Search

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2009.10.002 Byline: Li Huang, J. Keith Murnighan Keywords: Trust; Relational schema; Relational cues; Subliminal priming; Automaticity; Nonconsciousness Abstract: Because the choice to trust is inherently risky, people naturally assess others' trustworthiness before they engage in trusting actions. The research reported here suggests that the trust development process may start before the conscious assessment of trustworthiness, via the activation of a relational schema. We present three experiments that examined the automatic, non-conscious activation of interpersonal trusting behavior via a variety of subliminal cues: positive or negative, relational or non-relational, and trust-related or not. In all three studies, subliminal relational cues influenced subsequent trusting behavior, apparently without conscious awareness. Results from the third study also indicated that subliminal relational cues that were specifically trust-related influenced trustors' expectations of the likelihood of reciprocity. Overall, the data provide initial evidence that the development of interpersonal trust can start before and beneath conscious awareness. Author Affiliation: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208-2011, United States Article History: Received 12 December 2008; Accepted 15 October 2009 Article Note: (miscellaneous) Accepted by Maurice Schweitzer

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2007.10.003 Byline: Niro Sivanathan (a), Madan M. Pillutla (b), J. Keith Murnighan (a) Keywords: Power; Ultimatums; Dictatorship; Control; Dependence; Resources; Bargaining; Information Abstract: Changes in power almost invariably lead to changes in behavior. This research investigates the effects of power increases and power decreases for individuals who are in strong or weak positions. We hypothesized that individuals will have strong reactions to gains in power (their demands will increase markedly) but they will act almost as though they do not recognize losses in power (their demands will not drop much) when they lose power. Four experiments track individuals' actions when they move from ultimatum to dictatorship games, from dictatorship to ultimatum games, or when they have the same power position repeatedly. The data consistently show that people over-react to an increase in power, but that they react appropriately to a loss in power. The discussion explores the behavioral disconnect between increases and decreases in power. Author Affiliation: (a) Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, IL 60208, USA (b) London Business School, UK Article History: Received 2 May 2006 Article Note: (footnote) [star] This research was supported by grants to J. Keith Murnighan from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada and the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University and to Madan Pillutla via a Direct Allocation Grant from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. A SSHRC doctoral fellowship provided additional assistance to the first author. We very much appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions provided by Max Bazerman, Xiao-Ping Chen, Tim Devinney, Rod Kramer, George Milkovich, Greg Oldham, and Bob Wyer. Finally, we thank Jeff Edwards and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.10.001 Byline: Gillian Ku (a), Deepak Malhotra (b), J. Keith Murnighan (c) Keywords: Decision-making; Rivalry; Social facilitation; Time pressure; Escalation of commitment; Auctions; Competition; Arousal Abstract: In 1999, Chicago sponsored a public art exhibit of over 300 life-sized fiberglass cows that culminated in 140 Internet and live, in-person auctions. Collectively, the cows sold for almost seven times their initial estimates. These unexpectedly high final prices provided the impetus for a model of decision-making, 'competitive arousal,' which focuses on how diverse factors such as rivalry, social facilitation, time pressure, and/or the uniqueness of being first can fuel arousal, which then impairs decision-making. In Study 1, live and Internet bidding and survey data from 21 auctions throughout North America tested the model's predictions, as well as hypotheses derived from rational choice and escalation of commitment models. Analyses provided considerable support for the competitive arousal and escalation models, and no support for rational choice predictions. Study 2 was a laboratory experiment that investigated the similarities and differences between escalation and competitive arousal, finding again that both can result in overbidding. The discussion focuses on the implications of these findings and on the broader issue of competitive arousal and escalation and their impact on decision-making. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Organisational Behaviour, London Business School, UK (b) Negotiation, Organizations, and Markets Unit, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, USA (c) Department of Management and Organizations, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2011, USA Article History: Received 28 July 2003 Article Note: (footnote) [star] This project benefited from the assistance and support of several organizations and many people. First, we gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance of the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. We also thank auction organizers from all over North America who provided us access and insights to their auctions. Michael Jensen, Chen-Bo Zhong, and Adam Galinsky provided both comments and help with the data analysis. Finally, we thank Don Moore, Madan Pillutla, and Alvin Roth for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.

The findings of a study of 140 Internet and live bidding, and data collected from 21 auctions across North America, reveal that emotional factors - rivalry, time pressure, social facilitation, and the first-mover advantage - that affect auctions, may also impact decision-making in organizations and other contexts. Another laboratory-based experiment to study the similarities and differences between escalation of commitment and competitive arousal also shows that both the factors may cause overbidding. The implications of these findings on decision-making are overviewed.

The rejection of ultimatum offers in negotiations is adequately explained by the rejection/spite model and the fairness model which takes into consideration the role of emotions in the acceptance of offers. An economically advantageous ultimatum offer may be rejected on the grounds that one of the parties in the negotiation perceives the offer as unfair and damaging to the self-image. This affront to the self-image evokes anger and results in spite - the rejection of the advantageous offer.

The social norms used by individuals to distribute adventitious outcomes are studied. Results show that the finders keepers, losers weepers, and share and share were the most frequently used norms. Strong support was found for the losers weepers norm with most adventitious outcomes remaining unshared. More gains were shared than losses while individuals who decided to share, shared their outcomes equally.

The winner's curse observed during auctions is defined as the losses incurred by the highest bidders due to their overestimation of the value of the acquired object. It is shown that individuals fall victim to the winner's curse even when they are given information, experience, time, varied endowments and the possibility of profitable bids aimed at helping them avoid the curse. However, these factors did succeed in reducing auction bids.

The concept of intravention as a tool in conflict management is studied by comparing it with the concept of mediation under similar situations. Unlike the mediator, the intravenor can control the outcome of the dispute by imposing their own decisions, either for self-interests or for the disputant's interests. A study conducted to determine the efficiency of intravenors as a third party revealed a pattern of dispute resolution behavior. They were more likely to assert their power to resolve the conflict rather than leave the disputants to solve the problem for themselves.

Research is presented concerning the development of two bargaining games to investigate the management of ultimatum bargaining and the effectiveness of deception and retribution techniques. The higher deception levels of proposers are discussed.