1. The effect of state laws on capital structure
- Author
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Wald, John K. and Long, Michael S.
- Subjects
Capital structure -- Laws, regulations and rules ,Government regulation ,Banking, finance and accounting industries ,Business ,Economics - Abstract
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.10.008 Byline: John K. Wald (a), Michael S. Long (b) Keywords: Leverage; State laws; Profitability Abstract: US manufacturing firms incorporated in states with stronger payout restrictions use less debt, while antitakeover statutes do not significantly reduce long-run leverage. Correcting for the endogenously determined choice of where to incorporate, we find that firms sort themselves according to state laws and capital structure needs. After accounting for self-selection, state antitakeover laws are positively associated with debt as a fraction of market value, possibly due to lower market values for these firms. Payout restrictions appear to reduce leverage for firms that have not reincorporated outside their home states. These constraints explain part of the negative relation between profitability and leverage. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Finance, College of Business Administration, The University of Texas at San Antonio, One UTSA Circle, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA (b) Department of Finance, Rutgers Business School, Newark and New Brunswick, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ 07102, USA Article History: Received 2 August 2005; Revised 20 October 2005; Accepted 28 October 2005 Article Note: (footnote) [star] The authors would like to thank Ivan Brick, Matthew Clayton, Dhammika Dharmapala, David Haushalter, Laura Field, Michelle Lowry, Ileen Malitz, Dalia Marciukaityte, Fernando Zapatero, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at Moodys and at the 2004 Southern Finance Association meetings for comments on earlier drafts. The authors also thank the Whitcomb Center at Rutgers University for data support.
- Published
- 2007