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Random case assignment is thought to be an important feature of decision-making in federal courts because it helps guard against favoritism (actual or perceived) toward particular parties or types of cases. In bankruptcy courts, cases are randomly assigned to both judges and trustees. In Chapter 7 cases, for example, the trustee is a quasi-judicial actor, typically a private-sector lawyer, who has been selected to audit the debtor's finances, find and liquidate assets, and police compliance with the law. We study three major bankruptcy jurisdictions (covering Chicago, Los Angeles, and parts of New York) and find that the random-assignment process for Chapter 7 trustees is failing in two of them (Chicago and New York). We introduce several measures of non-random assignment. Across all measures, random assignment is failing: Trustees within the same court have substantially different case characteristics, despite the purportedly random assignment process. We present evidence that the imbalance in case characteristics is caused by attorney manipulation: Attorneys strategically time their case filings to avoid or attract particular trustees ("trustee shopping"). By contrast, among cases filed by debtors who have not hired attorneys ("pro se filers"), there is no case imbalance across trustees. Because they do not engage in manipulation, pro se filers – who account for the bottom decile of income and asset values among Chapter 7 debtors – are the debtors most burdened by trustee-shopping by bankruptcy attorneys. We conclude by presenting evidence that trustee-shopping is less prevalent in Los Angeles due to differences in its random-assignment protocol.

African American bankruptcy filers are more likely to select Chapter 13 than other debtors, who opt instead for Chapter 7, which has higher success rates and lower attorney fees. Prior scholarship blames racial discrimination by bankruptcy attorneys. We present an alternative explanation: Chapter 13 offers benefits, including retention of assets such as cars and driver's licenses, that are more valuable to African American debtors because they have relatively long commutes. We take advantage of a 2011 policy in Chicago, which suspended driver's licenses of consumers with large traffic-related debts. The policy produced a large increase in Chapter 13 filings, especially by African Americans. Two mechanisms explain the disparate racial impact: African Americans were more likely to have traffic-related debts and they incurred greater costs from license suspension due to their relatively long commutes. When we match African Americans to other debtors with similar commutes, we find no racial difference in the propensity to file for Chapter 13. These findings suggest that racial disparities in bankruptcy reflect racial disparities in commuting.