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The changeover from coal to oil propulsion in the world’s navies in the period of the First World War has been treated by many historians largely as a straightforward efficiency exercise in adopting new technology. This article assesses the issues of coal through analysis of the problems related to ship operations which were encountered with manpower, ship design, and coal supply. It argues that the demise of coal became likely through the introduction of turbine propulsion, which gave warships for the first time real potential to achieve and maintain high speeds. It then became unavoidable when the limitations inherent in coal firing became obvious in the context of global, long-range operations and a threat environment that included the submarine and which required surface ships to maintain much higher speeds at sea for vastly more extended periods than they had prior to 1914.

The changes in Britain’s strategic situation, and thus defence and foreign policy, caused by the transition from coal to oil for were nothing short of profound. Before oil, Britain provided the glo...

The Royal Navy experienced many unpleasant surprises in the opening months of the First World War. Too many preconceptions were based upon the expectation of a short war, an outlook encouraged by the relative brevity of pre-war manoeuvres and a desire to avoid risk. The absence of a fleet-onfleet encounter in the opening days of the conflict soon created significant pressures on ships and people. The navy was not used to continuous high-speed steaming and the unremitting demands placed upon seagoing personnel, including the heavy labour of repeated coaling. For a fleet poorly provided with bases and repair facilities in the North Sea, the reality of the submarine threat was also very different to what had been expected. This paper analyses both the situation in which the British found themselves and the reasons behind it.

In early 1949, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) suffered a succession 'of mass insubordination'. A commission of inquiry followed, which produced an extraordinarily wide ranging assessment of the culture of the RCN and what needed to be done to improve the service. Much of what came to be called the 'Mainguy Report' was good, but it is clear in retrospect that many of its conclusions, were driven by the powerful influence of a French-Canadian naval volunteer reserve officer, Louis Audette. His personal perspective of war service and his own interactions with the British Royal Navy profoundly coloured his own outlook and progressively that of the commission, including Rear-Admiral Mainguy who was the chair. Audette was in civilian life a lawyer and on his own testimony, he put his skills of argument and persuasion to determined use to drive the commissioners to the conclusions he wanted. Keywords: British Royal Navy; Louis Audette; Mainguy Report; Rear-Admiral Mainguy; Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)