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ABSTRACT The aim of this study is to develop of a new binder using entirely by-products for a production of CLSM. The new cementless binder, tentatively named Fa-RmLG, was made [...]

ABSTRACT This paper presents the results of the strength development and macrostructure properties of soft dredged clay stabilized with basic oxygen furnace steel (BOS) slag, using the vane shear test, [...]

This paper evaluates the unconfined compressive strength ([q.sub.u]) and stiffness ([G.sub.0]) of marine dredged clay treated by ordinary Portland cement. Although the cement-treated marine dredged clays have been used as filling materials for construction or reclamation, many of previous studies were more applicable to soft foundation improvement methods such as deep cement mixing and jet grouting. This study aims to investigate how the [q.sub.u] and [G.sub.0] of cement-treated marine dredged clay vary with water and cement contents at various curing times and to observe the relationship of the [q.sub.u] and [G.sub.0]. A series of unconfined compression and bender element tests were carried out for cement-treated Tokuyama dredged clay with different values of water and cement contents at various curing times, ranging from 5 h to 90 days and the relationship between the [q.sub.u] and [G.sub.0] was examined. Specific volume normalized by that at liquid limit were applied to facilitate parametric study. The study revealed that the behavior of [q.sub.u] with curing time are closely similar to that of [G.sub.0], and a trend of development of [q.sub.u] and [G.sub.0] change before and after 3 days of curing time. The [q.sub.u] and [G.sub.0] can be correlated with the normalized specific volume. The [q.sub.u] and [G.sub.0] exhibits a linear relationship for the curing time. Based on these results, the empirical equations for estimating [q.sub.u] are proposed using [G.sub.0] estimation equations and the relation between [q.sub.u] and [G.sub.0]. In addition, the applicability of formulas based on the relation of [q.sub.u] and [G.sub.0] was evaluated using the relation of [G.sub.0] and secant modulus ([E.sub.50]). It was confirmed that the [G.sub.0] can successfully describe the improvement effect of cement-treated marine dredged clay and can be used to effectively predict the [q.sub.u] using the proposed formulas. Keywords: Dredged marine clay Bender element test Unconfined compressive strength Stiffness Specific volume Secant modulus, 1. Introduction Every year in Japan, large amounts of clayey sediment soil that are deposited on the bottom of the sea are dredged to maintain ports and waterways [21]. Since [...]

ABSTRACT Coal ash generated from the combustion process of thermal power plants and excavated soil from construction sites in Jeolla Province (South Korea) have significant environmental and economic impacts. The [...]

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.01.009 Byline: Seoungpil Ahn (a), Pornsit Jiraporn (b)(c), Young Sang Kim (d) Keywords: Multiple directorships; Agency theory; Board appointments; Mergers and acquisitions Abstract: This paper examines the impact of multiple directorships on stockholder wealth around the announcements of mergers and acquisitions. Grounded in agency theory, we argue that multiple directorships affect the quality of managerial oversight and thus influence agency conflicts in acquisition decisions. We show that acquiring firms where directors hold more outside board seats experience more negative abnormal returns. This adverse effect, nonetheless, does not extend across the entire range of multiple directorships. Rather, the detrimental impact is significant only when the number of outside board seats surpasses a certain threshold. We interpret this result as suggesting that directors serving on multiple boards allow value-destroying acquisitions when they become too busy beyond a certain point, and the effect of directors' busyness on acquisition performance appears to be nonlinear. We employ several alternative definitions of directors' busyness and obtain consistent results. Author Affiliation: (a) Sogang Business School, Sogang University, Republic of Korea (b) Great Valley School of Graduate Professional Studies, Pennsylvania State University, USA (c) Thammasat Business School, Thammasat University, Thailand (d) Haile/US Bank College of Business, Northern Kentucky University, USA Article History: Received 8 February 2009; Accepted 14 January 2010 Article Note: (footnote) [star] We thank Yong-Cheol Kim, Vassil Mihov, Imants Paeglis, Mark D. Walker, seminar participants at the National University of Singapore, the FMA annual conference 2007 at Orlando, and the Asian FMA/NFA 2008 at Yokohama, and the anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.08.005 Byline: Pornsit Jiraporn (a), Young Sang Kim (b), Wallace N. Davidson (c), Manohar Singh (d) Keywords: Diversification; Corporate governance; Shareholder rights Abstract: Grounded in agency theory, this study investigates how the strength of shareholder rights influences the extent of firm diversification and the excess value attributable to diversification. The empirical evidence reveals that the strength of shareholder rights is inversely related to the probability to diversify. Furthermore, firms where shareholder rights are more suppressed by restrictive corporate governance suffer a deeper diversification discount. Specifically, we document a 1.1-1.4% decline in firm value for each additional governance provision imposed on shareholders. An explicit distinction is made between global and industrial diversification. Our results support agency theory as an explanation for the value reduction in diversified firms. The evidence in favor of agency theory appears to be more pronounced for industrial diversification than for global diversification. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Texas A&M International University, Laredo, TX 78041, United States (b) Department of Economics and Finance, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, KY 41099, United States (c) Department of Finance, College of Business and Administration, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, United States (d) Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University, Salem, United States Article History: Received 22 September 2004; Accepted 29 August 2005