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Background SARS-CoV-2 dynamics are driven by human behaviour. Social contact data are of utmost importance in the context of transmission models of close-contact infections. Methods Using online representative panels of adults reporting on their own behaviour as well as parents reporting on the behaviour of one of their children, we collect contact mixing (CoMix) behaviour in various phases of the COVID-19 pandemic in over 20 European countries. We provide these timely, repeated observations using an online platform: SOCRATES-CoMix. In addition to providing cleaned datasets to researchers, the platform allows users to extract contact matrices that can be stratified by age, type of day, intensity of the contact and gender. These observations provide insights on the relative impact of recommended or imposed social distance measures on contacts and can inform mathematical models on epidemic spread. Conclusion These data provide essential information for policymakers to balance non-pharmaceutical interventions, economic activity, mental health and wellbeing, during vaccine rollout.

Background To reduce the coronavirus disease burden in England, along with many other countries, the government implemented a package of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) that have also impacted other transmissible infectious diseases such as norovirus. It is unclear what future norovirus disease incidence is likely to look like upon lifting these restrictions. Methods Here we use a mathematical model of norovirus fitted to community incidence data in England to project forward expected incidence based on contact surveys that have been collected throughout 2020–2021. Results We report that susceptibility to norovirus infection has likely increased between March 2020 and mid-2021. Depending upon assumptions of future contact patterns incidence of norovirus that is similar to pre-pandemic levels or an increase beyond what has been previously reported is likely to occur once restrictions are lifted. Should adult contact patterns return to 80% of pre-pandemic levels, the incidence of norovirus will be similar to previous years. If contact patterns return to pre-pandemic levels, there is a potential for the expected annual incidence to be up to 2-fold larger than in a typical year. The age-specific incidence is similar across all ages. Conclusions Continued national surveillance for endemic diseases such as norovirus will be essential after NPIs are lifted to allow healthcare services to adequately prepare for a potential increase in cases and hospital pressures beyond what is typically experienced.

Background: National immunisation programmes globally are at risk of suspension due to the severe health system constraints and physical distancing measures in place to mitigate the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. We aimed to compare the health benefits of sustaining routine childhood immunisation in Africa with the risk of acquiring severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection through visiting routine vaccination service delivery points. Methods: We considered a high-impact scenario and a low-impact scenario to approximate the child deaths that could be caused by immunisation coverage reductions during COVID-19 outbreaks. In the high-impact scenario, we used previously reported country-specific child mortality impact estimates of childhood immunisation for diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenzae type b, Streptococcus pneumoniae, rotavirus, measles, meningitis A, rubella, and yellow fever to approximate the future deaths averted before 5 years of age by routine childhood vaccination during a 6-month COVID-19 risk period without catch-up campaigns. In the low-impact scenario, we approximated the health benefits of sustaining routine childhood immunisation on only the child deaths averted from measles outbreaks during the COVID-19 risk period. We assumed that contact-reducing interventions flattened the outbreak curve during the COVID-19 risk period, that 60% of the population will have been infected by the end of that period, that children can be infected by either vaccinators or during transport, and that upon child infection the whole household will be infected. Country-specific household age structure estimates and age-dependent infection-fatality rates were applied to calculate the number of deaths attributable to the vaccination clinic visits. We present benefit–risk ratios for routine childhood immunisation, with 95% uncertainty intervals (UIs) from a probabilistic sensitivity analysis. Findings: In the high-impact scenario, for every one excess COVID-19 death attributable to SARS-CoV-2 infections acquired during routine vaccination clinic visits, 84 (95% UI 14–267) deaths in children could be prevented by sustaining routine childhood immunisation in Africa. The benefit–risk ratio for the vaccinated children is 85 000 (4900–546 000), for their siblings (60 years) is 96 (14–307). In the low-impact scenario that approximates the health benefits to only the child deaths averted from measles outbreaks, the benefit–risk ratio to the households of vaccinated children is 3 (0–10); if the risk to only the vaccinated children is considered, the benefit–risk ratio is 3000 (182–21 000). Interpretation: The deaths prevented by sustaining routine childhood immunisation in Africa outweigh the excess risk of COVID-19 deaths associated with vaccination clinic visits, especially for the vaccinated children. Routine childhood immunisation should be sustained in Africa as much as possible, while considering other factors such as logistical constraints, staff shortages, and reallocation of resources during the COVID-19 pandemic. Funding: Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Background To contain the spread of COVID-19, a cordon sanitaire was put in place in Wuhan prior to the Lunar New Year, on 23 January 2020. We assess the efficacy of the cordon sanitaire to delay the introduction and onset of local transmission of COVID-19 in other major cities in mainland China. Methods We estimated the number of infected travellers from Wuhan to other major cities in mainland China from November 2019 to February 2020 using previously estimated COVID-19 prevalence in Wuhan and publicly available mobility data. We focused on Beijing, Chongqing, Hangzhou, and Shenzhen as four representative major cities to identify the potential independent contribution of the cordon sanitaire and holiday travel. To do this, we simulated outbreaks generated by infected arrivals in these destination cities using stochastic branching processes. We also modelled the effect of the cordon sanitaire in combination with reduced transmissibility scenarios to simulate the effect of local non-pharmaceutical interventions. Results We find that in the four cities, given the potentially high prevalence of COVID-19 in Wuhan between December 2019 and early January 2020, local transmission may have been seeded as early as 1–8 January 2020. By the time the cordon sanitaire was imposed, infections were likely in the thousands. The cordon sanitaire alone did not substantially affect the epidemic progression in these cities, although it may have had some effect in smaller cities. Reduced transmissibility resulted in a notable decrease in the incidence of infection in the four studied cities. Conclusions Our results indicate that sustained transmission was likely occurring several weeks prior to the implementation of the cordon sanitaire in four major cities of mainland China and that the observed decrease in incidence was likely attributable to other non-pharmaceutical, transmission-reducing interventions.

Summary Many infection prevention and control (IPC) interventions have been adopted by hospitals to limit nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2. The aim of this systematic review is to identify evidence on the effectiveness of these interventions. We conducted a literature search of five databases (OVID MEDLINE, Embase, CENTRAL, COVID-19 Portfolio(pre-print), Web of Science). SWIFT ActiveScreener software was used to screen English titles and abstracts published between 1st January 2020 and 6th April 2021. Intervention studies, defined by Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care, that evaluated IPC interventions with an outcome of SARS-CoV-2 infection in either patients or healthcare workers were included. Personal protective equipment (PPE) was excluded as this intervention had been previously reviewed. Risks of bias were assessed using the Cochrane tool for randomised trials (RoB2) and non-randomized studies of interventions (ROBINS-I). From 23,156 screened articles, we identified seven articles that met the inclusion criteria, all of which evaluated interventions to prevent infections in healthcare workers and the majority of which were focused on effectiveness of prophylaxes. Due to heterogeneity in interventions, we did not conduct a meta-analysis. All agents used for prophylaxes have little to no evidence of effectiveness against SARS-CoV-2 infections. We did not find any studies evaluating the effectiveness of interventions including but not limited to screening, isolation and improved ventilation. There is limited evidence from interventional studies, excluding PPE, evaluating IPC measures for SARS-CoV-2. This review calls for urgent action to implement such studies to inform policies to protect our most vulnerable populations and healthcare workers.

As the new school year begins in the United States, school districts will be tasked with providing in-person teaching while keeping children and school staff safe, an increasingly difficult goal in the presence of the COVID-19 delta variant. We aim to provide updated interpretations of past and newly published studies to assist in assessing risk in schools, and to add additional perspectives on addressing the social determinants of learning and on the role of race and other social factors. We advocate for the continued implementation of risk mitigation strategies in schools, including mandatory mask policies, improved ventilation, and convenient access to vaccinations for those eligible, as recommended by the CDC, and to use this opportunity to make long-term improvements to our schools as a matter of urgency.

BackgroundTo reduce the coronavirus disease burden in England, along with many other countries, the Government implemented a package of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) that have also impacted other transmissible infectious diseases such as norovirus. It is unclear what future norovirus disease incidence is likely to look like upon lifting these restrictions.MethodsHere we use a mathematical model of norovirus fitted to community incidence data in England to project forward expected incidence based on contact surveys that have been collected throughout 2020-2021.ResultsWe report that susceptibility to norovirus infection has likely increased between March 2020 to mid-2021. Depending upon assumptions of future contact patterns incidence of norovirus that is similar to pre-pandemic levels or an increase beyond what has been previously reported is likely to occur once restrictions are lifted. Should adult contact patterns return to 80% of pre-pandemic levels the incidence of norovirus will be similar to previous years. If contact patterns return to pre-pandemic levels there is a potential for the expected annual incidence to be up to 2-fold larger than in a typical year. The age-specific incidence is similar across all ages.ConclusionsContinued national surveillance for endemic diseases such as norovirus will be essential after NPIs are lifted to allow healthcare services to adequately prepare for a potential increase in cases and hospital pressures beyond what is typically experienced.

In early 2020 many countries closed schools to mitigate the spread of SARS-CoV-2. Since then, governments have sought to relax the closures, engendering a need to understand associated risks. Using address records, we construct a network of schools in England connected through pupils who share households. We evaluate the risk of transmission between schools under different reopening scenarios. We show that whilst reopening select year-groups causes low risk of large-scale transmission, reopening secondary schools could result in outbreaks affecting up to 2.5 million households if unmitigated, highlighting the importance of careful monitoring and within-school infection control to avoid further school closures or other restrictions., Many countries have closed schools as part of their COVID-19 response. Here, the authors model SARS-CoV-2 transmission on a network of schools and households in England, and find that risk of transmission between schools is lower if primary schools are open than if secondary schools are open.

Background England’s COVID-19 response transitioned from a national lockdown to localised interventions. In response to rising cases, these were supplemented by national restrictions on contacts (the Rule of Six), then 10 pm closing for bars and restaurants, and encouragement to work from home. These were quickly followed by a 3-tier system applying different restrictions in different localities. As cases continued to rise, a second national lockdown was declared. We used a national survey to quantify the impact of these restrictions on epidemiologically relevant contacts. Methods We compared paired measures on setting-specific contacts before and after each restriction started and tested for differences using paired permutation tests on the mean change in contacts and the proportion of individuals decreasing their contacts. Results Following the imposition of each measure, individuals tended to report fewer contacts than they had before. However, the magnitude of the changes was relatively small and variable. For instance, although early closure of bars and restaurants appeared to have no measurable effect on contacts, the work from home directive reduced mean daily work contacts by 0.99 (95% confidence interval CI] 0.03–1.94), and the Rule of Six reduced non-work and school contacts by a mean of 0.25 (0.01–0.5) per day. Whilst Tier 3 appeared to also reduce non-work and school contacts, the evidence for an effect of the lesser restrictions (Tiers 1 and 2) was much weaker. There may also have been some evidence of saturation of effects, with those who were in Tier 1 (least restrictive) reducing their contacts markedly when they entered lockdown, which was not reflected in similar changes in those who were already under tighter restrictions (Tiers 2 and 3). Conclusions The imposition of various local and national measures in England during the summer and autumn of 2020 has gradually reduced contacts. However, these changes are smaller than the initial lockdown in March. This may partly be because many individuals were already starting from a lower number of contacts.

Objective To provide global, regional, and national estimates of target population sizes for coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19) vaccination to inform country specific immunisation strategies on a global scale. Design Descriptive study. Setting 194 member states of the World Health Organization. Population Target populations for covid-19 vaccination based on country specific characteristics and vaccine objectives (maintaining essential core societal services; reducing severe covid-19; reducing symptomatic infections and stopping virus transmission). Main outcome measure Size of target populations for covid-19 vaccination. Estimates use country specific data on population sizes stratified by occupation, age, risk factors for covid-19 severity, vaccine acceptance, and global vaccine production. These data were derived from a multipronged search of official websites, media sources, and academic journal articles. Results Target population sizes for covid-19 vaccination vary markedly by vaccination goal and geographical region. Differences in demographic structure, presence of underlying conditions, and number of essential workers lead to highly variable estimates of target populations at regional and country levels. In particular, Europe has the highest share of essential workers (63.0 million, 8.9%) and people with underlying conditions (265.9 million, 37.4%); these two categories are essential in maintaining societal functions and reducing severe covid-19, respectively. In contrast, South East Asia has the highest share of healthy adults (777.5 million, 58.9%), a key target for reducing community transmission. Vaccine hesitancy will probably impact future covid-19 vaccination programmes; based on a literature review, 68.4% (95% confidence interval 64.2% to 72.6%) of the global population is willing to receive covid-19 vaccination. Therefore, the adult population willing to be vaccinated is estimated at 3.7 billion (95% confidence interval 3.2 to 4.1 billion). Conclusions The distribution of target groups at country and regional levels highlights the importance of designing an equitable and efficient plan for vaccine prioritisation and allocation. Each country should evaluate different strategies and allocation schemes based on local epidemiology, underlying population health, projections of available vaccine doses, and preference for vaccination strategies that favour direct or indirect benefits.

Background To mitigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks from international air travellers, many countries implemented a combination of up to 14 days of self-quarantine upon arrival plus PCR testing in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Aim To assess the effectiveness of quarantine and testing of international travellers to reduce risk of onward SARS-CoV-2 transmission into a destination country in the pre-COVID-19 vaccination era. Methods We used a simulation model of air travellers arriving in the United Kingdom from the European Union or the United States, incorporating timing of infection stages while varying quarantine duration and timing and number of PCR tests. Results Quarantine upon arrival with a PCR test on day 7 plus a 1-day delay for results can reduce the number of infectious arriving travellers released into the community by a median 94% (95% uncertainty interval (UI): 89–98) compared with a no quarantine/no test scenario. This reduction is similar to that achieved by a 14-day quarantine period (median > 99%; 95% UI: 98–100). Even shorter quarantine periods can prevent a substantial amount of transmission; all strategies in which travellers spend at least 5 days (mean incubation period) in quarantine and have at least one negative test before release are highly effective (median reduction 89%; 95% UI: 83–95)). Conclusion The effect of different screening strategies impacts asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals differently. The choice of an optimal quarantine and testing strategy for unvaccinated air travellers may vary based on the number of possible imported infections relative to domestic incidence.

Background Epidemics of infectious disease occur frequently in low-income and humanitarian settings and pose a serious threat to populations. However, relatively little is known about responses to these epidemics. Robust evaluations can generate evidence on response efforts and inform future improvements. This systematic review aimed to (i) identify epidemics reported in low-income and crisis settings, (ii) determine the frequency with which evaluations of responses to these epidemics were conducted, (iii) describe the main typologies of evaluations undertaken and (iv) identify key gaps and strengths of recent evaluation practice. Methods Reported epidemics were extracted from the following sources: World Health Organization Disease Outbreak News (WHO DON), UNICEF Cholera platform, Reliefweb, PROMED and Global Incidence Map. A systematic review for evaluation reports was conducted using the MEDLINE, EMBASE, Global Health, Web of Science, WPRIM, Reliefweb, PDQ Evidence and CINAHL Plus databases, complemented by grey literature searches using Google and Google Scholar. Evaluation records were quality-scored and linked to epidemics based on time and place. The time period for the review was 2010–2019. Results A total of 429 epidemics were identified, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. A total of 15,424 potential evaluations records were screened, 699 assessed for eligibility and 132 included for narrative synthesis. Only one tenth of epidemics had a corresponding response evaluation. Overall, there was wide variability in the quality, content as well as in the disease coverage of evaluation reports. Conclusion The current state of evaluations of responses to these epidemics reveals large gaps in coverage and quality and bears important implications for health equity and accountability to affected populations. The limited availability of epidemic response evaluations prevents improvements to future public health response. The diversity of emphasis and methods of available evaluations limits comparison across responses and time. In order to improve future response and save lives, there is a pressing need to develop a standardized and practical approach as well as governance arrangements to ensure the systematic conduct of epidemic response evaluations in low-income and crisis settings.

Summary: Background: In most countries, contacts of confirmed COVID-19 cases are asked to quarantine for 14 days after exposure to limit asymptomatic onward transmission. While theoretically effective, this policy places a substantial social and economic burden on both the individual and wider society, which might result in low adherence and reduced policy effectiveness. We aimed to assess the merit of testing contacts to avert onward transmission and to replace or reduce the length of quarantine for uninfected contacts. Methods: We used an agent-based model to simulate the viral load dynamics of exposed contacts, and their potential for onward transmission in different quarantine and testing strategies. We compared the performance of quarantines of differing durations, testing with either PCR or lateral flow antigen (LFA) tests at the end of quarantine, and daily LFA testing without quarantine, against the current 14-day quarantine strategy. We also investigated the effect of contact tracing delays and adherence to both quarantine and self-isolation on the effectiveness of each strategy. Findings: Assuming moderate levels of adherence to quarantine and self-isolation, self-isolation on symptom onset alone can prevent 37% (95% uncertainty interval [UI] 12–56) of onward transmission potential from secondary cases. 14 days of post-exposure quarantine reduces transmission by 59% (95% UI 28–79). Quarantine with release after a negative PCR test 7 days after exposure might avert a similar proportion (54%, 95% UI 31–81; risk ratio [RR] 0·94, 95% UI 0·62–1·24) to that of the 14-day quarantine period, as would quarantine with a negative LFA test 7 days after exposure (50%, 95% UI 28–77; RR 0·88, 0·66–1·11) or daily testing without quarantine for 5 days after tracing (50%, 95% UI 23–81; RR 0·88, 0·60–1·43) if all tests are returned negative. A stronger effect might be possible if individuals isolate more strictly after a positive test and if contacts can be notified faster. Interpretation: Testing might allow for a substantial reduction in the length of, or replacement of, quarantine with a small excess in transmission risk. Decreasing test and trace delays and increasing adherence will further increase the effectiveness of these strategies. Further research is required to empirically evaluate the potential costs (increased transmission risk, false reassurance) and benefits (reduction in the burden of quarantine, increased adherence) of such strategies before adoption as policy. Funding: National Institute for Health Research, UK Research and Innovation, Wellcome Trust, EU Horizon 2021, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Understanding changes in human mobility in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic is crucial for assessing the impacts of travel restrictions designed to reduce disease spread. Here, relying on data from mainland China, we investigate the spatio-temporal characteristics of human mobility between 1st January and 1st March 2020, and discuss their public health implications. An outbound travel surge from Wuhan before travel restrictions were implemented was also observed across China due to the Lunar New Year, indicating that holiday travel may have played a larger role in mobility changes compared to impending travel restrictions. Holiday travel also shifted healthcare pressure related to COVID-19 towards locations with lower healthcare capacity. Network analyses showed no sign of major changes in the transportation network after Lunar New Year. Changes observed were temporary and did not lead to structural reorganisation of the transportation network during the study period., COVID-19-related travel restrictions were imposed in China around the same time as major annual holiday migrations, with unknown combined impacts on mobility patterns. Here, the authors show that restructuring of the travel network in response to restrictions was temporary, whilst holiday-related travel increased pressure on healthcare services with lower capacity.

Case isolation and contact tracing can contribute to the control of COVID-19 outbreaks1,2. However, it remains unclear how real-world social networks could influence the effectiveness and efficiency of such approaches. To address this issue, we simulated control strategies for SARS-CoV-2 transmission in a real-world social network generated from high-resolution GPS data that were gathered in the course of a citizen-science experiment3,4. We found that tracing the contacts of contacts reduced the size of simulated outbreaks more than tracing of only contacts, but this strategy also resulted in almost half of the local population being quarantined at a single point in time. Testing and releasing non-infectious individuals from quarantine led to increases in outbreak size, suggesting that contact tracing and quarantine might be most effective as a 'local lockdown' strategy when contact rates are high. Finally, we estimated that combining physical distancing with contact tracing could enable epidemic control while reducing the number of quarantined individuals. Our findings suggest that targeted tracing and quarantine strategies would be most efficient when combined with other control measures such as physical distancing.

Background The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted routine measles immunisation and supplementary immunisation activities (SIAs) in most countries including Kenya. We assessed the risk of measles outbreaks during the pandemic in Kenya as a case study for the African Region. Methods Combining measles serological data, local contact patterns, and vaccination coverage into a cohort model, we predicted the age-adjusted population immunity in Kenya and estimated the probability of outbreaks when contact-reducing COVID-19 interventions are lifted. We considered various scenarios for reduced measles vaccination coverage from April 2020. Results In February 2020, when a scheduled SIA was postponed, population immunity was close to the herd immunity threshold and the probability of a large outbreak was 34% (8–54). As the COVID-19 contact restrictions are nearly fully eased, from December 2020, the probability of a large measles outbreak will increase to 38% (19–54), 46% (30–59), and 54% (43–64) assuming a 15%, 50%, and 100% reduction in measles vaccination coverage. By December 2021, this risk increases further to 43% (25–56), 54% (43–63), and 67% (59–72) for the same coverage scenarios respectively. However, the increased risk of a measles outbreak following the lifting of all restrictions can be overcome by conducting a SIA with ≥ 95% coverage in under-fives. Conclusion While contact restrictions sufficient for SAR-CoV-2 control temporarily reduce measles transmissibility and the risk of an outbreak from a measles immunity gap, this risk rises rapidly once these restrictions are lifted. Implementing delayed SIAs will be critical for prevention of measles outbreaks given the roll-back of contact restrictions in Kenya.

Background: \ud The risk of severe COVID-19 if an individual becomes infected is known to be higher in older individuals and those with underlying health conditions. Understanding the number of individuals at increased risk of severe COVID-19 and how this varies between countries should inform the design of possible strategies to shield or vaccinate those at highest risk.\ud \ud Methods: \ud We estimated the number of individuals at increased risk of severe disease (defined as those with at least one condition listed as “at increased risk of severe COVID-19” in current guidelines) by age (5-year age groups), sex, and country for 188 countries using prevalence data from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2017 and UN population estimates for 2020. The list of underlying conditions relevant to COVID-19 was determined by mapping the conditions listed in GBD 2017 to those listed in guidelines published by WHO and public health agencies in the UK and the USA. We analysed data from two large multimorbidity studies to determine appropriate adjustment factors for clustering and multimorbidity. To help interpretation of the degree of risk among those at increased risk, we also estimated the number of individuals at high risk (defined as those that would require hospital admission if infected) using age-specific infection–hospitalisation ratios for COVID-19 estimated for mainland China and making adjustments to reflect country-specific differences in the prevalence of underlying conditions and frailty. We assumed males were twice at likely as females to be at high risk. We also calculated the number of individuals without an underlying condition that could be considered at increased risk because of their age, using minimum ages from 50 to 70 years. We generated uncertainty intervals (UIs) for our estimates by running low and high scenarios using the lower and upper 95% confidence limits for country population size, disease prevalences, multimorbidity fractions, and infection–hospitalisation ratios, and plausible low and high estimates for the degree of clustering, informed by multimorbidity studies.\ud \ud Findings: \ud We estimated that 1·7 billion (UI 1·0–2·4) people, comprising 22% (UI 15–28) of the global population, have at least one underlying condition that puts them at increased risk of severe COVID-19 if infected (ranging from 66% of those aged 70 years or older). We estimated that 349 million (186–787) people (4% [3–9] of the global population) are at high risk of severe COVID-19 and would require hospital admission if infected (ranging from

Summary Background Non-pharmaceutical interventions have been implemented to reduce transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in the UK. Projecting the size of an unmitigated epidemic and the potential effect of different control measures has been crucial to support evidence-based policy making during the early stages of the epidemic. This study assesses the potential impact of different control measures for mitigating the burden of COVID-19 in the UK. Methods We used a stochastic age-structured transmission model to explore a range of intervention scenarios, tracking 66·4 million people aggregated to 186 county-level administrative units in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The four base interventions modelled were school closures, physical distancing, shielding of people aged 70 years or older, and self-isolation of symptomatic cases. We also modelled the combination of these interventions, as well as a programme of intensive interventions with phased lockdown-type restrictions that substantially limited contacts outside of the home for repeated periods. We simulated different triggers for the introduction of interventions, and estimated the impact of varying adherence to interventions across counties. For each scenario, we projected estimated new cases over time, patients requiring inpatient and critical care (ie, admission to the intensive care units [ICU]) treatment, and deaths, and compared the effect of each intervention on the basic reproduction number, R0. Findings We projected a median unmitigated burden of 23 million (95% prediction interval 13–30) clinical cases and 350 000 deaths (170 000–480 000) due to COVID-19 in the UK by December, 2021. We found that the four base interventions were each likely to decrease R0, but not sufficiently to prevent ICU demand from exceeding health service capacity. The combined intervention was more effective at reducing R0, but only lockdown periods were sufficient to bring R0 near or below 1; the most stringent lockdown scenario resulted in a projected 120 000 cases (46 000–700 000) and 50 000 deaths (9300–160 000). Intensive interventions with lockdown periods would need to be in place for a large proportion of the coming year to prevent health-care demand exceeding availability. Interpretation The characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 mean that extreme measures are probably required to bring the epidemic under control and to prevent very large numbers of deaths and an excess of demand on hospital beds, especially those in ICUs. Funding Medical Research Council.

BackgroundNon-pharmaceutical interventions have been implemented to reduce transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the UK. Projecting the size of an unmitigated epidemic and the potential effect of different control measures has been critical to support evidence-based policymaking during the early stages of the epidemic.MethodsWe used a stochastic age-structured transmission model to explore a range of intervention scenarios, including the introduction of school closures, social distancing, shielding of elderly groups, self-isolation of symptomatic cases, and extreme “lockdown”-type restrictions. We simulated different durations of interventions and triggers for introduction, as well as combinations of interventions. For each scenario, we projected estimated new cases over time, patients requiring inpatient and critical care (intensive care unit, ICU) treatment, and deaths.FindingsWe found that mitigation measures aimed at reducing transmission would likely have decreased the reproduction number, but not sufficiently to prevent ICU demand from exceeding NHS availability. To keep ICU bed demand below capacity in the model, more extreme restrictions were necessary. In a scenario where “lockdown”-type interventions were put in place to reduce transmission, these interventions would need to be in place for a large proportion of the coming year in order to prevent healthcare demand exceeding availability.InterpretationThe characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 mean that extreme measures are likely required to bring the epidemic under control and to prevent very large numbers of deaths and an excess of demand on hospital beds, especially those in ICUs.Research in ContextEvidence before this studyAs countries have moved from early containment efforts to planning for the introduction of large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions to control COVID-19 outbreaks, epidemic modelling studies have explored the potential for extensive social distancing measures to curb transmission. However, it remains unclear how different combinations of interventions, timings, and triggers for the introduction and lifting of control measures may affect the impact of the epidemic on health services, and what the range of uncertainty associated with these estimates would be.Added value of this studyUsing a stochastic, age-structured epidemic model, we explored how eight different intervention scenarios could influence the number of new cases and deaths, as well as intensive care beds required over the projected course of the epidemic. We also assessed the potential impact of local versus national targeting of interventions, reduction in leisure events, impact of increased childcare by grandparents, and timing of triggers for different control measures. We simulated multiple realisations for each scenario to reflect uncertainty in possible epidemic trajectories.Implications of all the available evidenceOur results support early modelling findings, and subsequent empirical observations, that in the absence of control measures, a COVID-19 epidemic could quickly overwhelm a healthcare system. We found that even a combination of moderate interventions – such as school closures, shielding of older groups and self-isolation – would be unlikely to prevent an epidemic that would far exceed available ICU capacity in the UK. Intermittent periods of more intensive lockdown-type measures are predicted to be effective for preventing the healthcare system from being overwhelmed.

Summary Background Isolation of cases and contact tracing is used to control outbreaks of infectious diseases, and has been used for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Whether this strategy will achieve control depends on characteristics of both the pathogen and the response. Here we use a mathematical model to assess if isolation and contact tracing are able to control onwards transmission from imported cases of COVID-19. Methods We developed a stochastic transmission model, parameterised to the COVID-19 outbreak. We used the model to quantify the potential effectiveness of contact tracing and isolation of cases at controlling a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)-like pathogen. We considered scenarios that varied in the number of initial cases, the basic reproduction number (R0), the delay from symptom onset to isolation, the probability that contacts were traced, the proportion of transmission that occurred before symptom onset, and the proportion of subclinical infections. We assumed isolation prevented all further transmission in the model. Outbreaks were deemed controlled if transmission ended within 12 weeks or before 5000 cases in total. We measured the success of controlling outbreaks using isolation and contact tracing, and quantified the weekly maximum number of cases traced to measure feasibility of public health effort. Findings Simulated outbreaks starting with five initial cases, an R0 of 1·5, and 0% transmission before symptom onset could be controlled even with low contact tracing probability; however, the probability of controlling an outbreak decreased with the number of initial cases, when R0 was 2·5 or 3·5 and with more transmission before symptom onset. Across different initial numbers of cases, the majority of scenarios with an R0 of 1·5 were controllable with less than 50% of contacts successfully traced. To control the majority of outbreaks, for R0 of 2·5 more than 70% of contacts had to be traced, and for an R0 of 3·5 more than 90% of contacts had to be traced. The delay between symptom onset and isolation had the largest role in determining whether an outbreak was controllable when R0 was 1·5. For R0 values of 2·5 or 3·5, if there were 40 initial cases, contact tracing and isolation were only potentially feasible when less than 1% of transmission occurred before symptom onset. Interpretation In most scenarios, highly effective contact tracing and case isolation is enough to control a new outbreak of COVID-19 within 3 months. The probability of control decreases with long delays from symptom onset to isolation, fewer cases ascertained by contact tracing, and increasing transmission before symptoms. This model can be modified to reflect updated transmission characteristics and more specific definitions of outbreak control to assess the potential success of local response efforts. Funding Wellcome Trust, Global Challenges Research Fund, and Health Data Research UK.

BackgroundTo assess the viability of isolation and contact tracing to control onwards transmission from imported cases of 2019-nCoV.MethodsWe developed a stochastic transmission model, parameterised to the 2019-nCoV outbreak. We used the model to quantify the potential effectiveness of contact tracing and isolation of cases at controlling a 2019 nCoV-like pathogen. We considered scenarios that varied in: the number of initial cases; the basic reproduction number R0; the delay from symptom onset to isolation; the probability contacts were traced; the proportion of transmission that occurred before symptom onset, and the proportion of subclinical infections. We assumed isolation prevented all further transmission in the model. Outbreaks were deemed controlled if transmission ended within 12 weeks or before 5000 cases in total. We measured the success of controlling outbreaks using isolation and contact tracing, and quantified the weekly maximum number of cases traced to measure feasibility of public health effort.FindingsWhile simulated outbreaks starting with only 5 initial cases, R0 of 1.5 and little transmission before symptom onset could be controlled even with low contact tracing probability, the prospects of controlling an outbreak dramatically dropped with the number of initial cases, with higher R0, and with more transmission before symptom onset. Across different initial numbers of cases, the majority of scenarios with an R0 of 1.5 were controllable with under 50% of contacts successfully traced. For R0 of 2.5 and 3.5, more than 70% and 90% of contacts respectively had to be traced to control the majority of outbreaks. The delay between symptom onset and isolation played the largest role in determining whether an outbreak was controllable for lower values of R0. For higher values of R0 and a large initial number of cases, contact tracing and isolation was only potentially feasible when less than 1% of transmission occurred before symptom onset.InterpretationWe found that in most scenarios contact tracing and case isolation alone is unlikely to control a new outbreak of 2019-nCov within three months. The probability of control decreases with longer delays from symptom onset to isolation, fewer cases ascertained by contact tracing, and increasing transmission before symptoms. This model can be modified to reflect updated transmission characteristics and more specific definitions of outbreak control to assess the potential success of local response efforts.FundingWellcome Trust, Global Challenges Research Fund, and HDR UK.Research in ContextEvidence before this studyContact tracing and isolation of cases is a commonly used intervention for controlling infectious disease outbreaks. This intervention can be effective, but may require intensive public health effort and cooperation to effectively reach and monitor all contacts. When the pathogen has infectiousness before symptom onset, control of outbreaks using contact tracing and isolation is more challenging.Added value of this studyThis study uses a mathematical model to assess the feasibility of contact tracing and case isolation to control outbreaks of 2019-nCov, a newly emerged pathogen. We used disease transmission characteristics specific to the pathogen and therefore give the best available evidence if contact tracing and isolation can achieve control of outbreaks.Implications of all the available evidenceContact tracing and isolation may not contain outbreaks of 2019-nCoV unless very high levels of contact tracing are achieved. Even in this case, if there is asymptomatic transmission, or a high fraction of transmission before onset of symptoms, this strategy may not achieve control within three months.

To limit SARS-CoV-2 spread, quarantine and isolation are obligatory in several situations in Norway. We found low self-reported adherence to requested measures among 1,704 individuals (42%; 95% confidence interval: 37–48). Adherence was lower in May–June–July (33–38%) compared with April (66%), and higher among those experiencing COVID-19-compatible symptoms (71%) compared with those without (28%). These findings suggest that consideration is required of strategies to improve people’s adherence to quarantine and isolation.

BackgroundMany low- and middle-income countries have implemented control measures against coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). However, it is not clear to what extent these measures explain the low numbers of recorded COVID-19 cases and deaths in Africa. One of the main aims of control measures is to reduce respiratory pathogen transmission through direct contact with others. In this study we collect contact data from residents of informal settlements around Nairobi, Kenya to assess if control measures have changed contact patterns, and estimate the impact of changes on the basic reproduction number (R0).MethodsWe conducted a social contact survey with 213 residents of five informal settlements around Nairobi in early May 2020, four weeks after the Kenyan government introduced enhanced physical distancing measures and a curfew between 7pm and 5am. Respondents were asked to report all direct physical and non-physical contacts made the previous day, alongside a questionnaire asking about the social and economic impact of COVID-19 and control measures. We examined contact patterns by demographic factors, including socioeconomic status. We described the impact of COVID-19 and control measures on income and food security. We compared contact patterns during control measures to patterns from non-pandemic periods to estimate the change in R0.FindingsWe estimate that control measures reduced physical and non-physical contacts, reducing the R0 from around 2.6 to between 0.5 and 0.7, depending on the pre-COVID-19 comparison matrix used. Masks were worn by at least one person in 92% of contacts. Respondents in the poorest socioeconomic quintile reported 1.5 times more contacts than those in the richest. 86% of respondents reported a total or partial loss of income due to COVID-19, and 74% reported eating less or skipping meals due to having too little money for food.InterpretationCOVID-19 control measures have had a large impact on direct contacts and therefore transmission, but have also caused considerable economic and food insecurity. Reductions in R0 are consistent with the linear epidemic growth in Kenya and other sub-Saharan African countries that implemented similar, early control measures. However, negative and inequitable impacts on economic and food security may mean control measures are not sustainable in the longer term.Research in contextEvidence before this studyWe conducted a PubMed search on 6 June 2020 with no language restrictions for studies published since inception, using the search terms (“social mix*” OR “social cont*” OR “contact pattern*) AND (“covid*”). The search yielded 53 articles, two of which reported changes in social contacts after COVID-19 control measures. The first study reported changes in contact patterns in Wuhan and Shanghai, and the second changes in contact patterns in the UK. We found no studies examining changes in contact patterns due to control measures in sub-Saharan Africa, and no studies disaggregating contacts by socioeconomic status.Added value of this studyThis is the first study to estimate the reproduction number of COVID-19 under control measures in sub-Saharan Africa using primary contact data. This study also moves beyond existing work to i) measure contacts in densely populated informal settlements, ii) explore how social contacts vary across socioeconomic status, and iii) assess the impact of control measures on economic and food security in these areas.Implications of all the evidenceCOVID-19 control measures have substantially reduced social contacts and disease transmission. People of lower socioeconomic status face greater transmission risk as they report more contacts. Control measures have led to considerable economic and food insecurity, and may not be sustainable in the long term without efforts to reduce the burden of control measures on households.

Introduction: The progressive modular rebalancing (PMR) system is a comprehensive rehabilitation approach derived from proprioceptive neuromuscular facilitation principles. PMR training encourages focus on trunk and proximal muscle function through direct perception, strength, and stretching exercises and emphasizes bi-articular muscle function in the improvement of gait performance. Sensory cueing, such as visual cues (VC), is one of the more established techniques for gait rehabilitation in PD. In this study, we propose PMR combined with VC for improving gait performance, balance, and trunk control during gait in patients with PD. Our assumption herein was that the effect of VC may add to improved motor performance induced by the PMR treatment. The primary aim of this study was to evaluate whether the PMR system plus VC was a more effective treatment option than standard physiotherapy in improving gait function in patients with PD. The secondary aim of the study was to evaluate the effect of this treatment on motor function severity. Design: Two-center, randomized, controlled, observer-blind, crossover study with a 4-month washout period. Participants: Forty individuals with idiopathic PD in Hoehn and Yahr stages 1-4. Intervention: Eight-week rehabilitation programs consisting of PMR plus VC (treatment A) and conventional physiotherapy (treatment B). Primary outcome measures: Spatiotemporal gait parameters, joint kinematics, and trunk kinematics. Secondary outcome measures: UPDRS-III scale scores. Results: The rehabilitation program was well-tolerated by individuals with PD and most participants showed improvements in gait variables and UPDRS-III scores with both treatments. However, patients who received PMR with VC showed better results in gait function with regard to gait performance (increased step length, gait speed, and joint kinematics), gait balance (increased step width and double support duration), and trunk control (increased trunk motion) than those receiving conventional physiotherapy. While crossover results revealed some differences in primary outcomes, only 37.5% of patients crossed over between the groups. As a result, our findings should be interpreted cautiously. Conclusions: The PMR plus VC program could be used to improve gait function and severity motor of motor deficit in individuals with PD. Clinical Trial Registration: www.ClinicalTrials.gov, identifier NCT03346265.

Hidradenitis suppurativa–acne inversa (HS-AI) is a chronic inflammatory skin condition that involves the folliculopilosebaceous units. Histopathological studies have suggested that the occlusion of the follicular infundibulum and both innate and adaptive immunity play central roles.1,2 Limited data regarding the clinical aspects and prognosis of HS-AI are available. Patients affected by HS-AI may benefit from early dietary interventions aimed at the metabolic comorbidities that may predispose the patient to HS-AI, reducing weight as a secondary benefit. The rationalization of preventive and therapeutic approaches among centres may help to harmonize the clinical management of HS-AI internationally, with a lasting benefit to patients.

Tripe palms (TP) is a rare dermatologic condition. TP alone, or associated with malignant acanthosis nigricans (MAN), in most cases is a cutaneous paraneoplastic disorder and its recognition should prompt a full diagnostic work-up for an underlying malignancy. We report a case of a patient in whom the correct identification of TP and MAN has allowed early diagnosis of gastric cancer. Paraneoplasias are frequently the first sign of an underlying malignant tumor. Although relatively rare, they need to be recognized by dermatologists to make an early diagnosis and improve the prognosis related to the neoplasia.

UK variant transmission Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has the capacity to generate variants with major genomic changes. The UK variant B.1.1.7 (also known as VOC 202012/01) has many mutations that alter virus attachment and entry into human cells. Using a variety of statistical and dynamic modeling approaches, Davies et al. characterized the spread of the B.1.1.7 variant in the United Kingdom. The authors found that the variant is 43 to 90% more transmissible than the predecessor lineage but saw no clear evidence for a change in disease severity, although enhanced transmission will lead to higher incidence and more hospital admissions. Large resurgences of the virus are likely to occur after the easing of control measures, and it may be necessary to greatly accelerate vaccine roll-out to control the epidemic. Science, this issue p. eabg3055, The major coronavirus variant that emerged at the end of 2020 in the UK is more transmissible than its predecessors and could spark resurgences., INTRODUCTION Several novel variants of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the virus that causes COVID-19, emerged in late 2020. One of these, Variant of Concern (VOC) 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7), was first detected in southeast England in September 2020 and spread to become the dominant lineage in the United Kingdom in just a few months. B.1.1.7 has since spread to at least 114 countries worldwide. RATIONALE The rapid spread of VOC 202012/01 suggests that it transmits more efficiently from person to person than preexisting variants of SARS-CoV-2. This could lead to global surges in COVID-19 hospitalizations and deaths, so there is an urgent need to estimate how much more quickly VOC 202012/01 spreads, whether it is associated with greater or lesser severity of disease, and what control measures might be effective in mitigating its impact. We used social contact and mobility data, as well as demographic indicators linked to SARS-CoV-2 community testing data in England, to assess whether the spread of the new variant may be an artifact of higher baseline transmission rates in certain geographical areas or among specific demographic subpopulations. We then used a series of complementary statistical analyses and mathematical models to estimate the transmissibility of VOC 202012/01 across multiple datasets from the UK, Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States. Finally, we extended a mathematical model that has been extensively used to forecast COVID-19 dynamics in the UK to consider two competing SARS-CoV-2 lineages: VOC 202012/01 and preexisting variants. By fitting this model to a variety of data sources on infections, hospitalizations, and deaths across seven regions of England, we assessed different hypotheses for why the new variant appears to be spreading more quickly, estimated the severity of disease associated with the new variant, and evaluated control measures including vaccination and nonpharmaceutical interventions. Combining multiple lines of evidence allowed us to draw robust inferences. RESULTS The rapid spread of VOC 202012/01 is not an artifact of geographical differences in contact behavior and does not substantially differ by age, sex, or socioeconomic stratum. We estimate that the new variant has a 43 to 90% higher reproduction number (range of 95% credible intervals, 38 to 130%) than preexisting variants. Similar increases are observed in Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States. The most parsimonious explanation for this increase in the reproduction number is that people infected with VOC 202012/01 are more infectious than people infected with a preexisting variant, although there is also reasonable support for a longer infectious period and multiple mechanisms may be operating. Our estimates of severity are uncertain and are consistent with anything from a moderate decrease to a moderate increase in severity (e.g., 32% lower to 20% higher odds of death given infection). Nonetheless, our mathematical model, fitted to data up to 24 December 2020, predicted a large surge in COVID-19 cases and deaths in 2021, which has been borne out so far by the observed burden in England up to the end of March 2021. In the absence of stringent nonpharmaceutical interventions and an accelerated vaccine rollout, COVID-19 deaths in the first 6 months of 2021 were projected to exceed those in 2020 in England. CONCLUSION More than 98% of positive SARS-CoV-2 infections in England are now due to VOC 202012/01, and the spread of this new variant has led to a surge in COVID-19 cases and deaths. Other countries should prepare for potentially similar outcomes. Impact of SARS-CoV-2 Variant of Concern 202012/01. (A) Spread of VOC 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7) in England. (B) The estimated relative transmissibility of VOC 202012/01 (mean and 95% confidence interval) is similar across the United Kingdom as a whole, England, Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States. (C) Projected COVID-19 deaths (median and 95% confidence interval) in England, 15 December 2020 to 30 June 2021. Vaccine rollout and control measures help to mitigate the burden of VOC 202012/01., A severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant, VOC 202012/01 (lineage B.1.1.7), emerged in southeast England in September 2020 and is rapidly spreading toward fixation. Using a variety of statistical and dynamic modeling approaches, we estimate that this variant has a 43 to 90% (range of 95% credible intervals, 38 to 130%) higher reproduction number than preexisting variants. A fitted two-strain dynamic transmission model shows that VOC 202012/01 will lead to large resurgences of COVID-19 cases. Without stringent control measures, including limited closure of educational institutions and a greatly accelerated vaccine rollout, COVID-19 hospitalizations and deaths across England in the first 6 months of 2021 were projected to exceed those in 2020. VOC 202012/01 has spread globally and exhibits a similar transmission increase (59 to 74%) in Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States.

BackgroundTo mitigate and slow the spread of COVID-19, many countries have adopted unprecedented physical distancing policies, including the UK. We evaluate whether these measures might be sufficient to control the epidemic by estimating their impact on the reproduction number (R0, the average number of secondary cases generated per case).MethodsWe asked a representative sample of UK adults about their contact patterns on the previous day. The questionnaire documents the age and location of contacts and as well as a measure of their intimacy (whether physical contact was made or not). In addition, we asked about adherence to different physical distancing measures. The first surveys were sent on Tuesday 24th March, one day after a “ lockdown” was implemented across the UK. We compared measured contact patterns during the “ lockdown” to patterns of social contact made during a non-epidemic period. By comparing these, we estimated the change in reproduction number as a consequence of the physical distancing measures imposed. We used a meta-analysis of published estimates to inform our estimates of the reproduction number before interventions were put in place.FindingsWe found a 73% reduction in the average daily number of contacts observed per participant (from 10.2 to 2.9). This would be sufficient to reduce R0 from 2.6 prior to lockdown to 0.62 (95% confidence interval [CI] 0.37 - 0.89) after the lockdown, based on all types of contact and 0.37 (95% CI = 0.22 - 0.53) for physical contacts only.InterpretationThe physical distancing measures adopted by the UK public have substantially reduced contact levels and will likely lead to a substantial impact and a decline in cases in the coming weeks. However, this projected decline in incidence will not occur immediately as there are significant delays between infection, the onset of symptomatic disease and hospitalisation, as well as further delays to these events being reported. Tracking behavioural change can give a more rapid assessment of the impact of physical distancing measures than routine epidemiological surveillance.Research in contextEvidence before this studyMany governments have adopted physical distancing measures to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it is unclear to what extent these measures reduce the number of contacts and therefore transmission. We searched PubMed and medRxiv on March 28, 2020, with the terms “ (coronavirus OR COVID-19 OR influenza) AND ((school OR work) AND (closure OR holiday)) AND (contact OR mixing)” and identified 59 and 17 results, respectively. Only one study conducted in China during the COVID-19 pandemic reported a reduction in daily contacts outside the home during the period of “ lockdown”. We found no other published articles that empirically quantify the impact of these measures on age- and location-specific mixing patterns.Added value of this studyBy surveying adults’ behaviour in the UK during a period of stringent physical distancing (“ lockdown”) and comparing the results to previously collected data, we found a large reduction in daily contacts particularly outside the home, resulting in a marked reduction in the estimated reproduction number from 2.6 to 0.62 (95% bootstrapped confidence interval [CI] 0.37 - 0.89). This method allows for rapid assessment of changes in the reproduction number that is unaffected by reporting delays.Implications of all the available evidenceChanges in human contact behaviour drive respiratory infection rates. Understanding these changes at different stages of the COVID-19 pandemic allows us to rapidly quantify the impact of physical distancing measures on the transmission of pathogens.