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The adoption of a single currency in much of Western Europe, as well as incremental moves toward institutionalized European political representation and policy cooperation, raise the question of what propels sovereign states to forge increasingly sturdy regional ties. Our paper explores the options of South American countries with respect to three competing visions of hemispheric economic integration: NAFTA-Plus, Mercosur-CAN, and the Bolivarian Alternative. The three correspond to the preferred projects of the US, Brazil, and Venezuela, respectively. We suggest, albeit tentatively, that not only domestic political imperatives but also new opportunities and constraints created by the 21st century international system make Mercosur-CAN a likely choice, as well as the most viable option over the medium-run. We particularly emphasize the importance of the democratic transition throughout the continent in the 1980s to resolving collective action problems and making cooperation, even where there are conflicting interests, possible. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses Brazilian stabilization policy since 1985 to illustrate the uses of a cultural approach in understanding economic policy change. In the process, it reflects more broadly on the recent re-convergence on culture in the political science discipline, on how cultural explanations relate to other theories of social choice and change, and on what may be the most promising avenues of further research. The argument in brief is that broad cultural explanations are rarely useful, but when culture is combined with interest and institutional explanations in very focused settings, it enhances explanatory power immensely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy is supposed to give citizens oversight of the behavior and choices of their political leaders, while providing leaders with electoral incentives to respect the preferences of citizens. A shift from authoritarian to democratic rule consequently ought to alter policymaking. Using the case of Brazilian trade policy, we explore changed versus consistent patterns of post-transition interest aggregation, political participation, and economic goal-setting. Contrary to expectations of a notably enlarged role for Congress, we find that Brazil's executive still dominates trade policymaking. However, significant and increasingly transparent interest aggregation occurs within the executive. Moreover, policy capture by sectoral special interests is down, non-traditional civil society participants have gained some influence, and trade policy outcomes are arguably more public-regarding. We judge that Brazil's trade policy process has been incrementally democratized. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]