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To investigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the strategic decisionmaking of leaders with respect to biological weapons, this study employed a prospective simulation technique called Asynchronous Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming. Using an immersive, multimedia simulation conducted remotely and asynchronously, the effort engaged 240 carefully selected and curated expert participants in either biological weapons or the countries of interest (as well as 60 naïve participants). Across our sample of 30 countries, simulated interest in pursuing some type of biological weapons program (defensive or offensive) remained low to moderate. While such interest increased after the simulated onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was limited overall, with only a handful of states showing salient increases in offensive biological weapon interest. When directly referencing why their countries might have changed their post-COVID-19 interest in biological weapons, the most commonly cited reasons were: (1) COVID-19 demonstrated the power of biological weapons to disrupt societies and cause large-scale economic harm, and (2) the pandemic revealed either the state's own or its rivals' vulnerability to diseases like COVID-19, as well as an inability to efficiently respond and contain such diseases. In sum, despite a global pandemic with massive consequences, the simulation revealed that most states are not likely to dramatically change their strategic posture regarding pursuit of offensive biological weapons.

Historically, biological agents have been used to target various populations. One of the earliest examples could be the catastrophic effect of smallpox in Australia in the eighteenth century (as alleged by some historians). Modern biological techniques can be used to both create or provide protection against various agents of biological warfare. Any microorganism (viruses, bacteria, and fungi) or its toxins can be used as biological agents. Minnesota Department of Health has listed Smallpox (variola major) as a category A bioterrorism agent, even though it has been eradicated in 1980 through an extensive vaccination campaign. Category A agents are considered the highest risk to public health. Laboratory-associated outbreaks of poxviruses could cause unprecedented occupational hazards. Only two WHO-approved BSL-4 facilities in the United States and Russia are allowed to perform research on the variola virus. So, poxviruses present themselves as a classical case of a dual-use dilemma, since research with them can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes. Although the importance of ethics in scientific research requires no further elaboration, ethical norms assume greater significance during experimentation with poxviruses. In this chapter, we will update the readers on the sensitive nature of conducting research with poxviruses, and how these viruses can be a source of potential biological weapons. Finally, specified ethical guidelines are explored to ensure safe research practices in virology., (© 2024. The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.)

This paper reviews the elements and infection mechanisms of bioterrorism, assess North Korea's capability for biological warfare, and propose strategies for South Korea to counter potential bioterrorist threats from the North. The four critical elements of bioterrorism include the biological agent, the weaponization of the agent, the delivery system, and the impact of weather conditions on the attack. The infection routes for biological agents in bioterrorism include inhalation, ingestion, dermal exposure, and injection. The potential agents under development could include anthrax, smallpox, plague, and botulinum toxin, which might be deployed using missiles, artillery shells, or through covert operations. Proximity to North Korea significantly increases vulnerability to biological attacks. Possible methods include contaminating water supplies, food sources, or densely populated areas. Anthrax, smallpox, plague, and botulinum toxin could theoretically be delivered using packages attached to balloons. Minimizing the impact of a bioterrorism event requires strategy that includes four key actions: detection, decision-making, distribution, and dispensation. By integrating these steps, authorities can effectively manage and mitigate the effects of a bioterrorism event. Civilian doctors play a role in the early detection, diagnosis, treatment, and management of biological agents. Educating medical professionals is crucial for preparing against potential biological warfare or bioterrorism threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Genes are foundational to all organisms, yet their specific makeup is left to chance. Genome editing technologies, such as CRISPR, allow scientists to manipulate the gene and rid it of disease-causing mutations. Recent advancements have rendered current authority inefficacious in ensuring biosecurity. Nations could create "designer diseases" to infect others while protecting their own. The use and access to genome editing technologies must be controlled to restrict their use as biological weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trauma and toxic substances are connected in several aspects. On the one hand, toxic substances can be the reason for traumatic injuries in the context of accidental or violent and criminal circumstances. Examples for the first scenario is the release of toxic gases, chemicals, and particles during house fires, and for the second scenario, the use of chemical or biological weapons in the context of terroristic activities. Toxic substances can cause or enhance severe, life-threatening trauma, as described in this review for various chemical warfare, by inducing a tissue trauma accompanied by break down of important barriers in the body, such as the blood-air or the blood-gut barriers. This in turn initiates a "vicious circle" as the contribution of inflammatory responses to the traumatic damage enhances the macro- and micro-barrier breakdown and often results in fatal outcome. The development of sophisticated methods for detection and identification of toxic substances as well as the special treatment of the intoxicated trauma patient is summarized in this review. Moreover, some highly toxic substances, such as the protein toxins from the pathogenic bacterium Clostridioides (C.) difficile, cause severe post-traumatic complications which significantly worsens the outcome of hospitalized patients, in particular in multiply injured trauma patients. Therefore, novel pharmacological options for the treatment of such patients are necessarily needed and one promising strategy might be the neutralization of the toxins that cause the disease. This review summarizes recent findings on the molecular and cellular mechanisms of toxic chemicals and bacterial toxins that contribute to barrier breakdown in the human body as wells pharmacological options for treatment, in particular in the context of intoxicated trauma patients. "trauma-toxicology" comprises concepts regrading basic research, development of novel pharmacological/therapeutic options and clinical aspects in the complex interplay and "vicious circle" of severe tissue trauma, barrier breakdown, pathogen and toxin exposure, tissue damage, and subsequent clinical complications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States is actively reshaping parts of its national security enterprise. This article explores the underlying politics, with a specific interest in the context of biosecurity, biodefense, and bioterrorism strategy, programs, and response, as the United States responds to the most significant outbreak of an emerging infectious disease in over a century. How the implicit or tacit failure to recognize the political will and political decision-making connected to warfare and conflict for biological weapons programs in these trends is explored. Securitization of public health has been a focus of the literature over the past half century. This recent trend may represent something of an inverse: an attempt to treat national security interests as public health problems. A hypothesis is that the most significant underrecognized problem associated with COVID-19 is disinformation and the weakening of confidence in institutions, including governments, and how adversaries may exploit that blind spot. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Volume XV of the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law has been published, featuring articles written by student staff editors from the Texas Tech University School of Law. The articles cover a range of topics related to biosecurity, biosafety, and biodefense law. They explore the potential benefits and risks of emerging technologies such as bionanotechnology, genome editing, behavior-modifying chemicals, biohacking, and artificial intelligence. The articles emphasize the need for comprehensive regulations to ensure the ethical and safe use of these technologies, as well as the protection of vulnerable communities. The journal expresses gratitude to Dr. Victoria Sutton, the founder and Faculty Advisor, for her invaluable contributions and mentorship. [Extracted from the article]

After the 2003 Iraq War, the Iraq Survey Group confirmed that Iraq had no remaining weapons of mass destruction and validated UNSCOM's findings, but as Duelfer puts it, at the time, "UNSCOM did not know how good it was." The weapons that were in existence were to be destroyed, either under UNSCOM supervision or by UNSCOM itself, and then UNSCOM would undertake on-site inspections to verify the declarations and destruction activities. There are also suggestions, by Stephen Black ([1]), for instance, that UNSCOM triggered renewed global efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, as it demonstrated that even in the most antagonistic circumstances, international inspections can reveal an illicit biological weapons program. Many people will remember Colin Powell's historic speech to the UN Security Council describing Iraq's mobile production facilities for making biological weapons. [Extracted from the article]

While the secretary-general of the United Nations has questioned whether the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed a gap in global defenses against bioterrorism that a nefarious group may seek to exploit, the reality is that the pandemic has only underscored the folly of biological warfare, a strategy which relies on weapons – viruses, bacteria, and other pathogens – that would indiscriminately wreak havoc on the attacked and the attacker alike. Indeed, most countries in the world are part of the Biological Weapons Convention, the international treaty that – while lacking an enforcement mechanism – has successfully bolstered the near universal norms against the use of biological weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the use of nonhuman animals for biological weapons testing by military scientists at Porton Down Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, 1948-1955. After the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, the British state and its allies invested in new military technologies which could ensure their superiority in times of conflict. My analysis reveals the partial workings of the Porton Down Laboratory through its historical use of nonhuman animals. I demonstrate that nonhuman animals were simultaneously effaced and made visible during biological warfare experiments. This effacement and visibility was dependent on anthropocentric notions of animal subjection whereby their use in experiments made them "seen" as resources for use, yet paradoxically elicited their nonexistence as subjects. I extend the notion of "strategic ignorance" to develop a novel concept of "strategic effacement" to demonstrate this contradictory relationship which both impacted scientific "objectivity" and contributed to the continued exploitation of animals in the laboratory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research in public health and medical sciences has always placed a high priority in managing disease outbreaks, effective treatment capacities, and overall human health and wellbeing. Despite the fact that advances in biology, biotechnology, and medical research have proven to have sufficient value in terms of lifesaving treatments, these have also presented major challenges in their effective utilization. Hence, potentially posing serious risks in the form of bioweapons, thereby, endangering governance frameworks that prioritize biosecurity and counter-biological warfare. In this review paper, a thorough literature review has been conducted to explore the critical aspects between advances in biology and their potential misuse, which could result in serious risks to public health and security. The history of biowarfare has been studied, and the results identify major criteria that have been used in deeming a biological agent fit for the use in mass destruction programs. Five historical biological warfare agents (Bacillus anthracis, smallpox, Yersinia pestis, Vibrio cholerae, and Francisella tularensis) have been studied critically to conclude that not all biological agents may act as bioweapons, but only those agents meeting these criteria may cause catastrophic damage. This paper examines key risks associated with bioweaponry posed by the convergence of biotechnology and artificial intelligence as evident in today's world of innovation. Based on the situational analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic, the author also discusses some of the major shortcomings of the international framework and the healthcare system in handling future biological attacks having the potential of mass destruction. Through this paper, associations between different stakeholders, scientific communities, and research groups are highly recommended along with identifying the problem at its roots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Biological threats need to be conceptualized in a new framework and through new governance practices designed to address the challenges posed by the ever-changing boundaries of global health. This turn has turned potential biological threats into the main factors that require rigorous planning of institutional and individual preparedness for an effective approach to pandemic emergencies. Biological threats, as events that transcend the molecular boundaries of viruses, are turning hybrid social networks into the main focus of a global response to infectious diseases. In this article, I will present and analyze some important issues related to the threats posed by biological weapons and bioterrorism, the use of biotechnology to improve biological warfare agents and I will summarize the measures and constraints on countering bioterrorism and the response to biological weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When it comes to preparedness and response capabilities in the face of a large-scale biological incident, whether natural or human-made, American planning remains a work in progress. Recent legislation has called for a comprehensive biodefense strategy. If carried out in a thorough and systematic way, and properly funded, this will be a great improvement for the country and the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: Bioweapons; Dual use; Synthetic biology; Next-generation sequencing; Pandemic response; Information war EN Bioweapons Dual use Synthetic biology Next-generation sequencing Pandemic response Information war 182 186 5 04/27/22 20220301 NES 220301 The character of biological warfare is currently undergoing a substantial change. Bioweapons, Dual use, Synthetic biology, Next-generation sequencing, Pandemic response, Information war Other ways to limit an outbreak could be by engineering the DNA of a pathogen in ways that would restrict its replication to only a certain number of cycles or to certain environmental conditions.[17] As an additional safety mechanism, an attacker may prepare for large-scale vaccine production against the applied pathogen. The use of classic bioweapon pathogens has rested on the condition that they must be treatable or preventable for the troops of the attacker.[1],[2] Keeping outbreaks small and targeted may circumvent this issue. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the need to establish a new protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as of January 2022 to address the challenges posed by biological outbreaks and attacks. Under the proposed protocol, states parties should declare their most dangerous biological agents and should allow inspection of their high-containment laboratories. Other topics include the history of biological warfare in the first half of the 21st century.

Established by the United States in the early 1990s, cooperative threat reduction (CTR) played a leading role in, among other feats, dismantling the Soviet Union’s appallingly unparalleled biowarfare program. The lessons learned from that experience underscore an imperative to continue biosecurity efforts elsewhere around the world, from the Middle East and Africa to Southeast Asia. At a time when biological dangers pose a graver threat than even nuclear weapons, CTR deserves credit for its accomplishments, stalwart policy support, and all the funding it can get. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the prospect and potential of genetic warfare. Drawing on expert interviews and fieldwork, it begins by detailing how the recent and anticipated innovations in synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology solve the weaponization, delivery, and precision problems that had previously made biological weapons impractical. The article then considers how states and non-state actors may develop and use genetic weapons, with a focus on the problem of secrecy. Underlying whether to reveal or conceal genetic war capability is a trade-off between strategic surprise and deterrence. Actors requiring deterrence are likely to reveal genetic military capability. With the only rivaling source of deterrence being nuclear weapons, nonnuclear states and non-state actors are more likely to make public their genetic weapons capability than nuclear states. The question of whether to use genetic weapons covertly or openly also entails a trade-off. Covert use confers strategic and tactical benefits, whereas the benefits of unrestricted use are primarily psychological. Terroristic, genocidal, and apocalyptic regimes and non-state actors may use genetic weapons openly, but most would likely opt for covert genetic warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers strategic observations about the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It assesses whether the disease outbreak represents an intelligence failure. It describes how the global response to COVID-19 is an example of the so-called "spiral model" in action, whereby policy deliberations are overtaken by events. The analysis also assess how recent experience casts new light on assumptions common to the literature on biological weapons. It addresses the possibility that COVID-19 could spark a rise in cosmopolitan attitudes globally and offers reservations about using the COVID-19 experience as a future template for global pandemic response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cascade of innovations in biotechnology opens new pathways for biological warfare. The international laboratory network being developed under the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism could provide vital evidence in case of an alleged biological attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biological warfare agents include microorganisms or biological toxins that are used to produce death or disease in humans, animals and plants. Biological warfare has been waged intermittently for nearly 2,500 years and the deliberate use of microorganisms and toxins as weapons has been attempted throughout the history. Biological warfare has evolved from the crude use of cadavers to contaminate water supplies to the development of specialized munitions for battlefield and covert use. Desirable biological weapons are characterized by low visibility, high potency, and relatively easy delivery. The employment of biowarfare is not limited to war alone, but can occur at any time, at any place and by anyone. They can be employed as weapons of mass destruction. During the past century, the progress made in biotechnology and biochemistry has simplified the development and production of such weapons. The choice of the biowarfare agent depends on the economic, technical, and financial capabilities of the state or organization. The threat of bioterrorism is real and significant. The aim of the present study is to assess the awareness level on Biowarfare among the general public.A questionnaire based survey was conducted among 100 individuals through an online setting. Results were analysed statistically through SPSS software. In this study, we come to know that 75% of them are aware of biowarfare and the remaining 25% are not aware. Biowarfare preparedness is the need of the day. So the education on biowarfare is much required to the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While biological warfare has classically been considered a threat requiring the presence of a distinct biological agent, we argue that in light of the rise of state-sponsored online disinformation campaigns we are approaching a fifth phase of biowarfare with a "cyber-bio" framing. By examining the rise of measles cases following disinformation campaigns connected to the US 2016 presidential elections, the rise of disinformation in the current novel coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, and the impact of misinformation on public health interventions during the 2014-2016 West Africa and 2019-2020 Democratic Republic of the Congo Ebola outbreaks, we ask whether the potential impact of these campaigns—which includes the undermining of sociopolitical systems, the delegitimization of public health and scientific bodies, and the diversion of the public health response—can be characterized as analogous to the impacts of more traditional conceptions of biowarfare. In this paper, we look at these different impacts and the norms related to the use of biological weapons and cyber campaigns. By doing so, we anticipate the advent of a combined cyber and biological warfare. The latter is not dependent on the existence of a manufactured biological weapon; it manages to undermine sociopolitical systems and public health through the weaponization of naturally occurring outbreaks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ray also had an adventurous spirit - whether as an UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspector or visiting former Soviet bioweapons facilities and interviewing former bioweaponeers, Ray always liked being in the middle of the action on bioweapons policy issues. I followed all of Ray's work, particularly his writings on the Soviet biological weapons (BW) program, including the hefty tome I The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History i , co-authored with Milton Leitenberg and Jens Kuhn. I first met Ray Zilinskas in 1998, when I was fresh out of graduate school, a young and impressionable postdoc in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, as it was then known. [Extracted from the article]

This article summarizes published and archival information about Imperial Germany's attempts to infect draft animals in some Allied and neutral countries with anthrax and glanders during World War I. It casts doubt on claims that the Isle of Man was among the places affected. It considers the extent to which contemporary terrorist activity more closely resembles German biological sabotage plots than it does most modern state weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During World War II, the Polish resistance movement used chemical and biological weapons (CBW) against the Third Reich. The use of CBW against the Third Reich most likely originated in a secret Polish biological-weapons program, which existed in the 1930s and went underground after the September 1939 German invasion. Between 1940 and 1942, a unit of the Polish resistance movement named WKZO (Wielkopolskie Kierownictwo Związku Odwetu—the Greater Poland Leadership of the Union of Retaliation) conducted CBW sabotage in the German-annexed area Reichsgau Wartheland and its main city Posen (today's Poznań). By investigating the use of CBW by the WKZO until its destruction in 1942, it is possible to demonstrate how these weapons were made and used. The article also describes the German reaction, including what defensive measures the German high command took to meet the threat of CBW. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding states' perception of biological-weapons (BW) utility is key to understanding the motivations behind states' development, possession, and use of these weapons. The calculations underlying a determination of utility are complex, having to balance threat perceptions, national scientific and industrial capacities, diplomatic relations, and the importance of prohibitory norms. Case studies of the former US and British offensive BW programs, beginning in World War II, illustrate how perceptions of BW utility evolve under wartime circumstances. The US case also illustrates how perceptions of BW utility heightened during periods of international tension, namely the Korean War and early in the John F. Kennedy administration. Both the US and UK examples also demonstrate how possession of nuclear weapons affected perceptions of BW utility and the role of BW in military doctrine. Given the prohibitions on BW development and possession, BW utility today is limited to small-scale, covert operations, including assassinations, much like the recent assassinations and attempted assassinations conducted by North Korea and Russia. Unlike chemical weapons, BW have the additional characteristics of delaying the onset of effects, mimicking natural diseases, and foiling attribution efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1940 and the late 1950s, the United Kingdom had a limited biological program to provide a retaliatory capability should UK forces be attacked using biological warfare (BW). Aspects of BW defense have been investigated from 1940 up to the present day. Techniques, processes, and equipment used within biological research programs are recognized to have dual-use applications; aerobiology is one such dual-use area. Research during these offensive and defensive eras of the UK BW research program has contributed to aerobiological science, leading to a number of positive changes in some areas, including laboratory safety; understanding of infection by the aerosol route; and survival, detection, and identification of airborne pathogens. This article will discuss the historical contributions made to aerobiology science, the global contemporary legislation that governs dual-use research, and a modern case study based upon this type of investigation. The article will contribute to our understanding of the dual-use aspects of a BW program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biological warfare or biowarfare is the use of biological toxins or infectious agents such as bacteria, viruses, and fungi with the intent to kill or incapacitate humans as an act of war. It is a criminal act against unsuspecting civilians using pathogenic biological agents. Bioterror and Biological Warfare agents are most often colorless, by-and-large odorless microorganisms (bacteria, viruses, fungi) or toxins (usually protein toxins) derived from microorganisms that can be spread in air as aerosols or in food or drink to infect as many people as possible. They are easily concealed, and thus difficult to detect before an attack. Their main advantages to terrorists are allowing easy escape and causing panic and chaos within a civilian population. Their aim is to overwhelm emergency medical departments at local hospitals and clinics. However, there are ways to help protect yourself against bioterror agents and by extrapolating biological warfare agents and to help identify an attack when it occurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the first half of the twentieth century, the humankind experienced two devastating global conflagrations that caused millions of victims. The killer vectors were the destructive effects of firearms and, to a lesser extent, death was brought by terrifying actions utilising combat gases and biological agents. During the Cold War, the great military powers of the world continued their efforts to produce, develop, and store biological means meant to secure their victory in future wars. As a result, the spectrum of biological threats had to be reduced, and relaxation measures were taken. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Biological Weapons and Toxins and on their Destruction, a document signed in 1972, has the undeniable merit in this respect. However, it must be acknowledged that this Convention was not the first step taken. Previously, in 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was signed. Although the effectiveness of this Protocol was low, the importance of such initial agreement is huge, as it opened the road to biological disarmament, and to increasing trust among nations. Arguably, following the severe Covid 19 pandemic, the 1972 Convention needs measures, policies, and actions to substantiate the desire of powerful states to gradually and totally eliminate biological arsenals worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biological warfare is not an invention of the modern age. It has been practised since ancient times, when the Hittites sent plague-sick people to Egyptian camps to decimate their enemies before the battle. The difference between the epochs is made only by current technology, capable of multiplying, selecting, diversifying and hybridising the vectors of biological warfare. Thus, at present, a bacterium, grown in a laboratory-transformed pantry, can be more lethal than any chemical weapon. Considering that, in the modern age of public access to information, the line between spontaneous, natural pandemic and biological attack followed by the outbreak of a pandemic is narrowing, the vectors of a natural pandemic can always become, in the eyes of the public, vectors of a biological attack. Conversely, until the discovery of the "zero patient" - in which natural genomic mutations occurred - any biological weapon can be considered a "natural mutation" responsible for triggering a pandemic with devastating effects. Therefore, what are the characteristics of a biological weapon? What are the main categories of biological weapons? What are the main pandemic vectors? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the theoretical and practical assumptions, based on available facts and research related to COVID-19, in order to discern the origin of the coronavirus and its consequences on national and international security. The main finding is that the world is faced with an extremely dangerous biowarfare weapon, i.e. that the virus has been engineered in lab conditions. The acknowledgement of this fact may be of utmost importance for seeking solutions and adequate responses. The analysis shows that great world powers invest enormous amounts of money into further developments of biological weapons, and the academia plays significant role in the endeavor. In addition to human costs, what is at stake here are human rights, democracy and the security of mankind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We live in a time characterized by a dynamic arms race and other types of military activities. The bulk of the mass-produced weapons are of a technological nature. Biological assets are among the most dangerous for mass destruction man has ever produced. Biological weapons are a part of the human need for power and strong power. It is endangering the 20th and 21st centuries. Biological weapons are made up of viruses, bacteria, microorganisms, fungi, prostheses, and people are the victims. Quite innocent... Little is known in the public about him and his protection. Biological weapons affect humans, animals and plants. In this paper we want to clarify what biological weapons are and what are the measures to protect them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons could provoke dangerous reactions, including the country’s pursuit of other unconventional weapons systems. Owing to its highly developed pharmaceutical and biotech sectors, Iran has the technical capabilities for one such system—biological weaponry—within its grasp. It is unclear whether Tehran has already begun a biological weapons program, but the Iranian threat is grave enough to warrant serious consideration of a rigorous biological nonproliferation strategy that could be implemented in parallel with nuclear nonproliferation efforts. That strategy should be tailored specifically to Iran and focused on three sets of factors: those that facilitate proliferation, those that motivate proliferation, and those that shape the parameters according to which proliferation occurs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article addresses the need to keep biodefense in perspective. The opportunities available to a terrorist who wished to cause social and economic disruption by making people ill would, in fact, be rather wide-ranging. Despite the billions of dollars that the U.S. is spending on biodefense, well-informed critics feel that little real progress has been made. Vaccines and antidotes remain in short supply, local officials have not developed plans to distribute medical supplies in a timely manner to citizens, and hospitals do not have the capacity to handle a sudden surge in patients. While it is improbable that terrorists today could manipulate an agent for malign purposes it can not be ruled out in the decades ahead, in light of the accelerating development of biotechnology worldwide.

Weapons of mass destruction- chemical, nuclear and biological- is a horrifying term .We all know about the horrors of nuclear attack at Nagasaki and Hiroshima and khurdish and Iranian casualties of Iraqi chemical attacks. The third weapon of mass destruction-biological weapon-is being used since Middle Ages when soldiers used dead smallpox victims to infect their enemies or demoralize them.The attraction of biological weapon in biowarfare and bioterrorism is because of easy access to a wide range of pathogenic biological agents, their low production cost, difficult detection by routine security system and easy transportation from one place to another.In 1972,the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was signed bymore than 140 countries which called for termination of all offensive biological weapons research and development and destruction of existing biological weapons stocks. The information provided in this paper can be used to improve detection assays and assist other agencies in the development of effective preventive and therapeutic measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Use of biological warfare agents is an emerging threat to mankind. In 21st century awareness and threat regarding these biological warfare agents is increasing.These agents are used in war or for terrorist attack. Various toxins and microorganisms are used as biowarfare agents to cause harm to humans, animals and plants. They are classified under various categories. They can be used in various forms as sprays, as explosive or food or water contamination. Biowarfare agents are difficult to identify and can be easily transported and delivered which makes them more favorable tool for destruction for terrorist operations or to gain political advantage. To detect such agents, the diseases associated with them should be recognized using various techniques. Protective measures should be taken according to the symptoms of the diseases related and their contagious nature. This review on the biological warfare agents will provide information on the biowarfare agents, their mode of transmission and also the detection systems available to detect them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]