vulnerabilities throughout the cyber ecosystem at the tactical level fit into strategic decision-making by the United States and other states as well as non-state actors. Bridging this gap is an important and necessary step for both achieving the aspirational goals for cyber espionage and covert action, while at the same time deepening understanding of ancillary effects and externalities. Provided here is a narrative of the development of cyber conflict as well as several guideposts for assessing the utility of cyber attack as policy. Among the topics covered are: Internet-based intelligence activities; the role of encryption in the privacy-security debate; cyber economic warfare; the connection between cyber and kinetic action; and lastly the role of information and strategic influence in cyber conflict.

The United States Air Force (USAF) has proven to be a valuable force multiplier over the last decade and a half of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations around the world. As the nation continues to address security concerns in far flung corners of the earth, the USAF must posture itself to meet the challenges associated with threats posed by peer competitors and also maintain its ability to support COIN operations for the foreseeable future. In a time of fiscal constraints, it will become increasingly difficult to provide a balanced force structure that maintains capabilities for low intensity conflict (LIC) as well as high-tech systems to meet national interests in conventional engagements.

Israel’s strategic environment improved after the end of the Cold War 1 as its international status was enhanced considerably, and the historic process of reluctant acceptance of Israel as a fait accompli within the Arab world continued. 2 While the chances for a large scale conventional confrontation dissipated, two clear security challenges remained at the beginning of the twenty-first century: the nuclear threat from Iran and the low intensity conflict (LIC) with the Palestinians. The repercussions of Iran becoming a nuclear power and the ways to address this existential threat are beyond the scope of this article and are addressed elsewhere. 3 This article, instead, focuses on the Palestinian challenge, which is much closer to home. The article first discusses the dim future of the Palestinian Authority (PA), subsequently the nature of the threat it poses, particularly after the electoral victory of Islamic Hamas in January 2006, and ends by examining Israel’s options in dealing with challenges emanating from a Hamas-ruled PA. The article is sceptical of the dominant two-state paradigm and advocates the adoption of an open-ended conflict management strategy.

The fateful event of September 11 in the US and subsequent terrorist attacks in many countries had changed the world. We now live in a world of troubled peace, a far more dangerous world for many of us. A well-networked security force will have comprehensive situation awareness to respond to unconventional threats like terrorism, low intensity conflict and even SARS. Conventional military communications has proven to be ineffective especially in urban environment where high-rise buildings hinder the electromagnetic wave propagation of VHF and UHF communications. In Singapore, a well-defined and integrated network centric based communications infrastructure is being put in place to link military and homeland security forces into an integrated force.

The delivery of medical health care to soldiers serving in active front units in the Israeli Defense Forces requires the ability to adjust to different military activity settings. This study was conducted to compare patient satisfaction, as a tool for assessing quality of care, in different activity settings: training and Low-intensity conflict setting. A patient satisfaction survey was conducted simultaneously in battalions during low-intensity conflict and training activities. Data analysis showed that patients' perception of the quality of care they received and of medical staff attitude was higher in the conflict setting. Correlation analysis revealed that patients during conflict perceived outcome of care and accessibility as most important in evaluating overall satisfaction. We suggest that perception of high-quality medical care can be obtained during conflict conditions. Interestingly, in the conflict setting, the physical environment of the clinics appears to be less crucial to patient satisfaction than physician availability and medical outcome. These results may serve as a basis for changing health delivery systems by health policy makers.

Infrared technology has seen phenomenal growth since its inception during World War II. Defence applications have been the main driver of infrared technology development all over the world. Infrared systems have been mainly developed for night vision, all weather surveillance, search and tracking and missile seeker applications. Ever demanding defence system requirements have facilitated considerable investment. Research has been mainly directed towards the product development. Medical applications such as thermographs, transportation applications such as enhanced vision systems for airplanes, helicopters, sea vehicles, and automobiles, law enforcement applications in drug prevention and criminal tracking, managing forest fires and environmental monitoring are some of the spin-offs. Infrared technology has proven to be a force multiplier in war as well as low intensity conflict situation. Intelligent vision sensor development covering visible-infrared spectrum for automated surveillance, change detection, 3D machine vision systems, dynamic particle metrology, missile and ballistic testing/imaging, faster, more precise and more manoeuvrable robotic applications will drive the future research.

Little is known about how armed conflict attenuates established public healthcare systems. Politics aside, Libya has been justifiably feted as one of the world's great success stories in public health. Its ability to deliver low cost healthcare with good outcomes is held as a model for other developing countries. The most cursory examination of the evidence from the UN's Human Development Index strongly supports this. On life expectancy alone, Libya is ranked 53rd at 74.5 (compared to 59.8 in 1980). This is above Russia (65th) and Brazil (73rd) and well above their neighbours Algeria (84th) and Egypt (101st). Under-five infant mortality rates also illustrate the robustness of the system with a rate of 17 per 1000. In comparison, the under-five infant mortality rate for Egypt is 23, for the most prosperous African state Nigeria it is 186, and for the conflict-ridden state of DR Congo it is 199. The public gains by Libya are also particularly noteworthy when one considers that the Arab world, despite its resources, has underachieved in public health terms. The reasons for this, outlined in the Arab Human Development Report of 2002, is that while some Arab countries have also achieved similar public health gains, e.g. Qatar, others such as Yemen with an under-five infant mortality rate of 66 per 1000, have not. But all this is changing. The conflict in Libya is already altering mortality and morbidity rates as well as degrading public healthcare systems. While research on healthcare systems in post-conflict countries is well developed, little is known on how armed conflict degrades established functioning systems. One of the problems of defining what the post-conflict needs will be in Libya is the paucity of empirical research in many of these areas, despite the work already conducted in countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and the West Bank. Public health is not short of theoretical models but actionable research from the ground to support the post-conflict reconstruction of Libya's public health system is seriously lacking. Looking further afield it is clear from policy failures in Kosovo and Afghanistan that an evidence-based national health policy framework at the very beginning of post-war reconstruction is absolutely essential; leave it too late and the consequences are grave.1 However, while we have real-life general learning points from these conflicts they are no substitute for country-specific data. It is essential that research on the impact of the conflict on the Libyan healthcare system begins immediately. The desk-based public health risk assessment and interventions study published by the World Health Organization (WHO) in March (WHO/HSE/GAR/DCE/2011.1) is insufficient in scope and detail to deliver the necessary healthcare systems intelligence required for post-conflict reconstruction. A research ‘hot team’ using, for example, WHO's six essential inputs for a functioning healthcare system (Table 1),2 and a local skilled cadre could quickly and efficiently deliver such intelligence. Table 1 Immediate actions for assessing and strengthening public health in Libya (based on the WHO designated six primary inputs as essential for functioning health systems) The rebel Transitional National Council (TNC), now widely recognized as the legitimate government of Libya, has already endorsed rebuilding the healthcare systems in ways that strengthen equitable service capacity and the removal of barriers of access to care. Yet post-conflict countries face daunting economic and social challenges. We know from other conflicts that deterioration in public health is not due only to the direct effects of conflict. Long after the cessation of hostilities, ‘indirect’ mortality due to the disruption of livelihoods, inadequate food and water supplies, and the destruction of health systems, as well as to continued insecurity, continues to exert a downward pressure on health indices and/or causes stagnation. Yet conflict damage to public health systems is also due to the destruction of clinical infrastructure and the effect on healthcare professional human capital. While there has already been significant emigration from Libya there are no data yet on who has left the country nor what will be the long-term effect on healthcare professionals. Various scenarios are possible, but from studies of other African countries, the longer a conflict endures the more the healthcare system narrows to focus on the acute needs and delivery of care to support the conflict at the expense of all other domains of health.3 There are many unknowns that need to be acknowledged. The trajectory of the post-conflict environment has yet to play out and, unlike many other conflict states that were already fragile, Libya has a strong infrastructure and a ready source of capital. The danger is that Libya may well yet descend, as has been the case in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict into a state of chronic conflict with acute and constant insecurities. We know from studies of Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Lebanon and Sri Lanka4 that this drives substantial inequalities in healthcare with the rural poor relying on local primary care and the healthier, urban populations accessing secondary and tertiary facilities. Insecurity will only exacerbate this inequality. An even worse scenario would be the continued low intensity conflict that slowly erodes the national architecture leading to a ‘fragile’ state. In terms of preparation, some eventualities are more likely. For instance in post-conflict settings there is invariably a peak in violent deaths due to the combined effect of deprivation and the increased ‘weaponisation’ of the public. In policy terms, prior knowledge of these ‘highly likely’ trajectories is important to manage expectations and implement solutions. This avoids reactive politics when these problems are inevitably highlighted. Advanced planning for the post-conflict period needs to be integrated not only with the lead countries – UK, France, USA, et cetera – but also with the myriad of humanitarian agencies that will be part of this process. In an ideal world this would involve a single integrated operational public health plan. Whatever course is adopted there is an urgent need to conduct this research now to provide long-term solutions and develop new approaches to public health in the post-conflict environment both in Libya and further afield.

The efficacy of a composite Indian herbal preparation (CIHP) in sustaining the mental performance of soldiers engaged in prolonged low-intensity-conflict operations has been evaluated. For this purpose, a cohort of 56 soldiers acted as volunteers in combat situations. After recording their initial responses to psychological tests such as the d2 test, the trail-making test, the serial addition test, the short-term memory test, and the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing Anxiety Scale, they were randomly given either CIHP or placebo in a double-blind fashion for 8 days while they performed their usual combat duties. The final 3 days of assignments included physically exhausting and life-threatening events. On day 8, they were withdrawn from combat duties and the psychological tests were readministered immediately. After 7 days of rest, the tests were repeated once again. The results indicate comparatively better performance immediately after the mission by the CIHP group. CIHP was effective at sustaining the mental abilities of soldiers in a low-intensity-conflict environment.

The most prevalent menace since the end of the cold war is the occurrence of civil wars and local and regional conflicts. The term "low intensity conflict" describes the new threat environment and covers a multitude of phenomena, such as civil wars, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and counterinsurgency operations occurring between routine, peaceful inter- or intrastate competition, and a sustained conventional conflict. There is a great challenge to alert the physicians in general, and the surgical community of the world in particular, to the new threat environment and the medical challenges involved in treating casualties of low intensity conflicts. Specifically, a new international body of surgeons might be required to coordinate the recruitment, training, and creditation for surgeons with special expertise in the management of victims of such conflicts and to facilitate research and general knowledge of the medical challenges of modern conflicts.

Dear Editor, I am writing to you in response to an article titled ‘Stress in the Indian Armed Forces: how true and what to do?’ published in MJAFI 2011;67:209–211. 1. I am writing to you in the context of ‘Stress in the Indian Armed Forces’ a subject which has been scarcely discussed and researched with very few large scale studies to date.1–6 Does the available epidemiological data support the contention of a stress epidemic in the Armed Forces?7 The authors need to be complimented on bringing this important issue of military psychiatry to the fore. 2. The Indian soldier is unlikely to be differentially immune to the impact of stress-related to combat while literature from experiences from other Armed Forces like UK and USA is flooded with such reports. 3. While operating in counter insurgency operations (CI Ops) under constant threat to life, inhospitable terrain and climate and uncongenial environment, a soldier may face mental ill-health and morbidity while living in a changed socio-economic setting. At times possibly, a small insignificant or trivial stressor may actually work like a last straw on the ‘depleted’ coping capacity of the soldier. Most who have witnessed such incidents ‘wondered’ why did he do it? Some early and indirect indicators of combat fatigue and stress like absent without leave (AWL), road traffic accidents (RTAs), indiscipline, and insubordination are also important in assessing impact of combat stress. 4. I have had the privilege of serving with one of the authors in CI Ops. It is good to note that the authors have advocated ‘Combat Psychiatry’ initiatives which I had also suggested to the author during my discussions on the subject. 5. I was very fortunate to be part of a project on control measures launched in one of the formation where I worked with one of the authors. It was quite evident that given the right commitment and support by the ‘sensitive’ and ‘sensible’ command, it is feasible to reduce the most ‘tragic’ consequences of combat stress like ‘suicides and fratricides’ to a large extent. I do agree that Armed Forces have one of the ‘lower’ rates but ‘even a single suicide is too many when it happens to a soldier’. 6. During my stint on ‘Siachen’ I observed that the ‘toughest’ of the soldiers ‘crumble’ under the stresses of combat. Combat stress is an inevitable part of combat especially under changed scenarios of deployment in unconventional warfare like low intensity conflict (LIC) or CI Ops. We have a sacred duty towards the men we command keeping in mind the ‘Chetwode Motto’. We must study it, research it, and reduce it.

The "Warrior Ethos" is the written manifestation of what individual Soldiers ascribe to be. It is a covenant which embodies how Soldiers serve the nation and expresses their dedication to accomplish their mission and their responsibilities to each other and the Army. It informs how they train and what expert knowledge they must master. As the Army seeks to define required future capabilities, what cultural changes if any will be needed to adapt and ensure success? This paper maintains that the "Warrior Ethos", a subset of the Soldier's Creed, reflects a Cold War mindset focused on application of kinetic force and is out of alignment with the changing character of warfare as experienced over the last ten years of persistent conflict. Future conflicts are likely to be dominated by low intensity conflict and stability operations where leaders at lower levels will routinely face difficult and ambiguous circumstances which will require a high degree of moral judgment in the reasoned application of force. Adapting Army culture to meet these challenges will require an Army that values and builds trust relationships and places high priority on the development of moral character.

Contemporary low‐intensity conflict (LIC) policy and doctrine have been criticized as carrying forward the same concepts and assumptions that served as the foundation for the failed Vietnam‐War‐era U.S. counterin‐surgency policy. This article reviews and conceptually organizes the body of literature on LIC, then analyzes LIC doctrine and literature across four dimensions to determine if current LIC policy and doctrine have been revised to remedy the factors responsible for the failure of the United States’ Vietnam‐War‐era counterinsurgency doctrine. The analysis reveals that, although some positive doctrinal progress has occurred, there are dimensions of LIC doctrine and policy that have not yet been sufficiently addressed or resolved.

This article surveys the published literature on terrorism and low‐intensity conflict (LIC). Its purpose is twofold. The first is to assess the role that research on terrorism and LIC can play both in countering present and likely future adversaries and addressing existing and potentially new challenges. The second is to provide a baseline assessment of how firm a foundation current research into these subjects has provided. It argues that the need for policy‐relevant research in both terrorism and LIC looms larger than ever. Indeed, as U.S. security concerns and overseas interests in the coming decades are likely to be increasingly affected by a multiplicity of conflicts short of war occurring throughout the globe, research is needed to help identify the resources that we will require and the array of innovative, flexible policy responses we will need to adopt. Assistance is also required to help the United States define what those interests are and how they can best be served. Without a clear c...

As the international system enters a new phase of maturity and optimism, there is growing realization of the unwinnability of nuclear war. There is no doubt about the inconclusiveness of war as an instrument of state policy. The current international strategic environment indicates the emerging significance of low‐intensity conflict (LIC). Although this form of warfare has existed for centuries in its various manifestations, seldom has it been used to better outcome than during the last 40 years. In fact, LIC may euphemistically be referred to as the warfare of the “warfare of the future.” This article examines the emerging nature of low‐intensity conflict and its impact on the social development of Third‐World countries such as India.

America's ongoing battles in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted limitations in our understanding of the complexity of modern warfare. Furthermore, our cultural prism has retarded the institutionalization of capabilities needed to prevail in stabilization and counterinsurgency missions. An ongoing debate about future threats is often framed as a dichotomous choice between counterinsurgency and conventional war. This oversimplifies defense planning and resource allocation decisions. Instead of fundamentally different approaches, we should expect competitors who will employ all forms of war, perhaps simultaneously. Such multimodal threats are often called hybrid threats. Hybrid adversaries employ combinations of capabilities to gain an asymmetric advantage. Thus, the choice is not simply one of preparing for long-term stability operations or high-intensity conflict. We must be able to do both simultaneously against enemies far more ruthless than today's. This essay widens the aperture of the current debate to account for this threat. It compares and contrasts four competing perspectives and evaluates them for readiness and risk implications. This risk assessment argues that the hybrid threat presents the most operational risk in the near- to midterm. Accordingly, it concludes that hybrid threats are a better focal point for considering alternative joint force postures.

"Conduct a presence patrol in order to maintain stability in the area" may say a great many things to your average squad leader, but it does not tell him his mission. Maneuver warfare requires decentralized command, and hence mission tactics are central from the practical perspective of considering how to apply doctrine to action. While certainly this means commanders should avoid specifying some details of "how the mission must be accomplished" and requires "a subordinate's exercise of initiative framed by proper guidance and understanding," in a sense of real-world execution it also means the subordinate must be tasked with a mission. Difficulties in effectively assigning tasks in less than high-intensity environments arise from ineffective application of doctrinal language, not a lack of applicable doctrine.

The term “low-intensity conflict” (LIC) first appeared in the lexicon of the U.S. national security community in the latter half of the 1970s. During the 1980s, the Reagan administration and the Congress undertook several initiatives to prepare the United States to respond to various LIC challenges. Following a brief commentary on these developments, the author addresses three interrelated subjects. First, the conceptual debate surrounding LIC and its relationship to the American approach to strategy is examined. Second, the primary kinds of LIC that will occur in the 1990s are described. Finally, the implications and requirements for U.S. national security policy are outlined.

For 30 years, in rural Texas, rural Kentucky, and in the Army, I have observed a variety of efforts aimed at changing people's health. Recently I participated in one large effort (USNS MERCY), commanded a second (MED EL, JTF-Bravo, Honduras), was "neighbor" and visitor to a third (Medical Assistance Team in El Salvador), and had staff level interface with others (Ahuas Tara 88, Fuertes Caminos 88, and Special Operating Forces Humanitarian Assistance Team, all in Honduras). This article speaks to the philosophies which I believe drive, or should drive, these initiatives. Other articles will explore individual iterations.

(1991). Intelligence and low‐intensity conflict in the Philippine war, 1899–1902. Intelligence and National Security: Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 90-114.

In order to effectively plan and execute military operations in today's security environment, Regional Combatant Commanders require forces capable or planning and conducting missions across the range of military operations. Recent experience has shown that while U.S. forces are highly effective in high-intensity conflict against conventional enemies, they are somewhat less capable in low-intensity conflict against unconventional threats. By using the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, this paper identifies the dangers associated with a force unable to properly plan and execute operations against an unconventional opponent. The paper examines current U.S. military forces and defines three non-existing characteristics and resources needed for success in today's global security environment. It uses the United States Marine Corps as a model to identify changes currently underway, as well as areas for improvement. Finally, the paper makes recommendations that can be applied to all U.S. military forces, enabling successful operations in low-intensity conflict against unconventional threats while maintaining high intensity war fighting capabilities.

Over 200 years ago, a group of men gathered to create an enduring document that would usher a new era into the world: The Constitution of the United States of America. The document created a free and democratic country that stands as an example for freedom, equality, and democracy. Being a world leader has invited a full spectrum of threats against the United States in its promotion of these ideals. Unfortunately, in its zeal to defend the United States against its current enemies, the military has turned its attention away from conventional warfighting. Now, the United States military has become unwisely fixated on low-intensity conflict, almost ignoring the threat posed by the high-intensity conflicts of conventional warfare. Because focusing training on low-intensity conflict limits the U.S. military's ability to hone conventional warfighting skills, ignores the most dangerous threat to the country, and delays procurement for future threats, the U.S. military's priority should be training and equipping a force for high-intensity conflict. The United States must focus first on the most dangerous threat to the nation, a conventional threat. Focusing on a conventional threat means training and procurement should be focused around conventional tasks and equipment, while irregular capabilities are developed as a secondary issue.

To address the potential terrorist threats to America, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism state that the United States will wage a "war of ideas." The war of ideas seeks to change the minds of varying ideological populations. A war fought in the minds and among people -- human terrain -- requires human players to engage and communicate with indigenous populations in the context of the local culture. As the United States and its coalition partners in the global war on terror (GWOT) clear al-Qaeda from one location, terrorists will seek other locations. They target people to turn them against the United States and the coalition of the willing. A foreign or local government can win the war of ideas and defeat global terrorists only if it wins the hearts and minds of the people, which requires influencing their behavior by offering them a better solution than the solution al-Qaeda offers. A war of ideas is not new to the twenty-first century fight. While history cannot provide a panacea for global terrorism, today's military can learn lessons from historical small wars and low intensity conflicts to train and employ forces effectively to wage and win a war of ideas to counter global insurgents and their ability to win popular support. This paper employs a review of two case studies, Malaya (1945-60) and Vietnam (1964-72), to illuminate my thesis.

Low-intensity conflicts and special operations present a wide range of injury scenarios for military and civilian surgeons alike. Harsh environments, difficult and high-risk missions, long lines of communication, and isolated locations are but some of the factors that create challenge in providing care for patients in this category. Often surgeons and other medical personnel are faced with many additional medical and nonmedical tasks outside their usual expertise because of the small number of support personnel and medical footprints brought forward in these missions.

This report deals with network interdiction campaigns that are expected to be carried out indefinitely in time. Two sides are always involved, one desiring the unimpeded movement of some commodity, while the other desires the opposite. We consider two distinct situations. The first is motivated by warfare involving Improvised Explosive Devices (TEDs) directed against the movement of materiel in convoys on roads. It will be assumed that this kind of warfare is low level in the sense of destroying only a negligible fraction of the shipped materiel, so the objective becomes the maximization or minimization of the rate at which the convoys take lethal hits. The second situation is an economic one where the interdictor attempts to capture a significant fraction of the shipped materiel, so much so that a profit cannot be made by shipping it. This leads to a Nash equilibrium where the shipper's quantity shipped is in equilibrium with the interdictor's budget for interdiction.

The Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) has largely become what can be termed Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The use of supporting arms in general, and artillery in specific, is sporadic at best. Arguments have been made that artillery units, being the least engaged division units, are well suited for ancillary missions such as Information Operations (IO) and Civil Military Operations (CMO). CMO has been given to the artillery regiments and battalions as a secondary mission as directed in ALMAR 061- 05. Whether IO becomes a tertiary mission officially or as a result of CMO mission creep, it is undoubtedly on the horizon for the artillery community. For artillery batteries to be used as provisional IO batteries minor changes in structure and major changes in training must take place. The mission creep had already begun, even before the ALMAR outlining CMO as the secondary mission. The majority of IO billets are filled by Marines carrying the 08XX Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) designation. The logic behind the staffing of these billets is largely based on "effects based targeting," the latest term to be over utilized and under defined. This paper will not attempt to analyze the merits of this trend but rather work on the premise that it is a forgone conclusion that artillery will inherit this mission.

The aim of this three year project under the contract number ARO DAAD19-02-1-0211 was to develop a mathematical modeling and metrics framework for supporting the threat evaluation stage of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process of asynchronous Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) threats (FM34-7, Section 3-9). The first goal was to assess the extent to which emergent coordination happens among agents in so-called ping system simulations that model action taking place in a constrained resource environment. The second, related goal, was to assess whether the simulation systems possess near optimal fitness states. This report discusses how these assessments were made in the contexts of specific sets of agent decision and action protocols.

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military performance when called upon to execute lesser contingencies, including post conflict operations, have at best produced mixed results. In short, the essential point is this: the U.S. military's transformation since the end of the Cold War, while vastly enhancing its ability to wage war at the high end of the conflict spectrum, has not produced comparable increases in capacity at the lower end of the spectrum. This is the case despite the fact that the frequency and performance of U.S. military forces when involved in lesser contingencies clearly demonstrates the necessity to enhance U.S. military capabilities across the entire conflict spectrum. Ultimately, achieving U.S. national objectives in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which range from complex contingencies and peace operations to winning the final peace following decisive combat operations, will require changes and improvements in several critical areas. First, mission success during complex contingency and post conflict operations requires that the U.S. military and its civilian partners within the United States government (USG) reach a new level of interagency jointness, at both the strategic and operational levels. Second, if properly resourced and supported, there are two prototype initiatives: the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), which demonstrate great potential to bridge the interagency gap at the operational level. Last, COCOMs need to improve their ability to leverage not only other elements of national power, but also the contributions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IO's).

The nature of war has evolved in the past generation and in many regions full-scale military confrontations with definable combat zones and easily identifiable combatants have been replaced by amorphous low-intensity conflicts in which battle-lines are often not clearly delineated. Nonmilitary personnel on both sides are involved and noncombatants are frequent casualties. Furthermore the drastic alterations to everyday life that take place during a full-scale war do not occur and civilian routines although often disturbed are maintained. The current intifada involving Israelis and Palestinians is frequently characterised as a low-intensity conflict in which there are explosive periods of violence followed by quiet intervals. During these lulls continuing verbal violence and political activities affect the relations of the two nations. The most devastating effect of the intifada has been a further deterioration in the relations between Arabs and Jews. Hatred and hostility have replaced the tenuous and tentative feelings of amity founded on the Oslo peace agreements; yet the two populations live entwined in the same geographical area. The antagonism between Israelis and Palestinians creates major challenges for health-care workers whose mission is to provide impartial and empathetic care to all. (excerpt)

This paper focuses on why France a country with tremendous advantages in resources and military strength was defeated by a group of poorly equipped and largely untrained Algerian insurgents who mainly operated in groups of ten to twenty men and probably never had over fifteen thousand active fighters inside the borders of Algeria. The crux of the issue is that France failed to understand the nature of the war and why the Algerians were fighting. This failure led the French to misidentify the Algerian strategic center of gravity and by their actions to make French centers of gravity, their legitimacy to rule and their will to fight vulnerable to attack. Demonstrated by analyzing French and Algerian will intelligence and civil-military relations.

Operational commanders have historically struggled to align the process of conflict termination with long-term national strategic objectives. In the Global War on Terror, this challenge is exacerbated as operational planners must design counterterrorist campaigns that simultaneously consider the elusive nature of transnational terrorist organizations and the underlying causes for the creation of failed states that support such organizations. Cost-benefit analysis and negotiation, key concepts in theoretical conflict termination literature, are demonstrated to offer limited applicability to counterterrorist campaigns. Considerations for conflict termination in low intensity conflict are explored as a theoretical substitute for the post-conflict operations ongoing in Afghanistan. The limitations of joint doctrine in this area, although much improved in the last decade, are highlighted, with recommendations for increased emphasis on leverage in the post-conflict phase, when security and stabilization operations predominate. Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan is analyzed with due consideration for the national-strategic objective. The need to achieve leverage during post-conflict operations is considered paramount, and must be considered in conjunction with the primary objectives of the decisive operations phase.

Military medicine is the development within the art and science which is designed to carry out a specialized, essential and a highly significant mission under the adverse conditions of war. Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a mode of warfare which has come to stay and the Indian Military has to confront it as such. It is a campaign of nerves, less military and more psychological, with soldiers inevitably fighting with hands behind their back. The dichotomy the soldier faces, results in high levels of frustration leading to various stress disorders. The key in casualty survival lies in correct and timely psychological first-aid for which every section and platoon commander should be trained. Post Trauma Stress Disorder caused as a result of traumatic experience can deplete unit's efficiency and therefore needs monitoring for early detection and treatment. Evolving medical strategies for Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO), therefore assumes significance.

The establishment of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in the late 1980's created a single command designed to correct serious deficiencies in the ability of the United States to conduct special operations and engage in low-intensity conflict. Among other things, the creation of USSOCOM intended to correct problems associated with the command and control of Special Operations Forces (SOF). However, these command and control problems still exist today. Recent contingency operations in Afghanistan and the Philippines have shown the command and control difficulties with SOF. The command and control structure established for Task Force DAGGER was ad hoc in nature and did not follow current doctrine. Although not perfect, the C2 structure established for Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines followed current doctrine and proved much easier to work with. Current doctrine is a starting point for establishing command and control structures and combatant commanders should follow this doctrine when establishing lines of command. Creating a Standing Joint Task Force is not the way for combatant commanders to establish their staffs. In contrast, this paper argues that the optimal C2 for SOF operations in the 21st century should be a blend of doctrine and practical lessons learned during recent combat operations.

U.S. military medical personnel have been assigned to Honduras since August 1983. While reserve components have 2-week assignments and Air Force medics receive 3-month assignments, U.S. Army medical personnel are assigned for 6-month tours. Duties include rendering medical care and air evacuation capability to all U.S. Forces in the Central American area of operations, conducting medical civic action programs termed MEDRETES, and assisting the host government in developing and conducting a health care system for indigent rural Hondurans. Gynecological care to women soldiers assigned to this low-intensity conflict environment and gynecological surgery capability for indigent Hondurans has been one important aspect of the military medical presence.

The findings of the paper's research indicate that the U.S. Army has undertaken a sweeping transformation that promises to create a force that will be prepared for a broad range of low intensity conflict (LIC) missions without having created the necessary LIC doctrine, a training plan that will produce the leaders required, or a culture that is willing to embrace the mission. The American way of war and our historic aversion to low intensity conflict are players in this oversight. Recent events have forced an awakening in our Army. The need for transformation has been made apparent. Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo are cases in point. The Army's efforts to adjust can be traced back to CSA Meyer and the High Technology Light Division (HTLD). General Franks addressed the growing need for transformation in the early nineties. By the Kosovo deployment in 1999, there were few demurrers to CSA Shinseki's transformation. Although a grand ambition, the transformation force is being built without capstone doctrine. The new FMs, although very promising, have not been published and the efforts at Ft. Lewis to produce TTP are not synchronized with Ft. Leavenworth's capstone doctrine. The education and training required to produce this network centric force is not yet clearly envisioned. Moreover, the culture of the Army has not yet been transformed to embrace this bold new world. Time remains, but the Army must act fast.

As the United States enters the twenty-first century, the National Security Strategy depends more on the Reserve Components than it ever has in the past. Friction between the Active Army and Reserve Components, particularly the Army National Guard, has reached its peak and is now showing evidence of healing. However, the process is far from being released from intensive care and becoming the cohesive team that the nation will need in the future. Combat readiness of both Army and Army National Guard units has been the theme of countless debates and professional opinions. How to measure that readiness draws further discussion and criticism from military professionals and elected officials alike. Readiness, force structure, allocation of resources and their equitable balance between the Active and Reserve components are critical elements in meeting guidance of the Army's Chief of Staff in becoming "The Army". However, the most difficult bridge to cross is the one that spans the cultural gap between these organizations and their leadership. This paper will examine the cultural division and its perceived causes as it relates to the four major measured areas of readiness. The focused areas will be those used in the current Army readiness reporting as in accordance with Army Regulations 220-1. It will also consider current missions and operational tempo rates assigned to both the Active and Reserve components and explore possible reassignments of these missions and roles.

The world in 1999 is a rapidly changing place. Regional conflict based on ethnic, religious, cultural and economic differences is increasing because of a lack of superpower containment. The number of regional powers involved in these conflicts and the strength of their military forces is increasing because of the economic gains these nations have enjoyed from an improved world economy. Improved weapons technology is providing very precise weapons with increased ranges to whoever can afford them and improved information technology is permitting enhanced battlefield situational awareness that allows a commander to act and apply combat power faster than an opponent. The Government has adopted the policy of engagement to counter these many conflicts while they are still manageable and maintain U.S. leadership. To execute the policy of engagement while recognizing that all U.S. military forces have been significantly downsized, the National Military Strategy (NMS) requires that U.S. forces be multi-mission capable, meaning that forces should be trained, armed, and equipped to operate across the full spectrum conflict. The NMS also requires that U.S. forces be lethal so that U.S. forces can defeat the potentially larger opponents that are likely to be involved in these regional conflicts. The light infantry division was created in 1984 in an effort to provide a more strategically deployable force and to address the increasing number of counter-insurgencies present in the 1980's. This was accomplished by reducing the number and size of mobility and firepower assets in the division to the bare minimum that was thought to be required for operations in low intensity conflict. These reductions have reduce the division's mobility because now only one battalion out of nine can move faster than four kilometers an hour through the use of the divisions lift aviation battalion.