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The objective of this paper is to analyze the differential effect of Brexit on the British stock market and money market before and after the Brexit referendum. Prior work. Many research articles have emerged on the economic effect of Brexit, but these papers have largely been predictive in nature; this paper builds on these prior research and examines what exists rather than being predictive. Approach. Stock market data and exchange rate data were collected from the London Stock Exchange. The data were analyzed with the usage of paired t-test of difference in means. Results: Findings from the analysis show a negative stock value within three days after the referendum, but further analysis show a positive stock value increase within twenty one days after the Brexit referendum. Additionally, the t-test results show that the British Pound fluctuated toward a weaker trajectory than the pre-Brexit period. Implications: Policy makers should shorten the negotiation period for exiting international integrations to reduce protracted loss of investments. Future searchers should observe more days to expand this paper's new result between stock and money market fluctuations. Value: This paper contributes by examining the difference in fluctuation between stock and money market effects of Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the prospective exit of the UK from the European Union (EU), a crucial question is whether EU Structural Funds have been beneficial for the country and which aspects of Cohesion Policy should be maintained if EU funds are to be replaced. This paper addresses this question through a twofold investigation, assessing not only whether but also how EU funds have contributed to regional growth in the UK from 1994 to 2013. It documents a significant and robust effect of Cohesion Policy in the UK, with higher proportions of Structural Funds associated with higher economic growth both on the whole and particularly in the less developed regions of the country. In addition, it is shown that the strategic orientation of investments also plays a distinct role for regional growth. While concentration of investments on specific pillars seems to have no direct growth effects, unless regions can rely on pre-existing competitive advantages in key development areas, clear evidence is unveiled that targeting investments to specific areas of relative regional need has a significant and autonomous effect on growth. These findings have important implications for the design of regional policy interventions in Britain after Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the economic policy uncertainty in various countries has gradually increased with the increasing complexity of global economic situation, and foreign direct investment and trade have also been impacted. As a historic event, does Brexit affect the economic consequences of economic policy uncertainty? In this regard, we aim to examine the Brexit spillovers on five major EU member states and the UK through economic policy uncertainty. Cluster analysis and TVP-VAR model are used to analyze the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade (TRADE) during Brexit. The results at different time horizons show that, in addition to the Netherlands, impulse responses of foreign direct investment and international trade have the characteristics of positive and negative conversion. Despite all this, impulse responses of international trade are lower than those of foreign direct investment. Time points when foreign direct investment and international trade have the greatest impulse response vary from country to country. Overall, the impact of economic policy uncertainty on them is more reflected in the late Brexit period. Based on the above findings, we draw policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper analyses Europe's growth problem. Recovery from the recent global financial crisis and 'great recession' has been slower than after previous recessions in most advanced countries and areas, especially Europe. But the European growth problem is structural in character and it started much earlier. This paper analyses the structural causes of the European growth problem, evaluates the policies that Europe adopted to overcome it, and concludes that even with the appropriate policies, the prospects for accelerating growth in Europe will be difficult, especially in the context of Brexit and the slowdown of world growth in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are striking similarities between today's early 21st century trade political economy and its late 19th century equivalent. Ascendant populist nationalism, escalating trade protectionism and tariff wars, growing discontent over globalization's distributional impacts and fast emerging economic superpowers disrupting the global order are features shared by both periods. This comparative historical analysis explores what lessons and conclusions we may draw from the past late 19th century world that can be applied to today. Integral to this discussion are the prospects of our early 21st century world experiencing a similar endgame of global conflict, as transpired around a century ago. In revisiting the past to better understand the present and future, this paper first evaluates empirical similarities between the trade political economies of both periods. It then applies theories and concepts of economic nationalism, globalization and interdependence in developing deeper conclusions and arguments. Brexit, Trump and their historic parallels serve as primary focal points in this study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we outline the impact and likely future impact of Brexit on the pound. We argue that Brexit implies a significant depreciation of the pound and the degree of depreciation required is heavily linked to whether there will be a soft or hard Brexit. We find that the pound has had broadly similar depreciations to date against both the dollar and the euro. Brexit has considerably raised UK economic policy uncertainty and this, in turn, has at times led to an significant increase in future implied volatility of the pound. While there is an overall link between the state of the ongoing Brexit negotiations with the European Union and movements in the pound in the foreign exchange market, the link is not especially strong unless the perception that the negotiations are going badly has exceeded 60%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, by presenting and analysing some recent phenomena - like Brexit, the income (or more generally: prosperity) gap both between Western and Eastern, and Northern and Southern European member states, tensions within the Euro system, or even the resolution of the Greek crisis - would like to point to a certain direction which is worth to be considered in relation to the future of the European Union. In contrast to the standard narrative, it argues that instead of ever more integration - i.e. consisting of forcing more and more dogmatic economic policy under German domination -, Europe would benefit from a looser, multi-tier integration, based on mutually advantageous cooperation of nations. Such a solution would not exclude the preservation of a hard core of countries with deepening integration amongst their economies, but would give countries of the periphery the opportunity to preserve their room for manoeuver, their chances of development, and ultimately their dignity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK's defining domestic economic policy under the Conservative governments since 2010 can be subsumed under the term 'austerity'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Executive Summary: Alongside the challenge of maintaining economic competitiveness in the face of great uncertainty, Brexit brings an opportunity for the government to set out a new industrial strategy. The case for doing so rests on the need to address areas of persistent structural weakness in the UK economy, including low productivity. But it is important that any new industrial strategy be based on appropriately granular data reflecting the real structure of the UK corporate sector: the overwhelmingly preponderant role of services as opposed to manufacturing, for example; the importance of young, fast-growing firms as opposed to SMEs; the relatively high failure rate of companies in the UK; and the relative lack of successful mid-sized firms. Such a data-driven approach might spawn an industrial strategy quite different from the piecemeal programmes of recent years. Internationally, the UK is a laggard in this area, and the recently-created Industrial Strategy Council does not look strong enough to change that position. To move forward, the government needs to make industrial strategy a central plank of economic policy, embedded at the heart of the administration with its own staff and funding, and operations based on a comprehensive review of the economic contribution and potential of various types of firm. Needless to say, it cannot be a substitute for a continuing commitment to competition and markets, or a stalking horse for protectionism: interventions should be justified by carefully-argued market failure arguments, be time-limited, and transparently evaluated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit implies that the UK may move to different rules to control state aid, although changes will be minimal if it remains within the EEA and could be minor in the event of an EU/UK trade agreement. With a 'hard' Brexit, there could be much greater scope for selective industrial policy and that might be seductive to a government intent on a new industrial strategy. In this case, however, the risks of 'government failure' are considerable and it would be desirable to devise an institutional framework that strictly limits the scope for politicians to exercise discretion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU institutions must diagnose the crisis that Brexit and Trump have brought to the fore as an economic crisis that is malleable to policy, and they must forcibly sell that diagnosis to the member states if they want to halt the further disintegration of the EU. Doing so would give member states room to experiment with locally appropriate policies rather than simply accept "one size fits none" policy rules. Such a diagnosis would be nothing less than an explicit political intervention by a supposedly technocratic set of institutions. But technocracies work best in good times, and these are not good times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thatcherism was a very astute political project from the beginning—monetarism removed the need to do deals with trade unions in order to manage the economy and thus resolved the political problem which had dogged Conservatives through the 1970s. Andrew Gamble is right to identify a free economy and a strong state as complementary political principles—a credible economic policy was key to the difference between the Falklands and Suez. Now, the Conservative Party has once again shown its agility in responding to economic discontent by becoming a party of Brexit and assembling an election winning coalition of the excluded and the insulated. Age has replaced class as the crucial political divide. A political party can focus on older voters provided that it continues to recruit new voters as they go through the life cycle. But it is risky if it is actually an appeal to an ageing cohort of voters without recruiting from succeeding generations. The Conservative Party needs to appeal to younger voters, and offering the prospect of property ownership would be one way to do this. A belief in fairness between the generations unites different age groups [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores how Brexit is pushing the Great Britain towards aligning more closely with the rest of Europe in its politics, society, economics and international position. It mentions British withdrawal from the European Union results from the turmoil created by the 2016 referendum, along with process of withdrawal has exposed the decentralization and fragmentation in the Great Britain.

I "The major fluctuations in the rate of growth of demand and output in the years after 1952 were thus chiefly due to government policy. Growth in other and distant parts of the world has not only imparted a disruptive shock to advanced economies such as the UK but also changed fundamentally the relative importance of the UK in the matrix of world power (see [3]). 2 Britton A. (1991), Macroeconomic Policy In Britain, 1974-87, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Extracted from the article]

This article considers the recent evolution of the EU's third country regime for capital market access in light of Brexit, the important series of legislative reforms adopted in March 2019 as the 2014-2019 European Parliament/Commission term closed, and the emergence of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) as a material technocratic influence. The article suggests that while the capital market third country regime is changing (with Brexit a key but not exclusive driver of change), it is not being radically recast, although it is tightening. The regime remains broadly based on the more-or-less liberal 'deference' model which has long characterised EU third-country financial services policy. But it is becoming increasingly 'on-shored' by means of the direct application of EU rules and by ESMA's oversight/supervision of certain third country actors. The significantly more restrictive approach being taken to third country central clearing counterparties is a marked development, but here the political and economic context is distinct. The implications of the overall shift towards a more 'on-shore', centralised, and potentially restrictive access regime are considered, and a modest reform prescription is offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BREXIT is a historical step for the UK and the EU27 which could bring a strong Pound deprecation, an increase in risk premiums for British bonds and a transitory rise of financial market volatility plus a long-term reduction of economic growth in the UK; but also risks for the EU27. New BREXIT aspects are considered in an enhanced Branson model. Macroprudential supervision is a crucial policy challenge for EU28 in the context of BREXIT and the European Systemic Risk Board thus should have a critical role in 2019 and the following years. The ESRB should timely analyze the potential risk of BREXIT and consider adequate policy options to reduce or eliminate risks. Contract continuity as well as cooperation in prudential supervision between the EU27 and the UK stand for BREXIT-related problems that could create financial market stability - as is the BREXIT-induced UK deregulation pressure. EU prudential supervision post-BREXIT faces problems since a very large part of EU27 wholesale banking markets in the UK and thus not regulated by the EU after March 29, 2019. The EU Commission's competence for EU trade policy as well as international investment treaties gives the EU the opportunity to offer the UK not only a - limited - Free Trade Agreement but an international investment treaty as well, including options for global cooperation. Several policy innovations are proposed which could help to limit risk associated with instability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the prospects for an ordoliberal reform of the European Union in order to tackle its multiple crises. It shows what an ordoliberal European Union would have to look like and examines the constraints its implementation faces. Three reasons are identified that make an ordoliberal reform of the EU at present unlikely. First, in the EU's most powerful member state, Germany, where ordoliberalism has its origins, economic policy adheres increasingly less to this strain of economic thinking. Second, given the primacy of European integration in domestic politics, Germany values European unity higher than economic principles. Third, once Brexit is complete Germany will lack influential allies for an ordoliberal reshaping of the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

UK voters’ decision to overturn the country’s European Union membership has left most parliamentarians looking rather distant from the constituents they represent. The politicians staked much on assuming that people could be persuaded not to sabotage their economic self-interest, but that message conspicuously failed to resonate. When politicians spoke in abstract terms about the needs of ‘the economy’, significant numbers understood this to mean labour market conditions that had personally served them badly. It was commonplace in the immediate aftermath of the referendum to refer to these people as the ‘left behind’. However, they might more usefully be described as the ‘let down’ and, as the 2017 general election results show, they are still a significant if somewhat unpredictable voting constituency. Since the restructuring of the UK economy in line with global competitiveness norms these people have been required to earn their rights as citizens through demonstrating their work readiness. Yet hard work on its own is now no longer sufficient for so many people to receive the rewards promised under the terms of the new social contract. They have been largely abandoned to their fate by the politicians as labour market segmentation has led to a significant expansion of the in-work poor. This constituency voted in large numbers against continued EU membership. This suggests that the referendum result can be seen at least in part as a revolt against the way in which the abstraction of ‘the economy’ has informed UK politics in recent decades. The much lower profile given to this abstraction at the 2017 general election compared to its immediate predecessors indicates that, eighteen months later, on this issue at least we remain in the political rupture caused by the EU referendum result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: There seems to be an emerging conventional wisdom that the Brexit vote resulted from specific domestic factors in Britain, such as divisions within the ruling Conservative party, the rise of UKIP, strong reaction to increased immigration, all set against the backdrop of globalisation and its adverse effects. The end result was a populist revolt. The argument presented here is somewhat different. Whilst accepting that the above factors were certainly very important, it is argued that it is important to examine the key role of the EU itself in the creation of the current crisis within the EU. The construction of an EU policy‐making state has run far ahead of what voters at the national level want, leading to a central paradox within the EU, namely that the European elite which runs the EU has introduced some very beneficial public policies, yet that elite has become increasingly out of touch with its peoples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Often trumpeted as a bastion of modern economic and political integration, the European Union (EU) has played an integral role in the development of the United Kingdom's (UK) economy. However, in recent times, the relationship between the EU and the UK has become increasingly fragile, particularly on issues of national sovereignty, immigration, and the general bureaucratic reach of Brussels. Tension surrounding these concerns meant that on 23 June 2016, the British public voted, by way of a referendum, to leave the EU. This decision, often referred to as Brexit, has created a watershed moment in the history of the region, with implications that may have a significant impact on not only Europe, but also Asia and the wider global community. In order to make better sense of the issue, this study provides a brief synopsis of Britain's decision to leave the EU, before providing a detailed analysis of how the Brexit decision will impact the Asian region. As part of this discussion, a series of relevant policy issues are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Half a decade after the euro crisis, the European Union is in dire need of a growth strategy that is economically viable, politically legitimate and seen as socially fair. The United Kingdom's fateful choice for Brexit has given new urgency to this imperative. While it is deplorable to lose a strong political force behind the internal market, Britain's decision to leave the EU does create a window of opportunity for taking the Union's 'social market economy' ambitions, as laid down in Articles 2 and 3 of the Lisbon Treaty, more seriously than before. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An examination of Brexit and its initial impact on the main stock markets in the Greater China Region (GCR) was conducted using augmented market models that integrate Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) and implied volatility (VIX). The results do not seem to align with research in the field that has suggested that the EPU index helps to identify if market participants are reacting to political events. The main research findings suggest that Brexit does not appear to have an impact on the performance of market returns in the region and the influence of economic policy uncertainty in the GCR appears to be insignificant, except for Hong Kong. Overall, China’s stock markets do not seem to be panicking and overreacting to unfolding events in the UK, and market instability in the region appears to be more associated with global and regional events that are better captured by the VIX index. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]