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This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment profit. The net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain. In the limiting homogeneous market, the effect vanishes. Here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion. Keywords: Transparency; Tacit collusion; Cartel theory; Competition policy; Internet

We model policy choices where parties competing for election are better informed than voters about the state of the economy. In addition voters are uncertain about the incumbent's preferences and the median voter's vote potentially depends on the state of the economy. The incumbent may bias his policy in order to convey information to the voters and raise his chance of reelection. The bias depends crucially on which kind of uncertainty is the most important. Uncertainty about preferences leads to moderate policies, while uncertainty about the state of the economy leads to extreme policies. JEL classification: D72; D82 Keywords: Political economy; Signalling; Elections

Empirical investigations suggests that the real wage is surprisingly flat over the business cycle. This paper analyses a repeated game between a union and a firm which can contribute to explaining the flat wage. The parties cannot enter binding contracts, and revenue is fluctuating. The paper focuses on the best subgame-perfect equilibrium among those sharing the expected surplus in given fixed shares - e.g. equal shares. It is shown that (for moderate discount factors) this equilibrium has a more counter-cyclical wage, than what would be the case if the parties shared the surplus in each period in the same shares. Keywords: Business cycles; Real wages; Unions

We study the consequences of imperfect competition in a macro model with only one imperfection; that of labor market competition. Otherwise the model is 'clean'; agents are optimizers, prices are endogenous, and expectations are rational. We show that, although imperfect competition in itself can explain unemployment (as is well known), it does not in itself give strong support to the use of traditional fiscal policy in fighting unemployment. Fiscal policy will (almost inevitably) have real effects but only through a special effect that may be difficult to control. In many cases fiscal policy cannot create full employment, and it may very well have perverse effects.

An overlapping generations, macro model where consumers are divided into workers and capitalists is analysed. In each period the wage rate is negotiated between an employers' union and a trade union. Other prices adjust competitively. The solution concept used is cooperative, the wage rate chosen by unions should be undominated, i.e. there must not exist another wage rate leading to higher utilities for both workers and capitalists. The resulting one period equilibria, relative Pareto optima, RPO, and also stationary equilibra, stationary relative Pareto optima, SRPO are analysed. Results are that full employment (S)RPO always exist and in some economies unemployment (S)RPO also exist. Sufficient conditions for the latter to be the case are stated and the existence of economies fulfilling these conditions is demonstrated.