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We propose a renal imaging agent, the 99m Tc complex of the bidentate- N ,S chelate N -(mercaptoacetyl) glycine ( 99m Tc-2GAM), with the imaging characteristics of 99m Tc-DMSA but a faster kidney uptake; chemical evidence supports the formulation of 99m Tc-2GAM as [Tc V (O)(GAM) 2 ] − . After biodistribution and toxicity studies in animals, 99m Tc-2GAM was evaluated in five normal volunteers. 99m Tc-2GAM is rapidly cleared from the blood (t12 = 9 min) and 50% of the ID is excreted in the urine in the first 2 h. Dynamic data show a rapid renal uptake that increases up to 1 h with no significant wash-out between 1 and 8 h. The uptake in each kidney ranges from 11.3% to 20.7% ID. Low, stable liver uptake is observed. No significant activity is detected in other organs. We showed no differences between 99m Tc-2GAM and 99m Tc-DMSA compared in three patients with unilateral kidney disease. We conclude that 99m Tc-2GAM has good practical and dosimetric features for renal imaging.

The Army logistics community is attempting to become more effective in providing support to Combatant Commanders who must utilize forces in a more expeditionary manner under reduced time constraints laid out by former Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki. In addition to reducing logistical footprints increasing power projection capabilities and improving in-transit visibility Army logisticians are faced with new constraints in dealing with asymmetrical threats worldwide: specifically time and access. Recently the Army has had to support "on the fly" or "come as you are" without the benefit of pre-planned Time Phase Force Deployment Data force flow with uncertain access to Intermediate or Forward Staging Bases and without long lead times to build up supplies. This paper outlines a description of the time constraints for deployment of the Army's Stryker Brigade as an operational parameter for challenges in providing support. Additionally a comparison and contrast between Army doctrinal logistical support to the Stryker Brigade and Navy methodologies for support to a similar organization (the Marine Expeditionary Brigade) may reveal lessons learned. How the Army and Navy approach logistical support given the constraints of deployment times and in locations without guaranteed access for logistical bases could provide answers to a Combatant Commander's staff. The end result will be to suggest techniques the Army may adopt to become more expeditionary in nature and to identify joint interdependencies the Army can capitalize upon with the Navy.