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INTRODUCTION The scene-size-up is a crucial first step in the response to a mass casualty incident (MCI). Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) may potentially enhance the scene-size-up with real-time visual feedback during chaotic, evolving or inaccessible events. We performed this study to test the feasibility of paramedics using UAV video from a simulated MCI to identify scene hazards, initiate patient triage, and designate key operational locations. METHODS We simulated an MCI, including 15 patients plus 4 hazards, on a college campus. A UAV surveyed the scene, capturing video of all patients, hazards, surrounding buildings and streets. We invited attendees of a provincial paramedic meeting to participate. Participants received a lecture on Sort-Assess-Lifesaving Interventions-Treatment/Transport (SALT) Triage and MCI scene management principles. Next, they watched the UAV video footage. We directed participants to sort patients according to SALT Triage Step One, identify injuries, and to localize the patients within the campus. Additionally, we asked them to select a start point for SALT Triage Step Two, identify and locate hazards, and designate locations for an Incident Command Post, Treatment Area, Transport Area and Access/Egress routes. The primary outcome was the number of correctly allocated triage scores. RESULTS Ninety-six individuals participated. Mean age was 35 years (SD 11); 46% (44) were female and 49% (47) were Primary Care Paramedics. Most participants (79; 82%) correctly sorted at least 12 of 15 patients. Increased age was associated with decreased triage accuracy [-0.04(-0.07, -0.01); p = 0.031]. Fifty-two (54%) correctly localized 12 or more patients to a 27 × 20m grid area. Advanced paramedic certification, and local residency were associated with improved patient localization [2.47(0.23,4.72); p = 0.031], [3.36(1.10,5.61); p = 0.004]. The majority of participants (70; 81%) chose an acceptable location to start SALT Triage Step Two and 75 (78%) identified at least 3 of 4 hazards. Approximately half (53; 56%) of participants appropriately designated 4 or more of 5 key operational areas. CONCLUSION This study demonstrates the ability of UAV technology to remotely facilitate the scene size-up in an MCI. Additional research is required to further investigate optimal strategies to deploy UAVs in this context.

We study two vertical constraints on pricing which have received little study. A vertical MFN (“VMFN”) refers to an MFN on retail prices that is sought by an upstream manufacturer. A vertical margin constraint (“VMC”) refers to a requirement that the margin earned by a retailer on a manufacturer’s product not exceed what the retailer earns on a rival manufacturer’s product. Vertical agreements containing these constraints are found in the soft drink and cigarette industries. We study these vertical constraints in the context of two asymmetric manufacturers. In this setting, only the larger manufacturer uses the VMFN. We characterize pure and mixed strategy equilibria and find, as have others, that the VMFN raises prices, relative to a benchmark case. The VMFN harms the retailer and the small manufacturer, helping the larger manufacturer. This can lead to foreclosure of the small manufacturer. The VMC has opposite effects, leading to lower prices and higher retailer profits than in the benchmark case. It requires pre-commitment by the retailer in order to be used.

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG), during 2003–2004. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, litigations, and administrative and appellate matters.

Of the many activitiesof the Antitrust Division of theU.S. Department of Justice, we havesummarized some that raise interestingeconomic issues. We describe recentimprovements in the methodology to beused in ``coordinated effects'' analysisof mergers. We also discuss four casesbrought by the DOJ that raise issues ofmarket definition, the influence ofcommon partial ownership of competitors,and the effects of fringe suppliers inconstraining collusion by large firms.

We propose a model of Bertrand competition in which consumers choose firms based on prices and qualities. Service quality depends on congestion, which is a function of capacity and output. We first present theoretical properties of the model. Next, we calibrate the model to the wireless industry and use it to evaluate the impacts of changes in spectrum allocation on consumer welfare and profits. Simulations of the model show that when one firm acquires more spectrum, consumer welfare at all firms increases due to congestion externality effects. We find that a transfer of spectrum from one firm to another can either raise or lower consumer welfare at the firms not involved in the transaction, again due to externality effects. Where it is possible to compare the results of our model to the wireless industry, they are consistent with the data. We also explore some possible effects of the upcoming 2016 spectrum auctions.

A regulated upstream monopolist provides an input to firms in a downstream market. If the monopolist enters the downstream market, a natural concern is that it will act so as to raise its downstream rivals' costs. An offsetting incentive is that a higher downstream price will reduce demand for the input, which reduces the monopolist's profit. Conditions under which one incentive dominates the other are derived. The monopolist may desire to lower its downstream rivals' costs rather than raise them. These findings suggest that regulatory policy towards such downstream entry should not focus exclusively on the ability to discriminate.

The U.S. Congress passed sweeping telecommunications reform legislation in 1996 that will enable the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) to enter the interLATA long-distance market once certain conditions are met. This legislation empowers the state public service commissions, the Federal Communications Commission and the Justice Department to determine collectively when RBOC entry into interLATA long-distance markets satisfies the public interest. This article reveals that as long as RBOC long-distance market shares remain below certain critical levels, the RBOCs do not have the incentives (despite having the opportunity) to discriminate against their downstream competitors. These findings suggest that a public policy focused exclusively on eliminating the opportunity to discriminate may needlessly delay RBOC entry into interLATA markets and thereby deprive consumers of the benefits of enhanced competition.

The "parallel behavior is enough" standard cannot assist the courts in distinguishing horizontal agreements to restrain trade from normal competition. It would very likely impose significant costs on the economy by distorting competitive incentives and encouraging meritless litigation designed mainly to induce financial settlements.

This paper discusses the economic issues involved in the government's case against Microsoft. In particular, we examine the competitive effects of Microsoft's contractual restrictions, including the bundling of its Internet browser with the Windows 98 operating system in agreements with computer manufacturers (also called Original Equipment Manufacturers or OEMs), online services providers (OLS), Internet service providers (ISP) and Internet content providers (ICP). A secondary purpose is to review and critique the economic evidence presented by Microsoft in support of its contention that its behavior is not characteristic of a monopoly.

Currently, the FCC is refining a proposal to regulate the access services of the local exchange carriers (LECs) under a price-cap scheme, modifying rate-of-return regulation. See FCC (1988, 1989). One element of the proposal is that new services be treated for tariff review purposes in a manner quite similar to the FCC’s Optional Calling Plan Order, which set out a net revenue test for approval. This net revenue test would require that (1) a new service must be projected to increase net revenue for the service subject to price-cap regulation and that (2) this increase be projected to occur within the lesser of two time periods: 24 months from the incorporation of the new service into a price filing, or 36 months from the introduction of the services. This showing must be accompanied by net revenue projections which include marginal costs, price elasticity, and cross-elasticity effects.1

Introduction A key ingredient in most discussions of efficient pricing theory is the assumption that the regulated monopoly's customers are independent of each other. That is, it is assumed that the amount consumed by one customer has no impact on the surplus which can be earned by another customer. For this reason, it is possible (and convenient) to ignore interactions between consumers in designing efficient prices. In reality, there are many reasons why interactions between consumers could be important; in such cases, efficient pricing rules should take account of them. One especially important type of interaction occurs when the utility sells both to business customers and residential consumers. Residential consumers buy the utility's services as final products to be consumed. The business customers buy the utility's services as inputs into their own production processes, which produce outputs that they sell to other businesses and to final consumers, including, possibly, the utility's residential customers. The prices that the utility's business customers charge for the goods and services which they produce link their welfare to those of the utility's residential customers, who buy both the service of the utility and the outputs produced by the utility's business customers. Individual business users' profits are linked to the extent that they compete with each other. This type of interaction also occurs when a utility sets a nonuniform price schedule for business customers. Changes in marginal prices at given points on the schedule will affect total outlay for firms which consume larger amounts of the utility's services. This, in turn, affects prices in these industries.

A key element in determining the degree of inherent contestability of markets is the presence and extent of entry barriers. In US aviation markets, the entry barriers historically imposed by the Civil Aeronautics Board have been largely removed. However, it is thought that other entry barriers — barriers caused by historically determined feed advantages and airport access restrictions — may still prevent airline markets from being contestable. This chapter examines some recent evidence on the extent to which such barriers are currently significant in US aviation markets. The work represents a second effort at examining the degree of contestability of aviation markets during the transition to deregulation.1

After reviewing some recent developments in the airline industry, this article tests two hypotheses that were central to the argument for deregulation: (1) that CAB regulation caused airlines to employ excess capacity relative to the capacity that would be provided under unregulated competition; and (2) that potential competition would keep fares at cost even in highly concentrated markets. An econometric analysis of these hypotheses based on postderegulation data suggests that the excess capacity hypothesis is essentially confirmed. In contrast, the pattern of fares in late 1980 and early 1981 does not support the potential competition hypothesis that fares are independent of market concentration.