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Your search keyword '"Olsson, Erik"' showing total 24 results
Start Over Author "Olsson, Erik" Topic belief revision
24 results on '"Olsson, Erik"'

1. Hilpinen’s Theory of Inquiry

Author

Olsson, Erik J., Bueno, Otávio, Editor-in-Chief, Brogaard, Berit, Editorial Board Member, Chakravartty, Anjan, Editorial Board Member, French, Steven, Editorial Board Member, Dutilh Novaes, Catarina, Editorial Board Member, Rowbottom, Darrell P., Editorial Board Member, Ruttkamp, Emma, Editorial Board Member, Miller, Kristie, Editorial Board Member, McNamara, Paul, editor, Jones, Andrew J. I., editor, and Brown, Mark A., editor

Published
2022
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2. Individual Belief Revision Dynamics in a Group Context

Author

Volzhanin, Igor, Hahn, Ulrike, Jonsson, Martin L, and Olsson, Erik J

Subjects
belief revision, social networks, feedback, judgment, advice, social epistemology
Abstract

Our beliefs about the world are generally not formed in isolation:the inherently social nature of human beings means thatmuch of what we believe to know is based, at least in part, oninformation gained from others. Consequently, human knowledgeand its acquisition cannot be fully understood by consideringindividuals alone. In this paper, we examine the beliefdynamics in a group of networked participants engaged in asimple, factual estimation task. Specifically, we examine theextent to which participants revise their own judgments in lightof others’ responses, and compare formal models of that process.

Published
2015

24. Functional vs. Relational Approaches to Belief Revision

Author

Erik J Olsson, Olsson, Erik J, and Enqvist, Sebastian

Subjects
Philosophy, State (polity), media_common.quotation_subject, Belief state, Sign (semiotics), Cognition, Representation (arts), Belief revision, False dilemma, Psychology, Agreement, Epistemology, media_common
Abstract

In belief revision theory there is an on-going debate between functionalists and relationalists that shows little sign of ending in shared agreement. Roughly, functionalists hold that the result of revising a cognitive state with some new datum is a unique rationally determined belief state. Relationalists disagree. In their view, there may be several rationally admissible results of revising a cognitive state with a given datum. In an attempt to contribute to conceptual clarity three ways of drawing the functionalist-relationalist distinction are identified, giving rise to six non-contradictory overall positions. I proceed to consider arguments in the literature for excluding some of these positions on logical, philosophical or other grounds. Finally, I argue that part of what feeds the functionalist-relationalist controversy is a false dilemma based on an implausible conception of what it means rationally to suspend judgment. Making this precise requires a formal framework that includes a representation of the agent’s research agenda.

Published
2011

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